The leak of more than 11 million secret records from the law firm Mossack Fonseca reveals data on nearly 200 offshore companies linked to Chile. Notable among them are those of Agustín Edwards, Alfredo Ovalle (former president of the CPC), Hernán Büchi, Iván Zamorano, and the controllers of Ripley and the BCI.

Also appearing is the president of Chile Transparente, Gonzalo Delaveau. CIPER worked alongside 109 media outlets, led by the ICIJ, on this investigation, which unveils the secret business dealings of more than one hundred world leaders and politicians, as well as monarchs, soccer players, FIFA officials, and drug and arms traffickers.

The Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca (Mossfon)—used by clients from more than 200 countries and territories to create shell companies in tax havens and jurisdictions with lenient tax systems—is at the center of a global controversy.

And not only because of the investigation initiated weeks ago by the Public Prosecutor's Office of Brazil, after detecting that companies created by Mossfon in Panama may have been used to launder money diverted from the state-owned Petrobras in “Operation Lava Jato.”

On Sunday, April 3, the delicate situation facing the law firm founded in 1977 took an even darker turn. An investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) in conjunction with 109 media outlets from around the world—including CIPER—exposed the hidden ties that the Panamanian firm has historically maintained with heads of state, politicians, celebrities, and businesspeople in different countries.

It also revealed ties to countless “clients” included on international blacklists, among whom are fraudsters, suspects of financing terrorism, drug trafficking, and providing weapons to countries plagued by internal wars.

Mossack Fonseca also has a Chilean chapter. Although it formally opened offices in our country in December 2012 under the direction of lawyer Juan Cristóbal Recart Salas, its ties to Chile are long-standing and abundant.

To date, CIPER has identified that from the late 70s to the present, the Panamanian firm has been a vehicle for the creation of nearly 200 offshore entities linked to Chileans or foreigners with investments in Chile, in jurisdictions such as Panama, the British Virgin Islands, the Bahamas, Seychelles, and Nevada (USA).

In some cases, these are instrumental companies with a shell board of directors, made up of executives from the Mossack Fonseca firm itself or straw men. By taking advantage of banking secrecy and the opacity that prevails in those territories, one of the purposes of these paper structures is to safeguard the identity of the real owners of the money they manage.

The records investigated by CIPER and more than a hundred media outlets from 76 countries correspond to 11.5 million secret files from Mossack Fonseca spanning from 1977 to 2015. The documents were leaked by an anonymous source to the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung, which shared them with the ICIJ, which organized the collaborative international investigation.

The more than 11 million Mossfon files—which contain certificates, passports, board minutes, legal documents, and emails, among others—allow for penetration into the tax engineering schemes offered by the company. And, in many cases, those records provide the key to unveiling the best-kept secret of those companies: the hidden identity of their ultimate beneficial owners.

The investigation carried out by 376 journalists from around the world—including the CIPER team—illuminates the dark and gigantic underground of the international financial world. According to conservative calculations by French economist Gabriel Zucman (author of the book “The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens”), nearly 5.8 trillion euros are held under secrecy—and sometimes illicitly—in tax havens, representing 8% of global financial wealth.

In Chile, the total amount of capital invested in tax havens is not known with certainty. The only possible approximation is based on declarations made by Chilean taxpayers with money held in those jurisdictions.

In 2015, according to information provided by the Internal Revenue Service (SII) to CIPER, there were US$11.2 billion declared by 408 taxpayers with investments in Panama, the Cayman Islands, and the British Virgin Islands. The figure is equivalent to the total amount of loans made in the same year by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

Among the Chilean beneficiaries of offshore companies created by Mossack Fonseca that are still active are: the former president of the Confederation of Production and Commerce (CPC) and the National Mining Society (Sonami), and partner of the former financial chief of the DINA, lawyer Alfredo Ovalle Rodríguez; businessman Isidoro Quiroga Moreno, who has made millions in business deals with the sale of water rights granted by the State; the owner of the company El Mercurio S.A.P., Agustín Edwards Eastman; the former Minister of Finance, presidential candidate, and until recently director of Soquimich, Hernán Büchi Buc; the Calderón Volochinsky family, controllers of the retail company Ripley; and the gambling and betting entrepreneurs Luis and Lientur Fuentealba Meier, among others.

Special mention should be made of the lawyers who appear in these records acting as intermediaries between the real owners of those companies and the controversial Panamanian firm. Among them is the president of Chile Transparente (the Chilean chapter of Transparency International), Gonzalo Delaveau Swett, who has managed through Mossack Fonseca the administration of a series of offshore companies based in the Bahamas, from which a multi-million dollar mining and hydroelectric project in the V Region is controlled.

Despite the secrecy and the wide range of loopholes that make a tax haven a powerful magnet for capital, opening and maintaining companies in those jurisdictions is not illegal. But the facts and the Mossack Fonseca records themselves demonstrate that tax havens have been fertile ground for housing money from illicit activities and for circumventing or reducing the tax burden—via avoidance or evasion—that capital must pay in the countries where it was generated.

The information available in the Mossack Fonseca files linked to Chile does not yield evidence of illegalities. To break that barrier, one would need to have the complete banking information of those companies and cross-reference those records with databases from the SII and the Central Bank, but that information is protected by law under secrecy.

Of the nearly 200 offshore entities linked to Chile created by Mossack Fonseca between 1977 and 2015, about 70 are still active according to the records to which CIPER had access. CIPER sent a letter to the majority of their beneficiaries explaining what the investigation was about and asking them if their offshore companies are still active; if they hold checking accounts; and if the money linked to those accounts had been subject to capital repatriation during 2015.

Of the 50 letters sent (many of Mossack Fonseca's clients have more than one company), 12 were answered.

“A GREAT MONEY LAUNDERING MACHINE”

The law firm Mossack Fonseca was founded in 1977 in Panama by lawyers Jurgen Mossack and Ramón Fonseca, who on March 11 suspended his role as minister counselor to the government of the President of Panama, Juan Carlos Varela, after his firm was accused of being the link in a money laundering operation originating from the Brazilian giant Petrobras.

One of the prosecutors in the case, Carlos dos Santos Lima, labeled the firm a “great money laundering machine.”

Mossfon defines itself as a leading company in providing legal, fiduciary, and accounting services to clients around the world. It has nearly 500 employees and 44 offices. Simply put, what the firm does is offer natural and legal persons the creation of offshore structures—companies, trusts, and private interest foundations—in territories with non-transparent systems for the administration of their capital under total discretion.

Anguilla, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, Nevada (USA), Panama, and Seychelles are a handful of the more than 15 jurisdictions with which Mossack Fonseca works.

