On the morning of September 20, 1973, a large military contingent composed of members of the Army, Air Force, Carabineros, and armed civilians raided the El Toro settlement, located 13 kilometers from the town of Fresia, Los Lagos Region.

A group of the settlers, including five members of the MIR and one socialist, were detained, tortured, and "tried" by a War Council that, from the moment of their arrests, already held a verdict of capital punishment.

It was 7 a.m. on October 19, 1973, when death invaded the facilities of the Chilean Air Force (FACH) in Chamiza, Puerto Montt. At that hour, by order of the War Council of the Military Prosecutor's Office in wartime, the following were executed: Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR) militants José Cárcamo Garay (26), agricultural technician; José Luis Felmer Klenner (20), agronomy student; Mario Torres Velásquez (32), linotypist; Francisco Avendaño Bórquez (20), normal school teacher; and José Barría Barría (23), agricultural worker; as well as Socialist Party militant Óscar Arismendi Medina (46).

An express Council held on October 17 of that year sentenced the detainees in record time for "treason to the fatherland," accused of "forming a guerrilla school at the El Toro settlement," a property located 13 kilometers from the town of Fresia. Eight days before the executions, the accused already had the sentence of military prosecutor Eduardo Bravo Elgueta.

It all began in 1971. In the midst of the Unidad Popular (UP) government, and faced with the deepening of the Agrarian Reform, militants of the Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario (MCR) seized the El Toro estate due to the refusal of the property owner, farmer Evaldo Rebhein Neumann, to allow the use of a free-transit road that passed through the property.

But it was not until 1972 that the Corporación de la Reforma Agraria (CORA) began the expropriation process of the area with the aim of encouraging agricultural production and popular education aimed, particularly, at settlers who had not finished their basic education.

After the 1973 coup d'état, Rebhein and his wife, María Carrillo, were the civilians who influenced the detention of the six executed men.

Following the installation of the Military Junta in charge of the country, the Comando de Área Jurisdiccional de Seguridad Interior (CAJSI) was created, which aimed to administer and ensure the internal security of the country's regions.

The CAJSI Puerto Montt, which operated in the offices of the provincial Intendencia, had its own Regional Intelligence center or service (CIRE or SIRE), this unit being its operational organ.

Composed of the commanders of the different units of the Armed Forces and Order, this body was directed by the head of the State of Siege zone of Llanquihue and Chiloé, Brigadier General Sergio Leigh Guzmán, who was also the brother of the Commander-in-Chief of the FACH and member of the Government Military Junta, Gustavo Leigh Guzmán.

To comply with the instructions of the head of the State of Siege zone and Commander of CAJSI Puerto Montt, "liaison officers" were designated. They were Army Captain Eugenio Covarrubias Valenzuela, involved in the raid on El Toro; Air Force Group Commander Mario Jahn Barrera; Carabineros Lieutenant Carlos Tapia Galleguillos; and Investigative Police detective Roberto Díaz Moya.

All were involved in human rights abuses committed in the region.

Day of the raid

After the overthrow of the UP, the Puerto Montt zonal representatives of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR), the Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (MAPU), and the Socialist, Communist, and Radical parties met to analyze the magnitude of the coup.

On that occasion, they concluded that there was no capacity for response against the power of the Armed Forces and Carabineros, and they proposed, as a main task, to ensure the survival of the militants and their parties. "For this reason, a part of the MIR militants took refuge in the countryside as a security and withdrawal zone," stated the former regional secretary of the MIR of Puerto Montt and brother of one of those executed by firing squad, Víctor Cárcamo Garay.

With an area of 186 hectares, the El Toro settlement was consolidated as a center of the Agrarian Reform. Each member fulfilled a social, educational, and political role that was key to its organization.

Arismendi Medina, the only Socialist Party militant of the six executed, was its president. The rest, members of the MIR, were in charge of promoting popular education and advising farmers on small-scale agricultural and livestock production.

It was just beginning on Thursday, September 20, 1973, when, after 6 a.m., a large military contingent composed of more than 200 troops from the Army's 12th Sangra Infantry Regiment, the Air Force, Carabineros, and armed civilians raided the property.

The operation took the occupants by surprise. The H-54 helicopter that was flying over the area, the military trucks, and the violent entry of the armed forces and order personnel did not give time for warning or escape.

