In the late nineties, Lieutenant Conrado García Giaier became the colonel in charge of the Army's Intelligence Department II, and previously served as head of the CNI's Anti-Terrorist Unit. To signal the start of torture in Pisagua, he would play the organ from the local parish that had been brought into the prison.

It was the second time that night that young Luis Carló had come rolling down the stairs from the second floor of the Pisagua prison. Upstairs, the "Crazy Monk" laughed again with that booming voice that matched his height of over one meter eighty and his light-colored eyes.

Once the near-daily torture of the teenager—the son of an Army non-commissioned officer—was finished, the "Crazy Monk" locked him back in his cell and went down to the first floor. He opened the organ he had ordered to be moved from the parish of the legendary cove and began to play.

He did not play well, but he knew a little. With those chords, he announced that the show was beginning. Inside their cells, the couple of hundred prisoners felt their stomachs tighten. They knew of the "Monk's" bestiality.

They nicknamed him that because of the organ, but Lieutenant Conrado García Giaier was no monk. He was the most brutal officer at the Pisagua concentration camp after the 1973 military coup. That night, he ordered everyone to go down and form up in the prison courtyard and forced them to take off their clothes.

The night in Pisagua was freezing and the wind was blowing hard, even though it was November. The "Monk" had two large oil drums prepared. The stones were also ready up on the hill. He chose the two detainees who would start the peculiar session and ordered them to go up, guarded by soldiers.

The small hill was about 150 meters high and had a very steep slope. Once the prisoners reached the summit, Lieutenant García shouted from below to his subordinates to put them inside along with the pile of stones. "Go!" the "Monk" commanded, and his men pushed the drums down the hill with their human cargo.

They stopped far away, closer to the sea, which was roaring agitatedly. The two men crawled out, bloodied and dizzy. Before taking the others who would roll down the slope, the "Monk" forced the prisoners to lie on the ground of dirt and small stones, with their backs to the starry sky.

Several were shivering from the cold. In two strides, the "Monk" returned to the religious keyboard and hammered out some chords that only he understood. But it did not matter, as his audience feared him too much to throw eggs or tomatoes at him.

The organ stopped playing and the "Monk" ran down the few steps from the first floor to the courtyard. Then he began to jump on the naked backs, running across that human carpet. From time to time, he would stop and beat someone at random.

And he would continue his crazed race, shouting insults, with his large, light eyes wide open so as not to fall. On the afternoon of the following day, when the sun was burning mercilessly, the large metal sheet that covered part of the prison courtyard was scorching.

Now Lieutenant García revealed another of the gray walls of his sick mind. He ordered a formation again. This time, they were bare-chested, so that the sun would end up wounding the detainees' skin. He flew up the steps from the courtyard to the first floor like an angel and unleashed a storm of notes on the instrument, running both hands across the entire length of the keyboard several times.

Later, when some fainted outside, he took a few out and ordered them to sit on the sheet of iron that was boiling hot. He left them there until they began to scream in pain from the burns on their buttocks, despite their pants.

The tradition of the "Crazy Monk" was fulfilled once again, announcing torture with the sound that Bach loved most while playing for kings and learned scholars. The dramatic days and nights in Pisagua under the not-so-sacred mantle of the "Crazy Monk" have been recalled by dozens of former prisoners in the thousands of pages of the case file being investigated for the crimes against humanity that occurred in Pisagua.

Among others, by Luis González Vives and Luis Morales Marino. The story of the "Crazy Monk" in that concentration camp was embedded in them forever, at the point of blood and pain. Thirty-five years later, and for the first time, justice reached Conrado García last week.

In the end, he could no longer continue to pass himself off as a retired colonel who had nothing to do with the crimes of the dictatorship. The Fifth Chamber of the Santiago Court of Appeals prosecuted him and ordered Judge Joaquín Billard to arrest and book him for the kidnapping and forced disappearance of Jorge Marín Rossel and William Millar Sanhueza, which occurred in Iquique between September 23 and 25, 1973.

Along with the "Crazy Monk," retired officers Karl Hans Stuckhart and Pedro Collao also fell for the first time; at the time, they were in charge of military intelligence in that city along with García.

The "Monk" later went to Pisagua. Billard had previously exonerated all three of both kidnappings. Plaintiff lawyer Adil Brkovic expressed his satisfaction "because it cost us a lot to hunt down this sinister character." Lawyer Rodrigo Cortés acted on behalf of the Ministry of the Interior's Human Rights Program.

