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Tito Alejandro Fígari Verdugo

Victim of the military dictatorship.

Background

National ID (RUT)6.693.227-3

Case summary

Tito Alejandro Fígari Verdugo, known as "Luty," was a civilian and former militant of Patria y Libertad who served as a repressive agent for the Comando Conjunto and the DINA during the Chilean dictatorship. In 1986, he was prosecuted for his involvement in crimes and disappearances, although he was subsequently acquitted by the Supreme Court despite allegations regarding his active role in the repression.

Automatically generated summary. Please consult the original sources below for verified information.

MemoriaViva[1]

Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity, and I’m not sure about the universe…. Albert Einstein

The Secrets and Lies of the FACH

Lies cannot last forever; this is the preamble to the historical events that occurred in the dark days when fascism reigned in our homeland. It is essential that these events be remembered, as they are part of the country's cultural heritage.

During the year 2002, the FACH (Chilean Air Force) made futile efforts to distance itself from the crimes committed during the military dictatorship. It was published in "La Nación" at the time that General Patricio Campos Montecinos, who was the liaison with the Dialogue Table, was resigning because his wife, Viviana Ugarte Sandoval, alias "La Pochi," played a very active role in the sinister Joint Command (Comando Conjunto).

She was denounced by Colonel (Ret.) Otto Trujillo, who was being prosecuted and held in the Penitentiary. The objective of this command was to distort the information provided by the FACH to the Dialogue Table in order to hinder judicial investigations that implicated members of the institution.

Trujillo also denounced Colonel Roberto Serón Cárdenas, Commander Juan López López, and a civilian, Alejandro Figari, who was a militant of Patria y Libertad; he mentioned the latter as agents of repression who remained active.

They were prosecuted and dismissed by the Supreme Court. Due to the significance of the events, President Lagos requested that the high command conduct an investigation within the Air Force, and there were public calls for the departure of the Commander-in-Chief, General Patricio Ríos.

This was the second crisis to shake the FACH under his command, as the previous year he had been forced to retire the Chief of the General Staff, General Hernán Gabrielli, due to the lawsuits for torture to which he was subjected.

Personally, I thought that plots were being hatched to obstruct justice, regardless of whether or not the Joint Command had been reorganized. These conclusions were reached due to the positions taken by these torturers during the confrontations we had in the Courts of Justice.

I had testified in many trials and face-to-face confrontations with these individuals, and all they did, of course, was deny what they had done. It was pathetic to see them after the interrogations and confrontations as they gathered in the hallways with their lawyers to agree on their subsequent statements so as not to fall into contradictions.

The height of shamelessness occurred when these trials were held on the premises of the FACH Commander-in-Chief's office; they even had a room where they would meet before the confrontation with the Judge.

The testimony I provided at that time corresponded fundamentally to the repression exercised against approximately 60 uniformed personnel in the case titled "1–73, The FACH against Bachelet and Others" in the early days of the military regime. This occurred at the Air War Academy (AGA), the true school for training torturers who would later integrate the Joint Command.

I remember that I had early evidence of what the high commands were preparing. I obtained this in May or June of 1973 while serving as Captain of the Round for the Santiago Garrison. On that occasion, I was ordered to inspect the AGA at 02:00 hours.

Upon entering the AGA, the duty non-commissioned officer tried to prevent my entry; that attitude seemed suspicious to me. I immediately drew my pistol and detained the non-commissioned officer, since at that moment my position and rank was that of senior officer or the highest military authority in the Garrison.

The non-commissioned officer explained to me that General Gustavo Leigh, then Chief of the General Staff, had ordered him not to let anyone enter the Academy's facilities. At that moment, I decided to take the non-commissioned officer under arrest to the presence of Leigh.

The fact that had alerted me was that almost all the official cars of the generals and heads of Units in Santiago were parked in the unit's courtyard. I arrived at the Academy's Conference room, which was lit and the door closed.

I opened the door violently with a kick, pistol in hand, and the duty non-commissioned officer by my side. The room was plunged into a spectral silence. What was etched in my mind at that instant was the large-scale map of Santiago where the circuits of the planes around La Moneda, President Allende's house on Tomás Moro street, and the south-eastern sector of the capital, where the Santiago radio antennas were located, were highlighted.

