Juan Renán Jara Quintana
Victim of the military dictatorship.
Background
Juan Renán Jara Quintana
Victim of the military dictatorship.
Case summary
Juan Renán Jara Quintana was a colonel in the Chilean Army who served as second-in-command of the Second Rifle Company of the “Esmeralda” Regiment. During September 1973, he was stationed at the Estadio Chile, a facility used for the detention and execution of prisoners following the coup d'état.
MemoriaViva[1]
More than 5,500 Chileans were detained at the Estadio Chile following the coup. One of them was the singer-songwriter and theater director Víctor Jara, who was murdered after being savagely beaten by officers and soldiers for days.
The identity of one of those who was most brutal toward him, "El Príncipe" (The Prince), remains a mystery today. Furthermore, it has been very difficult to tear down the veil of silence regarding the identities of the other officers who were there, as they were part of the Chilean Army elite, many of whom led the repression within the DINA and the CNI.
In the following account—the most complete and extensive written to date regarding the murder of Víctor Jara, which partly inspired chapter 5 of Los archivos del cardenal—several statements from the case file on the singer-songwriter's death, currently overseen by investigating judge Miguel Vásquez, are reproduced, as well as interviews conducted by the author, who has investigated the subject for years.
Here, it is also reconstructed step-by-step what happened at the UTE and the Estadio Chile in the hours following the coup.
"On September 16 [1973], at 7:00, the body of Víctor Jara, along with five other corpses, was found next to the Cementerio Metropolitano, near the train tracks. Of the six bodies, local residents recognized two: Víctor and Litre Quiroga, who had also been seen by witnesses as a prisoner at the Estadio Chile.
I will provide the names of those witnesses to the court in due course. Some of those witnesses knew Víctor and Litre Quiroga personally; so much so that one of them knew that Litre had a scar on his chest, on the left side.
He verified this by opening his clothing. And regarding Víctor, they felt the calluses on his hands, typical of guitar players, which at that moment were full of bruises and swollen." This was read in the first judicial complaint filed by Joan Turner, requesting that the death of her husband be clarified: Víctor Jara Martínez, born on September 28, 1932, son of Manuel and Amanda.
The trial to identify the material and intellectual authors of his death began on September 12, 1978, following a complaint by his wife, a British national and dance teacher, whom he married on January 27, 1965. At the time he was murdered, he was 41 years old and had two daughters: Manuela, 13, and Amanda, 9.
It took 40 years for the bolt of secrecy surrounding the murder of Víctor Jara, Litre Quiroga, and dozens of other Chilean and foreign citizens who met their deaths at the Estadio Chile—whose identities and exact numbers remain unknown—to begin to slowly slide open.
The Estadio Chile and the Planning of the Coup
Until the late hours of the night of September 10, 1973, the central headquarters of the Universidad Técnica del Estado (UTE, today the Universidad de Santiago) was the epicenter of great activity. Everything was ready for President Salvador Allende to inaugurate the exhibition "Por la Vida Siempre" (For Life Always) at 11:00 the following morning, with an expected performance by singer-songwriter Víctor Jara.
Only a few knew what Allende would announce from the UTE: a plebiscite with which he intended to avoid the coup d'état. Two days earlier, the President had told General Carlos Prats, commander-in-chief of the Army until August 23, 1973: "It is the only democratic solution to avoid the coup or civil war." Allende knew he would not emerge victorious from that popular verdict.
What the professors and students of the UTE did not imagine, and neither did Allende, was that this very announcement of a plebiscite, which was quickly reported to those who wanted to overthrow him, had been the trigger that accelerated the coup.
And even less did they imagine that at that same hour, another flurry of activity, but for very different purposes, was engulfing several floors of the Ministry of Defense, located a few meters from the presidential palace.
Inside, a group of military officers under the command of Generals Herman Brady and Sergio Arellano Stark were finalizing the details for the attack on La Moneda and the occupation of Santiago, which would be unleashed only hours later.
The command of military operations in Santiago was configured that same morning. Under the leadership of General Brady, at the head of the Santiago Military Garrison, the following were aligned: General Sergio Arellano, in charge of the Santiago-Centro Group; General César Benavides, in the East Group; and Colonel Felipe Geiger, in the North Group.
The Reserve Group was given to General Javier Palacios, who would have a leading role on September 11.
Around a table in one of the ministry offices, a group of officers from the Army War Academy and Intelligence attached to the National Defense General Staff—the strategic core of the ongoing coup d'état (headed by Admiral Patricio Carvajal)—reviewed for the umpteenth time the details of the "Cobre" (Copper) and "Ariete" (Battering Ram) security plans, with the first orders on what to do with the Unidad Popular parties, their leaders, and the prisoner camps that would be set up.
"I must indicate that it fell to me to alphabetize a list of people who were to report to the country's regiments, which was read via a military communiqué. This list was given to me by Admiral Carvajal," later declared Álvaro Puga, who was one of the few civilians who participated in those preparations on the 10th (1).
Puga would also encounter Major Pedro Espinoza at the Ministry of Defense, who was dressed in civilian clothes and was in charge of the main Intelligence group of the National Defense General Staff, a unit that had supported the secret planning of the coup plotters during those months in 1973.
On the fourth floor of the building, another group—notably including Pedro Ewin Hodar (secretary of the National Defense General Staff) and War Academy student Colonel Roberto Guillard (2), and also including civilians—reviewed the drafts of the first military communiqués to be broadcast by a radio network led by Radio Agricultura (owned by the Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura, the main agricultural employers' association).
That officers from the War Academy, the so-called elite of the Army, were there was not surprising. Those officers were the first to join the preparation of the coup d'état in clandestine meetings with Air Force and Navy officers, who held the leadership.
By September 7, they were already informed of the imminence of the coup, for which reason the students of the academy's three courses were assigned to different units to ensure that the definitive day would be successful.
The importance of the War Academy in the coup was clearly reflected when Arellano entrusted the organization of the Santiago-Centro Group headquarters to Colonel Enrique Morel Donoso (3), director of the War Academy since August, when the incumbent, Herman Brady, assumed command of the Santiago Garrison.
That was also the moment when the academy became the armed wing of the coup plotters within the Army, with information transmitted by Colonel Sergio Arredondo González (4), a professor at the academy and one of the first conspirators. Arredondo would also have a leading role in the coup's actions as Chief of Staff of the Santiago-Centro Group.
Thus, on the 10th, Arellano Stark, Morel, and Arredondo made the final, stealthy contacts with the heads of the forces that would act against La Moneda and Santiago: the Infantry School, the Non-Commissioned Officers School, the Tacna, Yungay (from San Felipe), Guardia Vieja (from Los Andes), Coraceros (from Viña del Mar), and Maipo (from Valparaíso) regiments, and the Engineers School (from Tejas Verdes).
That same day, the 10th, in the offices of the Army Administrative Command (CAE), General Arturo Viveros (5), another of the early participants in the coup's preparation, summoned Commander Mario Manríquez Bravo to order him to prepare the Estadio Chile (located at Pasaje Boxeador Arturo Godoy No. 2750, between Calle Unión Latinoamericana to the east and Bascuñan Guerrero to the west) as a prisoner camp.
Before dealing with the Estadio Chile, Manríquez had to fulfill a delicate mission on September 11: to take charge of the burial of Salvador Allende and his autopsy, which would remain secret for 28 long years.
Major Hernán Chacón Soto, another of the War Academy officers, was also entrusted with the organization of the prisoner camps, under the orders of General Viveros. But he had received the order earlier: on September 8.
By then, the coup leaders had already decided that the Tacna Regiment would be the first and main detention center, as those on the lists prepared by the National Defense General Staff Intelligence group, headed by Major Pedro Espinoza, would be taken there. The commander of the Tacna, Colonel Luis Joaquín Ramírez Pineda, was already preparing.
The same was being done at the Tejas Verdes Engineers School by Major Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda. One of the conscripts from his school recounted the following in the trial seeking to establish who the material and intellectual authors of Víctor Jara's murder were:
"On September 10, 1973, around 19:00, a helicopter arrived at the Tejas Verdes Engineers School, carrying a Navy officer who went to speak with the school director, Colonel Manuel Contreras, who then gave the order to form up in the courtyard.
In the formation, we were ordered to prepare our backpacks and war weaponry, which consisted of a SIG rifle with one hundred rounds each. Around 20:00, we went to sleep, and at approximately 02:00 on the 11th, we were awakened by the duty corporal and ordered to form up in the courtyard.
The permanent staff was confined to barracks. Colonel Contreras told us that we were going into combat and that he did not want any casualties on our side. Together with my section, we boarded institutional trucks and headed to Santiago.
Those of us going to Santiago were: the Second Company, in charge of Captain Germán Montero Valenzuela, composed of the first, second, and third sections, in charge of Lieutenants Pedro Barrientos Núñez, Rodrigo Rodríguez Fuschloger, and [Jorge] Smith, respectively.
In addition to the Third Company, in charge of Captain Víctor Lizárraga Arias, and the first, second, and third sections of that company, in charge of Lieutenant Orlando Cartes Cuadra (6). In charge of this entire contingent was Major Alejandro Rodríguez Fainé" (7).
The conscript R.A. relates: "Once we arrived in Santiago, we headed to the Tacna Regiment, but it was occupied by the Maipo Regiment, which is why they took us to a basketball court at the War Arsenals.
The first thing they gave us was breakfast, and around 07:00 they formed us up and gave us a salmon-colored collar and a white armband with green turtles, and an officer, whose name and rank I do not know, indicated to us that we were going to overthrow the communist President Allende and that whoever did not want to go should take a step forward.
We looked at our companions: no one wanted to step out. Subsequently, the company, which was complete, headed to the side of the Ministry of Defense [Clarín newspaper], took a position in this building, and began to have crossfire with snipers from other rooftops."
The account of conscript R.A. was complemented by that of conscript C.A.P.: "After breakfast, Lieutenant Colonel Julio Canessa, commander of the War Arsenals, indicated to us that there would be an important event in the country, and Lieutenant Pedro Barrientos Núñez gave us more details and indicated that whoever did not want to go should take a step forward: obviously, no one stepped out.
Subsequently, we headed toward La Moneda along Calle San Diego, raiding all the buildings around the Ministry of Defense" (8).
Enrique Kirberg, rector of the Technical University, slept little and poorly that night. At 6:30, the ringing of the phone made him jump out of bed. "A group of armed civilians attacked the university radio facilities, disabling the antenna," was the brief announcement he received. After making sure there were no injuries, Kirberg went straight to the university.
The attack was carried out by the Navy contingent stationed at the Quinta Normal Naval Station, from where Admiral Patricio Carvajal, Chief of the National Defense General Staff, directed the development of the coup plans step by step.
On September 10, the Navy ordered a group of Marines and Intelligence personnel to move to Santiago. Among them were Lieutenants Miguel Álvarez and Jorge Aníbal Osses Novoa, of the Navy Intelligence Service. In Santiago, the officer Pedro Castro Bustos was already present, who reported directly to Frigate Captain Víctor Vergara" (9).
In La Serena, another group of soldiers from the "Arica" Artillery Regiment No. 2 was preparing to march to Santiago. In command of the Serena Group was Major Marcelo Moren Brito (10), second-in-command of the regiment led by Colonel Ariosto Lapostol, who did not travel.
Among those chosen was Captain Fernando Polanco, who was the head of Intelligence for the regiment and commanded an infantry company of about 120 men.
Shortly after Rector Kirberg entered the UTE, the Calle Ecuador sector became an anthill. While the first troops deployed in the surroundings, students and professors walked through courtyards and offices trying to obtain more information about what was happening.
From battery-powered radios that appeared everywhere, one could hear the strains of the Unidad Popular anthem "Venceremos," which Radio Magallanes broadcast over and over, accompanied by slogans to defend the government.
Around 10 in the morning, Víctor Jara said goodbye to his wife, Joan Turner, and his daughters Manuela and Amanda, and left his house at Calle Piacenza No. 1144. Knowing that a coup d'état was underway, he decided to be at his workplace: the UTE.
Joan will forever remember the image of Víctor in his black pants and black alpaca sweater, grabbing the keys to his renoleta (Renault 4) before leaving quickly in the direction of the university. He carried with him one of his most prized objects: his guitar.
Shortly after, Víctor Jara entered the UTE Vice-Rectorate of Communications, located across from the central building, where he worked as a folklore researcher and theater director. He went straight to the office of Cecilia Coll, head of the Artistic Extension department, his friend and companion of many days of culture brought to the poblaciones (shantytowns) and factories.
And also of volunteer work, where they unloaded flour and other basic necessities that were in short supply.
"'What do I do?' was the first thing he said to me. I saw him arrive clutching his guitar, his face worried. But he spoke to me with that conviction that impressed me, of being deeply convinced of what he was doing, whether in music, in theater, or in his militant attitude.
I heard him speak for a moment that morning with his wife, Joan, which reaffirmed to me that Víctor was clear about what his responsibility was that day," recalls Cecilia in an interview with the author.
That call was confirmed by Víctor Jara's wife, Joan Turner, who said: "Víctor called me on the phone around 11:30 to tell me that he had arrived safely, despite the movement of troops. To stay calm and to take care of the girls."
Cecilia Coll does not forget that it was she who told Víctor to go to the School of Arts and Crafts, the old building with solid construction that could better withstand a military attack, since many shots were being heard at that hour. By then, there were already hundreds of professors and students remaining at the UTE.
At that same hour, the officers who had staged the June 29, 1973, rebellion of the Armored Regiment No. 2, known as the "Tanquetazo," had already been released. The uprising, a draft of the coup d'état that would be executed three months later, left several dead and wounded and was organized and carried out by a group of military officers in conjunction with the far-right movement Patria y Libertad.
Its leaders were: Colonel Roberto Souper Onfray (11), who was the commander of the Armored No. 2; Captain Sergio Rocha Aros (12), commander of the regiment's Tank Company; Captain Carlos Lemus; and Lieutenants Raúl Jofré González, Antonio Bustamante Aguilar, Mario Garay Martínez (13), Edwin Dimter Bianchi, René López Rivera (14), Carlos Souper Quinteros, and Víctor Urzúa Patri.
Most were in military prison in different units in Santiago, accused of insurrection and sedition.
The maelstrom of the events of the 11th stifled the release of the seditious military officers. But the secret was kept for many years. There were reasons for this. The main one: to hide the names of those who ordered the missions entrusted to the officers who were just leaving military prison, chewing on the failure of their operation and their recognized violent and far-right vocation.
But there were other facts that surrounded that release and that connected those men to the Estadio Chile and the fate of Víctor Jara.