The records to which CIPER had access through the newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung and the ICIJ show that since its founding to date, Mossack Fonseca has created at least 214,488 offshore entities for clients from more than 200 countries and territories.

For some years now, Mossfon has been involved in successive controversies. It was the intermediary for the creation of 123 shell companies domiciled in the state of Nevada (United States), the ownership of which has been attributed to the businessman linked to the Kirchner family, Lázaro Báez.

The leaked files from Mossack Fonseca also lead to companies created by the inner circle of Russian President Vladimir Putin, delve into the secrets of FIFA, and show how relatives of world leaders, such as British Prime Minister David Cameron, and celebrities like Lionel Messi, have found in tax havens a reliable shelter to deposit their wealth.

The documents also connect the firm to at least 33 natural and legal persons included on US government blacklists for their commercial ties to drug cartels in Mexico and diamond traffickers in Africa, with terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, and with countries such as North Korea and Iran.

THE CHILEANS OF MOSSFON

On Tuesday, March 22, CIPER contacted tax lawyer Juan Cristóbal Recart (of the firm Recart, Bilbao, Villalobos) by phone and email, who has represented Mossack Fonseca in Chile since December 2012. The purpose was to ask for his version of the information to which we had access.

The lawyer excused himself, stating that he had a trip on Thursday of that week, although he showed willingness to talk upon his return (after the publication of this report). CIPER insisted on the urgency of the meeting, but Recart did not respond again.

We did receive a response from Felipe Lyon, in his capacity as representative for Agustín Edwards Eastman, owner of El Mercurio S.A.P. and beneficiary of the offshore company Aladin Marine Corporation, domiciled in the British Virgin Islands since May 1994.

Aladin Marine Corporation is reportedly the owner of the yacht “Anakena” (40 meters long and 150 tons), owned by Edwards and built by the prestigious Dutch shipyard Royal Huisman.

In his response to CIPER, Lyon—who, along with María Luisa del Río, Edwards' wife, has held power of attorney to represent this company since December 2014—stated that Aladin Marine Corporation was “an investment holding company” and that all of its assets are located in the United States.

He also added that the company's investments abroad had been financed “with funds taxed in Chile” and with income from “his work (Edwards') at an American company, during the time he had to leave the country for reasons of personal and family security.”

The American company to which Lyon refers is Pepsico Inc., a company of which Agustín Edwards was vice president between 1970 and 1975. Edwards arrived in the United States in September 1970, a few days after Salvador Allende was elected president.

Files declassified in May 2014 by the United States revealed the key meeting Edwards had with CIA chief Richard Helms on September 14, 1970. That morning, Edwards had breakfast in Washington with Henry Kissinger, then National Security Advisor to President Richard Nixon, and it was Kissinger himself who asked the CIA chief to meet with Edwards that same day to inform him of the situation in Chile.

In addition to Helms and Agustín Edwards, the president of Pepsi Cola, Donald Kendall (a friend of Nixon), participated in that meeting.

The declassification of the “memcon,” the official transcript of what was discussed at that meeting, revealed that the appointment was key in the momentum given from that day on to the destabilizing action undertaken by the Nixon administration against Allende.

The following day (September 15), Nixon himself ordered Helms to initiate a set of covert actions to “make the Chilean economy scream” and thus provoke a coup to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the presidency.

Agustín Edwards is not the only Chilean businessman with ties to Mossack Fonseca. The secret records of the Panamanian firm show how the former president of the Confederation of Production and Commerce (CPC) and the National Mining Society (Sonami), Alfredo Ovalle Rodríguez, set up a complex offshore structure in Panama to manage the capital generated by his investments in Chile, mainly those related to the Las Cenizas mining group.

In 1976, Ovalle, together with his partner Raimundo Langlois Vicuña (both lawyers), created the first of a series of companies with the head of the DINA Financial Department, Humberto Olavarría Aranguren, a former Navy officer and friend of Manuel Contreras.

Some of those companies were incorporated when Olavarría controlled the financial apparatus of the Pinochet regime's secret police. Ovalle was also the link between Olavarría and the former Panamanian president between 1990 and 1994, Guillermo Endara Gallimany, whom he had met in New York in the 1960s.

The same year that Ovalle and Olavarría launched their first venture, Endara incorporated several shell companies for the DINA in Panama intended to finance Operation Condor.

Mossack Fonseca was the vehicle with which Ovalle created the company Sierra Leona in 1987, domiciled in Panama. Part of the shares of that company were issued to the bearer and others in the name of two other companies also registered in that country: Thames Global Corporation and Blue Hill Group Incorporated.

Sierra Leona is in turn the owner of or has a stake in a series of mining, agricultural, and investment companies in Chile that Ovalle owns. In October 2008, all shares of Sierra Leona were transferred to a new structure created in Panama by the former CPC leader: the Fundación Bello Amanecer.

In the words of the Mossack Fonseca firm itself, an offshore foundation offers the possibility of maintaining greater protection of “confidentiality regarding the owner of the capital, even after it is dissolved,” “can function as a holding company,” and “as a vehicle to collect royalties and other types of returns,” among other benefits.

Alfredo Ovalle has taken every precaution to keep his identity as disconnected as possible from the offshore entities he controls. The administration of Sierra Leona is in the hands of a “shell board of directors” made up of executives from Mossack Fonseca itself.

The same names are repeated over and over again on the boards of hundreds of companies created by the Panamanian firm in different tax havens. This fictitious board, with powers to represent the company, receives instructions remotely (by email) to formalize in minutes the decisions made in Chile regarding restructurings, capital increases, opening bank accounts, and other financial operations.

Sierra Leona has opened checking accounts with different banks, such as HSBC, Credit Suisse, and Multibank, domiciled in Panama. In the Mossack Fonseca papers, there are no records that allow for quantifying the amount of capital that Ovalle manages in that country, although an email from October 2012 offers an approximation.

On October 16, a senior executive at Mossfon wrote to an assistant manager at Credicorp Bank in Panama explaining that he had a very important Chilean client (Alfredo Ovalle) who needed to open a checking account. “The companies are holders of shares in some Chilean companies which in turn own shares in a mining company there in Chile.

The Panamanian companies and the accounts they have are used to receive their respective dividends. Does Credicorp Bank have any objection to this? (...) The average would be 1MM annually (Editor's note: one million dollars).”

Another of Mossack Fonseca's clients is the former Minister of Finance under Pinochet, former presidential candidate, and director of Soquimich (he will leave the position at the end of April), Hernán Büchi Buc.

In the records of the Panamanian firm, Büchi appears as a shareholder of Compton Investment Inc., a company registered in Seychelles in January 2011 and whose director is the Argentine lawyer and wife of the former minister, María Eleonora Urrutia.

