"I was raped, they applied electric shocks to me, they burned me with cigarettes, they gave me ‘hickeys’ [chupones], they put rats on me. I think I was in Venda Sexy (a secret DINA facility); they tied me to a stretcher where trained dogs raped me.

I was always covered with scotch tape, then a blindfold, and then a hood. They laughed, they offered us food and gave us orange peels. They would wake us up at night to make us lose our sense of time." (Testimony of a 16-year-old girl, kidnapped in the Metropolitan Region, who was later expelled from the country without her family.) The horror became real for all Chileans.

Some will continue to say it is a lie, that the survivors "were paid to speak against the Armed Forces," or ultimately that "they deserved it." But the country has already learned the truth, and even a model-host wants to "know the names of the torturers." That is the idea of this special report: to provide a part of the truth that does not have to wait 50 years to be known.

That is one of the many criticisms made of the Report on Political Imprisonment and Torture presented by Ricardo Lagos on the night of Sunday, November 28, through a pre-recorded speech for the national network broadcast before the news programs on television channels began.

Alone, without victims or family members to look in the eye, the President of the Republic fulfilled the ritual of informing his fellow citizens. There was no symbolic delivery of the text, there was no possibility of asking questions, there was no recognition of the motives that led so many men and women to torture their compatriots, there was no accurate criticism, there were no names of victims or perpetrators, and the background information was not handed over to the Justice system, as had been done after the Rettig Report and even the Dialogue Table.

Reactions from hatred

Appointed senators and former uniformed officers reacted by dismissing their participation in the crimes. Former Admiral Jorge Martínez Bush demanded a "full stop" to end the "lies" against his institution.

The other former admiral, Jorge Arancibia, flatly denied the possibility of "decommissioning" the La Esmeralda, "which can only be decommissioned in combat," and threatened: "I cannot commit myself, nor can anyone else, to ensuring that something never happens again if I do not know what causes it." Many insisted on Hermógenes Pérez de Arce's thesis regarding the baseless slanders against the uniformed officers and the "military government," repeated by retired generals and admirals.

Appointed senator and former commander-in-chief of the FACH (Chilean Air Force) Ramón Vega supported the official statement of his institution and added that: "we are regretting the consequences today and we are investigating them, but a plan for torture is something I, at least, never heard of; it was never analyzed, nor in the War Academy, nor in the Aviation School, nor in any training school was the word torture ever heard." Senators Rodolfo Stange and Fernando Cordero, former general directors of the Carabineros, did not accept institutional responsibility for the tortures and asserted that "there are no reasons for the uniformed police to apologize." Stange criticized the report on torture "because it borders on the unconstitutional, calling into question institutions and not individuals. I participated in the government junta, but I do not make a mea culpa because I do not feel responsible for any extreme situation as is being indicated in Bishop Valech's commission," he noted. Cordero, for his part, said that one would have to "complete the third leg of the table, because at this moment the table is wobbly; a mea culpa must be made for what occurred before September 11, 1973, which was the cause of all the situations that occurred subsequently." The current General Director, Alberto Cienfuegos, also appeared distant from the possibility of apologizing or assuming institutional responsibility, although he should answer about what his role was, starting March 25, 1974, when as a lieutenant he was appointed on a service commission to serve as Head of the Information Office of the National Executive Secretariat for Detainees, remembered by many people by its acronym: SENDET. The UDI, National Renewal, and Lavín opted to downplay it, to appear in deep shock, even asserting that their participation in the dictatorship was, precisely, to prevent more abuses from being committed and to pave the way for democracy. No one believed them. Sergio Fernández continued trying to dismiss his participation in human rights violations, but his cabinet colleague Mónica Madariaga asserted that in the clandestine torture centers, the agents knew him as "the car’e jote" [vulture face]. Soon he will have to begin continuous visits to the courts, along with Sergio Onofre Jarpa, Sergio Diez, Ambrosio Rodríguez, among many others, to answer the many questions that arise about their responsibilities as civil authorities. A new avalanche of lawsuits for torture, like those already filed by hundreds of former political prisoners, is announced following the delivery of the report. Fernández Fernández must answer, for example, for why he denied to the Justice system the existence of Villa Grimaldi, as demonstrated by the confidential official letter in which he responds on May 18, 1978, to the inquiry from the Third Major Criminal Court of Santiago.