Violently apprehended, the members of the settlement were taken to a shed located south of the site. There, they were tortured and interrogated. The idea of Captain Eugenio Covarrubias Valenzuela, who was in command of the operation, was to find weapons and know where in the mountain, located north of El Toro, a supposed box of dynamite was hidden.

In the report of September 22, 1973, delivered by Covarrubias Valenzuela to the head of the State of Siege zone, Sergio Leigh Guzmán, it is indicated that after capturing the "guerrillas," checking the houses and the surrounding mountains of the settlement, weapons and explosives were seized.

The goal of the detainees, according to the Army captain, was to "prepare an assault on the Fresia Police Station to annihilate the personnel, seize the weaponry, and murder the Carabineros Lieutenant René Villarroel Sobarzo, nicknamed 'Juan Metralla' [John Shrapnel]."

Consulted by the newspaper El Llanquihue in September of this year about the reason for his nickname, the now 66-year-old retired Carabineros officer Villarroel Sobarzo pointed out that it is due to "a ranchera [by the band Los Broncos de Reynosa] that talks about Juan Metralla, a cowboy who liked to wear a hat and who is described as a gentleman.

Also, in Fresia, I did all my patrols on horseback. It was not a nickname with a negative connotation." The truth is that the nickname is due to the fact that "El Metralla" liked to shoot to intimidate the population.

Although he has denied his presence at the property on countless occasions, the statement that Villarroel Sobarzo made to the Military Prosecutor's Office on September 24, 1973, gives him away. In that document, "Juan Metralla" not only details how he and the rest of the armed forces personnel entered the property, but also points out that he knew Óscar Arismendi Medina in particular from before the coup d'état.

He accuses the peasant leader of creating publicity against him, and of cutting the face of a Carabineros non-commissioned officer who lived in Fresia in January 1973.

The cases involving "Juan Metralla" in human rights violations in the town of Fresia are numerous. In 2014, he was sentenced to serve 3 years and one day for the application of torture to seven detainees at the Carabineros Police Station in Fresia in September 1973. Likewise, he is being prosecuted for the deaths of peasant leader Abraham Oliva and former PS deputy Luis Espinoza.

Regarding his participation in the operation carried out in El Toro, former minister Leopoldo Vera Muñoz subjected him to prosecution and preventive detention in February of this year, along with Carabineros officer José Arnoldo Ule Guinea and Army Captain Eugenio Covarrubias Valenzuela, for the crimes of kidnapping, illegal detention, and application of torture to the six executed men.

However, on August 24, 2016, Villarroel Sobarzo and Ule Guinea, with the exception of Covarrubias Valenzuela who is already serving a sentence in Punta Peuco, were released on bail while the investigation process continues.

Sentenced from the beginning

Ten hours after their captures, Arismendi Medina, Cárcamo Garay, Felmer Klenner, Torres Velásquez, Avendaño Bórquez, Barría Barría, and a group from El Toro were "transferred by helicopter to the Sangra Regiment of Puerto Montt, where they were interrogated and tortured by agents of the Military Intelligence Service.

From there, they were taken to the Puerto Montt Investigative Police Headquarters, where they were also interrogated and tortured. Finally, they were transferred to the Chin Chin Prison, where they remained in punishment cells," detailed the lawyer for the Ministry of the Interior's Human Rights Program, Catalina Ross Fredes.

On October 11, the ruling for case file 11-73 was issued, signed by the Military Prosecutor in Wartime, Eduardo Bravo Elgueta, which condemned the six detainees to capital punishment for the crime of "organizing and instructing private militias armed with firearms and explosives" since before the coup d'état.

Hours later, the head of the State of Siege zone convened a War Council for the ad hoc military prosecutors for October 17. They were: Colonel Rubén Rojas, Group Commander Renato Valenzuela, Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo Partarrieu, Frigate Captain Osvaldo Schwarzenberg, Major Patricio Lira, and Squadron Commander Fernando Roca.

From the day of the arrest until the day they were notified of the resolution of prosecutor Bravo Elgueta (October 12), the detainees had no legal defense. Only on October 13 was Hugo Ocampo Paniagua assigned as their defense attorney. The sponsor of the prisoners, however, did not have the opportunity to interview the detainees.

For the lawyer of the families of the executed, Pamela Sánchez, the War Council was only administrative, "because before being brought before it, their fate was already known. Prior to the events, [Sergio] Leigh said that these people had to be killed, because the sentence was already dictated.