The company was opened through Mossack Fonseca's offices in Montevideo, Uruguay, and according to the records, it remains active. In October 2012, half of Compton's shares were absorbed by the company Deleo International Corp., domiciled in the British Virgin Islands, which Mossfon files identify as “owner of properties outside Uruguay.”

Lawyer Urrutia responded to CIPER's inquiries: “I am not a Chilean citizen and, given my status, I have not had to pay taxes in Chile based on my global income.” She also pointed out that the Seychelles company does not have bank accounts in any offshore jurisdiction.

COPPER, COAL, AND BETTING

Among the Mossack Fonseca papers, there is a record of a series of other offshore companies linked to Chilean businessmen and lawyers. Among them is the president of Chile Transparente, Gonzalo Delaveau Swett.

The lawyer has maintained a relationship with the Panamanian firm since at least 2006, when he was part of the law firm Guerrero, Olivos, Novoa y Errázuriz. Delaveau, a partner at the firm Honorato-Delaveau, is also a director of the mining company Andes Copper, a company with Canadian capital and the holder of the Vizcachitas project for the extraction of copper and molybdenum in Putaendo (V Region).

The project—which contemplates the installation of a run-of-the-river hydroelectric plant—has the local community up in arms due to the intensive use the mining company will make of the area's water resources.

Mossack Fonseca appears as the agent for at least five offshore companies domiciled in the Bahamas linked to Andes Copper and in which lawyer Delaveau has had a key role as director or secretary of some of them: Turnbrook Corporation (May 2006), DK Corporation (May 2011), Heatlhey International Inc. (August 2011), Turnbrook Mining Ltd. (December 2011), and Vizcachitas Ltd. (exists since 2006, but was incorporated into Mossfon's records in December 2013).

According to financial information from Andes Copper, Turnbrook Mining Ltd. owns 51.6% of the mining company, in which Chilean businessman Eduardo Covarrubias Noé also participates as a director.

Both Delaveau and Covarrubias responded to CIPER stating that they were not the beneficiaries of those companies, but only participated as directors of some of them. The president of Chile Transparente said that he was only a director at Turnbrook Mining, and that his relationship with the other companies was “for professional matters in my capacity as a lawyer or secretary of them.”

Businessman Isidoro Quiroga Moreno, owner of the holding company Asesorías e Inversiones Benjamín, also resorted to the services of Mossack Fonseca. Quiroga, with significant investments in the mining, hydroelectric, and salmon farming sectors, among others, has managed to amass part of his fortune in the deregulated water market in Chile.

A CIPER investigation revealed that Quiroga owns huge amounts of water from Antofagasta to Coihaique. In recent years, Quiroga has brought into his holding company nearly US$25 million from the sale of water rights granted free of charge by the State.

Asesorías e Inversiones Benjamín participates in three offshore companies created in Panama and which in 2012 were incorporated into Mossack Fonseca's portfolio: Carbones Andinos, Metalúrgicos de Colombia, and Rivergate Properties.

The businessman's response to CIPER states: “In 2008, through a subsidiary of Asesorías e Inversiones Benjamín S.A., I entered into certain contracts through which I joined, together with other Chilean and Colombian investors, the ownership of those companies.

It was a venture capital investment for the development and potential exploitation of coal mines located in Colombia.” He then pointed out that the results of his investment were not as expected, “generating only losses for me and the other investors who participated in this business.”

Brothers Luis and Lientur Fuentealba Meier, controllers of the Casino de Talca through Corporación Meier SAC (with investments also in Peru) and owners of Australis Limitada, dedicated to the commercialization of slot machines and gaming tables, have had a prolific relationship with Mossack Fonseca.

According to their financial statements, the Casino de Talca obtained profits of over $1.2 billion in 2015. In the Panamanian firm's papers, the Fuentealba brothers appear linked—as owners or representatives—to six offshore companies domiciled in Nevada, Panama, and the British Virgin Islands: Bluefield Management LLC (September 2002), Lyon Investment Group LLC (July 2004), Ivory Holding Services (September 2004), Drywood Ventures (August 2005), Astoria Company Design (August 2005), and Lynton Trading Ltd. (October 2010).

In May 2012, one of the minority shareholders of the Casino de Talca challenged the company's financial statements, accusing that the leasing of slot machines was done at prices outside the market, that consulting fees had been paid without board approval, and that there were debts to be paid that did not correspond to the casino, but to its majority partners.

The holder of one of those debts, in the amount of $2.304 billion, was precisely Corporación Meier SAC, as reported by El Mostrador.

Lientur Fuentealba responded to CIPER stating that 15 years ago he planned business projects abroad for which he created some companies as investment vehicles. He added that those business projects are no longer in force and although he states “not remembering the names of the companies, nor having participated in them,” he assures that all “fully submitted to legality.”

RIPLEY AND ANDES TASK

Jorad Trading Inc. and Woodfell International Corp., registered by Mossack Fonseca in August 2002 and April 2012 respectively in the British Virgin Islands, are companies linked to brothers Andrés, Lázaro, Michel, and Verónica Calderón Voloshinsky.

Through Inversiones R Matriz Limitada and Inversiones International Funds S.A., the Calderón family controls 53% of the shares of the retail company Ripley Corp., which in 2014 obtained profits of nearly $44.6 billion.

Ripley Corp. is, in turn, the owner of 40% of Woodfell International, a company that markets the Forever 21 clothing brand in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Panama. Mossfon records indicate that Jorad Trading is engaged in the import and export business in Chile, Peru, and China.

In December of last year, the SII filed a complaint against Alberto Calderón Crispín, one of the founders and main shareholders of Ripley (father of the Calderón Voloshinsky brothers), for a series of operations that took place in 2008.

He is accused that, together with his late brother Marcelo, they incorporated a company under a simplified tax regime, even though it did not meet the requirements, in order not to pay taxes on profits generated during the sale of a package of shares.

In its first complaint, in 2014, the SII calculated that US$22.3 million had been evaded. The complaint includes Jorge Andrés Saieh and Pilar Dañoboitía, both executives of the Saieh Group (the main financier of CIPER), which was the one that bought the shares of Ripley Corp.

Ripley did not respond to CIPER. The company is also under the scrutiny of the Public Prosecutor's Office after it rectified a series of payments for services not rendered to the SII, which may have been used to finance political campaigns.

The scandal of irregular political financing, which the Public Prosecutor's Office is investigating, reached the offices of Mossack Fonseca executives in Panama. At the end of 2015, they evaluated integrating into their portfolio the offshore company Unioncuatror Ventures Corp., registered in the British Virgin Islands.

