Luis Alberto Barraza Ruhl, single, employee, former Army Non-Commissioned Officer, and member of President Salvador Allende’s Presidential Guard, was detained by agents of the SIM (Military Intelligence Service) on October 29, 1973, on a public street while he was heading to the Estación Mapocho in Santiago to meet his mother, who was arriving from Illapel.

Barraza left his job at SEAM CORFO at 15:00 hours that day, heading toward the station, and was detained along the way.

That same day, Barraza telephoned his aunt, Guillermina Rhul Parodi, who lived in Las Condes, informing her that he had been detained by military personnel and was being held in Peldehue, and he asked her to come and get him.

Immediately, Nelly Ruth Parodi and Eduardo Cortés O'Ryan, relatives of Barraza, went to Peldehue, where the Officer of the Guard denied that the individual in question was being held at that facility.

According to his father's testimony, presented during the legal proceedings: "The following day, I went personally, along with my aforementioned relatives, to the Paratrooper School in Peldehue (Colina). There, we spoke with the guard, who told us that my son had been released that morning for a period of 5 days, at the end of which he was to return to the School."

"Six days later, three military men—two Sergeants and a Lieutenant—arrived at my son's home at Calle Rioseco 0222 and asked for my son. We replied that he had been detained and, despite the response we were given at the School, he had not appeared at the house.

The Sergeant, who identified himself as Domingo Cortés, belonging to the Paratrooper School, told me that he knew my son very well, having been his instructor." ... "Likewise, the aforementioned Sergeant repeated the story that my son had been granted a 5-day leave to retrieve valuable documents that he had in his possession, that the deadline had already passed, and that the boy had not returned."

"Given how implausible this information seemed to me, I questioned the military men, pointing out that I never believed this story, since the normal procedure, had my son been detained, would have been to escort him to the place where the 'valuable documents' were kept.

They said they would file the necessary reports. On two or three more occasions, the military men returned to my son's house asking for him."

Barraza had been a Second Corporal in the Army's Paratrooper and Special Forces School, from which he was discharged due to "Service Needs" on April 30, 1970, as recorded in the Service Certificate from the General War Archive dated August 5, 1971.

However, other individuals indicated that in 1970, David Héctor González Venegas, Javier Enrique Sobarzo Sepúlveda, Julio Antonio Martínez Lara, Enrique Alfonso Toledo Garay, Alberto Arnoldo Ampuero Angel, and Jorge Vicente Piérola Piérola had also been discharged, accused of being members of the Socialist Party.

Of these individuals, Martínez and Ampuero were victims of political executions. Toledo, Sobarzo, Piérola, and Barraza remain in the status of forcibly disappeared.

Barraza was a member of the GAP, which was the personal security team for the President of the Republic, Mr. Salvador Allende Gossens.

Since October 29, 1973, when he called his relatives to inform them that he was being detained, Luis Alberto Barraza Ruhl has remained forcibly disappeared.

JUDICIAL AND/OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

On March 3, 1974, a writ of amparo (habeas corpus) was filed on behalf of the affected party, which was entered into the Santiago Court of Appeals under case number 423-74.

On October 25, 1974, the writ of amparo was rejected by the First Chamber of the aforementioned Court. Along with this ruling, the court forwarded the records to the Criminal Justice system.

On March 25, 1977, a complaint for Presumed Misfortune (Presunta Desgracia) was filed with the Tenth Criminal Court, entering the case under number 4.785-6. This Court declared itself incompetent and sent the records to the Third Criminal Court of Greater Jurisdiction, where the records were lost after being registered as case number 128.346-6 on September 25, 1978.

The respective judge ordered the requested investigative steps to be carried out.

On October 6, 1978, the Minister of the Interior at the time, Mr. Sergio Fernández Fernández, sent confidential Official Letter 3587, which states: "...there is no order or resolution from this Ministry, nor has there ever been one, that affects the aforementioned citizen...".

The father and other relatives presented statements to the Judge describing the circumstances of the detention.

Sub-commissioner Luis Landeros Briones submitted a report to the Court summarizing his investigations, which consisted of taking statements from Barraza's father and relatives. The Legal Medical Institute and the prisons provided negative information, as they had no records of Barraza. Furthermore, all other inquiries made by the Sub-commissioner yielded no positive results.

On November 30, 1978, after reiterating the request for records, Lieutenant Colonel Hernán Saldes Irarrázabal, Director of the Paratrooper School, reported that "...in this Institute, there are no records of any kind regarding the arrest of Mr. Luis Alberto Barraza Ruhl."

On June 30, 1979, the case records were sent to the Visiting Minister, Mr. Servando Jordán López, who ordered that information be requested from the Paratrooper School, SEAM CORFO (where the forcibly disappeared person worked), the Immigration Department, and the Civil Registry and Identification Service, and the father of the forcibly disappeared person was notified to appear and testify again.

The requested information was made available to the Court, which allowed for the verification that the affected party had not died, had not left the country, had not sought asylum, and that he did indeed exist, given his records at the Civil Registry and Identification Service.

The Ministry of National Defense reported that the affected party had indeed been a Second Corporal at the Army's Paratrooper School and that "in April 1970, he was discharged for engaging in subversive activities." It adds that in 1970, he appeared as a member of the personal defense corps of H.E. (His Excellency).

On November 9, 1979, the Minister closed the summary proceedings and sent the temporary dismissal of the case to the Court for consultation. On November 27, 1979, the Court of Appeals approved the dismissal of the case.

The anthropometric records of Luis Alberto Barraza Ruhl were attached to case 4449 AF of the 22nd Criminal Court of Santiago, regarding the crime of illegal burial in Patio 29 of the General Cemetery of unidentified persons who died between September and December 1973.

The Investigating Judge of the case ordered the excavation of 108 graves in September 1991. From there, 125 bodies were exhumed and sent to the Legal Medical Institute. Currently (late 1992), the forensic identification reports are pending.

Source: (Corporation Report)

With bittersweet feelings, I received the news of a well-deserved tribute to be held in memory of Bernardo Cortés Castro, Alonso Lazo Rojas, and Luis Alberto Barraza Ruhl, former students of the Liceo Domingo Ortiz de Rosas in my native Illapel.

I emphasize the "bittersweet" nature of this, considering the dramatic circumstances in which these three fighters for human freedom and dignity offered their lives during the dark days of the Pinochet dictatorship.

I knew Bernardo and Alonso very closely, as, in addition to being fellow students at the Liceo, we were part of the cultural group Aquelarre, along with Manuel Tricalloti, Mario Ramos Vicencio, and others whose names now lie in the depths of my past memory. To all of them, my first thought in this very special moment.

