Journalist Manuel Salazar, a writer for Punto Final, has released through LOM Ediciones the second volume of Las letras del horror (The Letters of Horror), the first volume of which was dedicated to the DINA.

This work provides a detailed description of the unequal confrontation between the PC, MIR, and FPMR—which were slowly beginning to restructure—and the criminal operations of the repressive agencies (Operation Albania, Operation Machete, Mission Alfa Carbón, Carrizal, Lo Barnechea, Quilicura, Las Vizcachas, etc.), in addition to countless kidnappings, murders, and disappearances.

It also details the strategies of various military personnel and civilians who, upon glimpsing the end of the dictatorship, resorted to illicit associations and shell companies to ensure a comfortable retirement.

“The Brotherhood of the Unpunished”

Alvaro Julio Corbalán Castilla entered the Military School in 1966. His performance level was entirely average, standing out only for his artistic interests and joining the institute’s Musical Circle that same year.

He was always characterized by his powers of persuasion, a trait in which he recorded some illustrative anecdotes. It was standard for cadets to return to the barracks after a weekend leave by 11:00 PM on Sunday. But Cadet Alvaro Corbalán always exhibited the skill to obtain extra hours of leave.

During 1968, the then-Lieutenant Gerardo Urrich González, one of the strictest and most demanding officers in the history of that institute, was stationed at the Military School. On several occasions, while he was the duty officer, he handled telephone requests from Cadet Corbalán to be authorized to return later.

-My Lieutenant, the truth is that I am playing the guitar-, was the cadet’s invariable argument.

What was surprising to everyone was that Urrich granted his requests. Corbalán lived for the song festivals organized by the private girls' schools in the upper-class neighborhoods. Together with cadets Luciano García, Jaime Muñoz, Manuel Ibáñez, Jaime Mesina, Rafael Cruz, and Marcos Correa, they formed the group Voces de Manquehue, which won musical competitions at the Monjas Argentinas, the Colegio Universitario Salvador, the Saint John Villa Academy, and the Monjas Inglesas, among others(1).

Lieutenant Arturo Astete Bascuñán—a cousin of the folklorist Willy Bascuñán—was an enthusiastic promoter of Sub-lieutenant Corbalán’s talent as a composer and performer. In 1969, the promising artist sold the rights to the folk song “Lunita atacameña.” Years later, in December 1973, Corbalán signed a contract with Odeón to make several recordings a year.

But the young officer, despite his vocal and instrumental skills, was already thinking of other horizons.

In 1970, Corbalán, while a student in the second military course and having chosen the Artillery branch, reached the rank of sub-brigadier. In 1971, after a 45-day course held at Fort Gulick, at the School of the Americas in the U.S.

Canal Zone of Panama, Sub-lieutenant Corbalán completed the required course at the Artillery School in Linares. Subsequently, in August of that same year, he was assigned to the artillery group of the Pudeto Regiment in Punta Arenas.

Regarding his time in that unit, no information is known other than a humorous story. While serving as a forward observer for an artillery battery during a live-fire exercise, Sub-lieutenant Corbalán made an incorrect calculation.

As a result, a projectile killed about fifteen lambs. After the owner’s complaints, the regiment commander ordered Corbalán to pay for the dead animals. The most pleased by the error were the battery’s conscript soldiers, who were able to eat Magallanic lamb prepared in various ways for several days.

It has not been possible to determine exactly when the young officer began his work in Intelligence. It is plausible to assume that between 1971 and 1972 he was incorporated into the Second Department of Intelligence of the Fifth Army Division, based in Punta Arenas.

In 1975, while assigned to the Tacna Regiment in Santiago, Lieutenant Corbalán completed the basic Intelligence course at the Nos school, from where he was assigned to what was then known as the Army Intelligence Corps, CIE (today the Army Intelligence Battalion, BIE), a unit located at the corner of García Reyes and Avenida Bernardo O’Higgins.

The following year, Corbalán requested and obtained permission to attend the Specialized Course, thus obtaining a certification in secret service, after which he reached the second-in-command position of the Secret Service Department, DSS, within the CIE.