One winter morning in 1998, I called Colonel Conrado García. I told him I needed to speak with him. That I had twenty judicial testimonies against him. Former prisoners accused him of being a torturer and having a twisted mind.

He received me on the seventh floor of the Armed Forces building. I found him in uniform, smoking and pacing nervously. He invited me into his office. I showed him the testimonies. He denied everything.

He told me that he was now the commander of the Army's Department II. That is, intelligence. A high-ranking position. I told him I did not believe him, but that I would include his version in my report.

He insisted on his innocence. I then stood up to leave. Suddenly, he got up and grabbed me by the shoulder. "Look, Mr. Jorgito, don't screw up my career, please; I want to be a general and I'm about to be one," he told me with his eyes wide open.

I remained silent to gain a few seconds. The colonel surprised me. He offered me a cigarette and a coffee again, which I did not accept. "I'm sorry, I cannot reach a pact with you; I am going to publish my report," I told him, and I left. Years later, I learned that the "Crazy Monk" had also been the head of the feared CNI Anti-Terrorist Unit.

Source: Lanacion.cl, January 11, 2009

Chilean Repressor to be Promoted to General: A torturer who rose through the ranks

Accused of being a "ferocious torturer" in 1973 and currently an active-duty colonel and head of the Logistics Directorate of the Chilean Army, Conrado García Giaier is set to be promoted to general this year.

Chilean Air Force General Hernán Gabrieli once had problems due to his past. By Jorge Escalante From Santiago After remaining semi-conscious in his cell for three days, with several fractured ribs and a fractured shoulder, a destroyed eye, and urinating blood, Jorge Verdejo Magna arrived at the infirmary of the Pisagua political prisoner camp in the far north of Chile in November 1973, where he was hospitalized for twelve days.

He had been forced to crawl with his bare torso over dirt and ground glass, and to lie his body on a sheet of iron heated by the sun at the entrance to the prison. The same lieutenant who had tortured him climbed on top of him and stomped on his back with his heels.

Verdejo had fallen into the hands of Lieutenant Conrado Vicente García Giaier, according to the prisoners, one of his most "ferocious torturers" in Pisagua. In August 1990, Verdejo denounced Lieutenant García as his torturer before Judge Hernán Sánchez Marré, who that year investigated the discovery of a clandestine grave with 19 bodies of former prisoners in Pisagua.

His testimony is signed. "The officer who beat us the most in Pisagua and was characterized by his ferocity was Lieutenant Conrado García," Verdejo told Judge Sánchez. Today, Conrado García is an active-duty colonel in Chile and head of the Second Department of the Army's Logistics Directorate on the eighth floor of the Armed Forces building in Santiago, across from the office of the President of the Republic, Ricardo Lagos, in the La Moneda palace.

The officer could be promoted to general in the new high command restructuring next October. Lawyer Adil Brkovic, a plaintiff in the Pisagua cases before Judge Juan Guzmán Tapia—the magistrate who managed to prosecute former dictator Augusto Pinochet in Chile—maintains that the current Colonel García must be prosecuted because there is too much testimony and evidence against him, and adds that he has requested this from Magistrate Guzmán. "Judge Guzmán has been repeatedly asked to take his statement as a defendant for the crime of illicit association and torture.

The only thing missing to subject him to prosecution is for the judge to interrogate him. I hope the magistrate does so now, because there is an abundance of elements for him to be prosecuted as a torturer," Brkovic told Página/12.

The serious accusations are made against the then-Lieutenant García by at least twelve former prisoners of the Pisagua concentration camp, under their signature, both before Judge Sánchez and Magistrate Guzmán Tapia. "On December 1, 1973, they took 60 of us prisoners out to the prison's outer courtyard in our underwear.

Lieutenant García and Commander Larraín beat us and then took us up a hill, put us in drums, and sent us rolling down the hill," recalled former prisoner Freddy Alonso Oyanedel from Iquique in a telephone conversation with Página/12.

Prisoner Nelson Márquez Agurto was forced by Lieutenant Conrado García to climb onto the hood of a jeep with his bare torso. The officer accelerated the vehicle through the main street of Pisagua and braked suddenly.