One of those officers was the then-lieutenant and today Brigadier (Ret.) Raúl Aníbal Jofré González, who was released at the Army Telecommunications School, along with fellow rebellious lieutenant Edwin Dimter Bianchi. Jofré recounted:
"On September 11, around 18:00, they came to look for me and transferred me to the Garrison Command, located on the sixth floor of the then-Ministry of Defense. The same day, at different times, the rest of the officers who were detained arrived, with the exception of Colonel Souper, whom I did not see. The next day I was sent along with Lieutenant Edwin Dimter to the Estadio Chile..." (15).
Another rebellious and released officer did see Colonel Souper that morning at the central command of the coup. The now-Colonel (Ret.) Antonio Roberto Bustamante Aguilar (16) relates:
"On September 11, 1973, around 11:00, I was informed that I was free and was transferred to Zenteno No. 45, where the Ministry of Defense operated. I went straight to the sixth floor, where I remained on standby along with the other officers who had participated in the so-called 'Tanquetazo': Colonel Roberto Souper, Captain Sergio Rocha, Lieutenants Raúl Jofré, Edwin Dimter, Mario Garay, and René López.
In the afternoon, we were assigned to different units. I do not know to which unit Colonel Souper was assigned. Captain Rocha was sent to the Jurisdictional Area Command of the Interior Security Zone (CAJSI) of Puente Alto, where he had been imprisoned (the then-Railway Regiment No. 2); Jofré and López were sent to the Estadio Chile; regarding Dimter, I have doubts, and regarding Garay, it seems to me that he was sent to the Second Army Division.
I was assigned to the Jurisdictional Area Commands of Interior Security, or CAJSI of Santiago, which operated on the sixth floor, south wing of the Ministry of Defense (Fifth Department, Civil Affairs).
All security activities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as Carabineros and Investigations, were subordinate to the CAJSI. The Fifth Department of Civil Affairs, to which I was assigned, was in charge of Army Captain Ramón Castro Ivanovic, a third-year student at the War Academy" (17).
But there was another fact that everyone kept quiet about for many years, and which Lieutenant Edwin Dimter, another of the rebels who was released, decided to reveal to the court 31 years later, when the figure of Víctor Jara returned with unusual force:
"At noon on September 13, 1973, all the officers who had participated in the uprising of June 29 were received by General Augusto Pinochet, who addressed a few brief words to us and then told us that we were going to receive instructions.
Present at that meeting were: Colonel Roberto Souper, Captain Sergio Rocha; and Lieutenants Raúl Jofré, Antonio Bustamante, René López, Mario Garay, and the undersigned. Subsequently, I was assigned to the Estadio Chile, a facility to which I was transferred in a jeep that same day" (18).
The departure of Dimter and Jofré to the Estadio Chile was confirmed by the then-lieutenant and now Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Mario Garay Martínez, another of the rebels of the Armored No. 2: "Lieutenants Jofré and Dimter were sent to the Estadio Chile...
In my case, I was kept in the Second Division to perform administrative duties and at the disposal of the senior officers of the General Staff" (19).
At 10:20, after having broadcast Salvador Allende's last speech for the second time, Radio Magallanes went silent forever. At 11:52, the first bomb fell on La Moneda. Víctor Jara witnessed the impact and called his wife. Joan would later relate that in that conversation, he told her to stay calm, that he would try to return home, but later...
Shortly before 14:00, the occupation troops, led by General Javier Palacios, with a contingent from the Tacna and the Non-Commissioned Officers and Infantry schools, entered La Moneda. In charge of the five batteries of the Tacna Regiment, which later broke into the Ministry of Education, was Major Enrique Cruz Laugier (20).
Palacios later said that they received gunfire from inside the burning La Moneda and that the quick action of his aide, Lieutenant Iván Herrera López (21), prevented him from being hit by other projectiles.
And he added in an interview with María Eugenia Oyarzún: "Lieutenant Armando Fernández Larios bandaged me with a handkerchief that I myself gave him to cover the wound. Why was he there? I think the Army Intelligence Service (SIM) sent people on their own to identify the prisoners." Palacios was right.
Armando Fernández Larios already belonged at that moment to the intelligence team of the National Defense General Staff, headed by Major Pedro Espinoza, a group that had compiled the list of UP leaders and officials who were to be taken prisoner as a first priority. A task that the Intelligence personnel of the coup's General Staff would continue to carry out later at the Estadio Chile.
Inside the UTE, people were in turmoil. Rector Kirberg still could not convince himself that the government palace was burning in flames. Suddenly, shouts were heard: "To the Paraninfo! To the Paraninfo! General assembly!" In an interview with the author, Kirberg relates:
"The assembly was held. We were all together, professors, students, workers. The president of the UTE Student Federation, Osiel Núñez, spoke and called for the coup to be stopped... The morning had passed in a dizzying manner.
A delegation of Christian Democrat professors and students came to tell me that they were at my disposal. While we were still under the impact of the bombing, a patrol of Marines arrived. They complained about a flag at half-mast that someone had put up. 'Either raise it or lower it!' they ordered. We agreed to stay at the university. There were about a thousand of us."
Student Iris Aceitón does not forget those moments: "The cry of the UTE pierced the walls of the Paraninfo until it rose into the misty sky. A great shiver ran through my whole body. The faces of my classmates were full of tears. We hugged each other... The men did not hide their shock. Very few left" (22).
Everyone organized themselves for what was coming, which was nothing other than remaining there, in the house that gave them identity. Víctor Jara was one more among them.
"There in the courtyard, next to a large concrete column, leaning on his inseparable guitar, I spot Víctor Jara. He is with Patricio Pumarino. They invite me to approach. Víctor speaks to me and I hug him, grateful," recalls Iris.
Shortly after, a Carabineros major in command of a patrol arrived at the UTE and informed the rector that they were cordoned off: "No one can leave, not even move from one building to another, because you will receive fire. We are in a State of Siege and the curfew is already in effect," he said curtly.
Víctor Jara, true to his character, had decided to stay. Around 16:30, he communicated with his wife again: "After some difficulties, I managed to speak with him. He told me that he would not be able to get home because of the curfew, that he would have to stay at the UTE that night, that he hoped to see me at home the next morning.
That he loved me very much... That was the last time we spoke," relates Joan Jara.
"We organized ourselves into two groups, one of them in the School of Arts and Crafts and another in the central building, spread out in different offices. Of those of us in the central building, some were in the industrial engineers' sector and others in the Paraninfo.
The central building has a basement, so we felt safe. Víctor Jara remained in the School of Arts and Crafts, where the largest group of people was. He spent the night in one of its rooms," related student leader Mario Aguirre Sánchez (23).
Indeed, Víctor Jara remained in the Physics Laboratory of the UTE's School of Arts and Crafts. Student Juan Manuel Ferrari Ramírez was also there and did not forget it:
"That night, his expression was etched in my memory because he looked very serene, worried, and sad. He was hugging his guitar, which made him very unique, unlike the other people who were scared or in a panic" (24).
After Rector Kirberg reached an agreement with a Carabineros contingent to evacuate the university in complete calm the next morning, the longest night ever experienced at the Technical University began.
Neither Víctor Jara nor Kirberg nor any of the students and professors who had decided to remain at the UTE could imagine that at those same hours and at full speed, the coup-plotting military officers were preparing the Estadio Chile to receive its first prisoners. And they would be its next inhabitants.
Officer David González Toro, of the Army Administrative Command, received an order that linked him for life to the Estadio Chile:
"On the 11th, my General Viveros ordered me to take charge of the administration of a prisoner center that was going to be created. Hours later, I was informed that I had to go along with Commander Mario Manríquez, Major Sergio Acuña, and Sergeants Sergio Etcheverry, Caupolicán Campos, and Corporal Héctor Bernal to the Estadio Chile.
When we arrived in the afternoon, there was no one... When the detainees arrive, I am clear that there was personnel from the Tejas Verdes Engineers School, the CAE, and the Calama Regiment. I do not know if there was personnel from another unit... I remember seeing Commander Manríquez in a small office located along a wide hallway, next to some bathrooms" (25).
Major Hernán Chacón Soto received other orders regarding the Estadio Chile:
"At about 16:00 on September 11, I was ordered through the head of the Housing Department of the Army Administrative Command, Lieutenant Colonel Mario Pérez Paredes, that I had to take charge of a section of the Tejas Verdes Engineers School.
In the company of Lieutenant Colonel Pérez, I had to move, with this section in my charge, to the Estadio Chile, establishing myself at the location at about 19:00, where I was informed that I was in charge of the exterior security of the gymnasium...
In this task and with this section, I remained until September 15, 1973, as I recall, when all the detainees from the Estadio Chile were transferred to the Estadio Nacional."
One of the Tejas Verdes conscripts, M.C., recounted what was happening at the Estadio Chile during those hours:
"Around 19:00 on the 11th, we were ordered, the entire section, to go to the Estadio Chile, in charge of Lieutenant Rodríguez Fuschloger and Lieutenant Jorge Smith Gumucio [and he gives the names of all the sergeants, corporals, and conscripts who went with him].
Upon arriving, I observed several buses with detainees who were being brought down with their hands up and were being pointed at by soldiers. I was ordered to station myself at the entrance of the stadium, organizing the line of detainees that was entering.
This lasted for several hours until the stadium was almost full. Suddenly, next to the line of detainees, I saw an elderly man and allowed him to rest on the ground. I was surprised by Lieutenant Smith, who reprimanded me and wanted to have me detained for disobedience.
Lieutenant Rodríguez Fuschloger interceded in my favor. Subsequently, I went to rest for a few hours in a room on the second floor, and later, upon returning, Corporal R. ordered me to stay as a sentry in the gallery that was in front of the main entrance, in the hallway that divided the lower and upper gallery" (26).
Conscript R.A., from the Tejas Verdes Engineers School, also claims to have received the order to go to the Estadio Chile at 19:00 on the 11th. And he remembers that his entire section went, which was led by Lieutenant Rodrigo Rodríguez Fuschloger (27).
Upon arriving at the stadium, he says that with him were Sergeants Víctor Heredia Castro, Exequiel Oliva Muñoz, and Corporals Nelson Barraza Morales, Homero Reinoso Valdés, Carlos Sepúlveda Moreno, José Galdames Arteaga, Jaime Sepúlveda López, and 38 conscripts (he gives all their names).
Also going were Sergeants Sergio Montiel Díaz and Manuel Rolando Mella San Martín, who were not from his section but were at the Estadio Chile:
"Once we arrived at the stadium, on one side were some Carabineros buses with detainees, waiting for us to take our position in the facility. To guard the place, we divided ourselves into six-hour shifts.
The corporals ordered us where we had to be as sentries. I remember that I was stationed at the main entrance, on the outer side. From my position, I could observe the entry of the detainees. It was a large quantity.
Their personal belongings were left in a handkerchief or whatever else on one side of the entrance. All night on the 11th and the early morning of September 12, detainees arrived. On the 12th, around 06:00, I was relieved and went to sleep, to then assume my shift in the same place."
Not far from there, inside the UTE, hours of terror were being lived: "In the end, there were about 600 of us teachers, students, and staff who remained at the university, which was persistently shot at with long-range weapons throughout the night. Vehicles drove around the surroundings firing to frighten us," says an Engineering student in an interview with the author.
Enrique Kirberg: "At midnight, they called from the School of Arts and Crafts. They informed me that there was a wounded man: a cameraman, whom they called 'El Salvaje' (The Savage), had received a bullet in the spine that compromised his kidneys.
He was very serious. I asked for hospital assistance, I insisted to the military, we waited all night... Our man died on us... And I must say that there were no weapons inside the university and there was no resistance either. A myth has been created: it is believed that we resisted... It saddens me a little to disappoint them."
The president of the UTE Student Federation, Osiel Núñez, also remembered very well those moments when the cameraman and photographer for the university magazine Presencia, Hugo Araya Araya, "El Salvaje," was wounded: "The rector made several calls requesting an ambulance to transport the wounded man.
It was useless. At about one in the morning, we were informed that Hugo Araya had bled to death," he related to the Rettig Commission (28).
The group from the "Arica" Regiment that arrived from La Serena to reinforce the coup's military operations was made up of two Infantry companies and an Artillery battery formed by four pieces under the command of Major Marcelo Moren Brito. Their first mission was to "evacuate and occupy all the UTE facilities."
"The intelligence information handled by the Santiago Military Garrison was that inside that house of studies there were between 300 to 500 people, many of them armed. Navy personnel, dependent on the Quinta Normal Naval Station, together with Carabineros from the Calle Ecuador police station, had not managed to evacuate it, reporting that they had received shots from inside," recalls Second Lieutenant (Ret.) Pedro Rodríguez Bustos, who participated in the occupation of the UTE (29).
Officer Fernando Polanco also formed part of the contingent that was ready to attack the UTE, under the command of Major Moren Brito: "We spent that night at the Buin Regiment. In the early morning of the 12th, through an order that I presume was given by the commander of the Buin Regiment, Colonel Felipe Geyger, our entire group went to raid and occupy the Universidad Técnica del Estado facility...
Major Moren was the one who dealt with the superiors and received the orders directly from the commander of the Santiago-Centro Group. Our mission was only to evacuate the facility and coordinate the transfer to the Estadio Chile. Approximately in October of that year, the DINA was created, to which Major Moren Brito went directly and solely within our group" (30).
What Polanco, better known in the Army as "El Polaco" (The Pole), does not say is that in those same days he was also hunting for Unidad Popular leaders. That is how he arrived at the home of Félix Huerta, one of the members of Salvador Allende's most secret advisory committee.
Huerta was an invalid, and Polanco extorted him to give up the identities of his comrades in exchange for the life of his brother, Enrique Huerta (whom, however, they had already murdered). Polanco, in the end, did not kill Félix Huerta, but he continued his career in intelligence services, in the BIE, the most secret group of the Army Intelligence Directorate.
Other deaths, including that of Colonel Huber, a member of the DINA, would be attributed to him over the years. Huber was murdered when the illegal sale of weapons to Croatia was discovered once democracy was restored.
Around 6:00 on September 12, Enrique Kirberg changed his shirt and shaved. He wanted to be prepared to receive the military delegation that would assist in the evacuation:
"Suddenly I felt a terrible roar. They fired a cannon shot toward the university building. The shell opened a huge hole and exploded two offices away from where I was. I was left chewing pieces of concrete.
I looked out and saw troops entrenched who were firing toward the university. The windows of the front facade broke, making a frightening noise. We had to lie on the floor to dodge the shots. As the attack did not cease, I took my white shirt, approached the window, and waved it outside.
I heard shouts: 'Come out with your hands up!' A woman started to cry... I heard myself say: 'This is not the time to cry!'"