Only after a few seconds did General Leigh react and approach me.

"I had not the slightest doubt that a coup d'état was being planned."

I informed him of my action with the non-commissioned officer for ignoring the status of duty officer that I was invested with in those circumstances. Leigh apologized, assuring me that the non-commissioned officer had acted in accordance with his instructions and therefore he did not consider the situation to be that serious.

In any case, I left a record of this anomalous situation in the Santiago Garrison Round Book.

These unprecedented events were a warning for the group of Captains who were constitutionalists and therefore were not in favor of the Coup d'État; we immediately felt that our mission was to denounce to the President what was being prepared.

It seems pertinent to highlight that the group of Captains I mention all had university degrees in engineering, and our wives were also professionals; these characteristics allowed us to see and perceive civil society differently from the pure military man.

Consequently, our vision had a much more perceptive character regarding the social and political movements that were taking place in our country. At the time, it was uncommon for officers to have professional wives.

These unprecedented relationships allowed us to gather more closely and seek political channels to deliver that information to the President of the Republic, who was conceived as the Commander-in-Chief of all branches of the National Defense, to whom we owed absolute loyalty for being the Head of the Nation.

We met with the then-Senators of the Republic Eric Schnake (PS) and Anselmo Sule (PR) and with Carlos Lazo, president of the Banco del Estado. They obtained an interview for some members of the group with President Salvador Allende; furthermore, they were links to transmit the details of the coup that we were perceiving within the FACH.

The President did not believe our apprehensions and maintained that he could not conceive that it was possible for the Armed Forces to opt for a Coup d'État, by virtue of the fact that the Commanders-in-Chief and the General Director of Carabineros had recently sworn loyalty to him. Allende was convinced that he could politically manage the country's distressed situation.

Personally, I had no sympathy for any political party, and I had only voted for President Allende by virtue of his Government program that he showed the country during the campaign. By this point, I did not even agree with the handling that was being given to the government; it was clear that the credibility and governability of the system as a whole had slipped out of his hands.

The political moves to include military personnel in the government clearly did not yield results; they were incapable of functioning since they were unaware of the political workings of the portfolios they occupied and could not solve the problems.

I must acknowledge, however, that the organization of the opposition, which was already in the majority, was very fruitful for their aspirations to govern, as they managed military power to establish their economic and social policies.

When the coup d'état occurred, they arrested all of us who expressed in different ways our thinking regarding Constitutionality, and they arrested us along with Generals Alberto Bachelet, Sergio Poblete (aeronautical engineer), Commander Ernesto Galaz (General Staff officer), Captains Raúl Vergara (commercial engineer), Patricio Carbacho (electronic engineer), Jorge Silva (intelligence officer), Daniel Aycinena (electronic engineer), Eladio Cisterna (mathematics teacher), the second lieutenants Jorge Dixon, Oscar Navarro, Rubén Grimblat, Pedro Pons (engineering students), Ricardo Navarro (accounting and finance officer), and others. Several non-commissioned officers who had clearly declared their status as constitutionalists and therefore did not agree with the coup d'état were also arrested. Most of these non-commissioned officers were students at the State Technical University, where they were studying technological careers for their professional development. The latter suffered terrible torture for studying at the university and were reviled and accused of being communists; several of my non-commissioned officer comrades were tortured by officers Commander Enzo Dinocera and Captain Juan Carlos Sandoval. I think that in honor of justice, a civil trial should be initiated against these officials who were torturers, apart from the criminal trials that were carried out against commanders Edgar Cevallos and Ramón Cáceres, both convicted.

From the first moment, the aggression against us was brutal and excessive, as they considered us traitors for being loyal to the constitution. This was the paradigm of the ignorant FACH officers who, motivated by their commander-in-chief, confused loyalty to the constitution and the president with communist militancy.

In the moments of interrogation, when we would point out to them that they were the ones who were traitors to the Homeland, the beatings and other duress would begin. They carried out mock executions, applications of electricity, cigarette burns; they even used drugs and hypnosis in some cases; others were hung and whipped, etc.

The AGA was a torture center that was truly inconceivable for its rudeness and violence; they sought the degradation of our personalities and allowed the conscripts to kick us and observe us even when we went to defecate; they would point their rifles at us when we were sitting on the toilet bowls.