How can one forget the memorable days of those years, when our youth emanated strength and vigor for the sake of building a dignified and just society? Impossible. They were days of dreaming and sharing those dreams through literacy campaigns in the fields of Choapa, reciting poetry in recitals and radio programs, and performing theater and art exhibitions.

I remember very well when we staged “Revolación” in the Parish Hall of Illapel, a play inspired by the Cantata Santa María de Iquique by the group Quilapayún, with a full house that forced us to open new performances. I also remember the days of solidarity and volunteer work after the 1971 earthquake and the intense gatherings with which we planned many of our activities.

And suddenly, the hard and murderous blow of institutionalized barbarism arrived. The treacherous and cowardly coup of those who felt threatened in their petty interests. Bernardo fell in La Serena and Alonso in Copiapó.

To this day, nothing is known, not even where their bodies are located. That is why this tribute is so significant, and I join it from a distance, because as long as we remember them, they will not have died, much less disappeared.

It is our duty to ourselves and to future generations. The true transcendence of the human soul lies precisely in the defense of altruistic values such as justice and freedom, a defense that must necessarily pass through a fierce struggle against historical amnesia; where the same people as always still persist in silencing us with siren songs and alienation.

Source: davidnoticias.cl, May 15, 2019

Date: 05-15-2019

At the end of 1969, a conclave was held in which the left-wing coalition Unidad Popular, which grouped together socialists, communists, radicals, and other smaller organizations, designated Senator Salvador Allende, 62, as its presidential candidate for the fourth time.

He had to face two strong contenders: Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez, candidate of the National Party, and Radomiro Tomic of the Christian Democrats.

The progress of the campaign revealed that Allende was increasing his chances of reaching the presidency. This brought about increasing degrees of polarization, which were evident in the rallies, marches, and other activities where the crowds of people and the rivalries created situations that put the physical integrity of the leftist candidate at risk.

At that time, the Unidad Popular candidate had a Peugeot car, which was not very suitable for traveling to agricultural regions where the roads were in poor condition. Enrique Huerta Corvalán (“Kique”), a friend of the Allende family, especially of Taty, owned an American taxi that he had not used because he had been outside of Chile.

In a meeting, Taty commented that her father did not have a suitable car for the campaign; Enrique told her that he was willing to lend his car. Allende gave his approval, and Enrique Huerta began working as his driver.

In most of the electoral campaign activities, the Unidad Popular candidate was accompanied by his private secretary, Osvaldo Puccio (father); on some occasions, Jaime Suárez, Augusto Olivares (“Perro”), and Eduardo Paredes (“Coco”) also went with him.

These people had a personal friendship with Salvador Allende. They were the ones who, in an artisanal way, began to carry out a rudimentary personal protection service.

Some of the candidate's friends, such as “Coco” Paredes and “Perro” Olivares, were seasoned socialist cadres. They handled techniques of checks and counter-checks, which allowed them to verify if they were victims of stalking or other forms of surveillance.

Although the electoral activities were carried out normally, as the possibilities of an Allende victory increased, fear of an attack arose in this group of friends, mainly during trips to the provinces. The phrase they constantly repeated to show their concern was: “Someone has to take care of Allende, who is only going around with Enrique.”

Thus, fearing an attack, the need arose to create an organization that would provide the candidate with effective personal protection. Taty was the most interested in having this group materialize, as in her trips to Havana she had verified the efficiency that the Cubans had in that matter.

When Allende's close associates analyzed the situation, they agreed that it was necessary to contact the members of the National Liberation Army of Bolivia (ELN-B), since the Socialist Party did not have many militarily prepared cadres.

The National Liberation Army of Bolivia (ELN-B) was created by Commander Ernesto Che Guevara in the Bolivian mountains on March 25, 1967. Shortly after, and to collaborate in that effort, the Chilean section was created.

Its leader was the journalist Elmo Catalán. It was mostly formed by PS militants. In practice, it acted as a faction of the party. Allende's closest friends had known the “elenos” (members of the ELN-B, Chilean section) since the time they were medical students.

Taty had established a sincere friendship with them and on some occasions carried out activities in the organization's logistics support unit.

In mid-1970, a group of Chileans who had participated in the Teoponte guerrilla focus returned to the country from the Bolivian mountains. Among them stood out a young man named Francisco Gómez, whose battle name in the group was “Fernando.” He had been head of security for the Special Troops officer of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior, Dariel Alarcón Ramírez (Benigno), one of the survivors of the group of guerrillas who fought in Bolivia under the command of Ernesto Che Guevara. “Fernando” was specially trained as a bodyguard; he was an excellent marksman and an expert in martial arts.

Together with Benigno, they traveled through Europe and Latin America, carrying out confidential missions commissioned by the highest Cuban leadership, among them, the clandestine transfer of both to the Bolivian mountains to continue the guerrilla insurgency of the National Liberation Army of Bolivia.

We estimate that because of the experience “Fernando” possessed as an escort, he was commissioned by “Agustín,” commander of the National Liberation Army of Bolivia, Chilean section, to work with Allende in order to implement the first professional security service.

At the beginning, only “Fernando” and “Kique” (Enrique Huerta Corvalán) acted, helped by the candidate's friends who accompanied him to his campaign presentations. Later, they were joined by: 1) “Carlos Álamos” (Jaime Sotelo), former leader of the copper workers of the El Salvador mine.

In 1966, he had been imprisoned for his participation in the events that ended with the death of several workers at the mine. When he was released from prison, he joined the “elenos.” Later, he traveled to Cuba, where he was trained in rural and urban combat. 2) “Luisito” (Félix Vargas Fernández), from a mining family in Copiapó, a member of the Socialist Party and an eleno, fought in Bolivia; he had active participation in the rescue of the Cuban guerrillas who were escaping after the death of Che Guevara. 3) “Bruno” (Domingo Blanco Tarres), and 4) “Manuel” (Enrique Ramos), a young worker, socialist, and eleno, who was a civilian aide-de-camp to President Allende. The first members of the GAP were elenos, still young, some belonging to the Socialist Party. The brains of the GAP were, in addition to the President's daughter (Taty), “Coco” Paredes, “Agustín,” and Rolando Calderón.

The first custody activities were circles to prevent Allende from being attacked in any tumult; maintaining surveillance over the car in which they were traveling; when it remained parked, trying to detect if they were being followed; and checking the food and drinks consumed.

A short time later, the MIR militants appeared on the scene.

The Cuban Revolution in 1959 and the electoral defeat of Salvador Allende in 1964 spurred a process of radicalization of important sectors of the Chilean left.

In 1964, a group of young students from the University of Concepción, militants of the Socialist Youth Federation (FJS), withdrew from the organization and formed the Revolutionary Marxist Vanguard (VRM).

