The former director of the Chilean Investigative Police (PDI), Nelson Mery, spoke with Crónica Digital about the events at the Linares Artillery School, the structures of the security agencies of the Pinochet dictatorship, and their continuity in democracy.

Sitting at his desk as director of the School of Criminalistics at […] The former director of the Chilean Investigative Police, Nelson Mery, spoke with Crónica Digital about the events at the Linares Artillery School, the structures of the security agencies of the Pinochet dictatorship, and their continuity in democracy.

Sitting at his desk as director of the School of Criminalistics at the Universidad La República, we found the former Director General of the Investigative Police, Nelson Mery Figueroa. Impeccably dressed and sparing with his words.

His office is simple, unadorned, and he is always accompanied by his inseparable reddish briefcase, reminiscent of those American films where a Secret Service agent used a similar one, handcuffed to his wrist, always accompanying the President.

The leader's secrets are kept safe. Mery is a controversial figure. His image itself generates counterpoints. To many, he is a man feared because he knows too much. To others, he is misunderstood for the work he had to carry out over the last 36 years, where public silence was his best ally, while he never stopped speaking in court when it came to recounting what he saw and learned at the Linares Artillery School, where he was appointed as a liaison in 1973.

The dialogue with Nelson Mery was extensive. We attempted to create a narrative, testimonial, and revealing chronicle. Unpublished documents and background information speak to what was carried out by Department V of the Investigative Police.

The results of the Odette Alegría case, where his innocence was judicially proven, although he had to pay the cost of leaving his institution. Perhaps most revealing is discovering that the repressive agencies that acted with total impunity during the dictatorship continue to operate in democracy.

In this first part, we will address the subject of the Artillery School and his role as a police liaison. What he did and did not do. Mery claims that his silence served to save lives during the harshest moments of the repression.

LINARES: ROAD TO THE COUP

At the beginning of the 70s, Linares did not differ much from what was happening in the rest of the country. Some political events marked the polarization of the Province and placed it in the center of the news during the thousand days that the government of President Salvador Allende and the political project of the Unidad Popular lasted.

The growing and massive land seizures in the Province provoked the beginning of resistance from the landowners, with an emblematic event: the murder of the Zonal Chief of the CORA, Hernán Mery Fuenzalida.

On April 30, 1970, he went to the La Piedad estate to carry out the expropriation of 300 hectares of the property, accompanied by notary public Jaime Morandé and a force of 200 Carabineros under the command of General Rolando Santos Wittke.

In response, the landowners and some workers in their service opposed the measure, causing a serious confrontation. The result: Mery was struck down by a blow to the head with a club. The owner of the property, Gabriel Benavente, and 57 other subjects were arrested for these events.

In the following years, land seizures became massive to the point that positions were further radicalized between those in favor of and against the agrarian reform process initiated by Eduardo Frei Montalva and deepened by Salvador Allende.

For example, on October 20, 1971, 45 estates were simultaneously seized by peasants in Linares, and a provincial strike was declared. The action demanded that the Government reinstate the Zonal Director of CORA, Gabriel Coll Prado, who had been dismissed from his post after being caught by Carabineros with weapons in his vehicle.

Another event that placed Linares and the entire Province in the political center was the decision of a Partido Nacional deputy to resign from his post and leave the country solely because of Allende's victory.

This led to supplementary elections where María Elena Mery, a Christian of the left, and Sergio Diez, from the right, would compete. The same man who, years later, representing the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship at the United Nations, would deny the existence of forcibly disappeared persons in Chile.

The supplementary election caused political organizations to concentrate in the area to campaign. The electoral struggle was marked by armed clashes between the paramilitary groups Patria y Libertad and Comando Rolando Matus and left-wing supporters belonging to the Brigadas Elmo Catalán (PS) and Ramona Parra (PC).

On January 4, 1972, squads of Patria y Libertad commanded by the president of the PN, Fernando Romero, attacked left-wing militants who were distributing propaganda for the left-wing candidate, seriously wounding the vice president of the UP of San Javier, Celso Valenzuela Mellado.

Two days later, CORA official Teresa Célice was assaulted by supporters of Sergio Diez at the La Obra estate, who, upon being denied access to the union hall, unleashed their anger against the woman. The action of the right-wing group did not escalate further thanks to the defense of the peasants themselves, who repelled the attack.

Two weeks later, armed commandos of Patria y Libertad kidnapped and beat a group of high school students who were performing volunteer work at the Las Peñas estate. Political and social demonstrations multiplied throughout the region, and the 1973 parliamentary elections were marked by violence.

The media widely disseminated the problems, increasing social conflict. September 11, 1973, caught Linares divided. With the military coup, its inhabitants began to write another chapter of their history.

One marked by torture, illegal detentions, and the forced disappearance of persons, where jailers and genocidaires began to have a face, a name, and a surname. A collection of events that today is about to be clarified in the Courts of Justice.

History always has witnesses. Characters who must fulfill roles and become fundamental pieces of the events. One of them is the former Director General of the Chilean Investigative Police, Nelson Mery Figueroa, who, before and after the Military Coup, had to witness the atrocities of the military authorities who, with an iron fist, led the destinies of hundreds of Chileans detained at the Army's Artillery School in the city of Linares.

– What was your age and rank at the time of the coup? – At the time of the coup, I was a first-class detective. I was 31 years old, and until September 11, I worked in the Information Office of the Investigative Police, better known as the "political police." – What was your function in the so-called Political Police? – The job of an information officer was to gather what was happening from open sources.

To inform superiors of the public activities of political parties, both left and right. For example, when I had to participate in demonstrations, the organizers knew me and even gave me the nickname "Pepito." One was so involved in this that the political parties knew the function we had to fulfill, and we already knew the emphasis of each speech, the key ideas they would propose, etc.

So, we reported everything that was happening in terms of public meetings, rallies, the state of strikes, walkouts, and land seizures. – Is it true that the political parties of Linares knew you as a member of the Political Police? – In Linares, I never hid that I worked in Information because I considered that my function was within the Rule of Law.

I arrived at that unit during the Government of Eduardo Frei Montalva, although I worked in the operational area very occasionally. What was done was to inform the superiors, and it was they who determined the use of that information.

There was nothing one could question. – How well did you know the leaders of the UP parties and the right? – Apart from knowing them in their positions and leadership roles, it also happened, as in a small town, that there were ties of friendship and more human and social conversations. – Was your family a supporter of the Allende government? – My paternal family was pro-Allende.

My mother was too. We were five siblings, and with the exception of one, we were all supporters of the Unidad Popular, although not militants. At least among those of us who were in the city, there was no doubt.

The only one who had militancy was my brother-in-law, Hernán Gómez Torres, who was a militant of the MAPU and head of the Plant Department of the Linares Telephone Company. – What happened to your brother-in-law? – On October 24, 1974, he was arrested by the DINA in Linares.

They transferred him to a secret detention center in Santiago and released him on November 8 of the same year in the vicinity of the Penitentiary, from a moving vehicle. As a family, we had to go to the detention centers; my sister filed a recurso de amparo (habeas corpus) in the courts, and the complaint was processed before the Comité Pro Paz.

After being released, my brother-in-law returned to Linares and told me that they had arrested him because they suspected he was one of the people who facilitated communications for the "Escucha Chile" program broadcast by Radio Moscow.

Years later, and as a result of all this, my brother-in-law committed suicide. He never overcame what he lived through; he was buried in a trench, blindfolded. But he always had a kind of reluctance to tell what he really lived through.

THE NEW SCENARIO

Once the military coup occurred, the citizens of the Province of Linares were informed that new authorities had been defined. The newspaper El Heraldo (attachment 1), on Wednesday, September 12, 1973, indicated that Colonel Gabriel del Río Espinoza was assuming the position of Intendant and Chief of the Plaza Zone of the Province of Linares, and Captain Humberto Julio Reyes as second in command (adjutant).