The beneficiary of Unioncuatror is the controller of Sigdo Koppers and owner of the company Andes Task Consulting, Alejandro Reyes Pizarro.

Andes Task hit the headlines in mid-2015 when it was discovered that performance bonus payments for the two main executives of Chilevisión, a TV channel that in 2010 was still controlled by former president Sebastián Piñera, were made through other companies, including Andes Task.

The serious part was that the two executives acknowledged not having provided services for those companies and that they invoiced for them on the instructions of the manager of Bancard, Piñera's company. The story was widely disseminated by the media, which picked up the thesis that Andes Task had been part of a money triangulation scheme to finance the former president's campaign.

At that time, the Panamanian firm was evaluating the incorporation of Unioncuatror into its portfolio, so Mossack Fonseca executives decided to find out if the owner of this company was the same as that of Andes Task.

In the leaked records is the email with the response sent by the company that made the link between Unioncuatror and Mossack Fonseca: it is the same person, but Alejandro Reyes is a client of our complete trust.

And it adds: “if any of the rumors mentioned by this internet blog (Editor's note: refers to an article in El Mostrador) had any possibility of being true, it would have been recommended to stop working with the client.”

In the Mossfon records, it is not possible to confirm if the company finally came under its control.

CARS, SOCCER, AND PLANES

Mossack Fonseca's records also show how important foreign businessmen have requested their services to create offshore companies to control their investments in Chile. The most striking case is that of Ecuadorian tycoon Juan Eljuri Antón, holder of one of the most important business groups in that country (with nearly 160 companies, according to local press articles).

Eljuri is the ultimate beneficiary of the Panamanian company Bostick International, which in turn owns 100% of the shares of Autoeastern Chile SpA., incorporated in our country in January 2015, and representative of Nissan.

In his response to CIPER, the general manager of Autoeastern, Eduardo Saucedo, stated that the company “was incorporated to be part of a Chilean company that operates in the field of vehicle sales and distribution. Bostick does not maintain checking accounts or funds of any nature either in Panama or in any tax haven.”

René Kreutzberger, brother and partner of the popular television host “Don Francisco,” is another of the businessmen who has used the services of Mossack Fonseca to manage his investments. Kreutzberger, his wife, and children appear as beneficiaries of: the trust Mashe Nishar registered in the British Virgin Islands (2011) and the subsidiary companies domiciled in the same jurisdiction Gracias a la Vida (2011) and Kingsfield Enterprise Limited (2012).

A third company, Producciones RK Group Inc. (2012), is domiciled in Panama. Some of these companies, according to Mossack Fonseca records, are dedicated to managing real estate businesses in the Dominican Republic. Kreutzberger, who has incorporated a series of investment, agricultural, commercial, and television production companies in Chile, did not respond to CIPER.

The “distinguished” Chilean clients of Mossack Fonseca are not limited only to the business sphere. The Panamanian firm has been used by renowned soccer players in various parts of the world. Mossfon records show that nearly 20 players from teams such as Manchester United, Barcelona, and Real Madrid have knocked on the firm's doors to create offshore companies.

One of them is the Barcelona and Argentine national team star, Lionel Messi, who faces accusations in Spain for tax crimes.

On the list of soccer stars who have opened offshore companies with Mossack Fonseca is the former captain of the Chilean national team, Iván Zamorano. Although his company Fut Bam International Ltd, created in 1992 in the British Virgin Islands, has not been active since 2005, it was through it that he managed his image rights while he was a Real Madrid player (1992-1996).

Fut Bam granted temporary custody of those rights to Real Madrid in exchange for a total payment of 195 million pesetas (approximately US$ 1.3 million).

Another of the companies opened by Mossack Fonseca for Chilean clients was Air Management Inc., created in Panama in February 2002, whose owner was the late businessman Jurgen Paulmann, founder and controller of the airline Sky Airline.

Directors of that company—which was dissolved in November 2006—were José Manuel Rebolledo (he was president of the airline) and Juan Fernando Uauy (he was a shareholder of Sky).

NINETIES TROUBLES

Also appearing in the Mossack Fonseca papers with an inactive company (since April 2009) is the former general manager of Edesur, a subsidiary of Enersis, Alfonso Torrealba Ugarte. In September 1997, Torrealba created the company Discosa International Corp. in the British Virgin Islands, just one month after a group of Enersis executives (“the key managers”)—among whom were José Yuraszeck, Marcos Zylberberg, and Torrealba himself—completed the multi-million dollar operation of selling preferred shares to the Spanish company Endesa, a chapter known as the “Chispas Case.”

In May 1999, the protagonists of the lucrative business for which they would be sanctioned years later created Prospecta, with capital of US$3.5 million and through which it is presumed they channeled the money obtained irregularly after the sale of the shares.

It is precisely through an email address of that company (prospecta.cl) that Torrealba communicated with Mossack Fonseca executives. Discosa International was the holder of a checking account that the former Enersis executive opened at the HSBC bank branch in Switzerland. There, at least until 2007, Torrealba had deposited nearly US$1 million, according to leaked data from that financial entity.

Also appearing in the Mossack Fonseca records with a company inactive since 2008 is Luis Enrique Yarur, president and controller of the Banco de Crédito e Inversiones (BCI). Yarur was the beneficiary of the company Westhill Investment, created in August 1994 in Panama.

In the Mossfon files, there are records that account for a series of multi-million dollar loans made (one for US$6 million and another for US$59.5 million) in 1996 by the Chase Manhattan Bank (today JP Morgan Chase Bank) to Westhill Investment and in which Inversiones Petro S.A. acted as guarantor, the arm through which the Yarurs have historically controlled their family holding company.

Two years earlier, coincidentally with the creation of Westhill, Luis Enrique Yarur had begun taking control of the BCI by buying shares, according to press reports, at a price 50% lower than the value of their transaction on the Stock Exchange. According to El Mostrador, the operation was reportedly completed outside the country, thus avoiding the payment of taxes in Chile.

TAX GYMNASTICS

In February 2015, economist Claudio Agostini listed a series of evasive maneuvers possible to perform using offshore companies and accounts in tax havens. Among them, avoiding the payment of inheritance tax, the provision of fictitious services to companies related to the same owner domiciled in Chile, or having those same offshore companies act as lenders to local companies with high interest rates, allowing money to legally leave the country.

He also referred to the utility that offshore companies provide to high-level executives of large companies to receive multi-million dollar bonuses exempt from tax payments.

Indeed, in some of the millions of secret files from Mossack Fonseca, schemes of tax planning are discussed.

tax practices that point in that same direction. In April 2006, after visiting various Chilean law firms, the Mossack Fonseca executive who led the meetings informed her headquarters that one of the offices she visited was very interested in establishing a relationship with them: “Several clients want to move their money to a tax haven like Panama, and they do not want that money or its profits to return to Chile, as they would have to pay import or inheritance taxes.