Márquez was thrown off and was injured by the landing. Afterward, García forced him to spend nights naked outside the prison. Weeks later, Márquez went insane and attempted an escape. He was discovered hiding on the Pisagua pier and was riddled with bullets on January 18, 1974.

By then, García was no longer in Pisagua, because according to four lists that exist in the case files of Judges Sánchez and Guzmán, he remained in the camp along with Lieutenants Gustavo Abarza Rivadeneira and Irigoyen, under the command of Captain Hugo Elzo, between November 20, 1973, and December 20 of that year.

Some time ago, Colonel García himself acknowledged to Página/12 his stay in Pisagua at that time, although he denied the torture. One of the witnesses to Márquez's torment was prisoner Luis Tapia Hidalgo, who told Judges Sánchez and Guzmán, directly accusing García under his signature. "Lieutenant García was characterized as being the most ferocious of the punishers and torturers during that time I was detained in Pisagua," concluded Tapia in his statement.

The Organist García had moved the organ from the Pisagua parish to the prison guard room. Before starting his torture sessions, the officer would announce himself by tearing chords from the liturgical music instrument.

The prisoners nicknamed him "The Crazy Monk." "Lieutenant Conrado García was so wretched that one day he forced us to throw ourselves on the floor and clean the prison floor, which they had just mopped with oil, with our tongues.

Meanwhile, he would jump on our backs. I remember that he crushed the kidneys of José González Enei, who was an athlete, with his boots, and he was urinating blood," recalled former prisoner Luis González Vivas for Página/12.

He also recalled how Lieutenant García repeatedly tortured 17-year-old Andrés Carló. Witnesses to García's torture of young Carló were Tapia Hidalgo, Joaquín Naranjo, Juan Petersen Barreda, Benito Muñoz Zavala, Haroldo Quintero Bugueño, Hernán Núñez Vega, and Ernesto Pérez Fuentes. "Of all the officers who passed through Pisagua, this one was the most brutal, and now I think he is going to be a general.

I can't understand it, a man who tortured so much," summarized González.

Source: Pagina12.cl, May 1, 2011

Pisagua Case: Testimony of active Army officer opens new phase of investigation

The constant denials by the commander of the Second Department of the Logistics Directorate, Lieutenant Conrado Vicente García Giaier, in the face of reports from survivors, witnesses, or relatives of those who wandered through this prisoner camp, are the most recent background information in the case being investigated by Minister Guzmán, testimony after which the plaintiffs will request his prosecution.

Although the commander of the Second Department of the Logistics Directorate, Lieutenant Conrado Vicente García Giaier, asserts that during his time at the Pisagua prisoner camp his work was only to help with the physical conditioning of the detainees, the reconstituted account of victims of illegal coercion inflicted in this place, as well as the version of witnesses, confirms that the role of the active-duty Army officer was much more significant and violent than he indicates.

In his only judicial statement before the investigating judge Juan Guzmán, the person accused of human rights violations asserts that "I never tortured anyone, neither on my own initiative nor because I had received orders.

It is feasible that I may have created animosity, because I was doing physical conditioning with them. I never directly tortured a person, neither by hitting them nor hanging them nor anything like that."

Source: Primera línea, November 21, 2001

Three former Army officers convicted for the torture of 35 political prisoners in Pisagua and Iquique in 1973 and 1974

The minister on special assignment for human rights violation cases of the Court of Appeals of Arica, Iquique, Antofagasta, Copiapó, and La Serena, Vicente Hormazábal Abarzúa, convicted three former Army officers for their responsibility in the repeated crime of applying torture to 35 political prisoners committed in the city of Iquique and the town of Pisagua, during various periods between 1973 and 1974.

In the ruling (case roll 21-2012. Volume A), the visiting minister sentenced former colonels Pedro Santiago Collado Martí to 15 years in prison as the perpetrator of the crime regarding 29 victims; Conrado Vicente García Giaier must serve 13 years in prison for his responsibility in the case of 13 victims; and Arturo Alberto Contador Rosales to 8 years of imprisonment for his responsibility in the case of eight victims.

In the ruling, Minister Hormazábal Abarzúa established that after the military coup of September 1973, countless people from Iquique were detained for being sympathizers or members of left-wing political parties or supporters of Salvador Allende's government.

Those detained people, men and women of varying ages—a group composed of everyone from adolescents to middle-aged people—were taken to various military and police facilities by orders of General Ernesto Carlos Joaquín Forestier Haensgen (deceased), commander-in-chief of the VI Army Division and head of the State of Siege zone in the Province of Tarapacá.