The following year, on August 14 and 15, 1965, the Revolutionary Unity Congress was held. A hundred delegates attended, who approved a series of political theses, elected a Central Committee of 21 members, and designated Dr. Enrique Sepúlveda as chief. The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) had emerged.

Its main objective was to organize itself “to be the Marxist-Leninist vanguard of the working class and of the oppressed and exploited masses of Chile, who seek to break their chains of more than 150 years, fighting for the national and social emancipation that will lead them to socialism and communism.” In the fifth point of the founding declaration, it proposed “an audacious revolutionary policy capable of opposing this cynical imperialist violence with a virile and haughty response from the armed masses...”.

The new movement was extremely clear in its postulates; it defined itself as the armed vanguard of the oppressed classes; consistent with this, it was going to develop its strategy of confrontation with the bourgeoisie and the State.

In 1967, two years after its founding, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) held its Third Congress to evaluate its development. In the event, the organization was purged. The group that until that moment had control—the Trotskyist doctor Enrique Sepúlveda as secretary general, Eugenio Cossio, and Clotario Blest—was displaced.

The leadership was assumed by a group of young people from Concepción, headed by Luciano Cruz, Sergio Zorrilla, Edgardo Enríquez (“El Pollo”), Bautista von Schouwen (“Bauchi”), Jorge Fuentes Alarcón (“Trostko”), Andrés Pascal Allende (“El Pituto”), Humberto Sotomayor (“Tonio”), Nelson Gutiérrez (“El Guatón”), and Miguel Enríquez.

The latter became the most important leader. As head of the clandestine units, Arturo Villavela (“Coño Aguilar”) assumed the role. The control of the new organization by the young people meant an acceleration in the implementation of the armed strategy.

The year 1969 marked the intensification of the line of confrontation with the Christian Democratic government of Eduardo Frei Montalva. Commandos of the organization carried out assaults on banking entities, such as the branch of the Banco del Trabajo in the Vega Central neighborhood, which they attacked twice.

The confrontation intensified, especially since the humiliation that MIR students inflicted on the right-wing journalist Hernán Osses Santa María, of the Concepción newspaper Las Últimas Noticias de la Tarde. This fact allowed the government to initiate a persecution against the movement, which had to go underground.

That same year, internal differences arose in the organization. A group of them that criticized the line of approaching the mass fronts proposed by the leadership withdrew from the MIR. The splinter group constituted the Movimiento Manuel Rodríguez 2 (MR-2).

Among its main leaders were “El Rafa” and the journalist for the MIR newspaper, El Rebelde, Jorge Silva Luvecce. After the assaults on the Portofino Supermarket, on Calle Irarrázaval, and the Armería Italiana, this organization was dismantled and its members imprisoned.

Shortly before the elections of September 4, 1970, while the MIR was underground, a meeting of capital importance took place between Miguel Enríquez and Salvador Allende. The meeting was held in a Socialist Party safe house, which the MIR also used, located in the eastern area of Santiago.

To reach the residence, Salvador Allende was transported, in a maximum-security operation, by different cars to different points of the city, because, apparently, they feared the reaction of the people if it became known that the Unidad Popular presidential candidate was meeting with the guerrilla chief most wanted by the Chilean police.

There, the presidential candidate expressed his annoyance at the armed actions carried out by the MIR, which were used by the pro-right-wing press and caused damage to his campaign. Miguel Enríquez maintained that they did not do “recoveries” because they liked it, but because they needed the money to maintain the organization.

Allende promised to give the MIR 80,000 dollars (of the time) before the end of 1970. In turn, Allende asked Miguel Enríquez to take charge of his personal security. In the Political Commission, the miristas had already debated it and were in agreement.

When the MIR arrived to reinforce Salvador Allende's security group, probably before Congress ratified the victory obtained in the presidential elections of September 4, 1970, a collegiate leadership was created with a representative from the MIR and one from the Socialist Party.

In turn, the following members of the MIR joined the GAP: “Ariel Fontana” (Max Marambio), who had experience in that type of activity and assumed the role of head of the device, replacing the first person in charge, “Fernando.”

The main reasons for this fact have to do with the fact that “Ariel Fontana,” due to his origin—the son of a socialist deputy—had mixed with a part of the Chilean bourgeoisie from a young age, especially that linked to the left.

That allowed him to have a handling of “situations” that most of the other members did not possess. “Ariel Fontana” managed to fulfill his mission of accompanying Allende to all places, for example, to military garrisons, the Military School, or the Naval School, and when the soldiers who were on guard duty blocked his way, he would naturally and with great authority push them aside and enter.

Other members of the presidential escort could not do that easily.

Also incorporated into the GAP were the MIR members Sergio Pérez, Néstor Gallardo Agüero “Bolche,” and the former Army Special Forces commandos Mario Melo Pradenas and Luis Barraza Rhul. Probably Jorge Vicente Piérola and Julio Martínez Lara also joined.

We estimate that with the incorporations into the GAP of paratrooper soldiers who had been expelled from the Army for being recognized Marxists, Allende gave a clear signal that within the armed bodies of the State he could count on significant support. At the same time, for the anti-Marxist officers of the Army, it was a warning that it would not be easy for them to attack his person.

The elections of September 4 were held with absolute normality, and in them, Salvador Allende achieved a relative victory. The following period was one of uncertainty about the future, since, according to the current constitutional order, it was Congress in full that had to decide between the two first relative majorities.

To prevent Congress from ruling in favor of Allende, who had obtained the first relative majority, a group of extremists linked to the right and the former general Roberto Viaux tried to kidnap the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General René Schneider. The latter, upon resisting and attempting to draw his service revolver, was mortally wounded by the inexperience of the kidnappers.

We believe that this event was decisive for the constitution of the Group of Personal Friends (GAP). Certainly, if the right attacked the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, it could also attack the President.

In the attack on Schneider, the GAP found its foundational argument: the socialist President of Chile could only entrust his security to a group formed by people of his trust, who were absolutely loyal to him.

The first GAPs followed President Allende everywhere aboard a Volkswagen van. They carried revolvers, pistols, shotguns, and Winchester rifles, obtained by Osvaldo Puccio, by some friends of the President, and, to a lesser extent, by the MIR.

In one of the group's first outings, while they were in a neighborhood, an inquisitive journalist who was watching the armed young men who did not separate from the President—who were clearly not from the Investigative Police and who were rumored to be miristas—asked Allende who they were; and he, in one of his typical responses, replied, “they are some personal friends.” That is where the name was born.