In the decree, Colonel Del Río emphasized that, in accordance with Supreme Decree No. 223, "I assume command of all Military Forces, Carabineros, Investigations, and Administrative Authorities of the Province." The same document also established the appointments of the Governors of the Departments of Parral and Loncomilla to other officers, among them, Captain Claudio Lecaros Carrasco, who months later would assume the position of head of Department II of Military Intelligence at the Linares Artillery School.

– Why were you appointed as a liaison between Investigations and the Artillery School? – My boss, Commissioner Ricardo Hernández, simply assigned me to that function. I immediately asked him the reason, since I was the least indicated person.

All of Linares knew that I had voted for Allende, as we were participating within a democratic game where political sympathy was not hidden. That is why I expressed this conflict to my superior, since military intelligence could be aware of this information.

The Investigations regulations allowed me to represent this situation. He reiterated the order. I had the obligation to comply with it. Over the years, I think my leadership made that decision because of the role I played in the Information Office. – In other words, it was a decision of the institution's command. – It was their decision; I did not ask to be commissioned for that function. 15 days after being in the position, I began to try to return to my unit, and they would not allow it, because the first military decree established that the Armed Forces, Carabineros, and Investigations would depend directly on the Chief of the Plaza. So the orders were no longer given by the commissioner but by the military authority, Colonel Gabriel del Río, who only released me from the liaison function on December 28, 1973, returning me to my unit. Another thing that endorsed the Chief of the Plaza's decision was the instructions from General Ernesto Baeza, where he instructed that civil police officers should return to their units. – What was the role of the intelligence agencies, and what were the methods they used to arrest people? – The first thing is the Decrees and public calls to report to the Artillery School. They were directed at the leaders of the Unidad Popular parties, political, trade union, and peasant leaders, as well as people from the MIR. The Decrees were published by local newspapers. When the detainees began to arrive at the Artillery School, the question was: what to ask, about what? That is when Military Intelligence released a base questionnaire on three or four points that could not fail to be asked: the role of the detainee in the famous "Plan Zeta"; the weapons, which were an important thing; and asking about their political history. – In that context, what was your specific role? – In my particular case, the first thing I did was present myself to Colonel Gabriel del Río, and he referred me to Department II of Military Intelligence, so I had to present myself to Major Jorge Zincke Quiroz. As so many detainees began to arrive, Intelligence gave me the order to review the background that each of them had in the Information Office of the Investigative Police of Linares and Santiago. Given that the number of detainees was increasing, they assigned me the function of taking statements. I worked alone because I was in charge of reviewing the political background that the detainees had in Investigations, because to be able to interview a person, I had to know what to ask and who they were. I have always said that I interviewed, and always with the doors open, which the military guarded. – You have said that you never saw torture at the Artillery School, but that does not mean you did not know that torments were applied to detainees in that facility… – The people I had to interview made reference to having been tortured, and I have declared this judicially. I also declared it in Congress following the investigation to which I was subjected. In those years, I reported this situation of duress to the head of Military Intelligence, Major Jorge Zincke Quiroz, and in the proceedings, I have reiterated to his face the existence of these complaints. At this point, they deny everything, but I reported what was happening at the time. They told me: "don't you get involved there." – Was Zincke always in command of Military Intelligence? – Between October and mid-November, a relief occurred. Zincke left the position and was replaced by Captain Claudio Lecaros Carrasco, who, upon ceasing to be governor of San Javier, returned to the School to take charge of Department II. A few days later, two Investigative Police officers from San Javier appeared, attached to Military Intelligence, Carlos Neves and Nelson Volta Rozas. He brought them.

CIENFUEGOS 132

One of the best-known episodes of human rights violations at the Linares Artillery School relates to the detention and subsequent disappearance of the music student from the University of Chile, María Isabel Beltrán Sánchez, on December 18, 1973.

Nelson Mery Figueroa has always acknowledged his participation in the young woman's detention, along with Patricia Contreras Farías. Over the years, it has also been possible to determine the participation in these events of other MIR militants, Norma Montesinos Parra and Osvaldo Salazar.

In judicial statements, former political prisoner Belarmino Sepúlveda has stated that Norma Montesinos Parra participated in the detention of both women. The woman was arrested on December 11, 1973, in Linares and transferred to Santiago.

Montesinos has acknowledged that on the way to the Military School, she had passed through several addresses in the capital, including Cienfuegos 132. If her version of the events is correct, she had been at the location before the military operation where they finally arrested Patricia Contreras and María Isabel Beltrán (attachment 2).

In this regard, there is a coincidence in Montesinos' statements. In 2002, Patricia Contreras stated in a sworn declaration (attachment 3) that when she was detained at the Artillery School and was being interrogated by Nelson Mery, Norma Montesinos entered the room: "Moments later they brought in Norma Montesinos, who remained behind my back, so I could not see her, but I recognized her voice.

Mery asked her if I was the person she had seen entering María Isabel's house, to which she answered affirmatively." For the events that took place at the Artillery School, the following were prosecuted in due course: the former Vice Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General Jorge Zincke Quiroz, who was the Head of Military Intelligence in Linares (1973); former General Carlos Morales Retamal, in his capacity as Director of the Artillery School in 1974; former General Humberto Julio Reyes, adjutant of the Artillery School; former Colonel Félix Cabezas Salazar, deputy director of the Artillery School; former Colonel Claudio Lecaros Carrasco, head of Military Intelligence of the Artillery School; former Colonel Juan Morales Salgado, governor of Constitución; former Sub-officer Major Antonio Aguilar Barrientos, then of the SIM; and former Investigations commissioner Héctor Torres Guajardo.

– Why were you appointed to travel to Santiago to arrest Patricia Contreras Farías? – I still do not know the specific reason to this day. It turns out that they called me from Military Intelligence and directly asked me if I knew Patricia Contreras.

I told them yes, but the way Intelligence asked me about her caught my attention. That is when I found out that I had to travel to Santiago to arrest her, as she was involved in an alleged burial of four weapons in the Panimávida area. – Was she a militant of any political party; did she hold any position? – I knew her.

She was a socialist militant, and I understand she did not hold any position in the organization. What I deduce is that someone told Military Intelligence that I knew her and, furthermore, that she was my friend or that I had a more intimate relationship with her. – What relationship did Patricia Contreras have with María Isabel Beltrán? – They were friends and were in the same house. – How is it explained that the operation at Cienfuegos was so disproportionate, an enormous contingent of soldiers with spotlights to arrest a simple base socialist militant? – If we make the following connection: Patricia Contreras, a socialist militant involved in the burial of four weapons, is known by Nelson Mery, it could justify me coming to Santiago. But now, how is it explained that at the moment of traveling in a military jeep from Linares, the first destination is the Military School, and that in said facility, an enormous convoy of 20 or 30 soldiers joins up to carry out a simple arrest on Cienfuegos Street, an address I did not even know? I am unaware of the military reasons that determined this action… with soldiers everywhere, at night, with enormous spotlights pointing at a third floor. Over time, I have thought that there was something bigger arranged by Army Intelligence. When did I begin to understand it? When María Isabel Beltrán appears detained, and destined for Linares. – What do you think was the cause of the detention?

about María Isabel? – Over the years, I learned of a letter (Attachment 4) sent by Colonel Carlos Morales Retamal to María Isabel’s mother, Oriana Sánchez, in which he explains the reasons for her detention.