This General Leigh was confronted by prosecutor [Carlos Alberto] Ebensperger, because he told him that there was a lack of evidence and other details, and Leigh replied, 'Get out of here, you coward.' He replaced him by appointing Eduardo Bravo Elgueta."

One day before the execution, two of the sentenced men received visits. One was José Cárcamo Garay, who received a cousin who lived in the province, and the other was Francisco Avendaño Bórquez, who was seen by the FACH chaplain Leonel Ibacache. A week later, the clergyman sent a letter to Avendaño's family telling them about the situation he was in and his willingness to die for his ideals.

At dawn on October 19, the detainees were executed. The victims, who according to the death certificate of the time died from "multiple thoracic bullet wounds," were buried in a mass grave at the municipal cemetery of Puerto Montt.

Obtaining the remains of the victims was also an odyssey. Edi Rodríguez Ribeiro, wife of Torres Velásquez, who learned of her husband's detention a month after being released by Army personnel in October 1973, details it:

"Mario's aunt requested the body, and armed forces personnel asked her for a tin box. They walked a few meters away and dug up a body without confirming if it was Mario, and returned the sealed coffin to her."

"Legality" of the Councils

There are not a few cases of forcibly disappeared and executed persons who passed through war councils after the overthrow of the Unidad Popular. In this instance, with sentences that were practically unappealable, there was no sharp and objective investigation process; it did not allow the accused to have options to prove their innocence, nor were the evidence and confessions obtained under torture questioned.

Moreover, a significant number of cases were approved based on the conclusions of the investigating military prosecutor.

Despite the recommendations to the Chilean State made in 1974 by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) regarding the functioning of these tribunals, and even the legal and ethical invalidity of the resolutions of the war councils accredited by the Rettig Report in 1990, little progress has been made in Chile to annul their "legality."

In the case of the six executed in Chamiza in 1973, former minister Leopoldo Vera disqualified himself from making any kind of pronouncement regarding the war councils. In fact, there is no State law that aligns Chilean domestic law with international law in this matter.

"Progress has been made, but more is needed. Since the Nuremberg pact, Chile has slowly subscribed to international rights in terms of human rights, especially regarding the war councils that were applied to civilians after the coup d'état," specified the lawyer for the families of the six executed men, Pamela Sánchez Nieto.

However, and given the latest questioning by the IACHR of Chile regarding the case of Omar Humberto Maturana and others in September 2015, in October of this year, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court annulled the sentences of the Air Force war councils of June 30, 1974, and January 27, 1975.

In a historic ruling, it was established that after the overthrow of Salvador Allende's government, the war councils only applied their coercive procedures and acted against the 1925 Political Constitution that governed them.

Regarding the progress currently being discussed in parliament regarding the current "legality" of the war councils, the author of this report contacted, via email and telephone, each member of the Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples Commission of the Chamber of Deputies. However, none responded to the request for an interview.

Source: eldesconcierto.cl, January 14, 2016

Minister Álvaro Mesa sentences retired FACH officer to life imprisonment for homicides at Fundo El Toro

The visiting minister also sentenced retired Army personnel Eugenio Adrián Covarrubias Valenzuela, Fernando Luis Concha Giordano, and Francisco Javier Alarcón Castro; and the then-members of the Carabineros René Isidro Villarroel Sobarzo, José Harnoldo Ule Guineo, Gabriel Osvaldo Mejías Leyton, and Carlos Berríos Rodríguez to two 10-year prison sentences, as authors of the kidnappings and illegitimate coercion applied to the six victims.

The minister for extraordinary cases of human rights violations for the jurisdictions of Temuco, Valdivia, Puerto Montt, and Coyhaique, Álvaro Mesa Latorre, sentenced the Air Force squadron commander and ad-hoc auditor at the time of the events, Patricio Rodríguez Encalada, to life imprisonment as the author of the consummated crimes of qualified homicide, in the nature of crimes against humanity, of Mario César Torres Velásquez, José Mario Cárcamo Garay, Francisco del Carmen Avendaño Bórquez, Óscar Arismendi Medina, José Luis Felmer Klenner, and José Antonio Barría Barría.

These illicit acts were perpetrated in September 1973 at the Fundo El Toro, in the commune of Fresia.