From that moment on, they would be known by the press as the Group of Personal Friends (GAP). They traveled through the streets at high speed, showing the barrels of their weapons in a threatening manner, without the safeties on, prepared to fire at the slightest suspicion of an attack.

The secrecy in which they moved, without their real names or their origin being known, made them famous, loved, and hated.

On November 12, 1970, shortly after having assumed the leadership of the nation, President Allende decided to withdraw the proceedings for violation of the State Internal Security Law that affected 30 leftist militants, who had been apprehended, accused of carrying out guerrilla actions during the mandate of Eduardo Frei, and who until that moment remained detained.

The President's argument was that they deserved the presidential withdrawal, as they were only idealistic young people. Some of them, when they left prison, joined the Group of Personal Friends. We believe that with these new additions, the physiognomy of the organization in its first stage was complete.

It was then a small escort formed by four miristas and some socialists, which in no case exceeded 20 people.

We have said that one of the people who worried most about the President's security was Taty Allende. She was known in the highest spheres of the Cuban regime, not only as Allende's daughter but also as a true revolutionary.

Through her contacts, she requested Cuban support for the Group of Personal Friends (GAP). This aid materialized in two ways: the sending of officers from the Ministry of the Interior (Minit) and the Ministry of the Armed Forces (Minfar) of Cuba, experts in matters of protection of personalities, to advise the Allende escort and support their work in the field; and the specialization in the Caribbean nation of several contingents of the GAP.

“We prepared some people [...] for personal security in which we had experience, because we had had to defend ourselves [...] from those who wanted to liquidate us. And that experience we transmitted to the one we thought had enemies, who could try to attack [...] his life.” We believe that for the Cuban administration, this was important, as it allowed it to penetrate the President's environment, increasing its influence in the new revolution, and at the same time prepare the security for the visit that Fidel Castro would make during 1971.

One of the first Cubans to arrive in Chile to perform that task had the surname Riveros.

At that time, a group of ten people, formed among others by “Bruno” and “Manuel,” embarked for Cuba to specialize in the task of protecting the life of President Allende and his environment. The course lasted 15 days; they mainly carried out personal defense training and some issues related to security. Subsequently, at the end of 1972, a similar group traveled to take the same course.

The practice of sending people to Cuba to train them in paramilitary and personal security activities seems to have been quite frequent, even until the end of the government. In July 1973, a large contingent of Socialist Party militants landed in Havana.

There, they were informed that their mission was to acquire the necessary knowledge to join the Group of Personal Friends upon their return. They opposed this, as when they left, they were informed that they were going to receive preparation in rural and urban guerrilla tactics. When the coup d'état occurred, they were still in Havana.

For security reasons, Fidel Castro's arrival in Chile was only announced two days in advance, without mentioning the place of arrival, a reflection of the concern for his security and that of Salvador Allende. By that date, the young people who participated in the first instruction course had already returned from Cuba to join the presidential security device.

Fidel Castro sent a large contingent to take charge of his security, as well as that of the Cuban diplomatic personnel serving in the country. In command of the group came Antonio de la Guardia, accompanied by several members of the Special Troops corps, as they are known there, the equivalent of the American Green Berets.

They made contact with the Group of Personal Friends and together created a contingency plan that would allow them to successfully fulfill their mission.

The GAP was divided into two escorts; one had to be with Allende, and the other would join Fidel Castro's guards, forming a mixed group.

On the journey that both leaders made from Pudahuel airport in an open car, we note that aboard the car, “Carlos Álamos” and the Cuban officer Riveros were watching attentively.

We estimate that this event was one of the most significant aspects of the entire historical course of the Group of Personal Friends (GAP). It was their trial by fire, a sign of trust in the loyalty of its members and in their professionalism and operational capacity.

It is difficult for the situation to have been repeated on other occasions where a leader as jealous of his integrity as Fidel Castro would allow a significant part of his protection to be carried out by men who were not from his escort. Furthermore, it is a good indicator to visualize the close relations existing between the security apparatuses of Allende and Castro.

In the rest of the extensive visit of the Cuban leader, we have not collected particular facts that have demanded special actions on the part of Salvador Allende's security apparatus. In the activities where the Chilean President did not participate, the protection of Fidel Castro was in charge of the mixed escort.

In the visit to the port of Valparaíso, the government created, with trusted militants of the Unidad Popular parties, security brigades, which, mixed with the public, monitored the development of the activities.

Upon returning to their country, Fidel's escort, which had brought a larger quantity of weapons than they usually transported, left an important part in Chile, returning with the minimum armament to ensure the integrity of Commander Castro. In the country remained RPG-7 rocket launchers, AKA-47 rifles, pistols, and submachine guns, in addition to a large quantity of ammunition.

We believe that this donation was one of the greatest contributions of Cuban weapons to the Chilean left in the period of the Unidad Popular. Part of them became part of the GAP's arsenal; another was incorporated into the stock of the Socialist Party's military apparatus.

It is possible that, due to Allende's opposition, they did not give weapons to the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). However, as at that stage the miristas controlled the presidential security group, they also indirectly had access to them.

Subsequently, when the President of the Republic of Cuba, Osvaldo Dorticós, visited Chile, he was escorted by GAP agents.

The expulsion of the MIR

The way in which “Ariel Fontana” treated the young people of the device was the cause of innumerable difficulties, mainly with the militants of the Socialist Party and with those with more experience in the function they performed.

The men stopped trusting him and began to put difficulties in the fulfillment of orders. With the intention of overcoming these difficulties quickly, the MIR sent “Tonio” (Humberto Sotomayor), a member of the Political Commission, to assume the leadership in place of “Ariel Fontana.”

The institutionalization of President Allende's civilian armed guard in national life made it possible for the MIR to carry out a series of covert activities, under the guise of providing protection to the President and his residences.

The organization implemented true paramilitary training courses. The classes were taught with the “help of Cuban officers.” Indeed, the GAP leadership used the facilities built in El Cañaveral, where it had a small training field, and the shooting ranges of the Carabineros Corps in La Reina to impart guerrilla knowledge, which included shooting practice.

We believe that the use of police facilities was possible because it was the President's guard and Carabineros depended directly on the Ministry of the Interior; furthermore, Carabineros was the armed institution most loyal to the President. This is proof of the legal ambiguity in which the GAP operated.

Numerous MIR cadres who had no relationship with the GAP visited the facilities, receiving instruction.

instructions regarding the use of weapons and conspiratorial techniques and tactics. It is possible that around 1,000 MIR militants passed through the El Cañaveral facilities. Give or take a few, the significant point is that those who received this instruction were militants who acquired the basic knowledge to lead and instruct other members of the organization.