"At approximately 7:00, I was in the administration offices, along with about a hundred people, and we saw when they installed a cannon in front of the main building and fired three shells. Immediately, they unleashed a machine-gun attack for more than 30 minutes.
Through loudspeakers, an officer asked us to surrender. Everyone came out with their hands up and in single file between two rows of armed soldiers," related Professor Carlos Orellana (31).
Enrique Kirberg: "People started to come out with their hands up, but even so, they did not stop firing. My impression was that the soldiers were more scared than we were. Violently, they forced people to lie on the ground.
I did too, but the commander made me stand up at gunpoint and shouted at me: 'So you're the rector, you son of a bitch! Now you're going to see what university autonomy is!' Violently, he grabbed me by the arm, threw me against a wall, cocked his weapon, and aimed at me: 'You have 15 seconds to tell me where the weapons are, otherwise I'll shoot!' I was very clear that I was in front of my university; professors and students were listening to me.
I don't know where I got the strength, but very serenely I replied: 'The weapons of the University are knowledge, art, and culture.' The 15 seconds passed, and the man who was aiming at me did not pull the trigger.
He called a soldier and told him: 'Aim at him! And if he doesn't say where the weapons are, you know...' They fired a second cannon shot and then took the cannon toward the School of Arts and Crafts. My people were still lying on the ground. The soldier kept aiming at me; shouts and orders were heard while the troops broke down doors and windows and entered firing into the buildings."
As soon as they entered, the military asked for the student leaders to identify themselves. Osiel Núñez, president of the UTE Student Federation, did so. He was immediately separated...
tently and the beatings began. “Where are the weapons?” was the shout that was repeated:
“They beat me and threatened me with death. They fired twice at my side to make me decide to talk. I insisted that there were no weapons at the university. At that moment, they arrived to inform the commanding officer that a confrontation was taking place at the Escuela de Artes y Oficios.
I asked this military officer to allow me to go there to prevent a massacre. He agreed. I arrived at the scene, asking the students to leave the school, assuring them that they would not be fired upon; mainly staff members began to leave.
Then I was taken to another sector, where I did the same, but the students did not have time to leave because the military entered violently, firing. I asked the commanding officer to stop the shooting to avoid unnecessary deaths. The shooting stopped and students began to come out. But the military continued firing” (32).
Student Boris Navia Pérez recounts: “The military took out students, professors, and staff, men and women, and between rifle-butt blows they forced us to lie down in the street, in front of the main building, including the rector himself.
We remained in this place throughout the morning and part of the afternoon. In the distance, lumps could be seen lying down, which made the neighborhood think we were all dead. Among these people was also Víctor Jara” (33).
Many of the students and professors who remained at the UTE saw Víctor Jara lying on the ground with his hands behind his neck, like all his companions. This is how one of the students who was taken prisoner remembers it:
“They moved us to the baby soccer field of the Escuela de Artes y Oficios. Víctor was in my same row. Hours passed before they made us board the buses. They placed us on our knees on the floor of the bus, with our heads down and our hands behind our necks. Víctor traveled on the same bus as I did.”
Mario Aguirre Sánchez: “Osiel Núñez’s actions managed to dissuade the military and convinced them to moderate their behavior so that people could leave and not be machine-gunned. On a field at the Escuela de Artes, we were kept on the ground, being beaten by the military guarding us while different facilities were raided.
There was no resistance. Near noon, the raid ended and the transfer of the detainees in buses began. They led us with our heads down, to prevent us from seeing the place of detention.”
Enrique Kirberg: “Afterward, they put me in a jeep. On the side of the street, the women with their arms raised formed a line. Someone took my wife out of the line so she could say goodbye. We gave each other a tight hug. I would not see her again for a long eleven months…”
Rector Kirberg was taken to the Regimiento Tacna, where he heard executions and became convinced that his turn would come very soon. “And since I am an enemy of tragicomic things, I doubted whether to shout something or not before the volley.
I noticed that my body was damp and my heart was beating rapidly. I wanted to take out a piece of paper and leave a message for my family… I regretted it… When I was already prepared, they came to look for me and put me in a jeep.” From there he was taken to a basement of the Ministry of Defense, where he again witnessed beatings and insults. “On my knees, I saw a corporal who was patrolling the premises with a scimitar in his hand.
An officer took me out, they put me in a jeep, and they took me to the Estadio Chile.”
When the prisoners from the Universidad Técnica arrived at the Estadio Chile in the late hours of the afternoon of September 12, they were received by a military contingent whose characteristics are remembered by the then-sub-officer of the Regimiento Arica of La Serena, Pedro Rodríguez Bustos, who had participated in the assault on the UTE:
“Those who received the UTE detainees at the Estadio Chile were Captain Rafael Ahumada Valderrama, Captain Joaquín Molina Fuenzalida [who was murdered on November 9, 1988], and Second Lieutenant Jorge Herrera López [all from the Regimiento Tacna].
I was able to observe these officers at the moments when it was my turn to hand over the UTE detainees on September 12. They received the prisoners in their capacity as those in charge of the premises. Captain Ahumada was an Intelligence officer, so I presume he had to participate in the interrogations with other officers from the Tacna.”
A regime of terror
Among the nearly 600 prisoners from the Universidad Técnica who arrived at the Estadio Chile, there is a 16-year-old girl, a 4th-year high school student at the Liceo Darío Salas (located on Avenida España).
On the 11th, with some of her schoolmates, Lelia watched the bombing of La Moneda, trembling and from a distance. Shortly after, along with 12 other high school students, they decided to go to the Escuela Normal Abelardo Núñez, located a few blocks from the UTE. They spent the night there.
At 6:00 the next morning, a contingent of Carabineros burst into the school and arrested them. They remained lying on the ground of the roadway, face down and hands behind their necks for about two hours.
Suddenly, the Carabineros made them stand up and took them to the front of the UTE, where they handed them over to a group of military personnel with orange armbands. Lelia does not forget that sergeant who gave them food and let them go into a house so they could call their families and use the bathroom.
From the conversation, they knew they came from La Serena (Regimiento “Arica”). They did not know that they would soon enter hell. Lelia recalled:
“Upon entering the Estadio Chile, they placed us in a line with our hands behind our necks and jumping. At the entrance, there were four or five tables attended by civilians wearing suits and ties. They asked for our names, political affiliation, and the reason for our detention.
They also took our identity cards, which we were supposed to pick up later at the Ministry of Defense, according to their instructions. They separated us: the men to one gallery, the women to another. On the afternoon of the 12th, an Army official gave us a speech: he said that the days of Marxism were over…”
UTE student Mario Aguirre Sánchez also remembered that harangue: “A military man who identified himself as the person in charge of the premises took a microphone and gave a harangue saying that he had authorization to kill and did not want to be deprived of that pleasure.
He intimidated us by saying that the soldiers also had that authorization with the machine guns that fired 30 rounds per second and were known as ‘Hitler’s saws’ since they cut those they murdered in two.”
Years later (2004), Colonel Mario Manríquez Bravo (34) would acknowledge in a confrontation: “It is true that I stated to the prisoners that these weapons had been known in the Second World War as ‘Hitler’s saws,’ characterized by a high rate of fire that could cut a person in two.”
The conscript C.E., from the Tejas Verdes unit, entered the Estadio Chile around 11:00 on September 12. He remembers: “Trucks with prisoners were arriving. Lieutenant Pedro Barrientos ordered us to form a cordon for the line of detainees, many of whom were hit with rifle butts.
Once the detainees entered the stadium, Sergeant Mella distributed us in different sectors to guard the prisoners, located in the stalls and on the field, since in the gallery there was a .30 caliber machine gun, in charge of a soldier who had orders to fire in case of anything.
It was my turn to be on the southwest side of the galleries, where there were about 70 foreigners of different nationalities [He gives the names of the officers Jorge Smith Gumucio, Rodrigo Rodríguez Fuschloger, and Jorge Garcés Von Hohenstein, who commanded them (35)].
The stay at the facility was not good, as we did not receive food for about three days, let alone the detainees; furthermore, there was no water and the bathrooms were unsanitary.”
Enrique Kirberg: “As soon as I arrived at the Estadio Chile, they placed me against the wall, with my shoes pressed against the wall and my arms raised. A soldier was aiming at me. I saw more people arriving, in a line and with their hands raised and jogging.
I saw Víctor Jara pass by my side. He gave me that wide smile that characterized him. I signaled to him with my hand… An hour later they put me in another jeep and took me back to the Regimiento Tacna (36).”
UTE professor Carlos Orellana was also in the line of prisoners waiting to enter the stadium with his hands behind his neck: “There were several thousand prisoners. The military had formed groups and each detainee carried a number.
Víctor Jara was in my group. I saw when an officer hit him. It seems the officer recognized him, approached him, and punched him in the face. Víctor received the blow without falling. The officer called some soldiers and ordered them to take him away.
That happened in the corridors of the stadium. The soldiers took Víctor by the arms and led him to the basement. Before this incident, Víctor did not have any wounds.”
Professor Ricardo Iturra Moyano: “Upon arrival at the Estadio Chile, in the same line as me, about fifteen people ahead, was Víctor Jara. At the moment he was entering the stadium, a uniformed man stopped him and threw him violently against the wall, while insulting him and hitting him… Later, when Víctor Jara came to sit in front of me, I noticed that he had his hands in front, with his fingers curled, and he seemed to be suffering terribly” (37).
UTE professor César Fernández Carrasco was also in that line of prisoners: “Víctor Jara was in the line four or five men behind me. A soldier identified him and informed his superior. Víctor Jara was detained by several soldiers and beaten. His chest was hit so hard with the butts of the rifles that he fell to the ground…” (38).
Julia Fuentes says she did not see Víctor Jara inside the Estadio Chile, but like almost all the conscripts, soldiers, and officers who dominated the facility, she knew he was there. Julia was not a prisoner, although in a sense she was.
Because Julia was a cook at the stadium before September 11, and on the 12th a military patrol arrived at her house and took her directly to the sports facility. For a month, without the right to leave, she cooked for the officers and something for the conscripts in charge of the Prisoner Camp.
She entered the premises she knew so well, escorted, through a hallway located on the right side of the ticket offices. They warned her to walk straight ahead without looking:
“It was inevitable, I did it… there was a group of half-naked men, lying on the ground, piled one on top of the other. I didn’t know if they were alive or dead, but I saw their skin was very dark, not being able to specify if it was from hematomas or bruises.
I also saw hands, many hands that were waving and asking for water. I went up to the second floor directly to the casino and the kitchen, and where I walked I had no view of the field. In the dining room, the military ate, but the officers at separate tables.
The first 15 days I slept on a mattress in the kitchen itself. Later they gave me a room. I remember seeing from the kitchen when the soldiers gathered all the tables in the dining room and from their pockets took out handfuls of bills they had stolen from the prisoners.
I remember seeing in a hallway prisoners who were pushed by soldiers who stabbed them with bayonets. I also remember hearing many shots inside all day, both from rifles and machine guns, which I recognized by their unmistakable rattling… Several days after they took me to the stadium, a soldier commented to me secretly in the kitchen: ‘We finished off the singer Víctor Jara, because they killed him.’ That same soldier commented to me days later in private: ‘Tonight they are going to take 40 trucks loaded with dead people out of the stadium that they are going to leave at Cerro Chena’” (39).
Technical draftsman Guillermo Orrego Valdebenito was not taken prisoner at the UTE, but he did see Víctor Jara at the Estadio Chile. In 1973 he worked at the Standard Electric company, located in the Vicuña Mackenna industrial belt.
He was arrested at Textil Progreso on the afternoon of September 12 along with 60 other workers, who were taken by bus to the Estadio Chile by Carabineros and Army personnel:
“Approximately on September 13 or 14, I remember passing by Víctor Jara, whom I recognized immediately since, in addition to being a recognized artist, he worked as a professor at the UTE where I took evening classes in technical drawing.
It was noticeable at a glance that he had been mistreated and very beaten in the face, although he was in good spirits. Víctor was surrounded by students and people from the UTE. Very close to them was a group from CORFO.”
One of those professionals detained at the headquarters of the Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO), engineer Julio Del Río Navarrete, remembers:
“On September 12, I was arrested at the central office of CORFO, located at Ramón Nieto with Moneda, along with the other professionals who were there, among whom I can cite Alfredo Cabrera Contreras, commercial engineer; Hugo Pavez Lazo, lawyer; Gustavo Muñoz López, commercial engineer, and others whose names I do not remember.
We were taken on foot through downtown Santiago to La Moneda and sent to the Ministry of Defense, where we were interrogated and beaten in the basements. On the afternoon of the 13th, we were taken to the Estadio Chile in minibuses.
We entered through the Unión Latinoamericana street access, where we saw for the first time the officer Mario Manríquez, who received us and asked where we came from. When we answered, he said that we were the ‘ideologues of the system or the government’ and that we were communists.
He drew a pistol, chambered a round, put it to my temple, and asked what my political affiliation was. When I replied that I was independent, he said I was lying and that now we were all independent. At that moment they took out the corpse of a boy who could not have been more than 12 or 13 years old, to which Manríquez told us that the same thing was going to happen to us if we did not tell the truth.
Then he sent us to the basement where there was a group of eight young officers with red berets. They placed us against the wall. They tied our hands behind our backs and beat us on the back with fists and feet.
An officer hit us with nunchucks. They asked us where the weapons were and especially about the whereabouts of Pedro Vuscovic, who had been Minister of Economy and until that moment Executive Vice President of CORFO.
They even asked about the remuneration we received. Until Mario Manríquez, commander of the facility, arrived, accompanied by his general staff, formed precisely by the officers who were beating us. A dialogue took place that lasted approximately two hours, where the government of the Unidad Popular was discussed and talked about.
I pointed out to Manríquez that I was in charge of the logistics part that supplied the Army, Navy, and Air Force, for which I had had a lot of contact with Armed Forces officers, which I also fulfilled by direct instructions from the President of the Republic.
In the middle of the dialogue, Manríquez said that we were ‘recoverable.’ An officer intervened in the conversation who stated that he had been imprisoned until September 11 for the events known as the ‘Tanquetazo,’ the same situation as others of the officers, he said.
As we expressed to Manríquez our concern about the repeated robberies we had been subjected to, he said he would take charge. We gave him our money and he gave Alfredo Cabrera a card where his usual workplace appeared: the Army Administrative Support Command, located on Alameda near Portugal.
He told us to go later to look for the money at this place and that he would return it to us. And that is indeed what happened when we regained our freedom. Once the conversation ended, Manríquez ordered them to bring us food and give us some mattresses to sleep on, despite the officers’ complaints.
