At the beginning of 2004, the mayor of Providencia, Cristián Labbé Galilea, was on edge. On December 22, 2003, he was required to testify in the case being pursued by Judge Alejandro Solís, which investigates the deaths of 15 people that occurred in October 1973 in Liquiñe, near Valdivia.

The murdered individuals were simple peasants who worked at the Panguipulli lumber complex. Their relatives state that on the night of October 11, 1973, the 15 were executed by firing squad and their bodies thrown into the Toltén River.

In the following days, locals saw the remains downstream. According to their testimonies, the corpses were tied by their hands and feet. Some were inside sacks. Others even had their heads amputated. The mayor of Providencia, Labbé, appears in this sinister file for one reason: he was named by Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Arturo Antonio Bosch González as part of the military detail that operated in the area when the events occurred (see box).

Liquiñe, however, is not the only story that calls out to Labbé from the past. The former officer, who retired with the rank of Army Colonel, is also mentioned in another case being substantiated by Judge Alejandro Solís.

This concerns the investigation into crimes of illicit association, illegal detention, and torture that occurred in Tejas Verdes, in the V Region. In this case, former conscript Samuel Enrique Fuenzalida Devia identifies Mayor Labbé as one of the instructors who had the mission of training the personnel who later formed the DINA.

On March 31, Alejandra Arriaza, a lawyer for the Corporation for the Promotion and Defense of the People's Rights (CODEPU), requested that Labbé be confronted with Fuenzalida. The court's response was that the request would be resolved in due course.

Municipal elections are approaching, and many take it for granted that Labbé will be the UDI candidate for the position of mayor of Providencia. The testimonies from these proceedings do his aspirations no favors. He has plenty of reasons to be on edge.

The other caravan of death

For human rights organizations, the deaths in Liquiñe are not an isolated case. On the contrary, they were part of an extensive operation carried out between September and October 1973 that affected towns south of Temuco.

José Araya, executive secretary of CODEPU in Valdivia, goes further and states that the deaths in Liquiñe are part of “another caravan of death, similar to the one that operated in the north.” In its wake, more than 70 people were executed, and many of them remain forcibly disappeared.

For Araya, although military personnel and Carabineros from the area participated in these deaths, a group that came from Santiago played a central role in the events: these were paratrooper commandos from Peldehue, better known as “black berets.” Nearly 200 members of that select combat group appear today linked to the various proceedings for the executions that occurred from Temuco southward.

José Araya states that the presence of this elite corps was due to a specific reason. “The military believed that the region's forests were full of Cuban guerrillas. For months, they operated even with armed helicopters and bombed the mountains.

You can still see the craters they left behind,” Araya states. An account of that extensive operation was recorded in the November 18, 1973, edition of El Mercurio. There, under the headline "Cleanup operations of armed extremist groups," it reports on the actions of a “Special Anti-Guerrilla Brigade” which, under the orders of General Nilo Floody Buxton and Commander Carlos Medina Lois, operated in Neltume, Arquilhue, Lago Ranco, and, of course, Liquiñe.

The note describes the preparation of this anti-guerrilla brigade. "It is composed of professionals who graduated abroad, with honors. They have been in courses held in France, Panama, and the United States.

They have survived in the middle of the jungle with indigenous people, precisely for the purpose of specializing in this type of combat and for the fight against guerrillas." The facts today demonstrate that the Cuban guerrilla force that Floody's men claimed to be fighting never existed. This elite force simply fell upon unarmed peasants.

Bad memory During the investigation into the Liquiñe deaths, a central obstacle has been identifying the officers who were actually in the area. Sources from the Fifth Department of the Investigative Police, who have participated directly in this process, assured The Clinic that “the higher-ranking officers do not remember the names or positions of their subordinates, or they declare dates that do not match the proven facts.” However, the circle of protection has slowly been cracking, and “the lower-ranking military personnel at the time of the events are collaborating,” the source states.

Because of this, it has reportedly been proven that the Peldehue Paratrooper School participated in this detail with almost its entire complement, a unit in which Cristián Labbé served with the rank of officer. “Now, the judge has to define the dates and the participation of each officer,” the source concluded.

Labbé's name appeared in this slow release of data only on December 18 of last year. That day, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Arturo Bosch González revealed to Judge Solís the names of the officers who acted in the Valdivia area.

On the list, Labbé appeared as an officer who “exercised command.” Bosch stated that the contingent, composed of between 200 and 300 people, arrived in the area at the beginning of October, “remaining in the south of the country uninterruptedly until shortly before Christmas.” He states that the area was divided into strips under the charge of different officers, although today he cannot link names to territories.