What was truly important is that each of the MIR militants could form and lead a combat cell of more or less five people. This indicates that the GAP in that period was not only a device for Allende’s security, but at the same time a school for training combatants.

In other words, the GAP could have been the seed of a revolutionary army. One of the fundamental premises for security groups to successfully carry out their work is to have no weak flanks. From that perspective, the action that the MIR developed within the GAP strengthened its combat capacity but increased the risk of infiltration in Allende’s inner circle.

At that stage, some members of the group began to carry out “private financing” actions. These actions were robberies where the money did not go to the movements or leftist parties, but into the pockets of those who executed them.

GAP members who later left the organization without turning in their credentials carried out these operations and “when they were caught, they appeared as people from the GAP.” An event that illustrates the actions of the device at that stage was the one that occurred on Good Friday of 1972, in the town of Curimón, San Felipe department, Aconcagua province.

At dusk, a Chevrolet pickup truck, driven in a state of intoxication by Fernando Amaya Sepúlveda, a GAP member and former paratrooper officer of the Army, who carried a credential identifying him as an official of the Presidency of the Republic (presidential security, mechanic), crashed into a public lighting pole.

Amaya was accompanied by Guillermo Pardo Tobar, a former commando of the Chilean Army, Mario Pérez, about whom no further data was known, and Óscar Delgado (“El Negro Puga”), also a former commando and paratrooper.

After the accident, the first two were arrested and in their possession were found maps of military installations, an army grenade (of Spanish origin), two magazines for a Garand rifle with 15 projectiles each, two magazines for pistols with eight bullets each, eighteen .45 caliber casings and 14 .32 caliber casings.

Mario Pérez and Óscar Delgado managed to escape. We believe they were participating in the search for Major Arturo Marshall, a former Black Beret of the Army, and, apparently, they were also carrying out an operational study of the area.

Marshall, according to rumors circulating among leftist militants, was serving as a military instructor for the nationalist front Patria y Libertad, and the MIR thought he was hiding in the Yungay regiment of San Felipe.

But all the effort was useless; they acted irresponsibly, they started drinking, they crashed. They were arrested, and the nature of the mission was discovered. They alerted Army intelligence, which already knew them, and left the GAP in a bad position, compromising President Allende.

Luis Guastavino, a Communist deputy for Valparaíso, maintained that it was an abnormal event that should be investigated because “when an ultra-left action is developed […] that action ends up serving the interests of the Right.” Criticism also broke out in the opposition, which could verify how members or former members of Allende’s escort, under its “protection,” carried out actions at odds with current legislation.

In this way, doubts were sown about the true nature and objectives of the Group of Personal Friends. In that framework, the Socialist Party decided to assume control of the presidential guard, to organize it and professionalize it.

The main Socialist arguments were that if the President was a militant of the party, it was logical that they should be in charge of his security; it was also stated that the GAP members could not operate autonomously because they were Socialist militants; finally, it was maintained that the party had professional people, of absolute trust and impeccable behavior.

Allende and his inner circle accepted, and “Tonio,” as well as the majority of the MIR militants, stopped being part of the Group of Personal Friends. However, the movement took half of the organization’s arsenal.

Among the stolen items were two recoilless cannons, some .30 and .50 caliber machine guns, AKA-47 rifles, and FAL rifles from the capitalist camp. The relationship of political trust between the MIR, the Unidad Popular, and President Allende had fractured.

This break is clearly seen in the confrontation between police and residents in Lo Hermida on August 5, 1972. Members of the MIR leadership denounced that some detectives had tortured residents arrested in the incident.

The complaint, directed specifically against “Coco” Paredes, Director of Investigations, and Carlos Toro, a Communist, Subdirector of Investigations, caused unrest in the governing coalition and in President Allende.

According to Víctor Toro, Communist sectors raised the need to repress the MIR. The MIR leadership pointed out that they should remember that the MIR kept half of the weapons of the Group of Personal Friends.

Days after the confrontation and the accusations, the President visited the Lo Hermida shantytown, but some members of the MIR and other groups like the USOPO, led by commander “Raúl” (Raúl Romo), tried to prevent him from entering.

