Neltume

In mid-1981, the existence of a guerrilla camp in the Neltume area, Tenth Region, was reported by local peasants. The group consisted of MIR militants who had entered the country clandestinely as part of the so-called Operation Return, attempting to establish a base in the southern mountain range where the leadership of their organization would be installed in the future.

Following this information, an intense operation was launched involving CNI agents sent from Santiago, as well as personnel from the Carabineros and the Army.

In July 1981, the camp, which was still under construction, was discovered by security forces. A large quantity of material and documentation was seized during this operation. The group fled toward higher ground and was pursued by the agents.

In August, the MIR militants decided to send two of their members to the lowland cities to seek food and resume party contacts. However, they were detained by CNI agents and taken to Santiago. These detainees revealed the location where they were to meet their companions, as well as the password they were to use.

On September 13, 1981, taking advantage of this information, agents killed Raúl Rodrigo OBREGON TORRES, a topographic technician, as he arrived to meet his companions. The Commission is convinced that he was executed, as the agents utilized their knowledge of the meeting place and the password.

Consequently, the official version disseminated through DINACOS communiqués—which claimed, as in most of the other deaths, that they occurred as a result of armed confrontations—is false.

On September 17, Pedro Juan YAÑEZ PALACIOS, an electrician's assistant, was also executed by security forces. He had separated from the group because he was in very poor physical condition due to the harsh weather they had to endure; his companions had been forced to amputate a foot that had frozen and become gangrenous.

This fact leads the Commission to the conviction that it is highly improbable that he offered any resistance.

Around that date, the group split up, and three of them headed to the Remeco Alto sector to the home of a relative of one of the members in order to obtain food. The military was alerted to their presence by the residents of the house themselves and surprised them while they were sleeping, killing them.

Thus, the workers Patricio Alejandro CALFUQUIR HENRIQUEZ and Próspero del Carmen GUZMAN SOTO died inside the house, which was left completely destroyed by gunfire. José Eugenio MONSALVE SANDOVAL, also a worker, managed to flee a few meters from the house before being caught and executed.

The Commission is certain that in none of these deaths was there any prior resistance by the victims. All of this occurred on September 20, 1981.

On September 21, the two members of the group who had been detained at the beginning of the events, René Eduardo BRAVO AGUILERA and Julio César RIFFO FIGUEROA, both workers, were executed. They had been brought to the site of the operation from Santiago.

The communiqué distributed by DINACOS did not state how these individuals died and did not acknowledge that they had been previously detained. Other information from the CNI confirms the detention but claims they were killed while attempting to escape—a version that is implausible given the scale of the military deployment and the strict custody to which they must have been subjected, which is further confirmed by the omissions in the official communiqué.

Finally, on November 28, 1981, in Quebrada Honda, the medical assistant Juan Angel OJEDA AGUAYO was executed by Army troops. The account of an eyewitness to the events gives this Commission confidence that there was no real confrontation on this occasion either.

When weighing these cases, one must keep in mind what has been stated in Part One, Chapter II of this Report. It is necessary to clearly separate the actions or intentions that may be attributed to those who were killed, and even considerations regarding their dangerousness, from the legality or illegality of the authority's acts in combating them.

Certainly, no rule can ask the State to renounce the fight against an insurgency. Furthermore, no rule can ask it to combat it with ineffective means. But it is appropriate to demand compliance, in all circumstances, with certain rules that regulate the use of force.

Bearing this in mind, the Commission considers that in the events of Neltume, the authorities—who had already detained two of the individuals—were in a position to apprehend the others in all but one of the cases, rather than killing them.

If Neltume was intended by its participants to be the beginning of a guerrilla movement, it was, in practice—given the failure and the lamentable state of the MIR militants involved in this operation, and the enormous superiority of the State forces—an operation more police-like than strictly military.

Since the alternative of an apprehension was rationally available in each of the situations examined, it was not lawful to choose to execute them, even less so those who were physically in the power of their captors.

The only real confrontation in these events took place involving Miguel CABRERA FERNANDEZ, a worker, who fell on October 16, 1981, in the town of Choshuenco when he was discovered by Carabineros and an exchange of gunfire ensued. The Commission considers that his death occurred as a result of the confrontation and without a violation of his human rights.

In all other cases, and given what has been set forth, the Commission considers that these were executions, in violation of the human rights of those affected.