He believes, however, that Liquiñe could have been under the control of General “Nilo Floody or personnel under the charge of officer Saldes, or personnel from the Mountain School.” Mayor Labbé appeared before the judge two days after Bosch did.

In his statement, to which The Clinic had exclusive access, Labbé admitted to having been part of the brigade commanded by General Floody. He also admitted that the contingent was made up of about 200 people and that if it was under the command of a general, it was “because it was an important operational unit.” When asked about the objectives of this detail, he declared: “It was thought that a rural guerrilla could exist in the Panguipulli Lumber Complex; there was the idea that there could be a focus of this type of group.

The idea was to form this brigade to sweep these focuses. And in the event that a confrontation occurred, in addition to sweeping the place, to open fire.” Later, Labbé also acknowledged having participated in the counter-guerrilla operation.

But—and here the contradictions begin—he argues that he was only in charge of the reserve troops. "I moved along with the reserve unit to Panguipulli,” he declared. He then insisted on that point when asked about the events in Liquiñe: “I had no intervention in the operation because I was in charge of the reserve troops, which are deployed in extreme cases, which were not reached on that occasion,” he said.

The statement is striking. None of the officers who have already testified mention the participation of reservists in these operations. They only speak of permanent staff and conscripts. On the other hand, a retired military officer of the same rank as Labbé, who was exonerated after the military coup, told The Clinic that in a black beret commando, there is no reserve. “The black berets are an elite force, with highly trained, permanent personnel.

Besides, for a mission of that magnitude, they were not going to take reservists,” the former officer stated on condition of anonymity. Like Bosch, Labbé could not specify which officers acted in each zone, and according to his memories, almost no black beret marched to the south.

In his case, he claims he was only in the area for two weeks, at the end of November, when the Liquiñe deaths had already occurred. However, he makes mistakes. In court, for example, he was asked about a notation made by General Medina in the service record of officer Patricio Landaeta.

The notation is dated September 30, 1973, and reports that the group faced “enemy fire.” “I am unaware of what is meant by the expression 'enemy fire,' because from September 21 to 30, 1974, I was not at the Paratrooper School,” Labbé declares.

If you did not notice the mayor's error, read the sentence again. Labbé is asked about an event in 1973, and he answers about 1974. In the long run, Labbé is only clear that he is not responsible for the deaths under investigation, that during the period in question he was assigned to guard Pinochet's house, and that he only had the duty of instructing reserve personnel.

And the truth is that there is no evidence that Labbé participated in the crimes of Liquiñe or in the massacres carried out throughout the area. But the fact that he is mentioned by Bosch makes him a relevant witness to help clarify the deaths and, above all, those responsible.

Regarding this, Alejandra Arriaza, a lawyer for CODEPU, has no doubts. “All the background information confirms Labbé's participation. It only remains to specify his specific responsibility in the events,” she told The Clinic.

Gymnastics instructor

It is not only Liquiñe that complicates the life of the Providencia mayor today. His time at the detention center that operated in the exclusive seaside resort of Rocas de Santo Domingo, Tejas Verdes, also does so.

The investigation into this center is being carried out by the same Judge Solís and pursues the crimes of illicit association, illegal detention, and torture. In this investigation, Labbé's name jumped out from the judicial statement of Samuel Enrique Fuenzalida Devia, a former conscript who, on October 30, 2000, identified Labbé as one of the instructors at that torture camp. “During my stay in Rocas de Santo Domingo, a place that functioned as a DINA intelligence school, we received instruction in physical conditioning and various courses related to intelligence and the tracking of people.

In that place, we had as instructors César Manríquez Bravo, professor of the intelligence course; Cristian Labbé, physical trainer and current mayor of Providencia; Miguel Krassnoff Marchenko, in charge of hand-to-hand combat techniques, urban and suburban guerrilla warfare,” said Fuenzalida.

The former soldier has testified in several human rights cases, providing relevant information about the origin and operation of the DINA, an organization that for years was led by General (ret.) Manuel Contreras.

Before Judge Solís, Fuenzalida recounted that between December '73 and January '74, he was transferred to the Santo Domingo resort, along with military personnel from other branches of the country. The group was received by Contreras himself, who informed them “that we had been chosen from the armed forces to integrate a select group of people to form the DINA, an entity that was under his command.” Fuenzalida's statement has special relevance.

It sets the zero hour when Manuel Contreras began to prepare the agents who later participated in the bloodiest period of the Pinochet dictatorship. Fuenzalida maintains that Labbé Galilea was an instructor for approximately 600 military personnel, who months later were the first DINA officials.

The data available today indicate that in those years, Tejas Verdes was a sort of counter-insurgency academy where future agents not only received theoretical instruction but were also able to exercise their knowledge on the people detained there.