That same year, inspired by his growing successes, he composed the lyrics and music for the Intelligence School’s anthem: “We are children of the school of silence.”

Corbalán then joined the so-called Intelligence Community, directed by Odlanier Mena of the Army; Enrique Ruiz, head of the Air Force Intelligence Directorate (DIFA); Rubén Romero, a General of the Carabineros; and Ariel González, a Navy Captain.

In that community, the Comando Conjunto (Joint Command) was formed, a group that specialized in hunting communists and was directed by Commander Edgar Ceballos Jones of the Air Force.

Ceballos, known as “Commander Cabezas,” created a command under him composed of Daniel Gimpert of the Navy; Agustín Muñoz Gamboa of the Carabineros; Roberto Fuentes Morrison of the Air Force; and Alvaro Corbalán of the Army(2).

Between late 1976 and early 1977, Corbalán achieved his first major triumph as a secret service agent. With the collaboration of the Spanish priest Felipe Gutiérrez, chaplain of the Second Army Division, he achieved a complete infiltration of the administrative and human structure of the Archdiocese of Santiago, which involved clandestine nocturnal break-ins and the microfilming of classified documents regarding foreign financial contributions received by the Catholic Church in Chile.

The report, produced on video with accounts from Chaplain Gutiérrez, included information on bishops, vicars, priests, and deacons.

In 1978, the now-Captain Alvaro Corbalán structured his first secret service network, given the emergency situation that could have led to a war with Argentina. He set up the travel agency Cordillera Tour and, with the collaboration of agents working undercover at LAN Chile, traveled continuously to Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, and Panama.

In that work, he had an exceptional assistant: Jacqueline Caillaux, who later married an Army officer who was part of the CNI and was one of Corbalán’s most enthusiastic followers. Those trips awakened great ambitions in the young captain, which also demanded high expenses.

A few months later, that “front” for domestic espionage was investigated and closed by the commander of the CIE, Lieutenant Colonel Roberto Schmied Sanzi, who detected some irregular handling of fiscal funds.

Apparently, the financial anomalies existed; what is debatable is whether the context in which they allegedly occurred, according to later versions, was real. It was said that Corbalán was forced to dip into those funds because his normal income did not allow him to finance a heated romance with a stunning blonde official of the military government.

It is likely that such a relationship never existed and that Corbalán himself was responsible for spreading an interested version of the story.

Shortly thereafter, Commander Schmied allegedly placed Corbalán at the disposal of the Army’s Director of Intelligence, at that time General René Orozco. He, in turn, allegedly sent him to report to General Carlos Forestier, Vice Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

According to what Corbalán told some of his friends, Forestier, after the customary shouting, informed him that he would be assigned to the Miraflores Artillery Regiment in Traiguén, a unit considered a punishment post for officers of that branch. Corbalán reportedly replied:

-My General, a secret agent is worth more than an Army division!-

The captain’s response did not amuse the irascible general in the slightest, who notified Corbalán that he would proceed with his discharge from the Army.

Faced with this, Corbalán resorted to a final tactic:

-My General, do not forget everything I know!-

Weeks later, General Forestier informed the institution that Captain Alvaro Corbalán Castilla, under the false identity of Alvaro Valenzuela Torres, had been commissioned to perform services at the Central Nacional de Informaciones (CNI).

Upon arriving at the CNI in 1979, Colonel Jorge Carrasco—the “Negro” Carrasco—offered Corbalán his support, with the perspective of “giving another chance to a valuable man who messed up,” as he would explain years later to a group of comrades-in-arms.

It is unknown what that support was, but it is a fact that Alvaro Corbalán began to shine vigorously in a meteoric career. Some of his supporters attributed exceptional characteristics to him, such as the passion with which he undertook everything he did, following calculated and cold planning.

Physically—and everyone agrees on this—his stamina was remarkable. He could work for 16 hours or more and recover with only four hours of sleep. He never drank alcohol or smoked. He lived on juices, fruits, canned goods, and dairy products. He never had a poor diet. He did, however, have three great weaknesses: Fanta, Orange Crush, and cream pastries.