We fell asleep. After a time I cannot specify, I was awakened by Souper, an officer of thin build, short stature, and very fine features. He said that we had to go up to the stands because we were in danger there… We understood immediately: we had already experienced the interrogation.
Once they took us up to the stands, we were placed on the north side, where a selected group of prisoners was located. Víctor Jara was also there. He was alone, with no people around him and in the upper part, near a transmission booth.
Hours earlier, when we were still in the basement, I had spotted him in a locker room. His face was very well known. He was very bad, beaten, and with one eye practically closed. With my companions, we decided to go see him to know what he needed.
His face was swollen from the beatings and one eye closed, it seems the right one. His hands he could not move; they looked fractured, swollen, and sore. We remained with Víctor for about one or two hours until they took us down to the field to be transferred to the Estadio Nacional” (40).
Technical draftsman Guillermo Orrego was a witness to another fact that illustrates what Víctor Jara and the more than five thousand prisoners of the Estadio Chile were living through in those hours:
“On one occasion, a military man sent me to the infirmary with another detainee who had a nervous breakdown and who worked at Textil Progreso. In the infirmary, as well as in the foyer that leads to the stadium access, perpendicular to the Alameda, I could see several people lying on the ground who were not moving.
There could have been about 20. Some were covered with white sheets, but all were bloodied. I heard some groans. No one was guarding them. The officers in charge were from the Army, they wore olive green uniforms with maroon red berets.
The military man in charge of the facility was an officer who must have been between 40 and 50 years old, with a mustache and a bit corpulent, whom I later recognized in the press as an officer with the surname Manríquez.
There were other officers, more than 20, who distinguished themselves because they gave orders and imposed themselves by their commanding voice. Some of them wore black berets and others a kind of olive green peaked cap.
With greater certainty, I remember an officer with a black beret, thick black mustache, and dark complexion, who fired a burst of machine-gun fire into the air, and another who called himself ‘The Prince,’ since when he addressed the prisoners he had no need to use microphones: he said he had a ‘prince’s voice.’ He was a tall officer, of medium build, very white complexion, no mustache, blond and straight hair.
I don’t remember him wearing a beret or a peaked cap. He carried nunchucks with which he hit the detainees, being especially cruel and vulgar in his treatment” (41).
As the judicial investigation progressed and when Commander Mario Manríquez could no longer continue denying the deaths at the Estadio Chile and also that he was the commanding officer, he stated:
“At the moment of establishing myself at the Stadium, I called my hierarchical superior at the CAE, Colonel Martínez, by phone, to whom I informed that Intelligence personnel were operating in the basement of the Stadium, belonging to the four branches of the Armed Forces.
He ordered me to let them function, since they were doing important work considering the state of the country… I have the internal certainty that the Intelligence people in the basement also removed prisoners and took them out of the stadium, since they had their own vehicles and there was no control over them: they obeyed only their institutional commands.
I remember that one of the young lieutenants from the Armored Regiment always walked around with nunchucks. It is not part of Army training to use a weapon like nunchucks” (42).
“There was a lieutenant of Germanic characteristics, with a maroon beret, who was very crazy and beat the detainees a lot. The soldiers and corporals themselves worried about him, since his reaction was unknown.
No one approved of his action, but being an officer, no one said anything to him. Even the commander, Colonel Manríquez, did not know what to do with him. The conscripts called him ‘The Prince,’” relates a soldier in the case file.
It took years for the young student Lelia to get the voice and hands of “The Prince” off her: “I was at the Estadio Chile until September 18. During those days I suffered multiple humiliations, sexual assaults, and torture in interrogation sessions.
The interrogations were done in the locker rooms and bathrooms of the stadium, and the interrogators changed. Among them, I remember one they called ‘The Prince,’ who tortured me on several occasions” (43).
One of the prisoners at the Estadio Chile complements the accounts and describes ‘The Prince’: “Tall and blond and with an orange handkerchief around his neck. He boasted with a powerful voice that now these Marxists would have to pay for having had him detained on June 29 [the day of the ‘Tanquetazo’].”
And yes, precisely at the Estadio Chile was a group of the officers who led the rebellion of the Armored Regiment No. 2. They had been assigned to the prisoner camp as soon as they were released on the 11th itself, as they were being prosecuted for the crime of military insurrection.
It is interesting to contrast the witnesses’ statements regarding the physical description of “The Prince” with that made by the then-lieutenant and today Brigadier (R) and prosperous businessman Raúl Jofre, of the officers he stated accompanied him at the Estadio Chile: Edwin Dimter, Rodrigo Fuschloger, and Luis Bethke Wulf (44).
Jofré, also a protagonist of the Armored Regiment No. 2 rebellion, said:
“Edwin Dimter was thin, tall, white-skinned, blond, and with a powerful and strong voice. He must have been one meter eighty-five centimeters tall, and I don’t think he used a maroon beret; he must have used a peaked cap.
Luis Bethke, of the Infantry branch, was stocky, a little shorter than Dimter, white-skinned, blond hair, and with a strong tone of voice. Rodrigo Rodríguez Fuschlocher was tall, one meter ninety centimeters, had been a national basketball player, had dark brown hair, and was not white-skinned… I remember these officers because with Rodríguez Fuschlocher and Bethke we slept in the same room at the stadium.”
Brigadier (r) Raúl Jofré (45), who did not remember before the court that there were machine guns emplaced in the upper part of the Estadio Chile, did gather his memory and stated:
“The officer who can respond to these traits is Edwin Dimter (46), with whom I served for a year in the Armored Regiment, but we always had a strictly professional relationship and were not friends. Dimter’s personality was that of a person who was difficult to deal with, very intelligent, but with little judgment, and he had great physical presence.
I am not very clear about what activities he carried out at the Estadio Chile” (47).
In the process, Dimter denied any relationship with ‘The Prince.’ He said that while he was at the Estadio Chile he used “combat gear: regulation parka of bluish-gray color and as headgear the regulation peaked cap.
I did not use a beret.” And he would repeat: “I am not the officer who has been described, nor did I mistreat or kill any prisoner at the Estadio Chile.” And he would then elaborate on other officers who could correspond to those characteristics:
“A lieutenant less senior than me, with the surname Rodríguez Fuschlocher, who was from Concepción and a basketball player, taller than me, of athletic build and light brown hair. Likewise, there were two other officers who had German surnames: Lieutenant Bethke, who was about my height, thin, and with light hair.
The other officer was a lieutenant more senior than me, with the surname Haase [he refers to Nelson Haase (48), from Tejas Verdes who was indeed at the Estadio Chile], of the Engineers branch, who was in Santiago for medical treatment at the Military Hospital for an illness related to mental health, as he told me” (49).
But the conscript C.A., from the Tejas Verdes unit, did see Lieutenant Edwin Dimter (50) torture and murder a prisoner: a young man whom he describes as “well-dressed and with the appearance of coming from a family of good economic standing, who claimed to be an Architecture student.” Dimter had arrived with a sketchbook that belonged to the young man and accused him of “making plans of military installations.” The conscript was a witness to how Dimter interrogated him in German, only to then murder him “with a shot to his head with a SIG rifle.” C.A. remembered the scene that followed and which remained engraved in his mind: “Brain matter from the young man jumped onto the wall… Then, Lieutenant Dimter took the Seiko brand watch that the young man was wearing on his wrist and handed it to Commander Manríquez, telling him: ‘It’s a war trophy!’”
An incident that occurred around September 14 shocked the Tejas Verdes conscripts. Almost everyone remembers it:
“When I was on duty I was relieved by another conscript and was heading to the gallery hallway, when I hear a shot and I go to where it had occurred, observing that soldier M. had shot a young man who had lunged at him, with the soldier being left in a very bad state of mind,” recalls conscript C.E.
The author of the shot also recounted it: “Approximately on September 15, around 20:00, a detainee who had been heavily beaten by other officials tried to take my SIG rifle, struggling with him as he tried to take it from me.
Instinctively a shot went off, hitting him in the chest or stomach. I was taken toward the exit by a group of Army officials of different ranks. Even the head of the facility, Colonel Manríquez, arrived, who pointed out to me that what I had done was fine, since the detainee could have taken the rifle from me and it would have been a greater evil.”
Víctor does not return home
Joan Jara waited anxiously for her husband’s return. But Víctor Jara did not return on September 12. Together with her daughters, she tried to follow the course of events from her home. Until in the afternoon, television gave her the news that the Universidad Técnica had been taken by the military and that “a large number of extremists had been detained.” On Thursday the 13th, she learned that professors and students from the UTE had been taken to the Estadio Chile.
That same afternoon she received a call:
“At 16:30 a boy called on the phone. He told me that he had been at the Estadio Chile, that he had been able to leave, and that he had a message for me from Víctor. The last message Víctor sent me was to have courage, to take care of the girls, that he thought he was not going to be able to leave the stadium, that he was thinking of us… We were locked in the house without knowing what to do, without information.”
Joan Jara never lied. Each of her testimonies always adhered to the truth. Years later, that last person who transmitted her husband’s message would appear: Hugo González González.
“I was arrested on September 12 on the public thoroughfare for curfew and taken to the Estadio Chile. On September 13, I met Víctor Jara in a kind of hallway, on the side of the field. He was alone and sitting, without military custody, with physical signs of having been beaten a lot, those on his face being the most notorious wounds.
I approached to talk to him. He told me that he had been arrested at the Universidad Técnica and that he had been recognized in the stadium by the commander of the facility: a military man with a mustache, a bit solid, with black hair and middle-aged.
That this military man had separated him from the other detainees, subsequently being subjected to physical duress by the same officer. Víctor Jara indicated to me that he was threatened by the commander of the Estadio Chile, without specifying what type of threat.
And he requested that I call his spouse, Joan Turner, in order to communicate where his Renault was, which he had left parked in the vicinity of the Universidad Técnica. I was released on September 14, 1973.
I do not know if Víctor Jara was still in the place where I saw him, since subsequent to our first meeting I only spotted him one more time, in the same place, without being able to specify the exact day.
After being released, I fulfilled what I had promised Víctor Jara and gave his message to Joan Turner. I called her from a public phone that was on the Alameda to the number that Víctor Jara indicated to me. I told Mrs. Turner the location of the Renault and she asked me about Víctor’s state. I replied that he was fine…” (51).
The threat that Víctor Jara received and that Hugo González kept in his memory had another witness: Wolfgang Tirado, then a prisoner at the Estadio Chile:
“On the morning of September 13, I was able to change my location in the Estadio Chile and approach the fences where the release procedures took place. There I saw Víctor Jara again. I noticed that he was talking to an Army officer who had recognized him.
I saw that they pushed him and kicked him. I remember that the officer made a gesture with his hand across his neck, indicating to Víctor that he would cut his head off. The officer ordered two soldiers to take him aside. At that moment it was that they kicked him and hit him with rifle butts. I did not see Víctor again after that” (52).
Architect Miguel Lawner also saw Víctor Jara on September 13. Lawner, who was the main executive of the Corporación de Mejoramiento Urbano (CORMU), had been arrested in his office, where he remained along with other workers from the same entity until September 12.
He was taken to the Estadio Chile and left there thanks to the intervention of General Arturo Viveros, due to the relationship established between both by an agreement signed between the Army and CORMU.
Lawner would manage to leave the Estadio Chile alive to be sent, like the rector of the Universidad Técnica, Enrique Kirberg, as a prisoner to Isla Dawson. He never imagined that the episode of his meeting with General Viveros in those days at the Estadio Chile would be important to identify 30 years later the commander of the Estadio Chile. This is what Miguel Lawner related in the process:
“Upon returning to the access hall to the stadium, carrying the mattresses, on a staircase with an iron handrail, about 6 or 7 meters away, I could observe Víctor Jara. He was alone. Soldiers were guarding him in the vicinity, so I approached, being able to appreciate that he was very beaten and tortured, despite which he remained standing.
What I remember is that it must have been very late. That September 13, 1973, was the last time I was able to see Víctor Jara alive” (53).
Boris Navia: “On Thursday the 13th, in the afternoon, there was a great commotion in the stadium upon the arrival of several buses bringing residents from La Legua. It was said that they had resisted the military forces with weapons.
There were dead people, some very badly wounded, and others taken to the basements. There was a temporary forgetting of Víctor Jara’s existence. And then, the professors and staff of the UTE who were watching Víctor’s fate closely took advantage of that moment to drag him to the galleries and try to make him one more of the prisoners.
He looked with only one eye, since the other was totally inflamed. We cleaned the blood from his face and a carpenter from the UTE gave him his jacket to give him warmth. In our attempt to disguise his figure, someone provided us with a nail clipper and with great care we began to cut his curly hair, so characteristic.
A soldier gave him a raw egg. He said he would eat it as the peasants of Lonquén did: he pierced it at the bottom and then sucked it. Víctor was revived. Despite his wounds, he shared his fears regarding his family and his friends.”
Carlos Orellana: “On Thursday the 13th, I met Víctor Jara when the military began to organize the prisoners into groups. His face was very mistreated, swollen, and with blood on his face and clothes. His hands were very swollen and he could only move them with great difficulty.
He told us that he had been beaten for a large part of the night by the same officer from the entrance. And he told us that this officer recognized him and was the brother of a man with whom he had had an altercation two or three years earlier at the Colegio Saint George in Santiago, where he had sung ‘Preguntas por Puerto Montt,’ producing an incident with some students, among them the officer’s brother and one of the sons of the minister to whom the song alluded [Edmundo Pérez Zujovic, who was Minister of the Interior of President Eduardo Frei Montalva and who was murdered by an extremist commando on June 8, 1971]. The officer had evoked this fact in the course of the night… Víctor remained with us for two or two and a half days.”
Orellana’s account is corroborated by another prisoner: “On Thursday the 13th, when Víctor Jara finally went up to the stands, together with Carlos Orellana and other detainees, we treated his wounds as best we could.
We took turns going to the bathroom and wetting our handkerchiefs with which we made compresses to calm the swelling. On Friday the 14th, around 11:00 in the morning, a relative sent me some cookies and a small jar of jam with a sergeant.
The cookies were easy to distribute, but how to distribute the jam? It occurred to us that each one had the right to put their finger in the jar, turn it around, and take it out to suck it… I seem to see today Víctor’s finger dripping with jam… He was much better: his lips and his face had gone down a little.”
It is difficult for any conscript or officer who was at the Estadio Chile during those days in September to speak about Víctor Jara. Everyone knows he was one of the prisoners, but they remain silent. It would seem that, over the years, the secret that has surrounded his death, imposed by the Army, has permeated each of the men.