In the ruling (case file 10.819), the visiting minister also sentenced retired Army personnel Eugenio Adrián Covarrubias Valenzuela, Fernando Luis Concha Giordano, and Francisco Javier Alarcón Castro; and the then-members of the Carabineros René Isidro Villarroel Sobarzo, José Harnoldo Ule Guineo, Gabriel Osvaldo Mejías Leyton, and Carlos Berríos Rodríguez to two 10-year prison sentences, as authors of the kidnappings and illegitimate coercion applied to the six victims.

In the civil sphere, the court accepted the filed lawsuit and ordered the treasury to pay a total compensation of $2,750,000,000 for moral damages to the victims' families.

War Council

In the sentence, Minister Mesa Latorre considered the following facts proven:

"A.- That on September 20, 1973, in the morning hours, a military contingent composed of members of the Army, Air Force, and Carabineros of Chile entered a property located in the commune of Fresia, known as 'Fundo El Toro,' proceeding to violently detain all the men who were there, keeping them detained for several hours, during which time they were subjected to illegitimate coercion (torture) and interrogations, all of which is recorded, among other evidence, in the statements of Patricio Arismendi Añazco (at pp. 61 and 93 of Volume I), Miriam Arismendi Añazco (at pp. 64 and 102 of Volume I), Juvenal Sánchez Guarda (at pp. 131, Volume I), Pablo Carrillo Aburto (at pp. 134 and 2492, Volumes I and V respectively), Guido Negrón Aburto (at pp. 136, 2263, and 312, Volumes I, V, and VIII respectively), Jorge Ovando Agüero (at pp. 138, 775, and 1391, Volumes I, II, and III respectively), Sergio Angulo Cárdenas (at pp. 142 and 581, Volumes I and II), Luis Lopetegui Santana (at pp. 423 and 1975, Volumes I and IV respectively), Graciela Vegas Soto (at p. 1224 of Volume V), who were witnesses, direct and/or hearsay, of what happened there. These facts were also described in the indictment of page 1293 and following (Volume III) dated February 26, 2016, issued by Minister Leopoldo Vera Muñoz and confirmed by the Illustrious Court of Appeals of Puerto Montt at page 1507 (Volume IV).

B.- That in the facts described above, the following participated as apprehenders: René Villarroel Sobarzo, Osvaldo Mejías Leyton, Fernando Concha Giordano, Edinson Chávez Gallardo, Francisco Alarcón Castro, Jaime Serra García, Carlos Berríos Rodríguez, José Ule Guinero, as indicated in the report prepared by Captain Eugenio Covarrubias, found at page 2 of military file No. 11/73, a report that also mentions José Luis Felmer Klenner, Óscar Arismendi Medina, Francisco del Carmen Avendaño Bórquez, Mario César Torres Velásquez, and José Mario Cárcamo Garay as guerrillas captured in this operation, and the list of weapons supposedly found on that occasion.

C.- That subsequent to what is related in letter A, a group of the detainees was transferred to the Fresia Police Station, while Mario César Torres Velásquez, José Mario Cárcamo Garay, Francisco del Carmen Avendaño Bórquez, Óscar Arismendi Medina, José Luis Felmer Klenner, and José Antonio Barría Barría (persons executed by order of the War Council) were transferred to the city of Puerto Montt, where they remained detained at the Investigative Police headquarters for approximately one month, as can be inferred, among other evidence, from statements made by Gladys Arismendi Añazco (at pages 62, 99, and 563, of Volumes I and II), Miriam Arismendi Añazco (at pages 101, 1961, and 2291 of Volumes I, IV, and V respectively), Blanca Cárcamo Garay (at pages 86 and 72, of Volumes I and II), Luis Gallardo (at page 3145 of Volume VIII), and Jaime Benítez Sepúlveda (at page 3289 of Volume VIII). In such statements, the poor condition in which these men were found, as a result of the torture suffered, is also noted.

D.- That continuing with what happened, the 6 men mentioned above, along with other civilians, were placed at the disposal of the Military Prosecutor's Office in wartime of Puerto Montt, initiating case file No. 11/73 (added to this process and viewed at page 72, Volume I), on September 23, 1973.

Later, on October 11, 1973, a War Council was convened, which was composed of Colonel Rubén Rojas (Deceased. Death certificate at page 3364 of Volume VIII), Group Commander Renato Valenzuela (Deceased.