A group from the GAP forced their way into the social hall and opened the door so that Allende could enter and speak with the residents, in order to learn their version of the event. However, Allende tried to maintain good relations with the MIR, as noted in a report by the Institute of Latin America of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which states that “Allende, despite some of his statements regarding the MIR, where he threatens them with reprisals, aspires rather to bring this organization under his control than to weaken or destroy it.” The GAP under the control of the Socialist Party The PS’s dream of directing the organization that had the mission of guaranteeing the security of its President, and that also possessed the largest amount of weapons and logistical resources, was fulfilled. We estimate that in mid-1972 Marcelo Schilling was appointed coordinator between the party, the Presidency of the Republic, and the Group of Personal Friends. Schilling, political commissar of the GAP, in the new structure had the mission of organizing the device, giving it political-ideological unity, and providing the professionalization required to fulfill its task. He had to avoid the errors of the MIR period, to transform the presidential security group into an efficient organization that would totally guarantee the integrity of the President of Chile. New members joined the GAP, all Socialist militants, of absolute trust of the party leadership and the Presidency of the Republic. The leadership was constituted by “Bruno” as the supreme head of the device, “Carlos Álamos” was in charge of the Presidential Escort section, “Mariano” (Francisco Argandoña) continued as head of the Advance Group, “Kique” (Enrique Huerta) continued at the head of logistics as Intendant of the La Moneda Palace, and “Aníbal” (Juan José Montiglio Murúa) also assumed a position in the leadership. The leaders implemented some measures tending to reinforce the security of the device, such as facilitating the change of residence of some members, in order to concentrate them in an area close to President Allende’s house on Tomás Moro street. Many were moved to the houses of a modest neighborhood (known as “CORVI settlements”), located only a few blocks from the presidential house, towards the mountain, in the La Reina commune. The gathering of GAP members in a nearby place allowed the leadership to have better control of the activities they did in their free time, avoiding behaviors dangerous to the security of the organization, licentious and far from good customs; at the same time, the greater proximity allowed them to quickly respond to alarm calls; finally, money was saved on transport. The main drawback of them being together was an increase in the possibilities of breaking compartmentalization. We estimate that under the control of the Socialist Party through “Bruno,” “Carlos Álamos,” “Mariano,” “Aníbal,” “Kique,” and the political leadership of “Gastón,” the Group of Personal Friends acquired its definitive physiognomy, becoming an organization dedicated to the custody of the President of the Republic, his family, and the residences. The degrees of efficiency increased, with its members professionalizing until they became an effective paramilitary organization, whose militants were trained to develop the diverse tasks that the revolutionary strategy demanded. They received their training in Chile, because those who “traveled to Cuba were few, it was not a massive issue.” They began to practice led by the people who did have training in those matters. Among the instructors, Mario Melo, a former paratrooper officer of the Chilean Army, stood out. Some Cubans also arrived to teach them how to drive the cars, but the GAP “had a very good driver, better than the Caribbean ones”; other people came who helped them train, but basically the knowledge was acquired in Chile. What they knew was not much, but they stood out clearly because “they were super dedicated, very rigorous, they were very good.” Most of the training, at this stage, just like in the previous one, was carried out on the small obstacle course at El Cañaveral and in the nearby hills. Every two months, a score of young people from all over the country tried to overcome the obstacles to enter the group: they had to be members of the Socialist Party, have had constant militancy, possess clarity of ideas, meet the necessary physical conditions, and have recommendations from some leader. The selection was carried out at El Cañaveral, sometimes with the presence of Allende. We estimate that the final decision to hire the new GAP members was taken by the group’s leadership, but the President, his daughter Taty, and Dr. Eduardo “Coco” Paredes significantly influenced it. Once recruited, they were sent to one of the three branches of the organization. Those who were not selected returned to their bases of origin, where they could apply the paramilitary knowledge acquired. The Group of Personal Friends (GAP) was in itself a revolutionary organization, because no president of Chile has had a group with similar characteristics and, furthermore, it had no recognition whatsoever within the legality then in force. At the beginning, a legal initiative was discussed so that its members could be hired as officials of the Investigative Police. This proposal did not materialize. The legitimacy of the group came only from the support that the President of the Republic gave it in practice. During the MIR stage, it depended exclusively on the Presidency. When the Socialist Party took control of the organization, it began to depend on the party and the Presidency. Although we do not know the exact way it was financed and the amount of money it spent monthly, we believe it obtained the necessary resources from the Presidency of the Republic and the Socialist Party; it is also possible that the Cuban government gave it money on some occasion. The GAP members only received a stipend, as they were sent to the organization by the Socialist Party on a service commission. Structure of the GAP From the beginning, the organization designed a structure divided into three specific sections: the Escort, the Advance Group, and the Garrison. The Presidential Escort section was the most numerous and important of the divisions that the device had. It was composed of about 20 men, almost half of all the members the GAP had. Its specific mission was to protect and drive President Allende to the places where he carried out his activities. To transport him, the Escort section had several Fiat brand cars, most of them blue; it also had some of other colors, in addition to pickup trucks. All vehicles had the carburetor adjusted to run at 200 kilometers per hour. Once the Escort was set in motion, it was generally formed by three GAP cars, plus some Carabineros and Investigations patrol cars. On occasions, they would put a fourth car of a different color, whose mission was to distract possible attackers. In the Fiat designated with the No. “1” traveled the President; he was accompanied by the head of the Escort and the military aide-de-camp on duty; if he was not there, a member of the group, called a civilian aide-de-camp, took his place. This person remained close to Allende, he should never separate from him; and in the event of an attack, he had to interpose his body to receive the first impact and enable the reaction of the security members. In the fulfillment of his mission, he carried a pistol and a submachine gun and did not “know” bulletproof vests. They possessed radio transmission equipment and mobile phones whose battery was transported in the trunk of the car; for that time, it was a great technological advance. The communications center was in Tomás Moro. From there they controlled the dispatches, which were encrypted, using numbers and letters. The codes changed every so often, to avoid them being known by the enemies. The Advance Group was the least known of the GAP divisions. This division, not very numerous, under the command of “Mariano” (Francisco Argandoña), had the mission of anticipating and taking possession of all the places that President Salvador Allende visited. It had to coordinate with the Carabineros and Investigations services all the initiatives that were necessary to safeguard the place. Regarding the activities of the Advance Group, we can relate the events of May 21, 1971, in Valparaíso. In the morning, the traditional parade in homage to the naval glories was taking place. Very early, the security of the regional Intendancy was alerted by an anonymous call; the voice warned that elements belonging to Patria y Libertad had installed explosives under the Prat pier, which would be detonated when Allende arrived at the place. Members of the GAP Advance Group and investigations agents participated in the search for the bomb, under the orders of the Head of Security of the Valparaíso Province Intendancy and Admiral José Toribio Merino. The threat turned out to be false. The third section of the Group of Personal Friends was known as the Garrison. It was divided into several groups of no more than six people. Each of the units had its own person in charge. This person depended directly on the central command of the device. Its mission was to provide guard and protection services to the residences of Tomás Moro, El Cañaveral, and the La Moneda Palace, where they guarded the offices of the Presidency of the Republic. To carry out their activities at the Tomás Moro house, they built several guard booths or sentry boxes. They carried handguns and occasionally rifles or submachine guns. A central point of the device was compartmentalization. When the young people entered the organization, they were given a Presidency of the Republic credential with their new identity, and the pseudonym by which they would be designated in the GAP. They received precise instructions about not knowing their companions, not frequenting their houses, not mixing their family members. The idea was that they should have as little contact as possible between them, because in that way they offered fewer weak points. These measures worked quite well, since in reality the members did not get to know each other. After the coup d’état, if they were arrested, it was impossible for them to betray their companions. The compartmentalization was effective; an example of this are the difficulties that the survivors have, joining pseudonyms and real names, to identify their comrades. Towards the end of the Allende government, when the staff had decreased and the possibilities of a coup d’état increased, many members chose to space out visits to their family members. Luisa Catalán, wife of “Pato,” states that he went to her house once a month, sometimes every 90 days, and told her that and did not want to compromise her in his activities. Some members of the organization and their relatives were treated by the doctors of the Presidency. They performed treatments at Tomás Moro, La Moneda, or the public hospitals where they worked. The doctors did not know the medical history or the real names of their patients.

Source: interferencia.cl, September 13, 2020

Date: 09-13-2020

Black Berets on the streets: quarantine, Espina-style

“We are throwing everything we have at it,” said the Minister of Defense, Alberto Espina, when announcing that the fearsome Black Berets of the Army’s Operations Brigade would be in charge of enforcing the curfew and the quarantine.

And with the clear intention of reinforcing—before the citizenry—the meaning and implication of his statement, he added: “they are the elite forces of the Army that are actively collaborating in patrolling the metropolitan region,” while highlighting the professionalism, capacity, and training of the troops.

Espina’s macabre remarks resonated in the country’s collective memory and revived the pain of the families and friends of those murdered during the dictatorship by members of the “Black Berets” Command.

The prisoners were taken to the Peldehue Military Camp. There, after having been “thrown on the grill” and subjected to “Operation Corvo,” they were thrown into the sea from helicopters. This is the case of the former Army lieutenant Mario Melo Pradenas and the former military paratroopers Jorge Pierola Pierola and Luis Barraza Ruhl, who had belonged to the Army Paratroopers and Special Forces School.