They also want absolute confidentiality.”

The evasive practices referred to by Agostini are evident in several of the emails in the Mossfon registry. In 2009, a Mexican outsourcing company wanted to pay bonuses to its executives, which implied a monthly expense of US$350,000.

Mossfon suggested creating companies in Chile that would invoice the Mexican company in order to reduce the tax burden (Chile and Mexico have a treaty to avoid double taxation). In the email that CIPER found in the Mossack Fonseca records, it reads: “Thanks to the treaty, the withholding in Mexico is null or very minimal (…) I know we will manage to make the tax in Chile null or very low.

The money could be triangulated toward Paraguay, but anticipating that in the long run it can be sent to Panama to be deposited in the offshore accounts of this company’s executives,” wrote a lawyer from the Panamanian firm.

The treaties to avoid double taxation that Chile has signed with 25 countries whetted the appetite of Mossack Fonseca lawyers, who saw our country as a platform to “triangulate money.” This is evident in an email from April 2010 sent by a high-ranking Mossfon official to a lawyer at a Chilean firm: “The idea of using the Chilean company is to be able to invoice from there to countries that have signed treaties to avoid double taxation.

By invoicing for services, work, and commissions, the tax withholding in the country from where the payment comes would be zero, or a very low tax withholding (…) in Chile, we know that we will have to receive the money and then carry out tax planning.”

Another Mossack Fonseca executive who intervenes in this same email chain cites the case of a client from Ecuador who wants to reduce his tax obligations: “The only thing the Ecuadorian needs is to be able to receive an invoice from a Chilean company, for figures around US$500,000 or US$1 million, and to demonstrate in some way that the money has been sent to that Chilean company (…) We know that this is perhaps a somewhat ‘aggressive’ way of avoiding the payment of taxes.

Our apologies for the boldness of this scheme.”

Other emails reveal the methods Mossack Fonseca used to guarantee the secrecy of its practices. On May 25, 2012, the then-ambassador of Chile to Panama, Alberto Labbé Galilea, contacted one of the firm’s founders, Jurgen Mossack, directly.

He told him that he was going to receive a delegation from the Chilean Chamber of Construction, several companies with billing that “ranges between US$100 million and US$150 million,” and asked him to analyze the possibility of having a Mossfon executive instruct them on the “legal framework for private investments.”

Ambassador Labbé attached a list of the visitors who would make up the delegation. Upon seeing that a journalist from El Mercurio was on the list, one of the firm’s executives sent an internal email warning: “Unfortunately, we will not be able to touch upon tax planning schemes, so as not to be misinterpreted.”

PANAMA, THE STAR

The information analyzed by CIPER reveals that the preferred location for Mossfon clients linked to Chile is Panama: historical records show, to date, 91 offshore companies linked to Chileans or foreigners with investments in our country.

They are followed by the British Virgin Islands, with 55 companies; the Bahamas with 16; the Seychelles with 15; and Nevada with 14. The rest of the entities are distributed between Anguilla, Wyoming (USA), and Costa Rica.

Most of these jurisdictions are on the list of countries or territories considered tax havens or harmful preferential regimes, according to Supreme Decree No. 628 of 2003 of the Ministry of Finance.

CIPER requested, via the Transparency Law, the amounts declared in 2015 by Chileans in tax havens from the Internal Revenue Service (SII). The figure reaches $7,618,899,844,633 (equivalent to US$11.204 billion) and corresponds to 408 taxpayers with investments in 20 territories.

The money is concentrated mainly in three jurisdictions: Panama with $2,605,969,731,405 (US$3.832 billion), the Cayman Islands with $2,071,289,206,861 (US$3.046 billion), and the British Virgin Islands with $1,539,211,891,834 (US$2.263 billion).

The concentration of companies in Panama shown by the Mossack Fonseca records and capital, according to SII information, is not coincidental. The Central American country is the only one in Latin America that has refused to move forward in eliminating banking secrecy.

This was pointed out to El Pulso during his last visit to Chile by the director of the OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Pascal Saint-Amans, who is responsible for promoting a multilateral strategy known as BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting), which seeks to advance the automatic exchange of information to combat the root of tax avoidance.

Panamanian President Juan Carlos Varela, until recently advised by one of the law firm’s owners, Ramón Fonseca, indicated that his country will continue to sign information exchange agreements, but only bilaterally and with its main trading partners. Thus, he ruled out joining this multilateral initiative.

HOW TO CREATE AN OFFSHORE

Creating an offshore company in a tax haven takes little time. Five or six business days until it is registered in the chosen jurisdiction. In cases of greater urgency, Mossack Fonseca offers an express route: acquiring a “shelf company”—a “reserve company” already registered in a tax haven, with a nominal board of directors already formed and “virgin” from a commercial point of view.

Costs vary depending on the type of offshore structure the client requests. Let’s take the example of Panama with a “shell company”: a completely new company. According to Mossack Fonseca’s price list for “professional clients” (law firms that act as intermediaries between the beneficiary and the Panamanian firm), acquiring a company in Panama costs US$1,235.

Maintenance fees amount to US$495 per year, and if the client requests that Mossfon provide a board of directors to simulate being its administrator, another US$800 per year is added.

Sometimes it is the beneficiaries themselves who contact Mossack Fonseca directly, although it is common for lawyers or law firms to mediate that relationship, taking care of the payment of annual fees, legalizations, delivery of powers of attorney, obtaining certificates, and even facilitating their names to join boards of directors.

The list of law firms that have mediated between Mossfon and Chilean clients for the creation of offshore companies includes: Cariola, Díez, Pérez-Cotapos & Cía.; Guerrero, Olivos, Novoa y Errázuriz (today Guerrero Olivos); Vial y Cía.; Cuevas Abogados; Ovalle y Cía.; and Mena y Guijón abogados, among others.

The cost of creating an offshore company—board of directors included—amounts to about US$2,500. With that, one can already operate. The benefits provided by these companies—which do not carry out any type of economic activity in the country where they reside—are multiple.

Source: ciper.cl, April 4, 2016

Judge Raquel Lermanda accepted that the Chilean ambassador to Panama, Alberto Labbé Galilea, testify as an accused in the “Operation Condor” case, and therefore requested that the Investigative Police (PDI) notify him of the proceeding, which was requested by the Human Rights Program of the Ministry of the Interior.

According to sources from the organization, several witnesses linked the diplomat, brother of the mayor of Providencia Cristián Labbé, to the case investigating the disappearance of various left-wing individuals in Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil after the 1973 military coup.