Aside from being labeled an extremist in the document, it is noted that the young woman was in charge of infiltrating the Armed Forces. Therefore, I think that if they accused a MIR member of being in charge of infiltration within the Armed Forces, it was clear that this operation represented an important objective for military intelligence. – Who was in charge of the operation at 132 Cienfuegos Street? – No matter how much he denies it, the person responsible for the military operation at 132 Cienfuegos Street was Captain Humberto Julio Reyes.

It was the military who handled the information regarding María Isabel, because she was a military target. My mission was to arrest Patricia Contreras Farías, not this young music student. – The name Norma Montesinos appears in the judicial investigation.

What was her role in all of this? – Well, from what I have been able to read in the press and police reports, and know from conversations I have had with people from the MIR at the time, is that she was in Santiago on that date and had been transferred in a separate convoy from Linares.

Why did she come earlier? What did she do? She must answer those questions. – The proceedings state that you decided to identify yourself to María Isabel’s family. – That night of December 18, 1973, the family was asking the captors to identify themselves.

The military repeatedly refused to give their names. María Isabel’s mother asked for my name, and I agreed. I was the only one who did so, and the reason was that it was the correct way for a detective to act.

I did not have to hide my identity, especially because it was public knowledge that when searching for the forcibly disappeared, they were denied at the barracks and their relatives were in a state of uncertainty.

They did not know what was happening to their people. I wanted to leave a clue so that the family could know where to start looking. – You were always identified by María Isabel’s relatives as one of those responsible for her detention… – I have known that.

That is why I always wanted to speak with the family, and when I was Director General of the Investigations Police, I sent messages to the relatives. At first, they were reluctant. I wanted to tell them my side of the story so that the family themselves could verify my version. – When did you realize that María Isabel Beltrán was with you, headed to Linares? – After the arrest of both women took place, we moved to the Military School, where they separated us from the detainees.

I had to sleep in some sheds on a blanket, which gave me severe tonsillitis. Then, in the morning, on the way to the Artillery School, one of the vehicles broke down, so I got out to check whether or not my detainee (Patricia Contreras) was coming, since I was not certain she was traveling in the convoy.

It was at that moment that I realized that María Isabel Beltrán was coming along with Patricia Contreras. Both were accompanied by Sergeant Antonio Aguilar. – What happened in Linares? – We arrived at the Artillery School, where both were detained, and that day I went home to rest from the trip and the tonsillitis that had been caused by the frost.

As a result of this infection, I was given medical leave that lasted practically until Christmas. – When was the last time you saw María Isabel Beltrán? – On December 28, the same day I was relieved of my liaison duties and returned to the police unit.

It was the last time I saw her. María Isabel Beltrán was sitting on a wooden bench in a hallway where the offices of the Second Department of Military Intelligence of the Linares Artillery School were located.

Over time, I learned that Patricia Contreras had been taken to the Buen Pastor Detention Center. – Did you see Patricia Contreras again? – Between January and March, I don't remember the exact date, they called me from the School because Patricia Contreras’s statement had been lost and they had decided to hold a Court Martial for her.

Since I had arrested her, Military Intelligence asked me for the document, and since they didn't find it, they ordered me to take a new statement from her. I went to the School in the afternoon and took her statement.

That time, there was an opportunity to talk; she told me what happened once we returned from Santiago, how they interrogated her and María Isabel, what they did to them… She told me that when she arrived at the Artillery School, they interrogated her and subsequently sent her to Buen Pastor.

In contrast, Military Intelligence kept María Isabel at the School. Today, it is clear to me that for the military of the Second Department, María Isabel Beltrán was their fundamental objective.

QUOTAS OF HUMANITY

– Returning to your liaison work, how did you feel about what you were doing, arresting people, interrogating?… – What I tried to do during all the time I was at the Linares Artillery School was to contribute small quotas of humanity.

I could not leave there; there was an order from my superior command that forced me to be part of all that. Seeing myself involved in these situations meant an enormous emotional burden; I felt terrible.

The only way to sublimate this pressure was with those small quotas of humanity and by convincing myself that with my attitude, I could help save lives, diminish torture, and clarify things. Furthermore, there were many people who were set free based on the statements I had to take.

In this way, I compensated for that affliction I felt. – But you knew the people who were being detained. How are we to understand those quotas of humanity you speak of…? – If I had had a different disposition regarding the events that occurred in those years, if I had agreed with the military coup, I could have used the information I had on each of the political leaders of Linares.

Many would have been arrested, but reality shows that this was not the case. There are cases of important people in party organizations that I knew who were never arrested or denounced. – Who, then, provided the data to arrest people? – The thing is that Chileans have a fragile memory.

One must remember that after the military coup, the very next day, anonymous letters began to arrive where neighbors themselves denounced their own neighbors, their own friends. Military Intelligence became obsessed with those sources of information; amateur informants multiplied, and with them, the denunciations. – Did Military Intelligence ever question your work or your methods of interrogation?… – Yes.

They told me I should be more inquisitive. Major Jorge Zincke scolded me for "the quality of my reports," and I replied that that was how I performed my work and that if he was not satisfied, he could send me back to the Investigations Barracks.

The Second Department questioned the way I took the statements… they considered them too simple in light of military intelligence. People forget that in those times, a conscript soldier or a corporal had more authority than any civilian.

The power was military. – Why did you decide to remain silent for so many years? Were you afraid? – I was never afraid, but I can affirm that during the four months I was at the Linares Artillery School, I lost nine kilos.

To understand the situation that was being lived in Linares in those years, I can recount the case of a neighbor of my family who worked at the Agrarian Reform Corporation (CORA), was a member of the Christian Left, and was implicated in machine gun smuggling.

We always talked, and I told him to stay calm because if I knew anything, I would talk to him. He was very worried, to the point that he died of a heart attack due to the anguish that this situation caused him.

My neighbor was never arrested, but the fear was so strong that he could not manage this situation. I knew who he was, and I personally knew many others who were never arrested and who were important political leaders in Linares.

So, returning to the subject of fears and silences, people have never valued the silences I kept at that time. If it hadn't been for my silence, many friends of mine from the Internal Front of the PS of Linares, for example, would have been arrested. – Did you also remain silent before the Courts of Justice? – Never.

Public silence was not procedural silence. The first statement I made before a Court was in 1976, following the arrest of Alejandro Mella Flores, a member of the MIR. On that occasion, I judicially acknowledged that he was a prisoner at the Artillery School, a piece of information that at that date no military officer would acknowledge.

It must also be said that many used political names or aliases, and that sometimes made it difficult to know who was who. Personally, I have given judicial statements many times, including at the request of the victims' own relatives. – What did Nelson Mery do after returning to his unit in the Investigations Police? – In Linares, I returned to my duties in the immigration department.

In January, another problem arose with the military, as the border crossings in the area were opened because many people were traveling to Argentina. Due to my police function, I began to issue safe-conducts, and suddenly an internal order arrived indicating that from that moment on, safe-conducts had to be authorized by the Second Department of Military Intelligence of the Artillery School.

At first, I would group the safe-conducts, go to the School, go straight to the SIM, and wait for them to be stamped with a red seal, but later I began to leave them at the guard post, and right there they would leave me a folder with the authorized ones. – Why did the change in procedure occur? – Over the years, I have learned that Military Intelligence did not like me issuing passport applications and safe-conducts, since in their view, some people were taking advantage of this situation to flee the area.

Now, there is also another fact that has its reciprocity with the decision adopted in Linares: throughout Chile and its border crossings, passports and safe-conducts were reviewed by the SIM. It was their way of controlling. – During the dictatorship, did you have to get involved in intelligence work or organizations that fulfilled those functions in the Investigations Police? – Since I left the Artillery School, my work was carried out in the immigration section.

That function did not mean anything operational to me. It was a way of not seeing myself contaminated with anything. Then, in 1975, I was transferred to San Javier and subsequently to Iquique, always in secretarial duties.