Perhaps many Chileans who, for various reasons, do not know this part of Chile’s history will ask themselves: Why did they kill them? At the end of 1969 and the beginning of 1970, after it was revealed that Mario, Jorge, and Luis sympathized with the ideas of the Socialist Party and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), the military command of the armed institution decided to expel them from its ranks.

Once outside the institution, they exercised their right to participate actively in the social and political process that was unfolding in the country following the election of President Allende. In that context, they chose to be part of the people’s social struggle and, therefore, became linked to organizations of workers, peasants, and students, among others.

The murder of the former military personnel reveals that the coup-plotting army had them in its sights.

YEAR 2020, TIMES OF PANDEMY

“We are throwing everything we have at it,” said Espina to explain that—now—in times of pandemic, those who violate the curfew and the quarantine in force in working-class neighborhoods would have to deal with the elite military commands.

The Minister of Defense’s harsh warning brought his political past back to the surface. Apparently, he has not been able to get out of his mind that day in 1988 when, by stamping a large YES, he bet on the permanence of the dictator Pinochet. “The vast majority of Chileans do not accept taking a leap into the void, as is the option of the NO, which every day is, more clearly, directed by the left, especially the Marxist sectors,” he declared at the time to the newspaper El Mercurio.

In October 2018, the rector of the Diego Portales University, Carlos Peña, referred in his column in El Mercurio to the Pinochet-supporting figures who hold high political positions in the Piñera government. “Those who voted Yes, including the current Minister of Justice, looked back—they saw the torture, the disappearances, the bloody abuses, and did not consider them serious enough to say No,” wrote Peña.

Meanwhile, a poster with the caption “No to the Black Berets on the Streets” is circulating on social media. “This is a health crisis, not a war. We do not need weapons or repression. We require masks, protective equipment for health workers, cleaning supplies, and soup kitchens,” the image states.

Another netizen who signs as José José Ortiz asks: “Black Berets on the Streets—are they protecting us or repressing us?” and under the image of Espina, he begins his post like this: “Delusional, retrograde, a Pinochet supporter through and through.”

Source: elclarin.cl, May 10, 2020

Date: 05-10-2020

Tribute to be paid to three former students of an Illapel high school who were victims of the dictatorship, more than 40 years later

On the occasion of its 70th anniversary, the Domingo Ortiz de Rozas establishment will unveil a commemorative plaque for students Alonso Lazo Rojas, Bernardo Cortés Castro, and Luis Barraza Ruhl, who were forcibly disappeared during the military regime.

As part of the celebration of its 70 years, this Friday, May 17, at the Liceo Domingo Ortiz de Rozas in Illapel, commemorative plaques will be unveiled as a way to pay tribute to three students of the establishment who were forcibly disappeared during the military dictatorship.

They are Alonso Lazo Rojas, Bernardo Cortés Castro, and Luis Barraza Ruhl. “As the only humanist-scientific institution that exists in the Choapa Province, we have the duty to highlight historical events that have occurred and that involve us,” said Jenny Vicencio Tapia, director of the high school. “Keeping memory alive” “We believe that this is a way to keep memory alive,” explains the director of the establishment, Jenny Vicencio Tapia, emphasizing that “as the only humanist-scientific institution that exists in the Choapa Province, we have the duty to highlight historical events that have occurred and that involve us,” she details. In that same vein, Claudio Olivares, the high school’s cultural coordinator, remarks that the anniversary celebration must necessarily be dedicated to those who lost their lives during the military regime, these three students who until now “were somewhat forgotten,” but who, thanks to the plaque, will be remembered by every new student who joins the school community. “I think it was an outstanding debt we had,” assures Olivares. Where does the idea come from? But where does the initiative come from? According to Claudio Olivares, during the 1960s, there was a cultural group called “Aquelarre” that had members in practically the entire Choapa Province. Alonso Lazo, Bernardo Cortés, and Luis Barraza Ruhl all belonged to this collective, which was mainly dedicated to disseminating literary works and producing a small newspaper named “Líder” for internal circulation within the high school, which eventually also reached other sectors of Illapel. After the military coup, the group operated clandestinely until it dissolved; however, its members did not stop being friends and were devastated when they learned of the fate of the three former students of the Liceo Domingo Ortiz de Rozas. When democracy returned, they got back together and called themselves the “ex-Aquelarre.” It was these former members who fought for the tribute to their companions, which will finally see the light of day this Friday. is the number of former high school students who will be honored after more than 40 years The honorees Of the three honorees, two, Alonso Lazo and Luis Barraza, are still in the status of forcibly disappeared, and in the case of Bernardo Cortés, he is categorized as a victim of political execution. They began to write their history together when they met in Illapel and formed the Aquelarre group, but they followed different paths after the coup and would never see each other again, as they all lost their lives in different places. Luis Alberto Barraza Ruhl was 27 years old when he was detained. He worked as a public servant and was a member of the Socialist Party. At one time, he was an Army non-commissioned officer and a member of Salvador Allende’s Presidential Guard, but he retired and had already moved to live in the Metropolitan Region when agents of the SIM (Military Intelligence Service) arrested him on October 29, 1973, on a public street while he was heading to the Mapocho Station in Santiago. For his part, Alonso Lazo, a militant of the MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left), was 24 years old and was studying Pedagogy in Spanish at the University of Chile, La Serena campus, when he was detained on November 14, 1975, in Copiapó, the city where he resided. Bernardo Cortés Castro, the only one who is in the status of a victim of political execution, was killed by Army personnel on April 5, 1974, at the Arica Regiment in La Serena. His capture had taken place the day before in Coquimbo. The body was never returned to the family.

Source: WAP.DIARIOELDIA.CL 05/15/2019

Date: 05-15-2019

Judge Sergio Muñoz to order the arrest of former Black Berets

Minister Sergio Muñoz reportedly ordered the arrest of several former members of the Army late yesterday, as part of the investigation seeking to find those responsible for the disappearance and death of commandos from the Peldehue Paratroopers and Special Forces School in September 1973.

Regarding the case, the minister must investigate the disappearances of: Enrique Toledo Garay, Javier Enrique Sobarzo Sepúlveda, Mario Ramiro Melo Pradenas, and Luis Alberto Barraza Ruhl. In addition to the political executions of Julio Antonio Martínez Lara, Alberto Ampuero Angel, and David González Venegas.

All were paratroopers until 1970, the year they were discharged for their sympathies with the Socialist Party and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). General Parera on the list According to information obtained by this media outlet, the arrest of former general Carlos Parera Silva may have been ordered, although this information could not be confirmed by official sources.