One of the peculiar skills demonstrated by Corbalán at the CNI was training his men in a true game of cat and mouse. Most of the time, Corbalán and his agents knew well in advance who the main leaders of the armed Left-wing groups were and where they were located.

Why did they not arrest or repress them as soon as their whereabouts were known? The answer is known to some of the men who worked at the CNI. And it is simple. Corbalán delayed operations to obtain larger budgets.

A surveillance and arrest operation that could cost one million pesos and be carried out in a week was extended for months, achieving increasing economic benefits. That, apart from the “spoils of war.”

In the almost simultaneous attack against MIR leaders on Janequeo and Fuente Ovejuna streets on September 7, 1983, a valuable haul was obtained. In a film recorded by CNI agents on that occasion at Fuente Ovejuna 1330, journalist Ricardo Coya, a CNI collaborator, appears on camera stating that a sum of money had been found there.

Arturo Villabela Araujo, one of the leaders of the MIR, was killed there(*).

Similar losses were suffered almost daily by hundreds of Left-wing militants whose homes were raided and whose occupants were arrested. Corbalán’s men razed everything. When it came time to distribute the spoils, however, the largest share of what was collected remained on Corbalán’s desk in his office at the Borgoño barracks. That habit was something many never forgave him for.

At the CNI, Corbalán surrounded himself with a core of agents and civilian employees of his absolute trust. First as head of the Anti-Subversive Brigade, then of the Metropolitan Division, and later of all units existing in the Borgoño barracks, he accumulated power comparable only to that of his director, General Humberto Gordon.

Later, with Gordon on the Military Junta, Corbalán managed to get what he wanted, bypassing the instructions of his respective direct superiors. Along with his duties as the main operational head of the repression, he also served as president of Avanzada Nacional and the Corporación para la Paz (Corpaz), political facades for the CNI.

Among his trusted men were Hugo Alarcón Vergara, a former driver for the Intelligence School (ENI); the retired Carabineros non-commissioned officer Juan Carlos Vergara Gutiérrez (“El Punta”), head of his general staff; and Higinio Barra Vega (“Don Gabriel”).

In July 1989, Corbalán maintained a team of 19 civilian employees integrated into his inner circle. They were Francisco Barra Puentes, Ginno Carrasco Concha, Marcelo Charrier Ferrer, Jorge Domínguez Betancourt, Raúl Escobar Muñoz, Francisco Gajardo Quijada, Nelson González Oporto, Víctor González Salgado, Miguel Fernández Sabat, Jorge Meneses Arcauz, Lidia Merino Medel, Víctor Monsalve Oyarzo, Hans Muller Leiva, Fernando Nilo Cerecer, Juan Olivares Carrizo, Luis Penrros Guerrero, Adonis Rigoletti Gaete, Héctor Rubilar Pinto, and Oscar Villagra Rodríguez.

His special brigade, consisting of liaisons, guards, and motorcyclists, was composed of: Francisco Zúñiga Acevedo (“Félix Catalán Cueto”), Jorge Vargas Bories (“Jorge Polanco Lira”), Higinio Barra Vega (“Eugenio Riveros Cáceres”, “Don Gabriel”), Ana María Rubio de la Cruz (“María Soledad Barrera Lagos” or “Marisol”), José Ampuero Ulloa (“Miguel Carrera Poblete”), Guido Jara Brevis (“Hernán Cepeda Soto”), Miguel Gajardo Quijada (“Patricio Herrera Conejeros”, “Anteojitos”, “Hormiga”), Juan Pastenes Osses (“Juan Neira Asenjo”), Gerardo Charrier Ferrer (“John Ramírez Pérez”), Gonzalo Benavente Conejeros (“José Ríos Donoso”), Héctor Rubio Magallanes (“Héctor Gómez Gaete”), José Ascencio Jara (“Guillermo Rocha Díaz”), Juan Vergara Gutiérrez (“Víctor Fernández Gaete”), Juan Olivares Carrizo (“Juan Reynoso Rodríguez”), Oscar Villagra Rodríguez (“Julio Baeza”), José Meneses Arcauz (“Adolfo Guerrero”, “Shogún”), Jorge Domínguez Betancourt (“Matías Espínola”, “Capitán Matías”), Víctor González Salgado (“Iván Gómez”), Marcelo Charrier Ferrer (“César Durán”), Nelson González Oporto (“Juan Muñoz”, “Pichindunga”), Francisco Gajardo Quijada, Francisco Barra Puente (“Claudio”), Héctor Rubilar Pinto (“Junior”), Hans Muller Leiva (“Jorge Ramírez Donoso”), and Rodemil Madariaga Parra.