Death certificate at page 3368 of Volume VIII), Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo Partarrieu Navarrete (Deceased. Death certificate at page 3363 of Volume VIII), Frigate Captain Osvaldo Schwarzenberg, Major Patricio Lira Atkinson (Deceased.

Death certificate at page 3367 of Volume VIII), and Squadron Commander Fernando Roca Meroz (Deceased. Death certificate at page 3366 of Volume VIII) as members, and integrated as ad-hoc auditor of the Air Force, Squadron Commander Patricio Rodríguez Encalada, all of which is recorded at page 84 of the aforementioned military file.

E.- That the aforementioned War Council issued a conviction against Mario César Torres Velásquez, José Mario Cárcamo Garay, Francisco del Carmen Avendaño Bórquez, Óscar Arismendi Medina, José Luis Felmer Klenner, and José Antonio Barría Barría, sentencing them to the death penalty for the responsibility they bore as authors of the crime of treason contemplated in article 248 No. 2 of the Code of Military Justice (Pages 92 to 97 of military file 11-73).

Such sentence was executed on October 19, 1973, at 9:00 a.m., at the facilities of the Chilean Air Force, located in the Chamiza sector of the city of Puerto Montt (Page 101 of military file 11-73), with the 6 aforementioned convicts dying at the scene, as recorded in death certificates at pages 14, 17, 19, 22, 54, 187, 758, and in the statements of Carlos Humberto Ovando Méndez (page 424 of Volume I), who transported the lifeless bodies to a FACH van; of Juan Carlos Poloni (page 966 of Volume II), who was responsible for verifying the death of the convicts on the day of the execution; and of Luis Eduardo Garrido Quiroz (page 146 of Volume I), who examined the bodies and issued the respective death certificates.

F.- That the aforementioned sentence refers to the vague statements of the prisoners, statements which, as a result of the mistreatment received by them, make their words implausible due to the conditions in which the detainees were found, said War Council being then a predetermined act without foundation to end the lives of these detainees, because as recorded, among other evidence, in the statements of José Purralef (pp. 95, 2518, and 2719, Volumes I, V, and VI, respectively), Juvenal Sánchez Guarda (pp. 131, 224, all Volume I), Eugenio Covarrubias (p. 338 Volume I), María Langenbech (p. 2289, Volume V), Carlos Berríos Rodríguez (pp. 3405 to 3407 and 3420 to 3421 vta., all of Volume IX), the prisoners did not possess the quantity and types of weapons detailed in the file, nor is it true that they were guerrillas.

G.- That according to the statements of the defendants' defense attorney, Mr. Hugo Ocampo Paniagua (pp. 105, 569, 572 of Volumes I and III respectively), an adequate defense could not be developed in the case since he was not allowed the necessary time for it (2 days), nor could he become familiar with the facts as he could never have direct contact with the defendants for an interview, adding that he could perceive a series of contradictions in the statements of the detainees, so the defense by a single lawyer was something laughable.

To the above, he adds that they were sentenced by making an aberrant retroactive application of D.L. No. 5 (Declares that the State of Siege decreed due to internal commotion must be understood as 'State or time of War'), as it significantly increased the penalties of Law 17.798, on arms control, since in its art. 3, this Decree Law adds the death penalty to crimes that were only sanctioned with imprisonment, all with the flagrant contradiction of the norm contained in article 11 of the Political Constitution in force at that time, which states 'No one can be condemned, if not legally tried and by virtue of a law promulgated before the act on which the trial falls,' and that contained in the first paragraph of article 18 of the Penal Code, which in its text in force at the time of the investigated events states 'No crime shall be punished with any penalty other than that indicated by a law promulgated prior to its perpetration.' This defense attorney indicated that there was a preconceived determination to feign a formal process, without granting the accused an effective and real opportunity for defense, despite the severity of the proposed penalties. Regarding the latter, it is necessary to recall what was stated by Ernesto Jhan Barrera at page 1388 (Volume III), where he testifies to having received the order to prepare personnel for the execution of the victims before the War Council was held.

H.- That it should be noted that from the reading of file 11-73, it was initiated for the crime of infringement of the arms control law and article 248 of the Code of Military Justice. In relation to the facts that have the beginning of execution on September 15, 1973, according to consideration 2 of the sentence.