But also, there is guilt. Much guilt and memories of all those men and women who died there, whose identity and number are unknown. But in those days of 1973, what prevailed was total impunity. Because the greatest power was held by the officers and soldiers who accessed the facility where the detainees were interrogated.
There where, a few days later, according to the most reliable judicial testimonies, officers from the Army War Academy arrived.
The then-second lieutenant Pedro Rodríguez Bustos, who participated in the assault on the UTE and whose unit was later assigned as reinforcement to the Regimiento Tacna, relates:
“I remember that on September 16 or 17, it was my turn to go for the second time to the Estadio Chile, where I was able to verify that the conditions of the prisoners were bad; it was noticeable that they were tired people, although I cannot ensure that they had been beaten.
On this occasion, I verified that the situation of the stadium had changed. The guard of the same continued to correspond to Army personnel, from the Regimiento Tacna, but those in charge of the interrogations inside the stadium and of checking the detainees were personnel from the Intelligence area of the Santiago Army Garrison, with reinforcement from students of the Second and Third Year of the War Academy, with the rank of major and lieutenant colonel, with the mission of directing the interrogations.”
Among those War Academy officers who arrived at the Estadio Chile to reinforce the interrogation teams, two names are repeated: Major Hernán Chacón Soto, then a first-year student at the academy, and Víctor Echeverría Henríquez, from the second year.
The latter, who retired as a colonel, would later be seen at Villa Grimaldi, one of the main secret prisons of the DINA (his daughter would later be Undersecretary of the Navy, in the Ministry of Defense of Michelle Bachelet’s government, 2006-2010, but would not be able to assume as Undersecretary of the Armed Forces in 2014 after other accusations of torture against her father were made public).
Colonel (r) Juan Jara Quintana, who was also stationed in those days at the Estadio Chile, related:
“There were also at the Estadio Chile about 40 officers from the Army War Academy, from the First and Second year, who worked a four-hour shift and were relieved by their own companions since the academy was very close to them: at García Reyes with Alameda.
Among those who worked in the control of the entry of detainees at the Estadio Chile, I remember the officers Rubén Burgos Vargas, Víctor Echeverría Henríquez (who was my second commander in the Regimiento Rancagua in Arica at the end of 1980), Sergio Urrutia Francke, Patricio Vásquez Donoso, and Hernán Chacón Soto, among others” (54).
Jara’s testimony was expanded by another of the War Academy officers who would be assigned to the Estadio Chile: officer Alejandro González Samohod, who became an important general of the military regime. González acknowledged having been at the stadium and also stated having met there his companion from the War Academy, Richard Quass:
“Days before September 11, being a student of Strategic Leadership, Third Year, at the Academy…”
War Academy, I was assigned as a member of the headquarters of the commander of the Military Forces of the Metropolitan Region, under the command of General Sergio Arellano Stark. During the 10 days I served there, I had to perform duties at the Estadio Chile for about three of them, as I was sent to assist with security at the facility, without direct contact with the detainees.” Raúl Jofré would corroborate the role of the War Academy officers in the establishment of the prisoner camps when he declared: “It was at lunchtime on September 12 when my colonel, Oscar Coddou, at that time head of a General Headquarters of the Garrison Command and a professor at the War Academy, sent me to reinforce the Estadio Chile, which was being created as a provisional detention center while awaiting the Estadio Nacional.” Jofré would also say that among the interrogators was “an Army reserve officer, surnamed Prieto [Daniel Prieto Vidal, who currently presents himself as an ‘international affairs consultant,’ declared on October 26, 2007. He has a long history in Army Intelligence].” “At the access door to the stadium field, precisely on the northeast side, was the entrance to the basement. At that door, there was an officer in an Army dress uniform who would order the different prisoners to be brought. In this basement, the detainees were interrogated. It was a closed area with only one access. On one occasion, out of curiosity, I tried to go down to that sector, but another soldier signaled to me that he did not recommend it, as they had recently killed someone and it was full of blood. From the outside, the gunshots could not be heard. In this place, there was personnel very likely from Army Intelligence,” recounts conscript C.E. Conscript M.C. remembers: “The interrogations were carried out in a basement located on the ground floor where the locker rooms were. We did not have access to this place, but the officers did, among them Rodrigo Rodríguez and Jorge Smith, as well as civilians and other Army officers. To be taken to this place, the detainees were commonly taken from the stands by the soldiers guarding that sector. They returned in very bad condition... On one occasion, at night—I could not specify the date—while on sentry duty in the gallery located in front of the entrance, which had a small view of the door to the interrogation room that led toward the stadium exit, I observed them taking out several bodies, almost naked. They were loaded into an ambulance, which left in an unknown direction. It was a common comment that from that place, at night, they would take out the corpses from the basement. From the comments of the soldiers themselves, it was known that Víctor Jara was being held in the stadium, but I do not know where. One day, around 14:00, another conscript told me that Víctor Jara had died... I did not want to ask any more.” Conscript C.E.: “In the stadium, I was in charge of guarding the foreigners, about 60 of them, among them two Mexicans who were in the hall in poor physical condition. On one occasion, it could have been between September 13 or 14, in the afternoon, an officer with a maroon beret from the armored specialty ordered me to guard two detainees whom he himself told me were Mexicans. After approximately twenty minutes, he signaled for me to accompany him along with the detainees, leading me to the exterior, precisely to Calle Bascuñan Guerrero, where a machine gun was positioned. The lieutenant told me to leave the detainees on the path and that he would take them ‘for a walk,’ and he headed toward the machine gun. It was the term used to indicate that they would be executed by firing squad. A few minutes later, I heard the burst of gunfire, assuming they had been killed. It was common to hear it fire, mainly at night. The dead were thrown into the excavation for the Metro works, which were collected by an ambulance that passed by daily, which I could see from a distance: a white vehicle like a hospital one. It was rumored that the lieutenant who gave me the order to guard those two Mexicans was the same one who had crashed his tank into the doors of the Ministry of Defense during the ‘Tanquetazo.’ He stood out from the rest of the officers because he wore a maroon beret.” “Taking them for a walk.” An expression that to this day makes many of the soldiers who passed through the Estadio Chile shudder. For the majority, it means execution by firing squad. But also, where the execution would take place. Conscript G.M. says it short and direct: “The phrase meant that the detainees were going to be executed by firing squad either on the street that led toward the Alameda or in the basement.” “It meant that the detainees were going to be executed by firing squad on the street toward the Alameda,” says soldier M.T. The stands of the Estadio Chile were filling up with prisoners. The bathrooms collapsed; there was no water or food. Many came from the factories of the industrial belts. Manuel Bustos, who in September 1973 was a Christian Democrat union leader and president of the union of the intervened textile industry Sumar, also saw Víctor Jara: “In the morning [of September 11] we held an assembly at Sumar to repudiate the Coup. On my shift, there were about a thousand workers and I maintained that we should leave. But since many did not manage to get very far because there was no public transportation, they returned to the factory seeking refuge. As president of the union, I decided to stay in the factory with about 300 people who did not manage to leave when the curfew was announced. On the 12th, around 6 in the morning, the military arrived in trucks. They threw us all to the ground and began to beat us. I tried to explain to them, but I received more blows. I was detained along with about 150 workers. They took us out with our hands on our necks and at gunpoint they took us to the Estadio Chile. I remember that very close to me they killed a worker. I never knew his name, but the image remained engraved in my mind. Military personnel would pass through the corridors and one hit a man in the face with a submachine gun. The man shouted ‘Fascist!’ at him and they shot him. He was right next to me. Two colleagues from Sumar went crazy because of what they saw. One has already died and the other is wandering around out there... I spotted Víctor Jara from afar.” The arrival of the new prisoners has other witnesses. Like the protagonists of the peculiar shipments that would begin to leave from the Regimiento Tacna in the direction of the Estadio Chile. They had taken the prisoners who survived the attack on La Moneda to the Tacna, to whom hundreds more prisoners from the industrial belts would soon be added, just as the coup-plotting war command—also made up of officers from the Army War Academy—had established. The order was that only the La Moneda prisoners should remain at the Tacna. Shortly after, they would be murdered in Peldehue. Second Lieutenant Iván Herrera López, of the Regimiento Tacna, participated in those summary executions. He received the order from the regiment commander, Joaquín Ramírez Pineda, to transfer the La Moneda prisoners to Peldehue, together with reserve Second Lieutenant Castillo. The person who received the prisoners at that military training camp was Lieutenant Julio Vandorsee Cerda, of the Artillery Branch (55). The person who certified the deaths on the site itself, to later inform the heads of the Coup’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, was Major Pedro Espinoza, of the same Intelligence group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The now Brigadier (R) stated: “The only thing I had to perform in an extraordinary manner in September 1973 was that on the 12th I was ordered, by General Nicanor Díaz, to go to the Garrison Command, where I would be given a document to be taken to the commander of the Regimiento Tacna. I went to the office of the aide to General [Herman] Brady, commander of the Garrison, who gave me a sealed envelope that I transported to the Regimiento Tacna and delivered to the second-in-command, surnamed Fernández. I told him, also under instructions from General Díaz Estrada, that he had to release all the personnel from the Investigations [police]. I must add that the following day I received the order from the same general to witness the execution of the detainees from La Moneda, with the obligation to report the result upon my return” (56). It was not, however, the only execution of prisoners to which Pedro Espinoza was linked in those days. According to the author’s investigation, on September 14 he arrived at the Sixth Precinct, located on Calle San Francisco, to take away members of the GAP and the son of Mirya Contreras, the secretary and companion of Salvador Allende, who had been detained on the morning of the 11th at the doors of La Moneda. All of them were murdered and later dumped on some street in Santiago (57). The rest of the detainees at the Tacna were taken to the Estadio Chile, with exceptions that still remain unclear. The Army civilian employee Eliseo Cornejo, who transported some of those shipments, relates: “I was a driver of a bus, a truck, and a jeep assigned to the Logistics Battery of the Regimiento Tacna. And it was my duty to drive detainees who were in the boxes of the regiment... I believe many of them came from the industrial belt, I especially remember Madeco and the textile factories Hirmas and Sumar. There were also other people detained for curfew. On that occasion, I drove the bus with approximately 60 people, being escorted by two jeeps with regiment personnel, an officer, and permanent staff. All the vehicles parked on Calle Unión Latinoamericana and, escorted by two conscripts, the detainees were made to get off and advance through the passageway through which one enters the stadium, about 100 meters away. As a driver, it was my duty to make about three trips to the Estadio Chile driving the same bus and transporting detainees” (58). Soldier C.A. acknowledged having seen Víctor Jara at the Estadio Chile. And he stated that he crossed paths with him on September 14 between 17:00 and 18:00 “in the hall sector, eastern corridor, upon returning from patrol, when I was in the company of my section commander, Rodrigo Rodríguez Fuschloger.” And he adds that later he saw a person in civilian clothes call him “for an interrogation.” C.A. also saw Litre Quiroga, who had been the Director of Prisons under the Allende government, in the same stadium. Conscript G.B., from the Tejas Verdes unit, was a direct witness to how Lieutenant Edwin Dimter interrogated Litre Quiroga: “In wandering through the corridors I saw many people killed... One day, in the morning hours, while on guard in the corridor sector of the eastern entrance that overlooks the field, I saw Lieutenant Dimter who, together with his group of escorts, mentioned the name of Litre Quiroga. The detainee was next to seven other people lying face down with their hands on their necks. Dimter proceeded to beat them both with his foot and with the butts of his rifle on their bodies... After midnight and while on guard on the roof of the facility, in the northwest corner, I saw when Litre Quiroga and the other seven people were leaving toward the street. They were walking, one after another, along Calle Arturo Godoy, in a westerly direction, where there were soldiers arranged in two rows, leaving the middle free and a jeep, apparently armored, with a Reimetal (59) on its rear. When the detainees passed by, they began to shoot at them, then everyone left, leaving the bodies lying on the ground... I clearly identified Litre Quiroga, since I knew him when they were interrogating him in the stadium. And I know there were seven because I counted them afterward and certified that they were dead... After a few minutes, a large, white, thermal truck, freezer type, arrived with military personnel. They loaded the bodies and took them away.” Soldier G.M. of Tejas Verdes: “Two or three days after we arrived, I was ordered to guard a detainee who was later commented to be Litre Quiroga, Director of Prisons, who was in the entrance hall and whom the soldiers who passed by would beat. I was in his custody for the entire shift, which was taken over by another soldier whose name I do not remember.” Conscript R.A.: “From the comments of the conscripts, I found out that inside the stadium was the Director of Prisons (today Gendarmería), Mr. Litre Quiroga, who had pulled the fingernails off General Roberto Viaux Marambio for the ‘Tacnazo’ [the uprising that Viaux led during the Frei Montalva government]. He was characteristic because he was big and fat. I do not remember the date, but it must have been between September 14 or 15, at the moment I was changing shifts, I observed Litre Quiroga in the access hall, who was lying on the ground, in poor physical condition, but alive. I know this for a fact because he was moaning a lot. I did not observe anyone else around him. As the days went by, I did not see him again, nor did I know what happened to him.” Carlos Orellana: “On Saturday the 15th, while in the stands, a soldier came looking for Víctor Jara. This distressed us a lot. That same day, in the afternoon, a prisoner came to tell me that Víctor Jara wanted to speak to me. I went to the urinals, managing to pass in front of the office where he was being held. As I passed, I signaled for him to follow me. He met me in the urinals under the guard of a soldier, who stayed in front of the door. At that moment, Víctor was very weak; he walked with great difficulty. His nose was broken. His face was even more swollen. His shirt was full of blood. He spoke with difficulty. He told me that he had been beaten again. What he mainly wanted to tell me was that, in his opinion, a spy had infiltrated our group. Indeed, when he was being interrogated, he noticed an employee of the university who was speaking very freely with the military and he wanted to warn us of this fact. The soldier put an end to the conversation. I never saw him again. When we were leaving for the Estadio Nacional, a Brazilian man told us that he had seen him the night before, in the basement, lying on the floor. He could no longer speak. He had blood on his belly.” César Fernández: “There was another group also separated from the rest of the detainees, in the upper part of the south gallery. Both groups had been separated for being more well-known people. I recognized there Osiel Núñez, president of the UTE Student Federation, and a journalist and professor whose name I do not remember who did a very famous knowledge contest program on radio and television [Mario Céspedes]. Víctor Jara stayed with our group for approximately one full day. A reorganization of the prisoners into groups then took place for the purpose of the transfer to the Estadio Nacional. And in those circumstances, a couple of hours before our group left, about three or four military men came looking for Víctor Jara, beat him, and took him away to an unknown destination” (60). Another of the prisoners relates: “On Friday the 14th in the afternoon, they made us form groups of about 200 to be transferred to the Estadio Nacional. Víctor remained in my group. He wrote on a small piece of paper a poem he titled ‘Somos cinco mil’ [We Are Five Thousand]. Later I found out that the poem went outside, but with another title. The original that Víctor wrote was handed to a colleague who continues to live in Chile and who hid it in one of his socks, where it was discovered by the military in the interrogation they gave him in the infamous velodrome of the Estadio Nacional. Our group was the third to last to leave for the Estadio Nacional on Friday the 14th, at about 22:00. About two hours earlier, a patrol came looking for Víctor and amidst blows and insults they separated him from us. When our group left the Estadio Chile, through a side passageway, I spotted Víctor in the entrance hall of the stadium. He was on the ground and bleeding... It was the last time I saw him. Víctor did not arrive at the Estadio Nacional that night. Neither that night nor in the following days...” Lawyer Hugo Pavez: “On Friday, September 14, we were taken up to the stands and there, a few meters away, I saw Víctor Jara, who had half of his face very bruised and swollen as a result of the blows received. He was sitting and not speaking. When they placed us in the stands, they ordered us to register and then, in different groups, they were taken out of the stadium. The group I was in was the last to register. I saw Víctor again the next day when we were lined up on the field about to board a bus that took us to the Estadio Nacional. The Estadio Chile was already practically empty. Only a small group remained, among whom were Víctor Jara and Danilo Bartulín, a doctor on Salvador Allende’s staff” (61). Boris Navia Pérez: “On the night of Friday the 14th, we were about to board the buses that were taking people to the Estadio Nacional. Víctor was with my group. However, a final order made us turn back and we returned to the gallery where we spent the night. On the morning of Saturday, September 15, some prisoners were released and we all began to write small notes addressed to our families to inform them that we were alive, with the hope that some of the lucky ones could carry our letters. Víctor asked me for a pencil and paper and began to write what we all thought was a note for Joan, his wife. At that moment, he was sitting between Professor Carlos Orellana and me, when suddenly two soldiers approached and one hit him hard in the back with the butt of his rifle and the other grabbed him by the collar of his jacket and dragged him to the upper part of the stadium. Víctor dropped the pencil and paper, and could barely take a few steps between his captors. That same Saturday, at 14:00, they took us out of the Estadio Chile and in the foyer we witnessed a macabre spectacle: 40 or 50 corpses lying at the entrance, almost all stained white by the plaster that was in the basements, a facility at that time under repairs. Among those bodies was that of Litre Quiroga, Director of Prisons, and our dear Víctor Jara. His body was lying on its side; we could see his face and his clothes stained with blood... Upon arriving at the Estadio Nacional, beaten, tortured, and saddened by the death of Víctor, we verified that the paper and pencil he asked me for at the Estadio Chile were not intended to write a letter, but rather gave life to the last expression of his song and poetry, writing his last poem.” UTE Engineering student Erika Osorio: “I saw Víctor Jara again on Friday, September 15, when I was taken down for the second time to the basement for interrogation. When they took me out, an officer ordered the soldier who was guarding me to move me to where the UTE group was that remained in the same basement, since they were going to kill us all. I could see, at the end of a kind of corridor in that sector, several dead people. Their corpses were piled on top of each other. Others were still alive, but all with signs of physical abuse or wounds. Among these people was Víctor Jara. He was sitting on the floor, looking toward the ground. His face was very wounded and especially his hands, which were bloodied. At the urging of the soldier who was leading me, fortunately, I was able to be returned to the stands of the Estadio Chile, leaving free the next day, along with a group of women who came from the Cerrillos Industrial Belt” (62). Forty years after the Coup d’État, secret compartments of what happened that September 11, 1973, are still being opened. Because there were other troops assigned to the Estadio Chile than those that were known until now. This is the precise case of the contingent that arrived from Antofagasta, from the “Esmeralda” Regiment. Colonel (R) Juan Quintana was a lieutenant and second-in-command of the Second Rifle Company of that regiment on that date, a unit in charge of Captain Jorge Ramón Durand González and which also included second lieutenants José Luis Contreras Mora, Fernando Daguerrasar Franzani, and Rolando López Álamos. That group of soldiers who came from Antofagasta would be one of the last to withdraw from the Estadio Chile. A window that opens new witnesses.