According to the Rettig Report, this facility began operating as a detention center from September 11 itself, with testimonies of its systematic use until 1975. According to those who survived that hell, there were periods when Tejas Verdes had more than 100 prisoners.

Most were brutally tortured. Some disappeared. None of the survivors accuse Labbé of having participated in torture. Neither does Fuenzalida. But everyone who knows about this investigation believes that if the mayor of Providencia was an instructor, as the former soldier points out, he could provide relevant information about what happened there.

Especially because Fuenzalida's testimony is not the only thing that links Labbé to the DINA. There is also a confidential official letter in which Contreras himself mentions Labbé as an agent of his organization.

This is official letter 4380/19, dated December 1974, where Contreras requests “the extension of a diplomatic passport to the following DINA personnel: Mr. Cristian Labbé Galilea, Mr. Carlos Marín Castro, Mr.

José Riquelme Villagra, Mr. Rolf Esser Muller.” Contreras states that "the aforementioned personnel will carry out a specific service commission, and in accordance with the established policy, no Supreme Decree is issued.

As it is an urgent commission in Peru, we thank you for ordering the appropriate person to provide the maximum speed in the delivery of this document." According to lawyer Arriaza, Labbé is a high-ranking military officer in the DINA, not a simple gymnastics instructor. “He helped create that organization, then he travels outside the country, in an irregular procedure.

All of this is illegal; he must clarify his responsibility in the events being investigated,” the lawyer told The Clinic.

Bosch's list Excerpt from the judicial statement of Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Arturo Bosch González. (December 18, 2003) “I must point out that the brigade left from Santiago in the direction of the south at the end of September 1973 or at the beginning of October of that year, remaining in the south of the country uninterruptedly until shortly before Christmas; I do not remember the exact date of return. “In that brigade, as I recall, exercising command, in addition to Patricio Larraín Landaeta, were Captain Sergio Candia Muñoz, who was an officer of the Paratrooper School, Hernán Saldes, Carlos Rafael Parera Silva, Fernando Martínez González, Patricio Acevedo Trujillo, Emilio Timmermann Undurraga, Armando Hormazábal Marré, Hyram Eduardo Díaz, Hugo Jaque Valenzuela, Manuel Pérez Santillana, Alfredo Román Herrera, Juan Delmás Ramírez, Cristian Labbé Galilea. I am not sure if officer Alfredo Vicuña Oyazún went to the south.”

The forgetful one

Excerpt from Labbé's statement before Judge Alejandro Solís. December 22, 2003. “Regarding the officers indicated: Patricio Larraín Landaeta was an officer of the school, but I do not remember if he went to the south, the same for Sergio Candia; in the case of Hernán Saldes, he was in the south; Carlos Parera, I do not remember if he went to the south on that occasion; Fernando Martínez González, I do not remember him in the operation, the same as Patricio Acevedo Trujillo; Emilio Timmermann, I associate him with the school, I do not know if he went to the south; Armando Hormazábal, it does not seem to me that he went; Hyram Díaz, I remember he was an officer of the school but not in the operation, the same as Hugo Jaque; I do not remember Manuel Pérez in the operation; Alfredo Román Herrera, as far as I understand, passed away before the operation took place; I do not remember Juan Delmás; Alfredo Vicuña Oyarzún was a second lieutenant of the school; Arturo Bosch, I remember him from the school but before I left this unit to take the course in Brazil.”

Word of Mamo Excerpt from the confidential official letter in which Labbé is mentioned as “DINA personnel.” December 2, 1974 1.- I allow myself to request the extension of a Diplomatic Passport to the following DINA personnel: Mr.

CRISTIAN LABBE GALILEA Mr. CARLOS MARIN CASTRO Mr. JOSE RIQUELME VILLAGRAN Mr. ROLF ESSER MULLER 2.- The aforementioned personnel will carry out a specific Service Commission and in accordance with the established policy, no Supreme Decree is issued.

In the passport granted to them, please include the exemption from the corresponding tax. As it is an urgent Commission in Peru, we thank you for ordering the appropriate person to provide the maximum speed in the delivery of this document.

Source: theclinic.cl, September 27, 2011

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Advance excerpt from the new book by journalist Juan Cristóbal Peña: "Twisted Letters: A Profile of Mariana Callejas"

Journalist Juan Cristóbal Peña is launching his new book in which he explores the contradictions, the folds, and the darkness of Mariana Callejas, and by extension, of the Chile of those years. Callejas was a writer, a member of the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), the wife of fellow agent Michael Townley, a participant in the attacks that ended in the death of General Carlos Prats in Buenos Aires and former Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier in Washington D.C., as well as other international operations of the dictatorship's intelligence apparatuses.