The detainees were then taken to the Telecommunications Regiment of the time, where their data was taken and they were placed in various facilities or courtyards, and immediately separated by political affiliation or other reasons, confining them in containers, "pigsties" (a site where the military raised pigs), or "oases" (a sector where there was vegetation).

A portion of those people were interrogated in a sector of the unit located on a second floor, presumably in the building corresponding to the infirmary, and a number of them were tortured in various forms and intensities, depending on the political importance the military regime attributed to them, and then, immediately or after a few days, taking into account that same imputed political relevance, they were sent to Pisagua, usually in trucks guarded by Army personnel.

The detained women were held and interrogated in the Logistics Battalion, controlled by Army personnel. Afterward, they were sent to the Buen Pastor, guarded by nuns, where they had to share space with common prisoners, and then they were sent to Pisagua, where they were kept captive on the second floor of a theater under armed guard.

The Pisagua Prisoner Camp was directed by the then-Lieutenant Colonel Ramón Caupolicán Larraín Larraín (deceased), who in turn received direct orders from Forestier Haensgen. The camp guards were formed by a contingent led by a captain, who was assisted by two or more lower-ranking officers, lieutenants or second lieutenants, and by the respective enlisted troops.

Larraín ordered the entry of the detainees and under his command, either direct or delegated to the officers guarding the camp, sessions that the victims called "general softening up" were executed, consisting of beatings of all kinds, on various parts of the body, with greater or lesser force—"tasks" executed by the contingent on duty, with certain Carabineros or Army officers standing out, and those duties being repeated by the officers in charge of the guard.

In the Prisoner Camp, the prisoners were placed by political importance or by party on different floors of the facility, the lowest being the so-called "catacombs," cells that were in the worst conditions of habitability and overcrowding.

Along with the "collective softening up" sessions, there were individual interrogations, with the aim of obtaining forced confessions, in which a determined and permanent group of torturers under the command of prosecutor Mario Sergio Acuña Riquelme (deceased) and integrated, among others, by Roberto Fuentes Zambrano (deceased), René Valdivia Castro (deceased), Miguel Chile Aguirre Álvarez (deceased), and Blas Daniel Barraza Quinteros (deceased), who on some occasions interacted with officers in charge of the custody of the Prisoner Camp, who applied torture that left the victims with physical and/or psychological sequelae. This team of interrogators traveled regularly to Pisagua from Iquique in a small plane. The reason this group did not have a stable presence in Pisagua was because they executed the same practices against detainees at the Telecommunications Regiment, where they were under the command of Pedro Santiago Collado Martí, who directed the Military Intelligence Service, made up of military personnel and Carabineros, and who held meetings with Acuña Riquelme at least once a week. The torture consisted of blows to the body with rifle butts, hands, feet; placing the detainees naked or semi-naked on the floor and walking on them, sleep deprivation, exposure to the sun for hours and to the cold of the night without clothes, climbing and descending hills through "elbow and toe" exercises, throwing them inside drums down slopes, electricity to certain parts of the body, submerging the head in water ("submarine"), blows to the ears ("telephone"), mock executions, interrogations in which a firearm was left by their side, hanging from their limbs with the aim of stretching the body for prolonged periods, rape, sexual abuse, keeping them on meager food rations, and the constant threat of being executed, they or their relatives, among others. Only a portion of the detainees in Pisagua were subjected to a War Council, which were held in the school of that town, made up of various officers specially called for that purpose, with Mario Acuña serving as prosecutor and Ramón Larraín Larraín and Carlos Forestier Haensgen serving as ratifiers of the sentences ordered by the Council, interchangeably. A large percentage of prisoners were convicted informally, that is, without there being a written sentence or at least without them receiving one; many times they were convicted solely on the merit of their confessions obtained through torture. Summary by Darío Núñez

Source: resumen.cl, November 9, 2023

The minister on extraordinary assignment for human rights violation cases in the jurisdictions of Temuco, Valdivia, Puerto Montt, and Coyhaique, Álvaro Mesa Latorre, has indicted retired Army Major Sergio María Canals Baldwin and retired Army Lieutenant Luis Arturo Sanhueza Ross as perpetrators of the consummated crime of qualified homicide against: Rodrigo Obregón Torres, René Eduardo Bravo Aguilera, Julio César Riffo Figueroa, and Juan Ángel Ojeda Aguayo.