Colonel (R) Quintana related
“We left Antofagasta at 00:00 hours, arriving at 4:00 hours at Group 10 of Cerrillos, with a total of 160 men. Once in Cerrillos, at about 7:00 hours, we were transported by bus to the Military Stadium, located on Rondizzoni [today the Army Non-Commissioned Officers’ Country Club], finding ourselves in the place with a force of 6,500 men from all over Chile.
The First Rifle Company of the ‘Esmeralda’ Regiment was ordered to embark for Santiago 24 hours earlier, coming under the charge of Lieutenant Alexander Hananías Barrios... On the 15th, at about 8:00, by order of Captain Durand, the entire company had to head to the Estadio Chile where we were received by Commander Mario Manríquez Bravo, who indicated to us, together with Captain Durand, that there were a total of 5,500 detainees in the facility who came mainly from the companies of the Cerrillos Belt and that our mission was the custody of all the detainees distributed only in the stands and on the field... I have the absolute certainty that in addition to the students of the War Academy, there were the 1st and 2nd courses of Aide Aspirants of the Telecommunications School at the Estadio Chile. But the First Rifle Company of the ‘Esmeralda,’ in charge of Lieutenant Hananías, did not set foot in the Estadio Chile since it was their duty to constitute themselves in La Moneda after the military pronouncement. We were at the Estadio Chile, the entire Second Company, from 8:00 on Saturday the 15th until 9:00 on Sunday the 16th, when the total transfer of the 5,500 political prisoners toward the Estadio Nacional began. Those who carried out the interrogations in the basement of the facility or locker rooms were lieutenants Edwin Dimter and Raúl Jofré, among others... I met Litre Quiroga, Director General of Prisons, inside the stadium, whom I saw together with about 30 extremist detainees in a hall at the entrance of the facility, called Patio Siberia. They were all tied by their hands and feet, face down on the ground. Litre Quiroga was wearing a dark gray suit with white stripes, he was in poor physical condition, and I lost track of him during the transfer to the Estadio Nacional. When our company arrived at the Estadio Chile, the courses of the War Academy were already there, with us being the last to arrive and the last to leave” (63). Osiel Núñez: “On Saturday the 15th, I was isolated from the rest of the detainees, together with a Uruguayan couple and an Argentine with a shaved head who was finally executed according to the version of a soldier. Approximately at 19:00, a line of prisoners was formed in front of a side door on the right. In that line, I distinguished, among other 20 or 30 prisoners, Carlos Naudón, Mario Céspedes, Danilo Bartulín, and Víctor Jara. Moments before leaving, a young officer, with a fair complexion, almost blond, and a commanding voice, passed by and took Danilo Bartulín and Víctor Jara out of the line. He placed Víctor in an adjoining room and we were made to leave. Víctor smiled at me... We were transferred to the Estadio Nacional where they enabled a locker room for the so-called ‘big fish.’ Bartulín arrived at this locker room, so Víctor must have remained alone.” That was the last time Víctor Jara was seen alive. The last link It was a day in May 2009 when the man who had been a conscript from Tejas Verdes, José Paredes Vásquez, decided to speak. Paredes was assigned to the Estadio Chile and for 36 years kept the secret of what he experienced there, until he reached a judge and revealed what he saw one day in the basements: Víctor Jara and Litre Quiroga were thrown against the wall. Behind the prisoners, Paredes saw Lieutenant Nelson Haase and the second lieutenant in charge of the conscripts arrive. This was part of his account before the justice system: “Lieutenant Jorge Smith began to play Russian roulette with a revolver he was carrying. He approached Víctor Jara, who was standing, looking at the wall, with his hands on his back, so Smith made the cylinder of the revolver spin, closed it, aimed at Víctor Jara’s head, in the right parietal region, and fired. After receiving the shot, Víctor Jara fell to the ground, toward the side. He began to convulse on the ground and Lieutenant Smith ordered me to finish him off on the ground... When this was happening, the other detainees who were in the place, among whom was Litre Quiroga, were cornered, remaining silent. After the shots, other officers arrived at the locker room to see if we, the uniformed men, were okay. After this, Lieutenant Smith called for an ambulance by radio, a stretcher-bearer arriving after a short while, who gave us a brown plastic bag with camouflage, so we proceeded to put Víctor Jara’s corpse in the bag and we loaded it onto the stretcher, to then be removed from the place, ignoring what they would do with the corpse...”. Smith and Nelson Haase, together with other officers, allegedly murdered the other prisoners who were inside the locker room, among whom was Litre Quiroga. According to the autopsy protocol, the singer-songwriter’s body had approximately 44 bullet impacts on his body. Quiroga’s indicates 38 projectile impacts. José Paredes would later say that he invented everything. Because he is fanciful. Other officers would say that he stole, which contrasts with the service record of Paredes’s employers, the son of a Carabineros non-commissioned officer. And many have reiterated that Paredes did not travel to Santiago with the Tejas Verdes contingent and that he was never at the Estadio Chile. Nothing fits. Not only because Paredes’s account is consistent with the more than one hundred accumulated testimonies of how and who interrogated, tortured, and murdered inside the Estadio Chile. As fanciful as Paredes might be, it is difficult to believe that his imagination would recreate such a level of detail of what happened there. Because the most important thing is that there are at least three other testimonies that certify that José Paredes did travel to Santiago from Tejas Verdes and was at the Estadio Nacional. Víctor Jara’s corpse was dumped on a street in Renca on the morning of Sunday, September 16. The autopsy report, signed by Dr. Exequiel Jiménez Ferry, indicates that Víctor Jara was 1.67 meters tall and weighed 66 kilos. “In the right parietal region, there are two bullet entry holes. In the thoracic region, 16 bullet entry holes and 12 exit holes of different sizes. In the abdomen, there are 6 bullet entry holes and 4 exit holes. In the right upper extremity, there are 2 transfixing bullet wounds. In the lower extremities, there are 18 bullet entry holes and 14 exit holes. Cause of death: multiple bullet wounds.” To this day, the trial to identify the men who tortured and killed Víctor Jara remains open. In one of its covers, it reads: “It is established that in the last group that remained at the Estadio Chile and in which Víctor Jara was, there were also Manuel Cabieses, Laureano León (Undersecretary of Social Security), Waldo Suárez, Darío Pérez, Adriana Vásquez, and Danilo Bartulín (64).” The War Academy and the DINA In September 1973, Manuel Contreras obtained Pinochet’s consent for his great obsession: the organization of a new intelligence structure to initiate the anti-subversive struggle. And it would be he who would command it. The DINA had been born and its first headquarters would be the War Academy, an institution that he would very soon direct. In fact, the first service commissions of the officers chosen by Contreras to integrate the high command of the secret organization bear the label “assigned to the War Academy”: Raúl Iturriaga Neumann, Gustavo Abarzúa (65), and Rolf Wenderoth (66), all of them students of the academy. Until today, it was not known that high-ranking officers of the War Academy participated in the teams of interrogators and torturers of the Estadio Chile. Perhaps that is a key that explains why the Army for more than 35 years refused to hand over the rosters of those who were assigned to the Estadio Chile and their commanders, which were requested on countless occasions by various judges. The same thing happened with the list of the students who were at the War Academy in 1973. That persistent obstruction of justice by the Army, which continues to this day, acquires another meaning when it is revealed that the protected names were part of what was the military elite in 1973. Because starting in September of that year, they were the ones who would maintain control of the State for the next 17 years. That generation, strategically located at the War Academy, would have the greatest power ever deployed in the history of the military regime. Of its students, 28 became generals and occupied the highest positions in the State and the institution. And another 14 officers led the secret services, whether in the DINA or the CNI (see roster). Therein lies, in part, the origin of the secrecy surrounding who murdered Víctor Jara, Litre Quiroga, and all those who died and were brutally tortured at the Estadio Chile.
assigned to the Second Combat Company, under the command of Captain Luis Montero Valenzuela, Third Section, under the command of Lieutenant Rodrigo Rodríguez Fuschloger. He was discharged in mid-1975. (27) Army Second Lieutenant Rodrigo Rodríguez Fuschloger died in Santiago on March 15, 1974, in an accident. (28) Osiel Núñez testified in the trial for the death of Víctor Jara on several occasions.