In 1981, I returned to Santiago to the International Police, and later I embarked on the education area, until my appointment as Director General. Since the events in Linares, I was never operational again. – What differentiates you from the statements made by the military in the Linares cases? – I have always said the same thing, while the military officers responsible for the events at the Artillery School have varied their statements.

I have had numerous confrontations with them; I have identified them as responsible, and what do they do?… they deny everything or do not remember their participation. In the very case of María Isabel Beltrán, for example, I have always affirmed the same thing regarding her detention, but the military always denied their participation.

Only in 2003 did the uniformed officers begin to acknowledge that they had participated. I reiterate: my silences in the press do not mean that I have remained silent in court. That is where one must speak.

CLANDESTINITY AND INFORMANTS

In 1992, Nelson Mery was appointed Director General of the Investigations Police by President Patricio Aylwin Azocar, who led the Concertación for Democracy after defeating the candidate of Pinochetism, Hernán Büchi, at the polls.

However, democracy was trapped by the enclaves of the dictatorship. The 1980 Constitution was maintained, and Augusto Pinochet entrenched himself in the Army Command until 1998, only to later self-appoint himself as a senator for life.

The dictator's decline began with his surprise arrest in London in 2000. Today, he is being prosecuted for human rights violations, and along with his family, he is being investigated for illicit enrichment, fraud against the treasury, and possible arms and drug trafficking.

During Mery's administration, the Internal Affairs Department, known as "Department V," an area specialized in human rights matters, was restructured. Between 1992 and 2003, the "Fifth" located more than 6,000 witnesses and surviving victims; it reconstructed the organizational charts of the DINA, DINA Exterior, CNI, and the Joint Command, along with their links to members of Patria y Libertad, discovering all the operational brigades and special groups that operated during the military regime.

In addition, they discovered more than 530 operational identities of security agents and located 55 secret detention centers, forming an archive with more than 25,000 records that allow for the location of security agents.

In aid of the courts of justice, they have arrested more than 300 active or retired members of the Armed Forces, of whom 250 have been prosecuted for various crimes. Finally, the actions of the "Fifth" allowed for the arrest of Osvaldo Romo MENA, alias "el Guatón Romo" (1992), Miguel Estay Reyno, alias "el Fanta" (1992), and Carlos Herrera Jiménez, alias "el Boccaccio" (1994), who were hiding in Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, respectively, with false identities. – In how many human rights cases have you testified? – In about 10 cases, in some as a witness and in others as an accused.

In general, in the cases of the Linares Artillery School, I have always testified. – Have you been prosecuted for any human rights case? – Yes, I had a prosecution in Linares, and it was the product of the counter-complaint filed by Mrs.

Odette Alegría in response to my complaint for libel and slander. But the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court acquitted me. Despite what has appeared in certain media outlets, where an attempt was made to cast a mantle of doubt around my person, no one has declared that I tortured them or applied any illegitimate coercion against them.

Never. The greatest reproach is to say that I was there, but responsibly, no one could say that I participated in human rights violations because that would be a lie. – Do you believe your statements in the trials have served any purpose? – I believe so, and for that same reason, I think they are the cause of the problems that have come to me afterward. – In your opinion, is the participation of each of the military and civilians who participated in human rights violations at the Linares Artillery School clearly established judicially? – I have the impression that in the Linares case, there are more media-related aspects than judicial ones. I know that, procedurally, significant progress has been made. What remains pending are the issue of the exhumations that were generated in 1978 (fortunately, I was in Iquique on that date) and the issue of the informants, which is still in the nebula, both in Linares and in the rest of the country. – Why do you think former President Patricio Aylwin appointed you head of the Investigations Police? – I was appointed interim director due to the natural progress of the official ranking. I was number two in the institution, by seniority, but I came from the education area and not the operational area. Horacio Toro respected the ranking, and I was appointed. On that occasion, I brought the Linares case to the Government's attention, and I wanted the Executive to have it sufficiently clear. So they investigated and dismissed my apprehensions. – Upon assuming the position of Director General, you announced that you would remove all officials who had participated in security agencies such as the DINA and the CNI. – Remember that in March 1992, upon assuming the General Directorate, the Investigations Police of Chile experienced the repercussions of the so-called "Falcon Plans" after classified police intelligence documents were leaked by an Investigations sub-commissioner linked to the military regime's security agencies. This meant a concern regarding the loyalty to the Institution that the officials had, especially those who had participated in the former DINA and former CNI, who numbered around 300 active members. Personally, I thought that many of them would continue to be functional to the former security agencies, and I also estimated that they would generate pockets of resistance to the change necessary for institutional reconversion and commitment to democracy. – I imagine that was not the only measure. – Indeed. I assumed the position and communicated to all personnel that illegitimate coercion was over in the Investigations Police and that those who engaged in it would be discharged from the institution, just as was carried out. Another aspect that had to be attacked was dishonesty and corruption, and precisely where all these problems were installed was in the former DINA and former CNI, so I began to remove them from their positions. I thought that with that burden, Investigations could not function well. Little by little, these characters were removed from the Institution, while a valuable nucleus of detectives adhered to the transformative project. No one can say that any of these characters were promoted to the rank of general officer during the time I held the position.

THE POLICE, SECURITY AGENCIES, AND INFORMANTS

In 1992, Nelson Mery was appointed Director General of the Investigations Police by President Patricio Aylwin Azocar, who led the Concertación of Parties for Democracy after defeating the candidate of Pinochetism, Hernán Büchi, at the polls.

However, democracy was trapped by the enclaves of the Dictatorship. The '80 Constitution was maintained, and General Augusto Pinochet entrenched himself in the Army Command until 1997, only to later self-appoint himself as a senator for life.

The Dictator's decline began with the surprise arrest of the former general in London in 2000, and today he is being prosecuted for human rights violations, and along with his family, he is being investigated for illicit enrichment, fraud against the treasury, and possible arms and drug trafficking.

During his administration, the Internal Affairs Department, known as "Department V," an area specialized in human rights matters, was restructured. Between 1992 and 2003, the "Fifth" located more than 6,000 witnesses and surviving victims; it reconstructed the organizational charts of the DINA, DINA Exterior, CNI, and the Joint Command, along with their links to members of Patria y Libertad, discovering all the operational brigades and special groups that operated during the military regime.

In addition, they discovered more than 530 operational identities of security agents and located 55 secret detention centers, forming an archive with more than 25,000 records that allow for the location of security agents.

In aid of the courts of justice, they have arrested more than 300 active or retired members of the Armed Forces, of whom 250 have been prosecuted for various crimes. Finally, the actions of the "Fifth" allowed for the arrest of Osvaldo Romo Mena, alias

Guatón Romo (1992), Miguel Estay Reyno, el Fanta (1992), and Carlos Herrera Jiménez, Boccaccio (1994), who were hiding in Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina respectively, under false identities.

– Why do you believe former President Patricio Aylwin appointed you head of the Investigations Police?

– When the events of the Condor Plan operations occurred, I was appointed interim director by General Horacio Toro due to the natural progression of the official rank structure. I was number two in the institution by seniority, but I came from the education branch and not the operational area. Horacio Toro respected the rank structure, and I was appointed.

On that occasion, I brought the Linares case to the government's attention and wanted the executive branch to be sufficiently clear about it, and that is when they investigated and dismissed my apprehensions.

– Upon assuming the position of Director General, you announced that you would remove all officials who had participated in security agencies such as the DINA and the CNI.

– Remember that in March of '92, upon assuming the General Directorate, the Investigations Police of Chile experienced the repercussions of the so-called "Halcón Plans" after classified police intelligence documents were leaked by an investigations sub-commissioner linked to the military regime's security agencies.