These crimes were committed in the locality of Neltume, in the commune of Panguipulli, in 1981.

In the resolution (case file 1675-2003), Minister Mesa Latorre ordered the preventive detention of Canals Baldwin and Sanhueza Ross, considering the nature of the crime and the sentence they face for their responsibility in this crime against humanity.

“Given the merit of the background information, from which it is clear that the freedom of the accused constitutes a danger to the safety of society; taking into account, also, the probable legal sanction for the crimes in which they are attributed participation; and in view of the provisions of Article 363 of the Code of Penal Procedure, they will not be granted the benefit of provisional release,” the resolution states.

“Being aware that the accused are currently incarcerated in the ‘Colina I’ Penitentiary Center of the Chilean Gendarmerie, serving sentences for crimes investigated by another court, the preventive detention order is suspended until the completion of said sentence, at which time they shall be admitted,” the ruling concludes.

During the investigation phase, Minister Álvaro Mesa gathered sufficient evidence to establish the following facts:

A)

That during the month of March 1979, a group of Chilean exiles belonging to the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), who were residing in Europe, decided to create a guerrilla front in the southern zone of Chile.

To this end, they met in Paris at the end of 1980, traveling from Madrid to Argentina and entering our country, specifically the Neltume area, through unauthorized border crossings, creating the group called “Toqui Lautaro Guerrilla Detachment.” In this location, they began a period of logistical work and military preparation, constructing shelters for the purpose of keeping their food, weapons, and clothing protected. (as stated in the declaration of Jorge Enrique Durán Delgado on page 536 (Volume I), the declaration of Jorge Antonio Acuña Reyes on page 542 (Volume I), page 1,982 (Volume V), among other evidence)

B)

That the local residents noticed this situation and reported it to the Carabineros at the Neltume station, in the current Los Ríos region. Consequently, in the month of June 1981, a group composed of personnel from the No. 8 “Llancahue” Special Forces Command detachment, under the instruction of Captain Rosauro Martínez Labbé, went to that sector to verify whether the reports received were true or false.

C)

That subsequently, on June 26, 1981, this group tasked with checking the area discovered one of the camps created by the members of the aforementioned Detachment and decided to raid it. As a result of this military operation, the Detachment group split up, and the Army seized some of the belongings found in their shelters (maps, passports, food, weaponry). (according to evidence on page 1092 (Volume III), among others)

D)

That from that moment, the military operation officially began, led by Captain Rosauro Martínez Labbé, with the objective of annihilating the members of this group of young guerrillas. The following military and Carabineros units participated in this operation: Rancagua Aviation Regiment; No. 8 Special Forces Command Company; Valdivia Carabineros Prefecture, and all its dependent units. (as stated in Army IV Division Official Letter No. 3560/112/1184, sending the secret order on page 828 and page 829, Volume II).

E)

That during the second fortnight of August 1981, and with the objective of reinforcing the battalion led by Rosauro Martínez Labbé, the Anti-Terrorist Unit of the National Intelligence Center (CNI) arrived in the conflict zone, composed of approximately 15 uniformed personnel, under the command of Captain Conrado Vicente García Giaier.

By this date, the battalion commanded by Rosauro Martínez Labbé already had the Santiago and Valdivia units of the National Intelligence Center attached to it, as well as its “Red Group,” which was under the command of Chilean Army Captain Enrique Erasmo Sandoval Arancibia.

F)

That in this context, and also having to keep in mind the inclement weather and scarce food that caused health problems for the young people belonging to the “Toqui Lautaro guerrilla detachment” group, the following situations occurred:

1) That on August 30, 1981, Julio Riffo Figueroa and René Bravo Aguilera, while resting after being fed by locals Pedro Morales and Julia Navarro, were detained by a patrol composed of three Carabineros officers from the Malalhue station in the Huellahue sector.

After their detention, they were sent to Valdivia, specifically to the Las Ánimas station. There, they were interrogated by the OS7 Carabineros from Santiago. Subsequently, Julio Riffo Figueroa and René Bravo Aguilera were transferred to the Borgoña Barracks in Santiago, belonging to the National Intelligence Center (CNI), where they were tortured and interrogated.

On September 16, 1981, Julio Riffo Figueroa and René Bravo Aguilera were transported back to the conflict zone, particularly to Neltume, for the purpose of being used by the battalion under the command of Rosauro Martínez Labbé in the search for the other guerrilla camps and their members.