She was a student in Enrique Lafourcade's literary workshop, a finalist and winner of short story and novel contests, and the host of a workshop attended by authors of renown in subsequent decades. She resided with her family in a safe house in Lo Curro, where dark criminal activities were carried out during the military regime, while parties and literary gatherings were held.

A figure who has inspired books, plays, and television series. The following is an exclusive excerpt for CIPER from the book that goes on sale this weekend.

PART III: ANA AND ANDRÉS

The steady job arose fortuitously and implausibly, like so many things in this story. In the official account, and there is no parallel account that explains things better, it turned out that upon their return to Chile, the Townley Callejas couple arrived to live in a rented house in Providencia, and by those coincidences, the owner of that house was a friend of Colonel Pedro Espinoza. "Friend" is a figure of speech.

A figure of speech that is replicated in judicial files and journalistic accounts, because that woman was more of a lover to the colonel, who, through her, found out that the tenant was the same man accused of a crime in Concepción, an expert in electronics and explosives, who had made a name for himself in the Nationalist Front Patria y Libertad.

Colonel Espinoza was a short, dark-skinned man with thick, steel-wool-like mustaches. He was the man with the most power in the DINA after Mamo Contreras and had heard of Townley when, directing the Military Intelligence Service during the Allende government, he received the order to investigate the origin of the clandestine radio that operated from a moving car.

And although it was an order from the government, he boasted of not having done much to clarify the case. Two years later, upon learning that Townley was back in Chile, the colonel, through his lover, arranged a meeting with him in that same house.

In that first meeting, Townley spoke of his actions in the Nationalist Front Patria y Libertad and his knowledge of electronics and explosives. The colonel seemed to know very well who that man was, what he had done, and what he was capable of doing. “He told me that, given my self-taught knowledge with a great sense of creativity regarding electronics, I would be of great utility,” Townley declared to the Chilean justice system in 1978.

He also declared that they put him in charge of Major Vianel Valdivieso Cervantes, head of the DINA's Telecommunications Intelligence Department, and that in those first months as an “informant and technical consultant,” he received “a monthly and fixed remuneration, a sum of money that was quite meager, in terms of forcing me to take sporadic jobs in mechanics and repair of electronic equipment privately.” Perhaps what impressed Colonel Espinoza was the friendship Townley claimed to have with one of the secretaries of the U.S. embassy and with some marines.

For the times that were being lived, a U.S. citizen with good contacts at his embassy turned out to be of great utility. Michael Vernon Townley Welch seemed the right man to provide the state-of-the-art electronic espionage and counter-espionage equipment required by a service like the one Mamo directed, equipment he bought directly from the Miami and New York branches of Audio Intelligence Devices I.M.C., a company that only sold to duly accredited representatives of governments of countries friendly to the United States, those governments that, as Richard Nixon said around that time, might be a piece of shit but they were their governments. Thanks to his contacts and knowledge in electronics, thanks to his good offices, his will and initiative, and the success of the mission entrusted in Buenos Aires to kill General Prats, Michael Townley began to become indispensable. The electronic technician Rolf Esser Muller, hired by the Service for part-time work, told the Chilean justice system that Townley bought “highly sophisticated equipment,” such as “devices to sweep electromagnetic fields in search of hidden microphones” and “elements to detect telephone interference and neutralize its effect.” The same official recounted that it was the equipment imported by Townley that allowed them to verify that the telephones of the Chilean embassy in Lima were tapped. And a few years later, when Pinochet traveled to the United States and stayed at the Chilean embassy, they discovered hidden microphones in the same room where he was staying, by means of a “sensor system that consisted fundamentally of the effects of the vibrations produced by the voice that would produce modulations captured from the outside, through a laser beam that was permanently directed toward one of the windows of that room.” But all that which Rolf Esser Muller recounts happened later. Because at the beginning, Townley was a probationary official who was entrusted with all kinds of tasks. From attacks and purchases of electronic equipment abroad to the repair of household appliances for the wives of Army officers. Hair dryers, irons, televisions. It is probable that in the beginning, he did not take the true measure of everything he was getting involved in. And that shortly after, as he was American and knew about explosives, they considered him the best candidate to attack General Prats. It is also probable that, before formally entering the Service as a permanent official, he consulted with his wife. And that as a result of this conversation, the idea arose for them to hire her as well. After all, as had become evident a short time before, they were a team. The point is that by the second half of 1974, Michael Townley and Mariana Callejas were Juan Andrés Wilson Silva and Ana Luisa Pizarro Avilés, agents associated with the civilian staff of the National Intelligence Directorate, the famous DINA.

Source: ciper.cl, October 3, 2024