This account is part of his statement before the Rettig Report, on January 18, 1991. (29) Retired Second Lieutenant Pedro Rodríguez Bustos testified on April 4, 2002, and belonged to the Operations group of the “Arica” Regiment of La Serena. (30) Fernando Polanco testified on January 29, 2008, when he was 66 years old. (31) Carlos Orellana, who was an editor in exile for the magazine Araucaria and later a renowned editor at Editorial Planeta, testified via exhorto (letter rogatory) from France for the trial in Chile on September 11, 1979; he was detained at the Estadio Chile from September 12 to 17, 1973, and then at the Estadio Nacional until October 25, 1973. (32) Osiel Núñez remained for one month at the Estadio Nacional and from there was moved to the Public Jail, accused of being the organizer of the armed resistance at the UTE. He was detained there for two years. He was acquitted and transferred to Tres Álamos, where he remained for three months. He was placed under house arrest until he obtained authorization to leave the country. He returned to Chile in 1982. (33) The lawyer Boris Navia Pérez was the head of the Personnel and Appointments Department of the Universidad Técnica del Estado; in that capacity, he knew Professor Víctor Jara well. He was also detained at the UTE and taken as a prisoner to the Estadio Chile. He testified on October 23, 2001. (34) Commander Mario Manríquez, now deceased, served for 10 years as Security Manager of ENTEL. (35) Also the identity of 31 conscripts, 9 corporals, and 4 sergeants who were with him in those roles at the Estadio Chile. (36) Enrique Kirberg was finally taken to the Isla Dawson Prisoner Camp with the main leaders of the Unidad Popular. He died on April 22, 1992, of hepatic coma. All of his testimonies are part of an extensive interview conducted by the author. (37) Ricardo Iturra was a professor and official at the UTE; he met Víctor Jara in 1970 at the UTE while performing his work, when Jara arrived as Theater Director and singer and he was the director of the Permanent Education Program. He testified via exhorto from Paris on September 3, 1979, for the trial in Chile regarding the death of Víctor Jara. (38) Cesar Fernández Carrasco testified via exhorto from Germany; he was a professor at the UTE, where he was on September 11. (39) Julia Fuentes testified on July 19, 2003. In her statement, she also said: “When the Estadio Chile was vacated, they sent me to Tres Álamos (another Prisoner Camp), still as a kitchen cook. I remember having worked for Conrado Pacheco Cárdenas and for a major with the surname Salgado.” (40) Julio Guillermo Del Río Navarrete, engineer, 60 years old, testified on January 11, 2005. He was one of the prisoners who identified Miguel Krassnoff Martchenko as “El Príncipe” (The Prince). He was released from the Estadio Nacional on October 2, 1973, along with the rest of his companions, except for six of them who were transferred to the Investigaciones (police). For many of them, life changed forever. His testimony has been corroborated by the author with two other people who were prisoners with him. (41) On April 24, 2008, Guillermo Orrego Valdebenito (59 years old) testified. (42) Statement from March 31, 2006. (43) On December 28, 2007, Lelia testified; she identified the officer Edwin Dimter as “El Príncipe” in photos. This is how she recounted the event that allowed her to be released: “On one occasion, a group of the same soldiers who had come from La Serena arrived at the stadium—the ones to whom the Carabineros had handed us over at the UTE—at least the sergeant, who told us that when answering the roll call the next morning, we should indicate that we were detained for the curfew. That way, they would let us go free. And that is what happened.” (44) Retired Lieutenant Colonel Luis Bethke Wulf was an Infantry lieutenant in the No. 2 “Maipo” Regiment of Valparaíso in September 1973. During the Unidad Popular, his family suffered the expropriation of their lands. He retired in 1985. He testified on February 1, 2005. (45) Retired Brigadier Raúl Aníbal Jofré González has the following service record: “In 1970, paratrooper course at the Paratrooper School, and he was a lieutenant on January 1, 1971. January 1972, to the No. 2 Armored Regiment. March 1, 1974, correspondence course ‘Basic Application for Subaltern Officers’ until May 31, ’74; September 7, ’74, service commission to Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria; October 14, ’74, extraordinary course ‘Advanced Application for Subaltern Armored Officers,’ until October 31, ’74, at the Armored School (Antofagasta); January 1, ’75, captain; March 6, ’75, complements Supreme Decree, assigned to the Armored School (Santiago). He retired on April 30, 1998.” (46) The best and most comprehensive profile of the officer Edwin Dimter has been an investigation by journalist Pascale Bonnefoy, published in 2006. (47) On November 8, 2004, Raúl Aníbal Jofré González testified. When the prisoners from the Estadio Chile were transferred to the Estadio Nacional, he was to be the aide to the commander of the new Prisoner Camp, Colonel Jorge Espinoza Ulloa. (48) Retired Colonel Nelson Edgardo Haase Mazzei held the rank of lieutenant in September 1973 and served as aide to the deputy director of the Tejas Verdes Engineer School in San Antonio, whose director was Colonel Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda. In 1976, he was promoted to captain and moved to the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA). In 1990, he retired with the rank of colonel. He testified on January 27, 2005; he was 58 years old. (49) Retired Lieutenant Edwin Armando Dimter Bianchi testified on November 10, 2004. (50) Lieutenant Edwin Dimter Bianchi has the following service record in the Army: “On January 21, 1972, assigned as a second lieutenant to the No. 2 Armored Regiment in Santiago; on January 10, 1974, he was named lieutenant and moved to the No. 1 ‘Granadero’ Armored Regiment in Iquique; a year later he returned to Santiago, to the No. 2 Armored Regiment. On December 31, 1976, he was granted absolute retirement.” (51) Hugo González González testified on June 17, 2008. (52) Wolfgang Tirado testified via exhorto on March 11, 1980. He knew Víctor Jara well because “we worked in the same department at the UTE: he in the Music section and I in the Film section.” (53) Architect Miguel Lawner testified on August 31, 2004. (54) Retired Colonel Juan Jara Quintana, who retired in 1994, testified on August 1, 2013. (55) What Second Lieutenant Herrera saw and did caused him great shock. He retired as a captain in 1983. He testified on May 30, 2002. (56) Statement by Pedro Espinoza on January 10, 2008. (57) A witness to that retirement was the then-Carabinero Major Jorge Retamal Berríos. (58) On February 6, 2007, Eliseo Cornejo (64 years old) testified. (59) A powerful floor-mounted machine gun weighing 11 or more kilos, with a range of 1,300 meters, with a belt of 50 projectiles as a magazine. (60) On March 2, 2006, César Leonel Fernández Carrasco testified; he was a professor at the UTE and a member of its Superior Council. (61) Extracted from the judicial statement of Hugo Pavez on October 15, 2002, who was detained at the CORFO and taken to the Estadio Chile. (62) On May 14, 2008, Erika Osorio testified, a UTE Engineering student who was detained and taken to the Estadio Chile. (63) Retired Colonel Juan Quintana testified on August 1, 2013. He retired in 1994. (64) Danilo Bartulín, Salvador Allende’s doctor, was released when La Moneda was burning, at 16:00 on September 11, 1973, along with doctors Oscar Soto, Patricio Arroyo, Alejandro Cuevas, Hernán Ruiz, Víctor Oñate, and José Quiroga. Later, he was detained again and taken to the Estadio Chile and then to the Estadio Nacional. (65) Gustavo Abarzúa, an artilleryman, was the secretary of studies for the DINA and from there moved to the Army Intelligence Directorate (DINE), then was a Military Attaché in Uruguay and returned to the DINE, where he was in 1984, holding the rank of colonel. He reached the rank of general in 1987, being named head of the DINE. From there, in March 1988, he threatened a new September 11. In 1989, he also held the directorship of the CNI. In March 1990, during the restructuring for the transfer of power, he continued as director of the DINE, but in October he retired. He was linked to the La Cutufa scandal, an illegal financial firm formed within the Army that ended with never-clarified homicides. He was prosecuted for having given the order to assassinate the leader Jecar Neghme in 1989, according to the confession of one of his perpetrators, but the Supreme Court acquitted him in 2009. (66) Retired Colonel Rolf Wenderoth, an engineer, was part of the DINA high command as deputy director of Internal Intelligence. In 1995, he was head of Villa Grimaldi. He was later assigned to the CNI. In 1986, he participated in the creation of a special anti-subversive unit. In 1987, he was a Military Attaché in the Federal Republic of Germany, and upon his return in 1989, he retired. He was sentenced to 5 years and 1 day for the death of Manuel Cotez Joo in 1975. He has been prosecuted on several occasions for his participation in the detention and disappearance of persons and has invariably requested the application of the Amnesty Law.
Source: ciper.cl, April 13, 2014
Supreme Court: 25 years for the murderers of Víctor Jara and Littré Quiroga
The Second Chamber confirmed the previous decision of the Santiago Court of Appeals and upheld the sentences totaling 25 years for the kidnapping and qualified homicide of both victims, who were executed on September 15, 1973, at the Estadio Chile, after having been subjected to torture, after which their riddled bodies were thrown into the street in the vicinity of the General Cemetery of Santiago.
Within the framework of the emblematic human rights violation sentences that the Supreme Court is issuing (with the goal of issuing them before September 11, as reported by El Mostrador), the Second Chamber of the high court issued a harsh sentence this afternoon against the murderers of the singer-songwriter Víctor Lidio Jara Martínez and the Director General of Prisons in 1973, Littré Abraham Quiroga Carvajal.
Six of those convicted for the homicides of Víctor Jara and Littré Quiroga were sentenced as authors of qualified kidnapping and qualified homicide in both cases. The decision of the Second Chamber (composed of ministers Haroldo Brito, Jorge Dahm, Minister Eliana Quezada, and the lawyers Carolina Coppo and Leonor Etcheberry) thus confirmed the second-instance sentence, which had condemned the accused to sentences of 15 years and one day for the homicides, and 10 years and one day for both kidnappings.
Thus, the sentences were confirmed against former military officers Raúl Jofré González, Edwin Dimter Bianchi, Nelson Haase Mazzei, Ernesto Bethke Wulf, Juan Jara Quintana, and Hernán Chacón Soto. Meanwhile, the former military prosecutor Rolando Melo Silva was sentenced to five years and one day and three years and one day in prison, as an accessory to the homicides and kidnappings, respectively.
In the investigation, the visiting minister of the Santiago Court of Appeals, Miguel Vázquez Plaza, explained that on the night of September 11, 1973, Quiroga was detained in his office by a patrol from the Third Police Station of Santiago, after which they took him to the Ministry of Defense and then to the No. 2 Armored Regiment, where he was tortured, after which they transferred him to the Estadio Chile.
The following day, they also brought Víctor Jara there, who had been detained on September 12 inside the University of Santiago (Universidad Técnica del Estado, at that time, of which he was a professor and researcher), after that facility was besieged and attacked by troops from the “Arica” Regiment, under the command of the man who would later become one of the most important DINA officers: Marcelo Morén Brito.
According to the investigation by the visiting minister, when Jara arrived at the Estadio Chile along with the other prisoners, “he was recognized immediately by the military personnel stationed at the entrance to the facility, being verbally and physically assaulted from the moment of his arrival, to be temporarily placed in the bleachers section, along with the people detained at that university, without any charges being filed against him.” After that, he was separated from the others, the same as happened with Littré Quiroga.
The latter, in fact, suffered during “his entire captivity, constant and violent episodes of physical and verbal aggression by the Army officers present there,” as they accused him of “having been responsible for the imprisonment and mistreatment that General Roberto Viaux had allegedly suffered, which aggravated the punishment inflicted upon him by those who passed by him, even encouraging the conscripts themselves to take part in said punishment; and, in a very similar manner, regarding Víctor Jara Martínez, the aggressions had as their main incentive his artistic, cultural, and political activity, closely linked to the recently overthrown Government; he was subjected to identical physical torture, with the most severe blows being those he received in the region of his face and on his hands; both victims were subjected to kicks, punches, and blows with the butts of weapons.” Thus, both were arduously tortured between September 13 and 15, and were also constantly interrogated by military personnel and also (on several occasions) by personnel from the Second Military Prosecutor's Office of the time. On the 15th, Jara and Quiroga were separated from a group of prisoners who were being taken to the Estadio Nacional and “both were put to death, an act that occurred as a consequence of at least 44 and 23 bullet impacts, respectively, in all cases of 9.23-millimeter caliber, as specified in the corresponding autopsy reports and ballistic expert reports, which corresponds to the service weaponry used by the Army officers who were in said facility.” After that, both bodies were thrown onto the public road and found “on September 16, 1973, by residents belonging to community and social organizations, in the vicinity of the Metropolitan Cemetery, in a vacant lot near the railway line, who cleaned their faces and were able to recognize them.” In civil matters, the state was ordered to pay each of the plaintiffs, the spouse and children of Littré Quiroga, the sum of 150 million pesos, and to each of his siblings the sum of 80 million. Meanwhile, 150 million must be paid to each of the widow and children of Víctor Jara.
Source: elmostrador.cl, August 28, 2023
Two retired military officers convicted for the kidnapping and murder of Víctor Jara are fugitives
They are retired officers Raúl Jofré González and Nelson Haase Mazzei, who have not yet been detained following the Supreme Court ruling. Two of the seven retired military officers convicted for the kidnapping and homicide of the singer-songwriter Víctor Jara are in the status of fugitives.
During the week, the Supreme Court issued the sentences for Raúl Jofré González, Edwin Dimter Bianchi, Nelson Haase Mazzei, Ernesto Bethke Wulf, Juan Jara Quintana, and Hernán Chacón Soto: Ten years and one day for the kidnapping of Jara, and another 15 years and one day for the homicide of the artist and the lawyer Littré Quiroga at the Estadio Chile.
When the authorities went to arrest Chacón, the military officer took his own life to avoid serving the sentence. The seventh person convicted, the former officer and lawyer Rolando Melo Silva, was sentenced to five years and one day, and another three years and one day in prison, as an accessory to the homicides and kidnappings, respectively.
It is in this context that the Investigative Police (PDI) confirmed that two of the military officers convicted for the crimes are in the status of fugitives from justice. According to information from Radio Biobío, the fugitives are Raúl Jofré González (75), who was an Army brigadier, and Nelson Haase Mazzei (77), a retired colonel of the institution.
According to the PDI, since the arrest warrant was issued by the Supreme Court, both criminals have not been located, so their whereabouts are being investigated in order to proceed with their apprehension.
Source: t13.cl, September 3, 2023
Former Regional Ministerial Secretary of Justice and Human Rights under Piñera is the son of one of the military officers convicted in the Víctor Jara case
At the time, the appointment of Juan Enrique Jara as Regional Ministerial Secretary (Seremi) of Justice and Human Rights for Antofagasta, during the second administration of Sebastián Piñera, was a source of controversy and rejection due to his family ties to Juan Renán Jara Quintana, one of the perpetrators of the murder of Víctor Jara.
Juan Renán Jara Quintana, one of the seven retired Army members sentenced by the Supreme Court for the murder of Víctor Jara Martínez, is the father of Juan Enrique Jara, who served as Seremi of Justice and Human Rights for Antofagasta during the government of Sebastián Piñera.
It should be recalled that in a unanimous ruling on Monday, August 28, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court issued a final sentence against these former Army members for their responsibility in the crimes of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated homicide of both the singer-songwriter and the Director of Prisons at the time of the events, Littré Abraham Quiroga Carvajal.
These crimes were committed in September 1973 in Santiago.
Thus, Juan Jara Quintana, along with Raúl Jofré González, Edwin Dimter Bianchi, Nelson Haase Mazzei, Ernesto Bethke Wulf, and Hernán Chacón Soto, were sentenced to 15 years and one day in prison as perpetrators of the homicides, and 10 years and one day in prison as perpetrators of the aggravated kidnappings.
Meanwhile, former officer Rolando Melo Silva must serve 5 years and one day and 3 years and one day in prison as an accessory to the homicides and kidnappings, respectively.
However, Hernán Chacón Soto decided to take his own life when the Human Rights Brigade of the PDI (Investigations Police) arrived at his home, located on Calle Badajoz in Las Condes, to transfer him to Punta Peuco prison to begin serving his sentence.
The PDI also confirmed that Raúl Jofré González and Nelson Haase Mazzei are the only former military personnel missing in this case and remain fugitives from justice.
In a unanimous ruling, the Second Chamber of the Court—composed of ministers Haroldo Brito and Jorge Dahm, minister Eliana Quezada, and lawyers (ad hoc) Carolina Coppo and Leonor Etcheberry—ruled out any error in the appealed sentence, which had been issued by the Santiago Court of Appeals in November 2021.
The text states that between September 13 and 15, 1973, interrogations of detainees were conducted inside the Estadio Chile without following any prior judicial and/or administrative procedures. Some were carried out by personnel from the Second Military Prosecutor's Office of that time, and Víctor Jara was among those interrogated, with no record left of these actions, nor of any supposed charges or the formation of any legal process.