This caused concern regarding the loyalty to the institution held by officials, especially those who had participated in the former DINA and former CNI, who numbered around 300 active members.

– Personally, what did you think…

– I thought that many of them would continue to be functional to the former security agencies and I estimated that they would generate pockets of resistance to the change necessary for institutional reconversion and commitment to the democratic government.

I assumed the position and communicated to all personnel that illegitimate coercion would end in the Investigations Police, and those who engaged in it would be discharged from the institution, just as was carried out.

Another aspect that had to be attacked was dishonesty and corruption, and precisely where all these problems were installed was where the former DINA and former CNI members were, which is why I began to remove them from their posts.

I thought that with that dead weight, Investigations could not function well, and little by little these characters were distanced from the institution, while a valuable core of detectives adhered to the transformative project.

As Director General, no one can say that any of these characters were promoted to the rank of general officer during the time I held the position. Even some did not have pending cases at that time, and later, when their participation became public, they were not promoted either.

– What was the work of the Fifth Department during your period as Director General?

– The Fifth Department was restructured when I assumed the position of Director, and in addition to continuing to investigate the deviant conduct of police officials, it began to investigate the issue of human rights. Both groups grew according to the needs of the moment, but over time, practically the entire Fifth Department was investigating human rights cases.

Its main characteristic is that it highlights good, honest, and professional investigators. That provides guarantees for its actions. I could have had a department with many human and material resources, but if the detectives assigned to that function are not good, little or nothing could have been done.

The best were assigned to the Fifth, and there are the results. In this way, the truth began to be reconstructed.

– What were the first steps of the Fifth…

– The vital thing was first to discover the repressive structure of the security agencies and then to identify the operational aliases of the agents with faces. When you have faces, you have fingerprints, you have true names, ranks, responsibilities, and you know where they operate.

– Currently, Investigations has defined the structure of the security agencies that violated human rights.

– Of course it does. Today, the entire network of repressors is constructed with their names, pseudonyms, hierarchical responsibilities, and the operational structures they used.

– In recent months, there has been much talk regarding the case of former President Eduardo Frei Montalva; what is your opinion on this matter?

– My personal opinion is that former President Eduardo Frei Montalva was assassinated for political reasons. Now, if as a police officer I have to analyze all the variables of the case, I could say: there might be medical negligence, why not?

But the problem is the following: if President Frei died due to medical negligence, why so much trouble in acknowledging a death of that type? If there is a nebula today, it is because something is being hidden, something is not clear. An autopsy that is lost, that no one knows about, that appears in another hospital. It is very strange.

Another element to consider is that in my capacity as Director General, I knew what the doctors in the Frei case declared, and they, at the beginning, said that they had never entered the former President's room, for example, but when one proved to them with three or four nurses that they had indeed entered, they began to acknowledge the fact.

Is it possible that the doctors forgot whether or not they entered to see the former president? So the question must be asked in the following way: If this is negligence, what is the problem? This is the information that proves it, and here it is, we made a mistake, it was a consequence of septicemia.

But why do things disappear, why don't they remember the facts? This still has no explanation. In less than 30 days, the two main opponents of the Pinochet regime died: a political leader, Eduardo Frei Montalva, and a union leader, Tucapel Jiménez Alfaro. The assassination of Tucapel Jiménez has already been clarified.

– A similar situation is presented by the Berrios case, especially with the latest statements by Manuel Contreras.

– Why does Mr. Manuel Contreras come now to say that Eugenio Berrios is alive? What is he looking for with that? Could it be a distraction maneuver? We must not forget that before Eugenio Berrios's body appeared in Uruguay, photos of the former DINA chemist were found in Italy, and a version was leaked that the inventor of sarin gas had been taken by the DEA.

It is the same thing that Mr. Contreras is trying to do today with this new thesis. So, in police analysis, one thinks: when things of this type are done, it is because we are on the right path and there is evidence or situations that are being hidden.

The whole truth is not yet out. Berrios kept a folder in his house with press clippings related to the death of former President Frei Montalva. Why?

– Returning to the subject of security agencies, are there differences in the actions of the DINA, the Comando Conjunto, or the CNI?

– To understand how the security services acted, two factors must be considered. The first is the profile of the person leading the group, the leader. He imposes a way of working, but the second factor is more important and marks the difference between one and the other: the gathering of information and background on their targets and the redesign of their informant networks.

Because as informants become more productive and functional to the intelligence apparatus, they begin to be more selective and repressive. Then, they begin to work on tracking and telephone tapping. All of them learn and therefore modify their actions.

– What is your opinion on how the political work carried out by the MIR in the 70s was organized?

– In my opinion, the MIR, until 1970, used the military structure efficiently in its organization, but with the triumph of Salvador Allende, in a very personal opinion, they neglected their security norms, losing their caution. Only after the coup did they begin to restructure, but it was already too late.

– In the case of the Socialist Party…

– They were part of the Unidad Popular government, therefore it was an open party. However, they had an internal front structured, similar to the MIR, where there was even dual militancy.

– And what can you say about the organization of the Communist Party…

– It must be considered that the Communist Party was almost untouched during the coup itself. The structure and discipline of the communists allowed them to survive the first onslaught of the military, and that is why they were the first to call for fighting and resisting the Dictatorship.

They were the first to react and they restructured quickly to begin clandestine work. They had financial resources to overcome the first stage of repression. Only the most well-known, the public ones, fell, and not the apparatus. That is why the security agencies took time to detect them.

– Publicly, the actions of the DINA and the CNI have always been known, but it was only with the statements of Andrés Valenzuela in 1985 that the existence of the Comando Conjunto became known. How do you explain that the latter was kept so secret?

– I start from the premise that the Comando Conjunto as such does not exist; it is the same as the COVEMA (Command of Avengers of Martyrs), it obeys more of a media action. They called it Comando Conjunto because it was a group that coordinated the Air Force, the Carabineros, and Investigations at the Air Force War Academy (AGA), but it was not a structure called as such.

The COVEMA was also not a structure organized for that purpose; it was the press that identified them that way. It is like Operation Albania; it never had that name. The security agencies called it Operation Corpus Christi.

– Let's talk a little about the informants who collaborated with the security agencies. You have said that from the very day of the coup, betrayals began to exist, if they did not already exist as a form of political intelligence prior to September 11, 1973.

The best known are La Flaca Alejandra, Miguel Estay Reyno, among others. On the other hand, you have said that the detection of the internal political structures of the left-wing parties had a direct relationship with their ability to react and organize in clandestinity. How do you explain that they detected the leadership of the Communist Party in 1976?

– In my understanding, the main enemy that the Communist Party had was the informants.

– As a police officer, does it not strike you that in the cases of the Communist Party leaders who are now forcibly disappeared, there are few witnesses?

– Of course it strikes me.

– And what is your opinion…

– For the moment, I have no opinion.

THE REPRESSORS CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN DEMOCRACY

Since the return to democracy in Chile, few intelligence actions and intimidation by members of the former regime's security services have been known. However, taking stock shows that they continue to operate.

The high-profile "Piñeragate" case reveals the telephone espionage of the businessman and former presidential candidate of Renovación Nacional, Sebastián Piñera, by the DINE. The fact was broadcast on Megavisión by the owner of the channel himself, Ricardo Claro, a recognized Pinochet supporter.

Involved in the operation were, among others, the current UDI senator, Evelyn Matthei, and army captain Fernando Diez, and moments before the truth became known, one of the businessman's sons was kidnapped for hours and forced not to continue with the investigation.