Finally, on September 21, 1981, they were executed, with the cause of death for René Bravo Aguilera listed as craniocerebral and thoracic gunshot wounds, and for Julio Riffo Figueroa as a craniocerebral gunshot wound. (as stated, among other evidence, in the declarations of Adrián Ewaldo Porras Riffo on page 1, page 15 (Volume I), page 1292 (Volume IV); of Juan Pablo Cea Villalabeitia on page 679 (Volume II); of José Antonio Mora Sanchez on page 680 (Volume II); of Renato Cortés Muñoz on page 681 (Volume II); of José Andrés Vial Martínez on page 682 (Volume II); of Jaime Patricio Martínez Fuentes on page 687 (Volume II); of Luis Alberto Jerez Prussing from page 1024 to page 1029 (Volume III); of Renzo Eugenio Gattavara Ghillino from page 1183 to page 1184 (Volume III); Death certificate of Julio César Riffo on page 12 (Volume I), page 658 (Volume II), 1273 (Volume IV). Report on page 624 (Volume II). Death record of Julio César Riffo on page 26 (Volume I). Autopsy report of Julio César Riffo on page 674 (Volume II); Official Letter No. B-4 2114 of September 22, 1981, from page 684 to 685 (Volume II), which accounts for the death of Julio César Riffo and René Bravo; Decree 3336 of September 8, 1981, recording the arrest of Riffo and Bravo in CNI facilities on page 798 (Volume II); Decree 3370 of September 12, 1981, extending the detention of Riffo and Bravo on page 799 (Volume II); Death certificate of René Eduardo Bravo Aguilera on page 12 (Volume I), page 662 (Volume II), and page 1272 (Volume IV); death record of René Eduardo Bravo Aguilera on page 26 (Volume I); Autopsy report of René Eduardo Bravo Aguilera on page 673 (Volume II))

2) That Pedro Juan Yáñez Palacios, during his journey, suffered gangrene in his feet, for which he had to be left by his companions in the hollow of a tree trunk with a rifle. However, due to the strong smell of medicine he emitted, he was detected by the group of soldiers from the No. 8 Llancahue Command—also including Conrado García Giaier, who was monitoring the area—who killed him.

His precise cause of death was a craniocerebral gunshot wound. (according to death certificate page 188 (Volume I) and page 666 (Volume II); on page 624 (Volume II), death report; Autopsy report page 670 (Volume II); Declaration of Erasmo Sandoval on page 1941 (Volume IV), among other evidence)

3) That as a result of the information provided by the detainees Julio Riffo Figueroa and René Bravo Aguilera regarding the meeting place and the password, a group of soldiers, including Jerez Prussing and Enrique Sandoval Arancibia—already indicted in this case—and others from the No. 8 Llancahue Command under the command of Rosauro Martínez Labbé, managed to find and kill Raúl Rodrigo Obregón Torres on September 13, 1981, when he was on his way to meet his companions.

His precise cause of death was a cervicothoracic gunshot wound. (according to death certificate page 187 (Volume I) and page 654 (Volume II); report page 624 (Volume II); autopsy report page 671 (Volume II) and 1074 (Volume III); Declaration of Enrique Sandoval on page 1863 (Volume IV); page 2055 (Volume V); page 2118 (Volume V); Declaration of Aquiles González on page 3887 (Volume VII), among other evidence)

4) That around mid-1981, one of the young men, Juan Ángel Ojeda Aguayo, arrived at the house of a relative named Isaías Aguayo Márquez, located in the “Quebrada Honda” sector, in the vicinity of the Neltume locality, Panguipulli, staying in that place on repeated and discontinuous occasions where he went to look for food.