Now, the government junta issued D.L. No. 3 on September 11, which declared a state of siege for the entire country, published on September 18 of that year. Subsequently, D.L. No. 5 was issued on September 12, but its validity is from September 22, 1973.

This D.L. established that the State of Siege decreed due to internal commotion must be understood as 'State or time of War' and also increased the penalties of the arms control law. Without prejudice to what has already been stated in the preceding letters regarding the simulation of the War Council for the purposes of executing the aforementioned victims, the sentence of the military file in motive 5th typifies the facts against the defendants of that time, in the penal type of art. 248 No. 2 (which stated 'Shall incur the penalty of major imprisonment in its maximum degree to death: 2nd He who, in case of war and with the purpose of favoring the enemy or harming Chilean troops, commits an action or omission that is not included in the preceding articles nor constitutes another crime expressly penalized by the laws') and for this it indicates 'That although it is true that the accused formed a militia or militarily organized group, it is no less true that their purpose and resolution are constituted by acts that had the precise purpose of harming Chilean troops in time of war as can be inferred from the invoked statements...'. More specific is the sentence in motive 2, which expressed 'That according to the merit of considerations 10 and 11 and especially to what is provided in articles 418 and 419 of the Code of Military Justice already cited, it is evident that finding the Republic in a state of war and the Chilean troops being in front of the enemy from the very moment or instant in which they undertook the security services against those guerrilla organizations and even more so the very actions of submission and reduction of those same adversaries paramilitarily prepared in order to avoid greater damages than those already caused by the action of these, it is sufficiently demonstrated that the Chilean troops are in front of the enemy.'

I.- That given what was described above by normative hierarchy article 11 of the Political Constitution of 1925 cited above and by specialty of article 18 of the Penal Code, a law pronounced subsequently that allows applying a type or a higher penalty cannot be applied to the detriment of the prosecuted or sentenced person.

In this case, as the state of war was declared, the penal type of article 248 cited above was applied to the detriment of the sentenced. If the state of war had not been declared, this penal type could not have been applied.

It is in that sense that a violation of the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law occurs insofar as it harms the prosecuted and violates the superior norm of the order of the time, which was article 11 of the Political Constitution. In any case, as has been said in the previous letters, the War Council was only a form or a bad example of what is due process.

J.- That in the same line of reasoning, one must also keep in mind what was stated by Carlos Ebensperger at page 1290 (Volume III), in that he pointed out to the general that since the commission of this crime was prior to the date on which the state of war was decreed, the norms of this state could not be applied to it, much less the firing squad, relating that for such a comment the general was extremely annoyed and at the end of September, he exonerated him for treason to the fatherland, professional ineptitude, and lack of military courage.

K.- That the participants of this War Council, despite having been pointed out by the defense attorney the violation of the Political Constitution of the Republic that was being incurred and being the physical, procedural, and psychic condition of the accused manifest, obvious, and serious, acted in a predetermined manner and without analyzing the merit of the procedure nor the constitutional and legal norms described above, nor what had been pointed out to the general by prosecutor Ebensperger (a person specialized in the matter), approving the death penalty for the accused, without making any objection, so it only remains to qualify that as homicide.

L.- That having performed the preceding analyses, there is no doubt that everything done there was only a staging to fulfill its objective, which was to execute the detainees identified above, which happened, as recorded in the certification on page 101 of file 11-7.

M.- That in addition to what was stated above, one must consider the tendency of the time, which relates to using military tribunals in times of war to justify repressive actions without foundation. In this aspect, the report of the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture, the 'War Councils' (added at pages 3307 to 3313 of Volume VIII) concluded that in them the character and rights of the prisoners were not respected, nor were any of the precepts established in international conventions on war considered. 'In effect, they limited themselves to receiving and recording information contrary to the accused, omitting all action or diligence that could benefit and exculpate them, even though it was their duty to investigate the truth of the facts and gather the information that would serve to prove them.'

N.- That also based on what was pointed out above, the Most Excellent Supreme Court has ruled regarding War Councils held at the time of the investigated events, invalidating them through the appeal for review, in cases file No. 27.543-16, No. 1488-20, No. 4176-2019, and No. 6889-2019, whose simple copies are attached to this process from pages 2104 to 2171 (Volume V), from pages 3166 to 3185 (Volume VIII), from pages 3475 to 3487 (Volume IX), and from pages 3488 to 3500 (Volume IX), respectively."

Source: pjud.cl, December 13, 2023