Another fact is the intelligence operation that took place to take the DINA chemist, Eugenio Berrios, first to Argentina and then to Uruguay, where he finally lost his life. The event took place on October 26, 1991, through the "Monte Aymond" border crossing, and the Army Intelligence Battalion, dependent on the DINE, was involved in the operation.

A curious fact occurred during the government of Patricio Aylwin, in 1992, when the Executive presented a parliamentary motion to reduce the financial resources allocated to the 400 former CNI members who were attached to the DINE. However, in Congress, this motion was rejected by the parliamentarians for the 1993 Army Budget.

The constant death threats, surveillance, telephone tapping, and pressure on family members received by members of the Fifth Department of Investigations throughout these years. To name a few cases: in 1992, there was surveillance of the home of then-inspector Nelson Jofré, who was investigating the "Letelier case," by the DINE.

That same year, detective Osmán Arellano, who was investigating the "Tucapel Jiménez" case, was harassed; his housekeeper was intercepted on the street by three men and a woman, warning her not to lie and that her boss should be careful.

In 1993, detectives Rafael Castillo and Nelson Jofré traveled to Buenos Aires, where they were followed by an Army intelligence officer, a former CNI and former DINE member, as is judicially proven. In 1996, a telephone tap was detected at the home of the Director General of the Investigations Police.

In 1998, inspector Douglas Rodríguez received a telephone threat from a defendant in the "Albania Case."

In 2001, a witness who had provided information on the activities of former Army officers Patricio Castro Muñoz (former CNI, Cutufa, and member of Augusto Pinochet's security team) and Álvaro Corvalán Castilla (former Metropolitan Chief of the CNI) reported being followed, and among the license plates he provided, two corresponded to vehicles assigned to the Army Logistics Directorate.

In 2006, during the long weekend of Fiestas Patrias, Santiago woke up littered with flyers from the 11th of September Nationalist Movement, the same one created by Álvaro Corvalán Castilla, defending the work and figure of General Pinochet.

– Returning to the trials against the repressors, do you believe that the security agencies continue to operate in Chile?

– Of course they do. What happened with Eugenio Berrios is public proof that these agencies exist, that they have resources, and that they function in democracy.

– And how do you explain the latest statements by Manuel Contreras?

– Even if Mr. Manuel Contreras says he is alive, all of this is a military intelligence-type maneuver carried out illegally in a democratic government. The Piñera case is another sign that they continue to act.

– Under whose protection, or does a parallel structure exist?

– Without a doubt, it is a parallel structure, but one that has communicating vessels with the formal apparatus from which they obtain information. For example: where are the DINA and CNI archives?

We must not forget that there are loyalties from the past, hierarchies that are maintained over time, complicit silences, things that they will never say.

– But there are former agents who are beginning to acknowledge their responsibility.

– They are small breaks that occur as a result of the evidence itself that is accumulating in the proceedings. They have had to acknowledge their participation due to the consistency of the evidence, and they use as a strategy acknowledging their responsibility only as far as they cannot deny it.

There are others who shift responsibilities and argue that other crimes correspond to so-and-so or such-and-such to assume. Each of these assertions that I make is consistently accredited in the Courts of Justice.

Odette Alegría

– Does it not strike you that on the same day that the indictment of the military personnel from the Linares Artillery School was announced, a complaint against you appeared on Megavisión by a former political prisoner identified as Odette Alegría? How do you explain this coincidence?

– It is curious that both things were broadcast simultaneously. The first statements by Odette Alegría were made on Megavisión and, as it has been possible to determine, the journalist arrived at the former prisoner's house through the former general's own lawyer, Humberto Julio.

They are the ones who reported that there was a witness who blamed and placed Nelson Mery as part of the torturers of the Artillery School, since he was not on the list of those indicted in the case investigated by Minister Alejandro Solís.

– Do you believe it was an intelligence operation?

– I have always believed it was an intelligence operation.

– Why…

– What happens is that when I was Director General of the Investigations Police, I had information that pointed to the clarification of human rights cases, but when I left the position, many people who were collaborating withdrew and told me that they could not do so out of fear.

Having left the General Directorate meant being in a complicated position to continue obtaining information. I agree with those who today do not want to continue collaborating out of fear. It is different to do things with all the institutional support that the Investigations Police provides than to provide information to the citizen Nelson Mery.

The objective of this intelligence operation was to remove me from the position, and they succeeded.

– Today, the case of insults and slander against Odette Alegría is final, and with the court's ruling, it in some way confirms your version of innocence in the reported events, but what do you think of her now?

– That she was functional to this intelligence action. I still cannot understand the reasons that led her to be part of all this. Her life story could lead us to think that she might be trapped by some previous relationship with the military.

– What background information do you have to affirm that previous relationship?

– She herself has declared that when she was detained at the Linares Artillery School, she was taken out of her captivity to be treated for cystitis and for a tooth repair. In addition, she said that she was able to take free exams to finish her second year of high school while still detained.

We are talking about the first months of the Military Coup. No prisoner had these facilities, much less at that time.

– From a human point of view, how do you describe Odette Alegría?

– From that perspective, I think Odette Alegría is a victim of her past. She is trapped. Someday she will have to say why she did what she did.

– What does Chile need to find itself again?

– To look in the mirror. It is necessary for many of the details that are in the proceedings to be known. It is necessary for the truth to be known even more. Chile does not really know what the security agencies were like in their essence in terms of repression.

The details of how the detention occurs, what happens to people, the tortures to which they were subjected, the degrees of evil that were experienced in each of the detention centers are not known.

It is necessary for the episodes of exhumations to be known, a fact concatenated in time that begins in 1973 and continues in the years 74, 75, 76, and only in 1978 is the illicit act perfected with the removal of the bodies, so that no evidence of anything would remain.

This did not occur to a sergeant or a general on his own; it was an institutionalized policy. If the Dictatorship had wanted to end the "excesses of the security agencies in the first years," they could have done so when they applied the amnesty, but that was not the case.

– What do democratic governments have to do to dismantle these groups?

– Today there is an "intelligence law," and if it were respected in its entirety, Chile would be on the right track. Because one must distinguish between what is military intelligence, political intelligence, and strategic intelligence. Currently, internal security is in the hands of the ANI and the two police forces, and as long as each intelligence area...

that he is performing his job should not generate conflict. – When does the problem arise, then? – When an area that does not correspond to them is invaded, or when the residual information they maintain or receive is not shared with the person in charge of that matter.

For example, if the Investigative Police (Investigaciones) is following a drug trafficker and it turns out that the person is a spy, they must necessarily inform military intelligence so that they can take the appropriate measures, and vice versa.

Those are the things that must be verified. The emphasis that any intelligence policy must have is that it must be civilian; that is, those who must implement these intelligence policies must be civilians and not the military. – Finally, what will Nelson Mery dedicate himself to now? – I will remain linked to academia and try to move forward with this School of Criminalistics project that the Universidad La República has today. – And regarding human rights… – I will continue collaborating with the Courts of Justice whenever I can, just as I have done until today, whenever I can… The procedural truth, in which I believe, will surface with facts, people, names, and surnames. It is a debt that has not yet been entirely paid, and it is a necessity of the country toward the victims, their families, and history itself. Looking in the mirror will do us good to recognize painful truths of the past and be able to move toward the future.

Source: CrónicaDigital.cl, October 01, 2006

The magistrate's ruling for the kidnapping of Guillermo del Canto affected two officers and a sergeant from the Army, all retired, in addition to a former commissioner of the Investigative Police. The visiting minister Alejandro Solís Muñoz handed down his 15th conviction for human rights violations that occurred during the military regime since he inherited part of the cases investigated by former minister Juan Guzmán Tapia against Augusto Pinochet.