According to their testimonies, Labbé, in his capacity as second secretary of the Chilean embassy in Buenos Aires, allegedly sent information to the DINA via diplomatic pouch after contacting the former Chilean secret police agent in Argentina, Enrique Arancibia Clavel, the latter convicted for the crime of General Carlos Prats and his wife.

Regarding this background information, Foreign Minister Alfredo Moreno indicated to Cooperativa that “I do not know that information, it is the first time I have heard of it, so when I have it, I will be happy to comment on it.”

Source: Cooperativa.cl, June 30, 2010

AFDD describes Ambassador Labbé’s representation abroad as “shameful”

The vice president of the Association of Relatives of the Forcibly Disappeared (AFDD), Mireya García, asked the Government to dismiss the Chilean ambassador to Panama, Alberto Labbé, after the latter was summoned as an accused in the Operation Condor process by the judge of the case, Raquel Lermanda.

García pointed out that it is “shameful that Labbé is representing us abroad,” arguing that the Government has included some people who are related to human rights crimes. Likewise, the leader compared this new case with the former director of the Gendarmerie, Iván Andrusco, who also testified as a witness in the “degollados” (slit-throat) case. “I assume that this official will be removed from his duties; really, a person who testifies as an accused cannot represent the country abroad,” expressed the AFDD representative.

Hinzpeter’s statements have “a double objective” After the questions raised by Minister of the Interior Rodrigo Hinzpeter regarding the human rights program, who said that “there are cases that have excessive processing,” the spokesperson pointed out that the Secretary of State’s statements have a double objective. “These are statements that seek the path of firing the current lawyers who work in the program and putting in people of his political color, or it has to do with changing the meaning of the program,” she emphasized.

García concluded that “I believe there is an intention to lead the program toward something that is not yet defined. This Government is capable of anything, and clearly the Human Rights Program is a nuisance when there are two people who have to testify before the justice system and hold representative positions.”

Source: Emol.com, July 2, 2010

Ambassador Labbé testified regarding Operation Condor

The new Chilean ambassador to Panama, Alberto Labbé Galilea, testified before Judge Raquel Lermanda, who is momentarily instructing the process for Operation Condor. The Human Rights Program of the Ministry of the Interior asked Judge Lermanda to take Labbé’s statement in the capacity of “accused,” and the magistrate accepted the requested proceeding, without specifying whether she would interrogate him as a witness or in the requested capacity.

The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that, however, the judge interrogated him “in the capacity of a witness,” and that, “having provided his statement, Minister Lermanda indicated to him that there was no inconvenience in him leaving the country and assuming his new duties” in Panama.

The ambassador had to recount to the magistrate what role he played alongside a group of DINA agents at the Chilean embassy in Buenos Aires between the years 1975 and 1976. During that period, and from that diplomatic mission practically intervened by the DINA, a series of actions were coordinated with the dictatorship in Santiago, which meant the disappearance of several Chilean opponents of the military regime of Augusto Pinochet.

In those years, Alberto Labbé was the second secretary of the embassy in Buenos Aires, and the one who sent information to Santiago to “Luis Gutiérrez” regarding the activities of Chilean exiles in Argentina, which were spied on by the Chilean agents. “Luis Gutiérrez” was the alias that the DINA assigned to the head of the foreign department of that organization.

In the process for Operation Condor, there are some former agents who mention the link they maintained with the current ambassador while they were assigned to the foreign department at the diplomatic mission in Buenos Aires.

It was also that embassy in Buenos Aires that, at that time, collaborated in the staging of Operation Colombo, through which the dictatorship tried to make people believe that the forcibly disappeared did not exist and were an “invention” of Marxism.

To do this, they made corpses appear in some places in the Argentine capital, arguing that they corresponded to left-wing militants who had not been detained in Chile, but had fled to Argentina and had died among themselves due to internal political quarrels, or had fallen in clashes with Argentine military or police forces.

Operation Colombo was part of Operation Condor, through which the Pinochet regime captured Chileans in exile and took them to Chile to murder them, or simply made them disappear abroad. Labbé is the brother of the former DINA agent, the Colonel (R) and mayor of the Providencia commune, Cristián Labbé.

Source: La Nacion.cl, July 6, 2010

Human Rights: Judge interrogated Ambassador Alberto Labbé

Judge Raquel Lermanda interrogated the current Chilean ambassador to Panama, Alberto Labbé Galilea, yesterday to clarify his links with a group of DINA agents who, between the years 1975-1976, operated in the Chilean embassy in Buenos Aires, when Labbé was the second secretary.

The Human Rights Program of the Ministry of the Interior asked the judge to interrogate Labbé as an accused for the crimes of Operation Condor, and the magistrate accepted the requested proceeding, without specifying whether she would interrogate him as a witness or in the requested capacity.

Yesterday, the Foreign Ministry said in a statement that the judge interrogated him “in the capacity of a witness” and that, “having provided his statement, Minister Lermanda indicated to him that there was no inconvenience in him leaving the country and assuming his new duties.” In those years, and from that diplomatic mission intervened by the DINA, actions were coordinated with the dictatorship in Santiago that meant the disappearance of several Chilean opponents of the military regime of Augusto Pinochet.

Background information from the process reveals that Labbé sent information via diplomatic pouch to Santiago to “Luis Gutiérrez” regarding the activities of Chilean exiles in Argentina. “Luis Gutiérrez” was the alias that the DINA assigned to the head of the foreign department of that organization.

At that time, that embassy collaborated in the staging of Operation Colombo, through which the dictatorship tried to make people believe that the forcibly disappeared did not exist.

Source: La Nación, July 7, 2010

Diplomat already testified in 2004 in Operation Condor case: Izurieta case repeats in judicial summons to Ambassador Alberto Labbé

Ministry of the Interior lawyer Karina Fernández insisted on summoning the diplomat who had already testified regarding the operation of the Chilean embassy in Buenos Aires when he was second secretary.

Director of the Human Rights Program, Rossy Lama, was not aware of the aforementioned request. The Chilean ambassador to Panama, Alberto Labbé Galilea, who must testify in the investigation of the Operation Condor case after substitute minister Raquel Lermanda accepted a request made by lawyer Karina Fernández of the Ministry of the Interior’s Human Rights Program, had already provided testimony in the process in 2004, when it was being substantiated by Judge Juan Guzmán.

Labbé was consulted at that date on how the Chilean embassy in Buenos Aires functioned between the years 1975 and 1976, where he had been third and second secretary. The filing by lawyer Fernández, who asks that he testify as an accused, was made after Labbé’s appointment to the embassy in Panama became known, and although the minister’s resolution was adopted on June 18, it was only leaked yesterday, the same day that President Sebastián Piñera met with the ambassadors.