The one who was in command of this situation and who allowed it to achieve his objectives was General Gustavo Leigh Guzmán, Commander-in-Chief of the FACH and member of the Government Junta. I saw him personally giving instructions to General Orlando Gutiérrez Bravo, the prosecuting attorney of the FACH process and head of the torturers.

Paradoxically, I had been his flight instructor at the FACH Gliding School; he was the boss and witnessed everything, even when they tortured his former boss, General Poblete.

The dementia and hatred of General Leigh was such that he allowed himself to say on the radio on September 11 the following: "For every member of the Armed Forces who is a victim of attacks, five Marxist prisoners who are in prison will be executed," Pinochet, another madman who approved the measure, which was later classified as an "appalling order" by the historian James Whelan, among others.

These were the typical harangues worthy of Hitler's German fascist regime.

It is necessary to make it clear so that history may judge them, that I was also a witness when Leigh witnessed the torture of General Poblete. At the AGA, torture was established as a normal procedure for interrogating prisoners.

It was clear that what had to be obtained from the prisoners in terms of statements to justify the conclusions of the summary was pre-established. At the end of the interrogation processes, one had to sign what was established, and that was achieved through torture.

After approximately 45 days at the AGA, the Summary "I-73, The FACH against Bachelet and others" was terminated, and the trial began in a War Council in which, paradoxically, the Judge was the same torturer and prosecuting attorney, General Orlando Gutiérrez.

In said trial, we had no defense, despite presenting defense lawyers, since when it was argued that the statements of the accused had been obtained under torture, the lawyers were threatened that under no circumstances could such a defense be argued.

As for my case, having admitted to having denounced the Coup d'État, I was accused of "incitement to sedition," "treason to the homeland," and "intellectual creator of Plan Zeta and Plan Fuga." No evidence of these accusations was presented; only the statements that the accused had signed during the process were used, documents that were effectively obtained under torture.

We were sentenced in December 1973, five comrades to the death penalty and others to different prison sentences. My initial sentence was 20 years in prison and was later reduced to 15 years, citing my previous good conduct, which puts this fallacy of a process in the most absurd light.

On the other hand, those sentenced to death had their sentences reduced to life imprisonment or 30 years in prison. I spent two years in different prisons. In 1975, I availed myself of Decree Law 504 to serve the rest of the sentence in exile, emigrating to the United Kingdom.

On August 29, 1975, a plane took me to England, where I was received by the English Organization "World University Service," which was in charge of managing the entry of exiles. The most relevant thing about this was that by September 15, I was already enrolled at the University of London, at the "Imperial College of Science and Technology and Medicine," in the Department of Aeronautical Engineering.

Where I studied for three years and obtained high-level academic degrees, which allowed me to work in England and later in Switzerland, where I obtained several patents for my inventions.

The fact of having been a FACH Officer allowed me to know very closely those who were my torturers, as well as Generals Leigh, Mathei, Vega (who was a Designated Senator), Rojas, and the current FACH commands.

It must be understood that I knew them before the coup; therefore, I have an appreciation of their personalities, their capabilities, and their weaknesses. This allows me with authority to leave on record in this book the list of FACH personnel who tortured at the Air War Academy and other units of the Institution and the list of members of the War Council.

General Engineer Orlando Gutiérrez Bravo

Operational Chief and prosecuting attorney, applied the sanctions in the Fiscal ruling and sentenced 3 FACH officers and 1 non-commissioned officer to death: Colonel Ernesto Galaz, Captains Raúl Vergara and Patricio Carbacho, and Non-Commissioned Officer Belarmino Constanzo. (The sentences were later reduced to 30 years in prison)

Group Commander Pilot Sergio Lizosain Mitrano,

apparently the second in the chain of command among the torturers.

Squadron Commander Engineer Edgar Ceballos Jones Squadron Commander Pilot Ramón Cáceres Squadron Commander Pilot Gonzalo Pérez Canto (operated at the Cerro Moreno Base in Antofagasta, was very well known for his aggressiveness and sadism among the tortured)

Squadron Commander Pilot Jaime Lavín Fariña (*)

(this officer was prohibited from entering the U.S. for his participation in acts of torture).