Demands from organizations

The coalition of organizations of former political prisoners reacted in unison (see page 2); the groups of victims' families joined the denunciation. The Communist Party announced new lawsuits and added that "the main reparation the country expected is that which relates to it being proportional to the damage caused.

This implies truth and full justice for all victims. We demand that for the sake of those principles, the Report be made public in its entirety; that the names of the torturers be handed over to the courts of justice and all judicial proceedings that are required be initiated; that their files be declassified immediately and not in 50 years; that all those responsible for torture and abuse be immediately removed from the armed and police forces; that the military doctrine whose matrix is established by North American imperialism, and in which Chilean military and police cadres are and have been systematically instructed to repress their own people, be ended." The issue of monetary reparation was not the center of the controversy, except for Ricardo Lagos's attempt to blackmail the tortured with the threat of having to take money from social programs to pay their compensation. From CODEPU, another demand was made: "Just as new deadlines are going to be opened to reconsider the status of victims for those who did not qualify, we propose that because it is a crime against humanity, there cannot be an exclusionary deadline for qualification. In this sense, the State must open a new deadline for new submissions from people who, for various reasons, did not attend the initial call, especially when the Report itself points out that the testimonies collected ‘only represent a partial sample of the total universe of people affected by such human rights violations during the military regime'." Thus, neither the mea culpa that some media outlets, such as Canal 13, tried to make, nor the "astonishment" of some officials of the dictatorship like Jorge Hevia, have managed to remove the main issue from the center: in Chile, there was torture. Torture was systematic and organized, supported by the entire infrastructure of the State turned terrorist; hundreds of men and women were trained to subject other men and women to the most terrible abuses. The use of rats and dogs to sexually assault prisoners, electricity in the most delicate corners of their bodies, mock executions, food deprivation for long periods, and many other aberrations were committed against those they considered "enemies," "humanoids" in the words of one of the members of the Military Junta. The other thing that has been clear is that the survivors have had the courage and dignity to recount what they suffered, to transform it into hope and the desire to continue insisting on the need to transform this country, to continue fighting to make the dreams of those who could not come to give their testimony a reality: the executed and the forcibly disappeared. by Julio Oliva García

Source: rebelion.org, December 10, 2004

Case File 2182-1998 “Villa Grimaldi” Guillermo Roberto Beausire Alonso case

21°)

REGARDING THE DETENTION CENTERS;

Report No. 336 of the Fifth Department of Investigations regarding the groups, barracks, and a list of names of DINA agents who provided services in the different detention and torture centers: "Londres 38", "José Domingo Cañas", "La Venda Sexy" or "La Discoteca", "Cuartel Terranova" or "Villa Grimaldi", "Cuatro Álamos" and "Tres Álamos".

Metropolitan Intelligence Brigade Chiefs: Cesar Manríquez Bravo; Pedro Octavio Espinoza Bravo, “Don Rodrigo”; Marcelo Luis Moren Brito, “Coronta” and “Ronco”; and Carlos López Tapia. General Staff: Rolf Wenderoth Pozo; Enrique Jesús Fieldhouse Chávez; Higinio Barra Vega; Jaime Rubilar Ocampo, messenger; Iván Jofré, typist, Army non-commissioned officer.

Barracks Chief (José Domingo Cañas): Ciro Ernesto Torré Sáez; Francisco Maximiliano Ferrer Lima. Caupolicán Brigade Chief: Marcelo Luis Moren Brito. Halcón Group: Miguel Krassnoff Martchenko; Jorge Claudio Andrade Gómez; Alejandro Paulino Campos Rehbein; Miguel Ángel Concha Rodríguez.

Halcón Brigade members: Bascaly Humberto Zapata Reyes, “Troglo”; Osvaldo Enrique Romo Mena, “Guatón Romo” and “Comandante Raúl”; Teresa del Carmen Osorio Navarro, “Marisol”, “Tere”, “Soledad”; José Abigail Fuentes Espinoza, “Car’e Santo”; Luis René Torres Méndez, “Negro Torres”; Rodolfo Valentino Concha Rodríguez, “Concha”; Carlos Enrique Miranda Mesa; Tulio Pereira Pereira; José Abel Aravena Ruíz, “Muñeca”; José Avelino Yévenes Vergara, “Kiko”; Osvaldo Pulgar Gallardo, “Lalo” and “Pulgar”; “Gordillo”; Blond freckled youth; “Lucas”, Army conscript; “Mario”, Army conscript.