The director of the Human Rights Program of the Ministry of the Interior, lawyer Rossy Lama, was not aware of Karina Fernández’s action. This repeated the same situation that occurred last May, when it was requested to summon the current Undersecretary of Defense, Óscar Izurieta, in the Víctor Jara case, without informing Lama.

On that occasion, Rossy Lama said that internal work standards had not been met, as there was an instruction stating that all documents emanating from the program had to be reviewed before being presented to the court.

In parallel, the Ministry of the Interior decided yesterday to incorporate lawyer Gonzalo Fuenzalida (36), creator of the NGO Victims of Crime and a man trusted by the Executive, into the Human Rights Program team.

His role will be to expedite the processing of cases. Fuenzalida will join the team of 15 lawyers. Three mentions Alberto Labbé Galilea, who has a vast career in the diplomatic service, appears mentioned three times, by two witnesses, in the investigation currently being conducted by Minister Raquel Lermanda.

The judge took over the case as a substitute on June 8, replacing the titular minister Víctor Montiglio, who is facing health problems and who substantiated the case since May 2005. The first time Labbé is named is in the testimony given in August 2003 by a former non-commissioned officer who was an aide to a colonel, who was allegedly secretly assigned to the DINA at the embassy in Buenos Aires.

The former non-commissioned officer told the judge that, on occasions, the colonel would give him the information he wanted to send to Chile by diplomatic pouch and that he would take it to the official whose turn it was to prepare the pouch.

Among them, he mentioned Labbé’s name. The other two mentions correspond to statements made in October of the same year by another retired non-commissioned officer, a driver for a colonel who allegedly had links to the DINA.

The retired non-commissioned officer was asked which officials he remembered from the embassy at that date. He mentioned Ambassador René Rojas Galdames, “a Mr. Labbé, and another Mr. Fernández.” The same non-commissioned officer was asked who the colonel dealt with, and he pointed out names and positions of officials who, as he remembered, spoke with the officer, such as the ambassador, the air attaché, another officer, “and Mr.

Labbé,” among others. Due to his role at the embassy, he was asked to testify in 2004. The current ambassador to Panama testified in writing—he was out of the country—authorized by the court, which asked him about how the embassy in Argentina functioned.

He was never summoned again. The so-called Operation Condor corresponded to the coordination in the late 70s and 80s of the intelligence services of countries with military governments in South America, whose purpose was to exchange information and pursue across borders people classified as “subversive” by said regimes.

Joined the Foreign Ministry in 1966. Alberto Labbé’s diplomatic career began in 1966, when he joined the Foreign Ministry as an Administrative Officer. In 1970, he joined the staff of the Foreign Service and that same year assumed the position of secretary of the Protocol Directorate, a position he held until 1974.

Afterward, he went to the Chilean embassy in Buenos Aires, where he served as second and third secretary. In 1979, he was chief of staff to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in 1985 he was appointed counselor of the embassy in the USA.

Between 1988 and 1990, he was deputy director of Protocol, and in 1990 he was appointed consul of Chile in Miami. He returned to the country in 1995 to serve as a liaison for the General Directorate of International Economic Relations with the private and business sector.

In 1999, he assumed the position of consul general in Chicago, and between 2004 and 2010 he served in the liaison office with Congress. He has studies at the Diplomatic Academy, the Institute of Geopolitical Studies of the Argentine Republic, and Johns Hopkins University in Washington D.C.

Source: El Mercurio, July 1, 2010

Operation Condor: Foreign Minister does not rule out dismissal of ambassador to Panama

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfredo Moreno, assured this Thursday that if it is proven that the ambassador to Panama, Alberto Labbé Galilea, had ties to the so-called Operation Condor, which has sparked calls from the opposition.

In that case, “it is not appropriate for him to be a public official,” he said in statements to Radio ADN, although he reiterated that there is no evidence linking him to the case. On that basis, he asked to wait for the results of the judicial investigation: “Let us stick to what the judge decides,” he stated, and stressed that “in matters of human rights, no transaction of any kind should be made.” According to sources linked to the process, Alberto Labbé, who was summoned at the request of lawyers from the Ministry of the Interior’s Human Rights Program, has been pointed out by several witnesses as having sent reports that ended up in the hands of the DINA when he was second secretary of the Chilean embassy in Buenos Aires. Labbé sent documents via diplomatic pouch with information about Chilean exiles living in Argentina, which was given to him by Enrique Arancibia Clavel, a DINA agent who years later was convicted for his participation in the assassination of the former commander-in-chief of the Army, Carlos Prats, and his wife, Sofía Cuthbert, in 1974.

Source: emol.cl, July 1, 2010

Another Chilean ambassador with a dark past

The judicial action is due to the links Labbé Galilea had with the former DINA agent and the only person convicted in the case of the assassination of General Prats, when the diplomat served as second secretary of the Chilean Embassy in Buenos Aires.

A new political mess related to human rights was generated for the Sebastián Piñera administration by the summons to testify—in the capacity of an accused—of the recently appointed Chilean ambassador to Panama, Alberto Labbé Galilea, in the trial known as Operation Condor.

The judicial action ordered by Judge Raquel Lermanda is due to the links the diplomat had with the former DINA agent (the repressive organization of Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship) and the only person convicted in the case of the assassination of General Carlos Prats, Enrique Arancibia Clavel, when he served as second secretary of the Chilean Embassy in Buenos Aires in the mid-seventies.

Isabel Allende, the socialist senator and daughter of former president Salvador Allende, described it as “unpresentable and regrettable that an ambassador who represents not only a government, but an entire country and the State of Chile, be called to testify as an accused in a crime as treacherous and atrocious as the case of General Carlos Prats and his wife Sofía Cuthbert,” which occurred in September 1974 in Argentina. “Apparently he had a position at the embassy in Argentina and, in some way, connections with Arancibia Clavel, who was convicted for this crime.

The government must take action,” the parliamentarian warned. In Allende’s opinion, beyond what the Justice system itself decides, “it is regrettable that people whose situation is not entirely resolved continue to be appointed.

That is highly inconvenient. I think the government should be more prudent and stick more to what Piñera said repeatedly during his campaign, regarding that there would be no appointments of people linked to processes for human rights violations, and now we are seeing that there are.” With those statements, the legislator pointed to the impasse that occurred with the former Chilean ambassador to Argentina, Miguel Otero, who had to resign from his position after he minimized the systematic violation of human rights by the Pinochet dictatorship.

According to the resolution approved by the magistrate, Labbé, who between 1975 and 1976 served as second secretary at the Chilean Embassy in Buenos Aires, must clarify his relationship with the DINA agents who were part of the foreign department of that repressive organization and who remained attached to that diplomatic mission.