The high-ranking former officer became known in democracy when he broke with protocol and tradition by not requesting authorization from President Patricio Aylwin to begin the Military Parade. The President did not forget the incident and vetoed Parera’s promotion at the end of that same year.

However, an old acquaintance of his, General Augusto Pinochet, appointed him military attaché in South Africa. The Military Judge On September 11, 1973, Carlos Parera held the rank of major and, like Raúl Eduardo Iturriaga, was Second Commander of the Black Berets in Peldehue.

Both joined the DINA General Staff in 1973. In 1976, this officer served as head of the DINA’s Foreign Department. In 1977, when the intelligence agency was dissolved, he did not continue in the CNI, but rejoined the Army and was assigned as commander of the Dolores regiment; director of the Paratroopers and Special Forces School; and in 1985, military attaché in France, as recorded in the archives of the Vicariate of Solidarity.

Subsequently, Parera was Commander-in-Chief of the Second Division and, therefore, military judge of Santiago. It was in this capacity that he ordered the archiving of the cases he was overseeing regarding the forcibly disappeared.

On December 19, 1988, while the triumph of the Concertación was still being celebrated, this former agent hastily signed the application of the “Amnesty Law” to 70 cases of people forcibly disappeared by the DINA. In this way, he granted amnesty in several cases against Contreras and those who were responsible for the disappearances, and at the same time, he granted himself amnesty.

Source: November 26, 2004 El Mostrador

Date: 11-26-2004

Minister Carroza prosecutes 23 former Army members for crimes at the Peldehue Paratroopers School in 1973

The minister on extraordinary assignment for human rights violation cases of the Santiago Court of Appeals, Mario Carroza, issued an indictment against 23 former Army officials for their responsibility in three crimes of qualified kidnapping and eight counts of qualified homicide.

These crimes were perpetrated against military and civilian prisoners inside the Peldehue Paratroopers School, in the commune of Colina, between September and October 1973. Meanwhile, former non-commissioned officers Juan Manuel Cárcamos Vásquez, Pedro Montoya Roldán, Carlos Marín Castro, Miguel Silva Alarcón, José Riquelme Villagra, Jorge Barrientos Becerra, Juan Bautista Muñoz Olave, Luciano Mendoza Estay, Rodolfo Hidalgo Barahona, Aldo Villarroel Garay, Oscar Silva Abarca, Julio Fuentes Lagazzi, Juan Aranda Mendoza, and Carlos Arellano Lepe were charged as accomplices to the crimes.

In the case of Fidel Segovia Rojas, Minister Carroza prosecuted him as an accomplice to the three qualified kidnappings and the qualified homicides of Julio Martínez Lara, Moisés Cossio Pérez, Enrique Toledo Garay, Daniel Estada Bustos, Ricardo Pardo Tobar, and Javier Sobarzo Sepúlveda.

Former Army officer Renato Alarcón Carrasco was charged as the perpetrator of the three qualified kidnappings and the homicides of Julio Martínez Lara, Moisés Cossio Pérez, Enrique Toledo Garay, Alberto Ampuero Ángel, David González Venegas, Daniel Estrada Bustos, and Ricardo Pardo Tobar.

Former non-commissioned officer Hernán Arancibia Rozas was charged as an accomplice to the kidnapping of Mario Melo Pradenas and the qualified homicides of Moisés Cossio Pérez, Daniel Estada Bustos, and Ricardo Pardo Tobar.

Former officers Rafael Sánchez Vera and Osvaldo Acevedo Trujillo were prosecuted as perpetrators of the homicide of Moisés Cossio Pérez and Daniel Estrada Bustos. Finally, Carlos Saravia Vera was prosecuted as the perpetrator of the qualified kidnappings of Mario Melo Pradenas and Jorge Piérola Piérola, and of the homicides of Julio Martínez Lara, Moisés Cossio Pérez, Enrique Toledo Garay, Alberto Ampuero Ángel, David González Venegas, Daniel Estrada Bustos, Ricardo Pardo Tobar, and Javier Sobarzo Sepúlveda.

According to the information gathered during the investigation stage, Minister Carroza was able to establish that the victims—most of them former members of the Army, some expelled from the military institution at the beginning of the 1970s due to their apparent links with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)—were detained in the days following September 11, 1973, by personnel from the Peldehue Paratroopers and Special Forces School and soldiers from Punta Arenas.

They were taken to the Peldehue military unit, where eight of them were executed outside of any legal process. Likewise, all traces of Mario Melo Pradenas, Luis Barraza Ruhl, and Jorge Piérola Piérola were lost from this military facility.

The majority of the victims were part of the Black Berets commando group that was expelled from the Army at the end of 1969, for some, and the beginning of 1970, for others, when their revolutionary positions and links with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) were revealed.

From then on, under the leadership of Mario Melo Pradenas, they became part of the MIR’s operational force as instructors, and later integrated and organized the first contingent of the GAP. All these former uniformed personnel who had made the choice to stand with the people and be part of their struggles were viciously persecuted by the criminal hordes of the dictatorship.

In the resolution (case file 38.483), adopted last Wednesday the 12th, the visiting minister prosecuted former Army officers Rodrigo Sánchez Casilla, Arturo Bosch González, and Jaime Enrique Lepe Orellana as perpetrators of the crimes of qualified kidnapping of the former Black Berets and former GAP members Mario Ramiro Melo Pradenas, Luis Alberto Barraza Ruhl, and Jorge Vicente Piérola Piérola, and of the qualified homicides of the fellow former Army commandos and former GAP members Julio Martínez Lara, Moisés del Carmen Cossio Pérez, Enrique Alfonso Toledo Garay, Alberto Arnoldo Ampuero Ángel, David Héctor González Venegas, Daniel Germán Estrada Bustos, Ricardo Guillermo Pardo Tobar, and Javier Enrique Sobarzo Sepúlveda. At the time of the military coup, the former Black Berets were in the sights of the coup-plotting military forces. They were 15 men, the first class of Black Berets trained in Chile, and were, according to their then-superior, Captain Fuentealba, excellent instructors, elite cadres. For the coup-plotting army, they were extremely dangerous. They had become members of the GAP; most were instructors and militants of the MIR, others militants of the PS. During September 1973, eight of them were detained by members of the Army, the Air Force, or the Investigations police. Arrested on different dates and under different circumstances, some were taken to the National Stadium, but most of them were transferred to the military facility in Peldehue and executed there. Most of the murdered were buried in Patio 29 of the General Cemetery of Santiago. Three of them remain forcibly disappeared.

Source: resumen.cl 10/19/2016