Solís sentenced General (Ret.) Gabriel del Río, Captain (Ret.) Claudio Lecaros Carrasco, and former sergeant Antonio Aguilar Barrientos, all from the Army, and the former commissioner of the Investigative Police Héctor Torres Guajardo to 10 years and one day in prison for the kidnapping of MIR militant Guillermo del Canto Ramírez, which occurred in January 1974.

Former detective Nelson Volta Rozas was sentenced to five years and one day in prison as an accomplice. In May 2006, visiting minister Víctor Montiglio Rezzio had favored General (Ret.) Del Río with the application of the 1978 Amnesty Decree Law for the crimes of the so-called Caravan of Death in the city of San Javier, Maule Region, making this the first sentence to affect the military officer who was intendant in the early days of the regime.

Meanwhile, the rest of those convicted are already facing suspended prison sentences for the torture that took place inside the Linares Artillery School between 1973 and 1974, in a case investigated by the visiting minister of the Talca Court of Appeals, Víctor Stenger Larenas.

Guillermo del Canto Ramírez was 30 years old at the time of his detention and was the regional secretary of the MIR for Linares-Maule, and therefore a member of the party's Central Committee. Since November 1973, he had been intensely sought by members of the Military Intelligence Service (SIM) in the area, where he was also an official of the Agrarian Reform Corporation (CORA).

Despite the intense search in the Maule Region, Del Canto Ramírez had managed to leave for Santiago to take refuge in the house of some cousins located at 560 Santa Clara Street, La Cisterna, where he was captured in the early hours of January 2, 1974.

Military personnel broke into the home and took Del Canto Ramírez and his wife, Marianela Méndez Soto, to be transferred to the Military School and the Linares Artillery School, from where the whereabouts of the agricultural technician were lost.

Minister Alejandro Solís is the judge who has handed down the most convictions in human rights violation cases since October 14, 2002, when the Supreme Court decided to divide the more than 200 lawsuits processed by former judge Juan Guzmán Tapia.

On that occasion, in addition to Solís, ministers Jorge Zepeda Arancibia and Daniel Calvo Flores were appointed, the latter of whom was later replaced by Joaquín Billard Acuña, while Guzmán remained only with the processes known as the Caravan of Death, Operation Colombo, Operation Condor I and II, and Calle Conferencia, which he processed until his retirement in March 2005 without handing down any convictions.

Source: El Mostrador.cl, June 4, 2007

Five military officers and two detectives prosecuted for kidnappings in Linares

Visiting minister Alejandro Solís prosecuted five retired members of the Army and two former detectives as perpetrators of the aggravated kidnapping of three MIR militants and a union leader, who were last seen alive at the Linares Artillery School between September 12, 1973, and January 2, 1974.

The ruling becomes an expansion of the resolution he issued on July 6, 2003, when he indicted six former uniformed officers for other cases of forcibly disappeared persons contained in the same episode.

The magistrate decided to indict Colonel (Ret.) Gabriel del Río Espinoza, who was the commander of the aforementioned facility and—at the same time—regional intendant at the time; Colonel (Ret.) Claudio Abdón Lecaros Carrasco; former Investigative Police commissioner Héctor Torres Guajardo; Sergeant Major (Ret.) Antonio Aguilar Barrientos; and former Investigative Police commissioner Nelson Volta Rosas, as perpetrators of the crime of aggravated kidnapping of Guillermo del Canto Ramírez, a MIR leader.

According to the investigation substantiated by Solís, at 00:30 hours on January 2, 1974, Del Canto was detained while he was with his spouse, Marianela Méndez Soto, at the home of his cousin Félix Ignacio Valenzuela Ferrer, located at 560 Santa Clara Street in the commune of La Cisterna.

In effect, several officials who claimed to belong to the Regiment of the city of Linares entered the place and detained Del Canto Ramírez and his cousin for being a "concealer"—as the captors stated. Both detainees were taken in a truck to the Military School in Santiago, where they were interrogated.

The following morning, Valenzuela Ferrer was released, while Guillermo del Canto was transferred to the Linares Artillery Regiment, where he remained detained for a few days, being interrogated and tortured, and subsequently, on an undetermined date, taken to the Tejas Verdes prisoner camp in San Antonio, where his trail was lost until today.

Three other victims On the other hand, Minister Solís prosecuted General (Ret.) Carlos Edmundo Morales Retamal, then director of the Linares Artillery School, as a perpetrator of the crime of aggravated kidnapping against university student and former MIR militant María Isabel Beltrán Sánchez, committed starting on September 18, 1973.

He also prosecuted former Investigative Police commissioner Héctor Armando Torres Guajardo and Sergeant Major (Ret.) Antonio Aguilar Barrientos as perpetrators of the crime of aggravated kidnapping against former MIR militant Héctor Hernán Contreras Cabrera, committed starting on December 8, 1973.

Finally, the judge indicted Colonel (Ret.) Juan Hernán Morales Salgado as a perpetrator of the crime of aggravated kidnapping of José Alfonso Saavedra Betancourt, a former union leader at the Celco company, perpetrated starting on September 12, 1973.

The magistrate granted provisional release to all those prosecuted, and only in the case of Morales Salgado, who is being charged in this case for the first time, was the benefit granted with consultation to the Court of Appeals.

The First Chamber of the appellate court confirmed the release of the former military officer this Tuesday, with the favorable votes of ministers Juan Cristóbal Mera and Amanda Valdovinos, in addition to the member lawyer Benito Mauriz.

Mery's companions In the prosecution, which consists of more than 60 pages, Minister Solís included the various allusions that exist in these cases regarding the participation of the former director of the Investigative Police in the detention of these opponents of the military regime.

In fact, several witnesses point to him as part of the group of agents who detained María Isabel Beltrán. Likewise, one of the detectives who served at the Artillery School, Armando Torres Guajardo, maintained that in that unit "there was a Security Department, in charge of Captain Lecaros, and it had other officials, such as Nelson Mery, under the command of Jorge Zincke.

He participated in the interrogations, and regarding María Isabel Beltrán, a MIR militant arrested in Santiago, he witnessed about 3 interrogations led by Captain Lecaros, who, to intimidate her, would strike her on the back with a rubber 'churro' (baton)." Meanwhile, one of the survivors of the Linares Artillery School, Osvaldo Efraín Salazar Saavedra, who was detained on December 19, 1973, by a platoon of military and detectives who took him to the Military School and then transferred him to the Linares Artillery School, states that Nelson Mery participated in that group.

For his part, the former director of the civil police, who left his post due to his alleged connection to human rights violations, declared in the prosecution that "on September 12, 1973, being a detective, he was designated as a liaison officer at the Linares Artillery School, and on one occasion he was called by the 'Intelligence Office,' and Aguilar asked him if he knew Patricia Contreras, whom he knew because he was a friend of her sister, Elena." "He answered yes, and they ordered him to go to Santiago because she was allegedly involved in hiding weapons in Panimávida.

They arrived at a house on Cienfuegos Street in a military jeep, in charge of Captain Humberto Julio; Sergeant Aguilar and Detective Volta also went; they detained her and took her to the Military School; the next day, on the way back, he got out of the jeep and looked into the truck she was in, and he also found María Isabel Beltrán, who had been detained by military personnel," he added. "He always considered that María Isabel Beltrán was a military intelligence target, as stated in writing by Colonel Morales Retamal, who points out that she belonged to a MIR cell, maintained extremist activities in Parral, and was involved in the infiltration of people into the Armed Forces, the main charge for which she was detained," Mery assured the court.

Source: elmostrador.cl, April 19, 2006

Nelson Mery indicted for "torture" of 17 detainees in Linares

The secretary of the Second Civil Court of Linares, Silvia Cáceres, provided the details of the indictment of the former director of the Investigative Police, Nelson Mery, for the crime of torture of political prisoners while he operated as a liaison officer with the Army in Linares after the coup d'état.