Squadron Commander Pilot Enzo Dinocera Flight Captain Pilot Álvaro Gutiérrez (also highly known for his aggressiveness and sadism)

Flight Captain Pilot Víctor Mettig

Flight Captain Pilot León Dufey (* operated in Antofagasta and AGA) Flight Captain Pilot Florencio Doublé (*) Captain Engineer Juan Carlos Sandoval. Lieutenant Dumont. Lieutenant Franklin Bello Captain Wachtendorf Non-Commissioned Officer Juan Norambuena Aviation Sergeant Hugo Lizana Aviation Corporal Gabriel Cortes Lieutenant Pilot Hernán Gabrielli (* operated in Antofagasta)

Others who have been forgotten by the author and who have surely been denounced in other books or processes for human rights violations.

The members of the War Council, who sentenced the accused, knowing in advance that the confessions had been obtained under torture, are the following:

Air Brigade General Pilot Juan Soler Manfredini (president of the council) Colonel Pilot Eduardo Fornet Fernández (*) FACH Medical Colonel Humberto Berg Fontecilla (this doctor wandered around the AGA during the process and was denounced as a torturer) Colonel Engineer Sergio Sanhueza López FACH Lawyer Colonel Julio Tapia Folk (Auditor of the Council, denounced as a torturer) Colonel Pilot Javier Lopetegui Torres Group Commander Pilot Carlos Godoy Avendaño

(*) Reached the rank of active General in the FACH.

The baseness of this group of criminals and torturers, I was able to verify once again when I was confronted with some of them in different courts and for different causes, since they showed no repentance, much less acknowledged what they did, despite all the complaints against them.

During the interrogations, they were not capable of looking straight ahead. They are damned cowards who abused and reviled our personalities while using the power usurped from the democracy of our homeland.

Unlike the returned hawks, who walk with our heads held high and without fear because we have our consciences clear, they hide and self-protect so that they are not identified and confronted with their bad actions.

What better example of the shame and fear of showing their faces and defending, for example, the ignominious act of attacking La Moneda or the presidential house and the radio antennas of the time. They are cowards because they hide, they are cowards because they are protected by the institution, and in my personal perception, I have not the slightest doubt that the current FACH commands, by denying knowing those who attacked La Moneda, are not telling the truth.

For very simple reasons, it is not possible that the personnel who made up the FACH groups that operated the Hawker Hunters of the time are unknown. I refuse to accept that there is no evidence or that it was eliminated, and on the other hand, I also cannot understand how the judiciary cannot be more drastic by interrogating with greater persuasion the leader of the flock of evildoers who attacked La Moneda to identify the group.

Commander López cannot deny that he knew, and he also cannot argue that due to an oath he cannot identify the rest of the pilots, since if that is so, he is denying evidence to justice and that must be punished criminally.

Therefore, I can conclude that Judge Carroza is being very lenient in this case. Here I begin to doubt the equality before the law. I can understand the concept that the pilots were ordered by the Commander-in-Chief of the FACH to commit those excessive and abusive attacks.

Then, if these pilots were dignified and had a sense of self-esteem and honor, they should face that reality and submit to the scrutiny of the nation, arguing that it was not possible to avoid being the author of the insane attack ordered by General Leigh.

The officers who belonged to Aviation Group No. 7, who have been most published in newspapers and magazines as well as named in trials, are the following:

Commander Mario López Tobar

(commanded the squadron of planes that attacked La Moneda and allowed himself to publish a book related to the bombing of La Moneda)

Captain Fernando Rojas Vender

(became commander-in-chief of the FACH, involved in the Rattan Furniture affair)

Captain Enrique Montealegre

Captain Eitel Von Muhllembrock Lieutenant Ernesto González Yarrá (before dying, he acknowledged having fired on La Moneda)

Lieutenant Gustavo Leigh Yates (son of General Leigh)

Some FACH Officers noted for their lies and abuses.

Source: jaimedonoso.wordpress.com, June 13, 2012

View original source

References

  1. 1

How to cite this record

DondeEstan.cl (2026). Tito Alejandro Fígari Verdugo. Retrieved on October 15, 2026, from https://dondeestan.cl/record/figari-verdugo-tito-alejandro. Original sources: Memoria Viva (https://memoriaviva.com/criminales/figari-verdugo-tito-alejandro).