Águila Group Chief: Ricardo Lawrence Mires, “Cachete Grande”.

Águila Group members: Miguel Eugenio Hernández Oyarzo, “Paco Hernández”; Emilio Marín Huincaleo, “Indio” and “Caballo Justiciero”; Mario Braulio Marín Castro; Rosa Humilde Ramos Hernández, “Rosa”; Emilio Hernán Troncoso Vivallos; Pedro René Alfaro Hernández; Germán Alfredo Esquivel Caballero; María Órdenes Montecinos, “Guatona Gaby”; Manuel Jesús Clavijo Vera; Eduardo Garea Guzmán; Alicia Contreras Ceballos; “Gino”, surname Ferrada, from San Antonio; “Vitiligo” or “Manchado”; “Fritz”; “Espinoza”; “Inostroza”; “Gato”; “Villanueva”.

Tucán Group Chief: Ernesto Godoy García, “Cachete Chico”;

Tucán members: Carlo Alberto Carrasco Matus, “Mauro”. Vampiro Group Chief: Nibaldo Jiménez Santibáñez; Daniel Valentín Cancino Varas, “Pájaro” or “Pájaro Loco”, driver; “Jara” or “Mora”, Carabinero.

Purén Brigade Chiefs: Raúl Eduardo Iturriaga Neumann; Gerardo Ernesto Urrich González.

Purén Brigade members: Heriberto del Carmen Acevedo; Palmira Isabel Almuna Guzmán; Germán Jorge Barriga Muñoz, “Don Jaime”; Manuel Andrés Carevic Cubillos; Manuel Rolando Mosquera Jarpa; Ingrid Felicitas Olderock Bernhard; Antonio Paredes Pedraza, “Larry”: Marco Antonio Sáez Saavedra; Manuel Abraham Vásquez Chahuan; Irma Nelia Guareschi Salmerón; Manuel Jesús Leyton Robles; Verónica Águila Ubilla; Elsa del Tránsito Lagos Salazar; Francisca del Carmen Cerda Galleguillos; Claudio Pacheco Fernández, “Este niño” or “Inhumano”; Ximena San Juan; Viviana Ugarte; “Coja”; “Rucia”; “Piña”, “Pamela”, Carabinero, wife of guard Clavería.

Guard Group: Óscar Núñez, “Chacra”, Army non-commissioned officer; José Luis Venegas Silva, “Cabezón Venegas”; Samuel Enrique Fuenzalida Devia, “Gato”; Luis René Torres Méndez, “Negro Torres”; Jorge or Miguel Yañez; Manuel Delgado, “Chufinga”, corporal; Raúl Bernardo Toro Montes, “Toromonte”; “Obreque”, Army corporal; “Francisco”; “Montero”, Óscar de la Flor, “El Negro”, Army non-commissioned officer.

Detainee Custody Guard: Juan Carlos Neira Hernández, Hugo Hernán Clavería Leiva; “Clavo”; Leonardo Mario Pampilioni Moccia, “Pam”; Juan Carlos Escobar Valenzuela, “Cacha”; Carlos Rogelio Soto Cubillos; Ricardo Tapia Báez, “Charles Bronson”.

Other Guards: “Jote”, Air Force soldier; “Rucio”; “Cucharita”; “Tuberculoso”; “Diego”; “Crespo”; “Rucio de los Fierros”; “Otero”.

Other unclassified agents: Manuel Lucero Lobos, driver; Hernán Eduardo Ávalos Muñoz; Nelson René Herrera Lagos; Julio José Hoyos Zegarra; Ana del Carmen Vilches Muñoz, “Pamela” or “Francesca”; Elías del Carmen Camuz Camuz; Viviana Aminta Pincetti Barra; “Loco Gangas”; Vallejos, “Gargal”; Contreras, driver; Cavada, Sergeant, Méndez, driver.

Group that advised the interrogators: Basaure, “psychologist”.

Other officials of the Investigative Police: Jorge Alfonso Palma Franjola; Mario Santander González; Juan Ángel Urbina Cáceres; Jorge Lander Cabezas; Jorge Segundo Madariaga Acevedo; Luis Matías Olea Pineda; Flavio Rolando Olea Pineda; Miguel Aguilera Ruíz; Francisco Aladino Caamaño Díaz; Lionel Cox Roa; Manuel Gregorio Chirinos Ramírez; Carlos René Favre Bocaz.

Source: Judiciary, June 14, 2013