As she explained, Judas Nelson Lenin Mery Figueroa was subjected to prosecution for 17 cases for "unduly prolonging the communication of a prisoner, applying torture, or unnecessary rigor." In addition, she released the names of the other defendants, all for the crime of violating article 150, number one, of the current Penal Code, who are former detectives and retired military personnel: Nelson Volta Rosas, for 17 crimes.

Sergio Gallardo López, accessory to 16 crimes. Héctor Torres Guajardo, perpetrator of 11 crimes. Hugo González Yañez, perpetrator of three crimes. Claudio Lecaros Carrasco, perpetrator of two crimes. Antonio Aguilar Barrientos, perpetrator of four crimes.

On Tuesday, the judge of the Talca Court of Appeals, Víctor Stenger, ordered the detention of the former director of the Investigative Police, who remains deprived of liberty at the institutional training school in the Estación Central commune of Santiago.

The judge is investigating the complaints of former political prisoners in the area, who reported in August 2003 the torture they suffered in military facilities of the Seventh Region after the military coup of September 11, 1973.

Mery appears among those identified as responsible for the illegal coercion, in his capacity as a liaison officer between the Investigative Police and the Army in Linares after the overthrow of Salvador Allende.

Source: Cooperativa.cl, August 25, 2004

Nelson Mery granted unconditional release

The former director of the Investigative Police, Nelson Mery, was released after the indictment issued against him for the crime of "torture" against 17 political prisoners detained in Linares after the military coup of September 1973 was revoked.

The first chamber of the Talca Court of Appeals accepted the writ of amparo (habeas corpus) filed by the former detective's defense. With the determination, adopted by two votes to one, Mery was immediately released after having been detained last Tuesday at the Investigative Police School, following his notification in Linares of the indictment issued by the special judge Víctor Stenger.

The amparo was voted in favor by ministers Roberto Salazar and Luis Carrasco, the latter being the president of the chamber; while the dissenter was Hernán González, who is handling several cases related to Colonia Dignidad.

In addition, the appellate court confirmed the provisional releases granted by the magistrate to the other six individuals involved in the case, who must pay a bail of 100,000 pesos each. In August 2003, the Association of Former Political Prisoners of Linares filed a complaint against Mery and those responsible for the illegal coercion they suffered during their detentions in military facilities of the Seventh Region after the military coup of September 11, 1973.

Mery denied having participated in torture, given that he only performed functions as a liaison officer between the civil police and the Army in the area and was not in charge of interrogating people. Last Tuesday, Judge Stenger resolved the indictment and detention of: Judas Nelson Lenin Mery, perpetrator of 17 crimes of torture.

Nelson Volta Rosas, for 17 crimes. Sergio Gallardo López, accessory to 16 crimes. Héctor Torres Guajardo, perpetrator of 11 crimes. Hugo González Yáñez, perpetrator of three crimes. Claudio Lecaros Carrasco, perpetrator of two crimes. Antonio Aguilar Barrientos, perpetrator of four crimes.

Source: Cooperativa.cl, August 26, 2004

Convictions for torture in Linares ratified

The Talca Court of Appeals confirmed the convictions for the crimes of torture committed at the Linares Artillery School between 1973 and 1974. In a unanimous ruling, the First Chamber of the appellate court—composed of ministers Olga Morales, Vicente Fodich, and member lawyer Roberto Salazar—ratified the resolution of visiting minister Víctor Stenger, dated November 16, 2006.

On that date, the magistrate had handed down a sentence for violation of article 150 N°1 of the Penal Code, in force at the time of the events, for applying "torture to a prisoner." Minister Stenger had determined the penalty for Nelson Volta Rozas, perpetrator of 14 crimes, each sanctioned with a penalty of 61 days of minor imprisonment; Héctor Torres Guajardo, as perpetrator of 6 crimes, each sanctioned with a penalty of 61 days of minor imprisonment; Antonio Aguilar Barrientos, perpetrator of 4 crimes, each sanctioned with a penalty of 61 days of minor imprisonment; Hugo González Yáñez, as perpetrator of 3 crimes, each sanctioned with a penalty of 61 days of minor imprisonment; and Claudio Lecaros Carrasco, as perpetrator of 2 crimes, each sanctioned with a penalty of 61 days of minor imprisonment. Finally, the President of the Association of Relatives of Forcibly Disappeared Persons in Linares, Juanita Soto, described the sentences imposed on the former members of the Armed Forces of Order and Security as "a shame for those who survived the torture applied under an authoritarian regime. What human being can receive this torture and now have them laugh at them with these sentences?" asked the representative of the human rights group. The torture, according to the file that accumulated 12 volumes and 4,256 pages, investigated by Minister Stenger, occurred mainly in the facilities of the Linares Artillery School between 1973 and 1974.

Source: latercera.cl, October 10, 2008

SUPREME COURT CONFIRMS RULING ORDERING COMPENSATION FOR PRISONERS TORTURED AT THE LINARES ARTILLERY SCHOOL

The Supreme Court ratified the sentence that ordered the treasury to pay $40,000,000 (forty million pesos) to Belarmino Sepúlveda Bueno, Pedro Sancho Barros, José Cifuentes Arcoverde, and Luis Zurita Figueroa, political prisoners who were subjected to torture at the Linares Artillery School in 1973 and 1974.

In addition, the State of Chile must pay for a press insertion in a newspaper in Talca and another in Linares, in which "the substance of what was ruled in case file N° 01-2003 by the Special Judge of the Second Civil Court of Linares, Mr.

Víctor Stenger Larenas, is made public, which sentenced Nelson Volta Rozas to fourteen sentences of 61 days of imprisonment; Héctor Armando Torres Guajardo to suffer six sentences of 61 days of imprisonment; Claudio Abdon Lecaros Carrasco to suffer two sentences of 61 days; and Antonio Aguilar Barrientos to suffer four sentences of 61 days of imprisonment as responsible for the crime of applying torture to prisoners at the Linares Artillery School between 1973 and 1974." In a unanimous ruling (case file 20580-2015), the Second Chamber of the highest court—composed of ministers Milton Juica, Carlos Künsemüller, Haroldo Brito, Lamberto Cisternas, and Jorge Dahm—ratified the appealed resolution that condemned the State of Chile for the responsibility of Army members in the crimes.

Source: maulenoticias.cl, July 30, 2016

Compensation for Linares torture victims confirmed

According to the resolution, the Treasury is to pay $40 million to Belarmino Sepúlveda Bueno, Pedro Sancho Barros, José Cifuentes Arcoverde, and Luis Zurita Figueroa, who were political prisoners subjected to torture at that military unit in the Maule region in 1973 and 1974. "The civil actions filed here by the victims against the Treasury, aimed at obtaining reparation for the damages caused, find their foundation in the general paradigms of International Human Rights Law and their normative consecration in international treaties ratified by Chile, which oblige the State to recognize and protect this right to full reparation," the sentence specifies. In addition, the State must pay for a press insertion in a newspaper in Talca and another in Linares, in which "the substance of what was ruled in case file N° 01-2003 by the Special Judge of the Second Civil Court of Linares, Víctor Stenger Larenas, is made public." This refers to the afflictive penalties for which he sentenced Nelson Volta Rozas to fourteen sentences of 61 days of imprisonment; Héctor Armando Torres Guajardo to six sentences of 61 days of imprisonment; Claudio Abdón Lecaros Carrasco to two sentences of 61 days; and Antonio Aguilar Barrientos to four sentences of 61 days of imprisonment as responsible for the crime of applying torture to prisoners at the Linares Artillery School between 1973 and 1974.

Source: elciudadano, July 25, 2016