According to the ruling, Víctor Jara received at least 44 bullet impacts at the time he was executed.
Son of one of those convicted in the Víctor Jara case
Juan Jara Quintana is the father of Juan Enrique Jara, who served as Regional Ministerial Secretary (Seremi) of Justice and Human Rights for Antofagasta during the second administration of Sebastián Piñera. He also served as Acting Government Representative in the region.
At the time, the appointment of Juan Enrique Jara was a source of controversy and rejection due to his family ties to one of the perpetrators of the murder of Víctor Jara.
Through marriage and birth certificates from the Civil Registry, it was corroborated that he is indeed the son of Juan Renán Jara Quintana.
In fact, this information was omitted when the authority was appointed in 2018, despite the incompatibility of this background with his position.
The spokesperson for the Agrupación Providencia, a memorial site at a former detention and torture center, Héctor Maturana, explained in November 2019 that "we realized there was no transparency in the appointment of Juan Enrique Jara as Seremi of Justice.
It is a position linked to justice and human rights. Upon assuming the role, he should have stated that it was inappropriate due to the implications regarding his father. For us, the lack of transparency in his appointment is a very serious matter."
Furthermore, Maturana added in his statements to El Desconcierto that "in this month (November) we have had no contact. As a government, they have done a terrible job. The Seremi of Justice and Human Rights has in no way referred to the deaths and violations suffered by protesters during this social uprising; in no way have they referred to the people who have lost their eyes as a result of the pellets fired by the Carabineros.
There is no information or stance regarding these issues."
UDI, defender of the dictatorship, and pro-Kast
Enrique Jara is a lawyer from the Universidad de Los Andes, a member of the UDI (Independent Democratic Union), and a defender of the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship.
At minute 37:42 of the documentary "I Love Pinochet," he appears justifying the civil-military dictatorship, claiming that responsibility for human rights violations corresponded to "isolated acts" by individual persons, and that in his view, the dictatorship ultimately constituted a rescue for Chile.
"I feel that what happened was an inevitable matter. Certain situations do hurt me as a Christian, as a Catholic, when there were human rights violations; obviously, there is a matter that bothers you a little, but especially with persons, not the (military) government in general, but suddenly officials, military personnel.
But yes, in general terms, Chile was rebuilt. That is to say, today it is one of the most thriving countries in Latin America, and in many countries, they are basically copying what was done in Chile; we see Uruguay, Argentina.
We see that the U.S. is analyzing the pension reform that was done in Chile to create the pension fund. Basically, that is what fills us with pride regarding what was done in Chile. A country was made anew in many things," stated Juan Enrique Jara in the audiovisual material.
In 2009, he was a candidate for deputy for the Coquimbo Region. During the campaign, he gave interviews where he said he conceived of education as a consumer good and asserted that he would present a project "so that the poorest families can choose more expensive schools for their children, supported by a government subsidy, and provide a voucher so that they can consume better education."
In addition, he has defined himself as religious and "pro-life," speaking out openly against women's rights on this issue. He also opposed the morning-after pill and abortion under three grounds.
On his Twitter account, he showed his sympathy for the far-right politician José Antonio Kast, to whom he has even written messages of support on his Twitter account.
However, all this information that could be found on his social networks was set to private, where his comments on Twitter cannot be accessed publicly, with the same situation applying to his Facebook account.
Threats to social organizations calling for demonstrations
Enrique Jara's management as Seremi of Justice in Antofagasta was also tarnished by his threats to social organizations that called for marches and mobilizations during the social uprising.
"We also want to call on the organizations that call for these marches to take their share of responsibility. The truth is that those who call for the marches, which ultimately end in violence, also have a share of responsibility," he indicated in statements to the press on November 26, 2019.
Then, in a clear threat to these groups, he stated: "We as a government are going to enforce all criminal responsibilities established by law, through lawsuits under the State Internal Security Law and everything that allows citizens to recover public order and the necessary peace."
On that occasion, he called on the courts of justice and prosecutors to fulfill their "responsibility."
"Just as Carabineros and the PDI work day and night exposing their lives, doing their job, we need all State institutions to fulfill their duty of responsibility: Judges, prosecutors, defenders... So that the crime does not go unpunished.
It is important that those who commit crimes, looting, arson, serious crimes, know that we as a Government are going to apply the full rigor of the law against them."
Another fact that overshadowed his management relates to the obstacle he represented for the demand of social organizations to recover the Providencia memorial site, which was declared a national monument in May 2016 but was occupied as a non-commissioned officers' school by the Carabineros.
In this regard, Héctor Maturana explained in November that his presence "obstructs and hinders the process initiated by our group to convert the space into an effective memorial site, which has an impact on the formation of new generations who are protagonists of their destiny and with a firm culture of respect and promotion of human rights, which sooner or later will defeat the recurring practices of the Carabineros, the Army, and other branches of the armed forces."
Maturana indicated that he had had some dialogues with the Seremi of Justice, also requesting meetings with the Regional Intendancy to channel their demand to recover the space and truly convert it into a memorial site, "where we have direct access and full participation." But he explained that "they have only remained words of good will, nothing concrete, it has had no weight.
Now that we know his family connection, he does not seem like a valid interlocutor to us either."
Source: elciudadano.cl, September 4, 2023
Updated list of human rights violators who are fugitives from justice made official
This is a list prepared by the law firm Caucoto Abogados, which includes 14 criminals, among whom are individuals linked to the murder of Víctor Jara, the execution of 38 peasants in the main Paine Case, and the assassination of the Spanish diplomat Carmelo Soria.
This Friday, the law firm Caucoto Abogados made official the updated list of former uniformed personnel who are fugitives from justice and convicted of various crimes against humanity.
It involves 14 people, some of them involved in the crime of Víctor Jara and Littré Quiroga, in the execution of 38 peasants in the main Paine Case, and the assassination of the Spanish diplomat Carmelo Soria, among other investigations, details a statement from the office specializing in human rights.
Regarding the list, it is made up of former military personnel, Carabineros, former Navy officials, and civilians who were members of the dictatorship's repressive apparatuses, such as the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), the National Intelligence Center (CNI), and naval intelligence, who are accused as perpetrators and co-perpetrators of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated homicide, illicit association, and the application of torture, among other illicit acts.
Specifically, it is composed of
1. Jorge Octavio Vargas Bories (retired Army officer, CNI), sentenced as a co-perpetrator of the murder of Federico Álvarez Santibáñez to 10 years and one day. 2. Rubén Aroldo Morales López (retired Carabineros officer), sentenced to 10 years and one day of major imprisonment as a perpetrator of the aggravated homicide of Jorge Vásquez Matamala. 3.
Luis Enrique Barrueto Bartning, a businessman sentenced to 10 years and one day as a co-perpetrator of seven aggravated kidnappings (forced disappearances) committed in the commune of Santa Bárbara.
To these are added four people convicted in the Conferencia II episode:
4. Federico Humberto Chaigneau Sepúlveda (retired Army officer, DINA) 5. José Miguel Meza Serrano (retired Navy official, DINA) 6. Eduardo Alejandro Oyarce Riquelme (retired Army non-commissioned officer, DINA)
All of them are sentenced as co-perpetrators of the crimes of aggravated kidnapping of Fernando Navarro Allendes and Héctor Véliz Ramírez, to a sentence of 12 years in prison each, to which are added the crimes of simple kidnapping of Juan Fernando Ortiz Letelier, Horacio Cepeda Marinkovic, and Lincoyán Berríos, for which they were sentenced to three years in prison, respectively.
7. Víctor Álvarez Droguett (retired Army official, DINA), sentenced as a co-perpetrator of the crimes of aggravated homicide of Juan Fernando Ortiz Letelier, Horacio Cepeda Marinkovic, and Lincoyán Yalú Berríos Cataldo, to a sentence of 15 years and one day of major imprisonment in its maximum degree.
In addition, he is sentenced as a co-perpetrator of the crimes of aggravated kidnapping of Fernando Alfredo Navarro Allendes and Héctor Véliz Ramírez, to a sentence of 12 years of major imprisonment in its medium degree.
Additionally, he was sentenced as a perpetrator of the crimes of simple kidnapping of Juan Fernando Ortiz Letelier, Horacio Cepeda Marinkovic, and Lincoyán Yalú Berríos Cataldo, to a sentence of three years of minor imprisonment in its medium degree.
Finally, Álvarez Droguett faces a 10-year prison sentence for the aggravated kidnapping of Marta Ugarte Román.
8. Alberto Roque del Sagrado Corazón Badilla Grillo, retired Navy officer, who was sentenced as a perpetrator of the aggravated homicide and the application of torture against Enrique López Olmedo, to sentences of 12 years and 541 days, respectively.
9. Juan Dionisio Opazo Vera (former conscript) sentenced as a co-perpetrator of 38 aggravated homicides to a sentence of 10 years and one day, in the Paine Case, Main Episode.
10. Nelson Edgardo Hasse Mazzei (retired Army officer) 11. Juan Renán Jara Quintana (retired Army officer), who, along with Hasse Mazzei, is convicted as a co-perpetrator of the aggravated kidnappings and aggravated homicides of Víctor Jara Martínez and Littré Quiroga Carvajal.
For these crimes, a sentence of 10 years and one day was established for the kidnappings, in addition to 15 years in prison for the crimes. 12. Guillermo Salinas Torres (retired Army officer) 13. Pablo Belmar Labbé (retired Army officer) 14. René Patricio Quilhot Palma (retired Army officer)
In the case of these three fugitives from justice, they were convicted as co-perpetrators of the crimes of aggravated homicide of Carmelo Soria Espinoza, and as perpetrators of an illicit association. For the first charge, a sentence of 15 years and one day was imposed on Salinas Torres, and 10 years and one day on the other two, while for the crime of illicit association, all were sentenced to 541 days in prison.
"Sentences must be fulfilled"
Regarding this list, lawyer Francisco Bustos asserts that it is a worrying situation that should be a priority for the authorities.
"States have the duty to investigate, prosecute, and punish crimes against humanity," he maintains.
"This duty does not end with the mere issuance of a conviction; these sentences must be fulfilled, and in that sense, the existence of fugitives for any crime, and especially 14 fugitives for crimes against humanity, represents a serious breach of state duties," he adds.
Finally, he stressed that "the judiciary and the plaintiffs in proceedings for crimes against humanity must take extreme measures, including the imposition of precautionary measures, in order to avoid this form of impunity."
Source: eldesconcierto.cl, November 24, 2023
Indictment issued against Pedro Barrientos for the murder of Víctor Jara
The former military officer was deported by the United States at the end of 2023, after being sought by the Chilean justice system since 2013, when the Supreme Court authorized his extradition for his participation in the crime against Jara and Littré Quiroga.
The presiding minister, Paola Plaza González, issued an indictment against former military officer Pedro Barrientos Núñez as the perpetrator of the crimes of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated homicide committed against the national singer-songwriter Víctor Jara Martínez and Littré Quiroga Carvajal, former National Director of Prisons, events that occurred between September 12 and 15, 1973, in Santiago.
Barrientos was deported by the United States at the end of 2023, a country where he had been a fugitive for decades, after being sought by the Chilean justice system since 2013, when the Supreme Court authorized his extradition for his participation in the crime against Jara and Quiroga.
In 2016, a jury in a civil case in the U.S. had found Barrientos responsible for the torture of Víctor Jara and other prisoners at the Estadio Chile.
The former military officer had escaped from Chile to the U.S. in 1989, at the end of the dictatorship, obtaining U.S. citizenship, which was revoked on July 14, 2023, for having used false information to obtain it. For that violation of U.S. immigration laws, he was deported to Chile on November 30, 2023.
Once he arrived in our country, Barrientos was notified of the indictment orders issued in 2012 and 2014 by minister Miguel Vásquez Plaza, who previously handled the case for the crimes of kidnapping and homicide of Jara and Quiroga. It was this same magistrate who, in the absence of the accused, determined his temporary dismissal.
With the indictment by minister Paola Plaza, he is closer than ever to receiving a sentence. According to the plaintiff lawyer, Nelson Caucoto, representative of the victims' family, "from our point of view, the fate of Mr.
Barrientos cannot be different from that of the other military personnel who were convicted and sentenced in this case, with significant sentences, proportional to the gravity of the crimes and unanimously confirmed by the Supreme Court," he maintained.
"This indictment by minister Plaza constitutes the beginning of the end of a trial that has lasted more than 50 years and that makes the longing for justice of Víctor and Littré's relatives a reality. Justice in this case will be possible despite the passage of time," expressed Caucoto.
Other convicted individuals
In August 2023, the Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court sentenced seven retired Army members for their responsibility in the crimes of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated homicide of the singer-songwriter and Quiroga.
They are Raúl Jofré González, Edwin Dimter Bianchi, Nelson Haase Mazzei, Ernesto Bethke Wulf, Juan Jara Quintana, and Hernán Chacón Soto to sentences of 15 years and one day as perpetrators of the homicides, and 10 years and one day in prison for the kidnapping of both victims.
Meanwhile, the former officer and former military prosecutor, Rolando Melo Silva, was sentenced to five years and one day in prison as an accessory to both homicides, as well as three years and one day in prison for also being an accessory to the kidnappings.
Hasse Mazzei, a former Army officer, is currently a fugitive from justice, while Jara Quintana, a former colonel, fled after the sentence was issued, being captured and detained in May 2024.
44 bullet impacts
According to the investigation, Víctor Jara was detained on September 12, 1973, at the Technical University of the State, and was subsequently taken to the Estadio Chile. September 15 is the last day he was seen alive, when in the afternoon Víctor Jara was taken out of a line of prisoners who were to be transferred to the National Stadium.
The following morning, his body was found by some residents in the vicinity of the Metropolitan Cemetery, along with five other corpses, among which was that of Littré Quiroga Carvajal.
According to the autopsy report, Víctor Jara died as a result of 44 bullet impacts and multiple fractures.
Littré Quiroga, meanwhile, suspended his medical leave to go to his office at the National Directorate of Prisons. From there, he decided to send most of the officials to their homes and communicated with a high-ranking military authority.
In response, he was told to report at 8:00 a.m. on the 12th to the Ministry of Defense. However, about twenty Carabineros arrived at the Prison Service offices. Littré Quiroga surrendered voluntarily to them. At night, he was transferred to the 2nd Armored Regiment.
On September 13, he was sent to the Estadio Chile, where he suffered multiple tortures and humiliations applied by Army personnel. He remained there until September 15, and the following day his body was found near the Metropolitan Cemetery, with 23 bullet impacts and multiple fractures.
Source: radio.uchile.cl, December 10, 2025
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