On November 28, 1981, a group of Army and Carabineros personnel stationed in the Neltume sector approached the mentioned house. After urging the residents to leave their home, Juan Ángel Ojeda Aguayo exited the place, where he was gunned down by a group of soldiers who fired multiple shots at him, resulting in a craniocerebral-facial gunshot wound, as well as multiple cervicothoracic gunshot wounds with rupture and explosion of organs and gunshot wounds to the lower extremities, which caused his death. (according to page 848 (Volume II), report accounting for the death; page 872 (Volume II) autopsy report; page 874, 919 (Volume II), page 1274 (Volume IV), death certificate; declaration of Jorge Farías Silva on page 880 (Volume II); declaration of Rita Yolanda Jaramillo on page 988 (Volume II) and 1592 (Volume IV); of Isaías Aguayo Márquez on page 2,029 (Volume V); Carabineros Official Letter of January 1982, page 918 (Volume II), among other evidence)

5) That Patricio Alejandro Calfuquir Henríquez, Próspero del Carmen Guzmán Soto, and José Eugenio Monsalve Sandoval arrived at the house of Mrs. Floridema Jaramillo, in Remeco Alto, who provided them with food and immediately took actions to report them to the Carabineros.

This was ultimately achieved by sending her son, Juan Carlos Henríquez Jaramillo, who traveled on horseback to the Neltume station to report this fact. Together with Carabineros, they headed back to their home, and upon passing in front of the Remeco school, they notified soldiers who were in a camp in the area, who in turn gave notice by radio.

Upon returning to the house, there were Carabineros stationed in various places, around four, but at the same time, Captain Rosauro Martínez Labbé arrived accompanied by at least two lower-ranking soldiers—among them Corporal 2nd Class Julio Araki Tepano—who, after urging the guerrillas to leave the house, fired against the property until it was practically unusable.

As a consequence, Patricio Calfuquir Henríquez, Próspero Guzmán Soto, and José Eugenio Monsalve Sandoval were killed. A large military contingent then arrived and continued with the operation and the transport of the deceased guerrillas.

The causes of death in the autopsy protocols were as follows: according to page 1075 for Patricio Calfuquir, the precise cause of death was five thoraco-abdominal gunshot wounds, complicated by rupture and explosion of organs and viscera, with the shots having characteristics of having been fired from a long distance with automatic, large-caliber weapons; on page 1076 regarding Próspero del Carmen Guzmán Soto, the precise cause of death was twenty-eight thoraco-abdominal and extremity gunshot wounds, complicated by rupture and explosion of organs, viscera, and comminuted fractures, with the shots having characteristics of having been fired from a long distance with automatic, large-caliber weapons; on page 1079 and in relation to José Eugenio Monsalve Sandoval, the precise, necessary, and immediate cause of death: (4) craniocerebral and thoraco-abdominal gunshot wounds, complicated, with rupture of organs and viscera, from long-distance shots with automatic, large-caliber weapons.

6) Miguel Cabrera Fernández, known as “El Paine,” who was the leader of the group, died in the locality of Choshuenco on October 15, 1981, in an alleged confrontation with Carabineros belonging to the staff of that locality’s station.

His precise, necessary, and immediate cause of death indicates “Cervicothoracic gunshot wound, anteroposterior, complicated by rupture of blood vessels and the left lung.” (Official Letter sending the body to the morgue page 751 (Volume II); Carabineros report on death page 749 (Volume II); Declaration to the prosecutor’s office by Paulino Flores Rivas page 753 (Volume II); declaration to the prosecutor’s office by Hernando Jara Valenzuela on page 753 (Volume II); background on Miguel Cabrera from page 830 to 841 (Volume II); Autopsy report page 755 (Volume II); death certificate on page 919 (Volume II); declaration of Héctor Rivas Bravo on page 842 (Volume II); declaration of Dagoberto Pineda Troncoso from page 1055 to 1584 (Volume IV)).

G)

That in facts 1 through 4, Captain Rosauro Martínez Labbé participated in his capacity as Commander of the No. 8 Command Company of the “Llancahue” Battalion, dependent on the Army’s IV Division, a company that was directing the operation in Neltume during the entire period it lasted.

The aforementioned Captain Martínez was in charge of organizing the different groups that moved through the sector, providing weaponry and giving instructions, among which it was highlighted that “they were at war” and that “upon seeing any man with the characteristics of a guerrilla, one should shoot to kill.” (according to declarations on page 3153, page 3155, page 3180, page 3182, page 3219, page 3185, page 3350, page 3355, page 3368, page 3385, page 3400, page 3478 (Volume VI), page 3616 (Volume VII) among many others; documents on page 1085 (Volume III) and following, 1286 (Volume IV) and following, 2338 (Volume V) and following).