As reported by the Chilean newspaper La Nación, the diplomat, who is the brother of the controversial mayor of Providencia, Cristián Labbé—one of the richest and most right-wing communes in Chile—must also give an account of the shipments that agent Enrique Arancibia Clavel made via diplomatic pouch addressed to the DINA in Santiago, with information and background on Chileans who resided in Argentina, some of whom later disappeared in the framework of Operation Condor.

Meanwhile, the resolution of the Human Rights Commission of the Chamber of Deputies to request the resignation of the ambassador to Panama strained the spirits of pro-government deputies Karla Rubilar (National Renewal) and Felipe Salaberry (Independent Democratic Union), members of that body. “We call the attention of the president of the Human Rights Commission (Hugo Gutiérrez, communist) to stop politicizing this commission.

Using his status, he is shooting at President Piñera’s government; if they want to do it as parliamentarians or individuals, no problem, but do not use the commission and Parliament,” said Rubilar. Salaberry, for his part, added that “the opposition abused a circumstantial majority in the Human Rights Commission to request the resignation of the current ambassador to Panama.” Regarding the summons to testify as an accused for cooperation with Operation Condor, he highlighted that Labbé “already testified before the former judge (Juan) Guzmán,” so “it does not seem prudent or convenient to us to use the summons to request his departure.” From the other side, the opposition deputy of the Party for Democracy (PPD), Tucapel Jiménez (son of the leader of the same name murdered by the dictatorship), compared Labbé’s case with Otero’s, but this time he hopes that the government does not delay its final decision. “It is sad that we realize that what the government is doing is no longer improvisation, but a strategy to vindicate figures linked to the military dictatorship and human rights violations. It cannot be a coincidence that so many mistakes occur in these appointments.” Another who spoke was the Minister of the Interior, Rodrigo Hinzpeter, who chose to calm things down. “All people in our country must attend and provide their collaboration with judicial procedures, so I do not assign any importance to it other than that which all Chileans in our country must fulfill.” However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfredo Moreno, hinted that, if some links between Labbé and the DINA during the dictatorship are proven, the ambassador will be dismissed. “It is not appropriate for him to be a public official,” Moreno told local radio stations, although he clarified that he is not aware that the diplomat, whose appointment as ambassador to Panama was made official on May 28, has been summoned as an accused, and assured that “the judge’s resolution does not mention that.”

Source: pagina12.com.ar, July 2, 2010

Guard at Líder accused of assaulting 10-year-old boy

According to Lorena Penjean, last Friday a private guard at the Líder supermarket in Recoleta assaulted her 10-year-old son; subsequently, they allegedly erased the records to hide the facts. As Lorena denounced on the radio program “Mañana será otro día,” last Friday she was shopping at the Líder supermarket with her two children and a friend of the children, when she realized her son was not by her side; suddenly a guard asked her if it was the boy who was crying.

Upon approaching the minor, Lorena saw that he was crying and asked him, “Why did they hit me?” Without getting an answer, she called the Carabineros, who took more than an hour to arrive and told her that there are no records and it is her word against the guard’s.

SENAME and SERNAC become part of the lawsuit Lorena’s complaint went viral and forced the National Service for Minors (SENAME) to file a lawsuit in the Third Guarantee Court of Santiago against those responsible for the beating of the 10-year-old minor.

SERNAC also announced that the supermarket must provide the background information. The minor suffered an ear injury, in addition to severe shock as a result of the assault. To this day, Lorena has not received an explanation from the supermarket.

According to her account, the guards allegedly indicated that they confused the boy with another minor who had been stealing, as if that justified the assault on a minor. Today, the Minister of Justice met with the minor’s mother and indicated that it was an “incomprehensible” act.

The supermarket indicated in a statement that they regret the act and fired the guard. However, it is not an isolated incident, as there are multiple complaints of mistreatment by guards. Other complaints Security guards have several complaints of violence and abuse against people.

In May of this year, a video was released where several Prosegur guards who worked at Líder in Iquique beat a young man. Another accusation from June of this year shows how a group of guards at Mall Arauco Maipú beat other people accused of stealing.

Also in May, a stocker at the Santa Isabel supermarket reported having been beaten by the supermarket’s guards who accused him of having stolen. He was even forced to undress; local workers even indicated that this type of situation was common.

This year, the family of Felipe Díaz, a disabled young man who worked on the subway, reported the mistreatment received by the company’s guards, who treated him as if he were faking being blind. A CIPER report from 2009 pointed out the lucrative business of private security companies.

There are thousands of guards that exist and millions that they handle. It has also been shown how many of these companies use former uniformed personnel, including some associated with former agents of the dictatorship.

According to the CIPER report “Private security: The millionaire business of exploiting fear,” one of the most important companies in the sector is in the hands of Rodrigo Zulueta Galilea and Alberto Labbé Galilea—brother of the former Colonel Labbé—who “created the three companies that gave rise to what is now the largest security company in the country: Empresa de Transportes Compañía de Seguridad de Chile Ltda. (whose trade name was Prosegur Ltda., 1979), Servicios Prosegur Ltda. (1983), and the training company for private security agents, Capacitaciones Ocupacionales S.L. (1991),” they also indicate that the former dictatorship agent Odlanier Mena created the company Asise, and even Manuel Contreras had the company Alfa y Omega. According to Sernac, in 2010 more than 200 complaints were received for mistreatment by supermarket and store guards; one of those cases ended with a fine to the Ripley store for the mistreatment by the store’s guards, where she was illegally detained for two hours and then accused to the Carabineros. Undoubtedly, the discourse of criminalizing poverty, social struggles, and the anti-crime policy that is installed by the governments of the day, today the New Majority with its “security agenda,” has a clear repressive content by including detention for suspicion or “preventive” detention, in contexts of strong questioning of the regime and its parties.

Source: laizquierdadiario.cl, July 1, 2015

Operation Condor judge interrogates Ambassador Labbé in her office

For more than an hour, Judge Raquel Lermanda, who replaces Minister Víctor Montiglio, interrogated the Chilean ambassador to Panama, Alberto Labbé Galilea, in the capacity of a witness, within the framework of the investigation into the crimes committed during the so-called Operation Condor.

This proceeding responds to the expansion of the first interrogation that had been carried out in the first week of July. The proceeding, requested by the lawyers of the Human Rights Program of the Ministry of the Interior, seeks for the diplomat to detail the functions of his position while he served as an attaché at the Chilean embassy in Argentina between the years 1975-1976 and the relationship with the DINA agents in the Foreign Department who sent information to Santiago about the Chileans who resided in the trans-Andean nation, some of whom later disappeared.

Source: upi.com, August 17, 2010