Corbalán lived his golden age in the first five years of the 80s, when he consolidated his power in the CNI, began to venture into politics through Avanzada Nacional, and became one of the kings of the diminished bohemian scene that existed in Santiago. “The Pharaoh,” as the agents of the repression called him, became closely associated with some executives of Televisión Nacional (TVN) and, through them, met the exuberant Maripepa Nieto, a Spanish showgirl whom José Aravena, the owner of the nightclub La Sirena, brought to Chile for the first time in 1981, and who later became the great star of TVN’s late-night programs and the partner of the operational head of the military dictatorship’s secret police.

Feared and admired by his men, Corbalán frequented venues such as La Casa de Canto, La Casa de Cena, Don Carlos, and the Rodizzio restaurants in Bellavista and Apoquindo; he held periodic receptions at his two-story house in El Arrayán—with a sauna, jacuzzi, and pool—the origin of which he could never explain; and he would stay at the Hotel O’Higgins in Viña del Mar or at his house in Papudo during the song festival and when he decided to take a few days of rest.

Maripepa Nieto came and went from Spain, and some close to Corbalán suspected that on those trips she carried errands for the CNI officer, including remittances of dollars for fixed-term deposits that were never detected.

The romance ended in the late 80s. The curvaceous Spaniard returned to Chile in the early 2000s to help her sister Rosario, who was detained at the Women’s Orientation Center accused of drug trafficking, a dark world into which she was dragged by a man linked to the security services who knew Corbalán perfectly(3).

NOTES

(1) Regarding Alvaro Corbalán, see the series of “exclusive” publications about his life in Cosas magazine, in December 1988 and January 1989. Also María Eugenia Camus: “Prontuario de sangre y fuego,” Análisis magazine, May 25, 1992; Osvaldo Muray: “Terremoto en la CNI,” Cauce magazine, July 18, 1988; and Cien Aguilas magazine, 1968. (2) See: Héctor Contreras and Mónica González: Los secretos del Comando Conjunto, Las Ediciones del Ornitorrinco, Santiago de Chile, November 1991. (3) Ana María Sanhueza: “Alvaro Corbalán: el amor más peligroso de Maripepa”; Siete+7, June 27, 2003.

See also Héctor Rojas M.: “Hermana de Maripepa Nieto tenía una extensa red de compradores de cocaína”; La Tercera, June 15, 2003, and Patricio Carrera: “Investigan el círculo íntimo de hermana de Maripepa Nieto,” La Tercera, July 19, 2003. (*) On the night of September 7, 1983, a CNI operational command annihilated five MIR militants who were living in hiding in Santiago.

The first blow was an attack on the home at Fuente Ovejuna 1330, Las Condes. There, Arturo Villabela Araujo, an engineer and member of the MIR political commission, and militants Lucía Vergara Valenzuela and Sergio Peña Díaz were riddled with bullets.

All three had returned to the country clandestinely. Shortly after, the same command attacked the house on Calle Janequeo 5707, Quinta Normal, where Hugo Ratier Noguera, a member of the MIR central committee, and militant Alejandro Salgado Troquián and the latter’s family members were living.

Salgado was killed in the street and Ratier in the courtyard of the house. It was said that both actions of state terrorism were in retaliation for the death of the Intendant of Santiago, General (ret.) Carol Urzúa Ibáñez, who was killed in an ambush set by the MIR on August 30, 1983, in Las Condes (PF Editor’s Note).

Source: Punto Final, edition No. 772, December 7, 2012