H)

That among the members of the No. 8 Command Company who were collaborating with the operations commanded by Captain Martínez was Corporal 2nd Class Julio Araki Tepano, who was part of the reconnaissance group and, among his participation in the search and detention tasks of the guerrillas, was in charge of notifying the group leader, Lieutenant Ivan Fuentes Sotomayor, that they had discovered a guerrilla base. (page 2488 (Volume V), page 2583 (Volume VI), page 3605 (Volume VII), page 3350 (Volume VI), page 3353 (Volume VI), page 3355 (Volume VI) among other evidence).

I)

Likewise, regarding the facts indicated in point 1, that is, Julio César Riffo and René Bravo Aguilera, Army Lieutenant Luis Arturo Sanhueza Ross, dependent on the No. 8 Command Company, participated as one of the officers in charge of one of the sections that was sent to the Neltume zone (according to declarations on page 1849, page 2.366, page 3.183, page 5.671, among other evidence).

Thus, according to declarations by conscript soldiers who were members of the squad under the command of Lieutenant Sanhueza Ross, they have indicated their knowledge regarding detainees who were under the charge of CNI personnel, describing that they were guerrillas, with their hands tied and a stick crossed behind their backs, tied with wires at each end of the stick at the height of their wrists, recounting how they were ordered to guard them and that subsequently, about fifty meters from where they were with Lieutenant Sanhueza Ross, these detainees were executed, and then the same conscripts were ordered to wrap the bodies in polyethylene and load them into a helicopter that transported them to the Company in Valdivia. (according to declaration on page 3.353 and page 3.473 (Volume VI), page 5.711, page 6.856 (Volume XIV), among other evidence). In the same way, regarding the facts indicated in number 4, that is, Juan Ángel Ojeda Aguayo, Lieutenant Luis Arturo Sanhueza Ross participated in them, in that he commanded the patrol that was in the vicinity of the Choshuenco locality and, upon receiving a notice from the Carabineros of that locality, he went with the patrol under his command to the house where Ojeda Aguayo was, setting up a security operation around the dwelling and participating in the events that resulted in the death of Juan Ángel Ojeda Aguayo. (according to declarations on page 880 (Volume II), page 8.443 and page 8.580 (Volume XVIII)).

J)

That the Anti-Terrorist Unit of the National Intelligence Center (UAT), led by Captain Conrado García Giaier, also formed a fundamental part of this operation. He participated actively in the search, detention, and subsequent death of some of the mentioned victims, which is also accredited in the indictment files on pages 2.046, 2.050, and 2.052 (Volume V) (confirmed by the Illustrious Court of Appeals of Valdivia according to page 2.169 (Volume V)) (declarations of Luis Bascur Gaete on page 1500 (Volume IV); of Carlos Leonardo Ruiz Iturra on page 2.398 and page 2.431 (Volume V); of Carlos Cesar Cisternas Cofré on page 2.401 (Volume V); service record from page 2324 to 2330 (Volume V); police report page 2.387 (Volume V), among other evidence).

K)

That in the same way, Army Major Sergio Canals Baldwin had active participation in the facts described in numbers 1 and 3, that is, Julio Riffo Figueroa, René Bravo Aguilera, and Raúl Obregón Torres. Major Canals Baldwin was part of the “Plomo Group” of the National Intelligence Center (CNI) and was sent to the Neltume zone, stationing himself with his group and with the other members of the CNI at the Termas de Liquiñe, occupying all the cabins during the entire time they remained in that locality, facilities in which Julio Riffo Figueroa and René Bravo Aguilera were detained, and that as a result of the information provided by these detainees, it was possible to find and kill Raúl Obregón Torres, as detailed in point 3 of this indictment. This officer performed operational and information-gathering duties regarding the activities in the zone and was the Army officer with the highest rank in the group of people who made up the National Intelligence Center (CNI) and who were sent from Santiago to support the work of other branches of the Armed Forces that were in the zone (according to declarations on page 3.653, page 3.656, page 5.550, and page 8.534, among other evidence).

That in all the reports accounting for the death of the members of the “Toqui Lautaro Detachment,” it is mentioned that they died as a result of confrontations, which is implausible, since one cannot ignore the unequal and deteriorated condition in which the members of the “Toqui Lautaro” group were, not only in terms of weaponry and preparation, but mostly in their physical conditions, remembering that the victims were in a state of malnutrition and one of them even had part of his foot amputated.

The disproportion in the use of force by the State agents was evident, since they could simply have apprehended the members of the group without the need to execute them.

Source: diarioelranco.cl, August 30, 2024