The expansion of Operation Condor beyond the borders of the Southern Cone required millions in funding, and the former head of the DINA, Manuel Contreras, attempted to obtain resources from powers interested in eliminating common enemies.

To this end, he traveled to Iran in 1976, convinced that he would receive a large sum of money from Shah Reza Pahlavi if he offered to assassinate the Venezuelan Ilich Ramírez, "Carlos the Jackal," the perpetrator of the kidnapping of OPEC leaders.

He was accompanied by former Nazi SS officer, arms dealer, and ally of Paul Schäfer, Gerhard Mertins, three high-ranking Chilean officers, and a Brazilian general. They left behind photos and traces at the Chilean embassy in Tehran that allow for the reconstruction of a story that has remained unpublished until now.

April 1976. Police violence in Iran is intensifying. Shah Reza Pahlavi, who maintains control of his country under the brutal repression of SAVAK, his secret police, has not yet recovered from the hard blow dealt to his power by a group of terrorists led by Ilich "Carlos" Ramírez Sánchez.

Three months earlier, on December 21, 1975, the group stormed the headquarters of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna, capturing 63 hostages, among whom was Jamshid Amuzegar, the Shah's favorite minister.

In addition to demanding a large sum for the ransom of the hostages, the order was to assassinate Amuzegar. A clear attack on Reza Pahlavi, who from that moment on had the most famous of international terrorists in his sights: the Venezuelan "Carlos the Jackal."

In those tense days, the head of General Pinochet's secret police (DINA), then-Colonel Manuel Contreras, landed in Tehran. His companions and his mission have remained a secret until today. But one of the witnesses to that trip kept photos and documents that he handed over to the author of this chronicle.

The images allowed for the identification of Contreras's main partner in his expedition to Iran: the German Gerhard Mertins (1919-1993). He was a former Nazi SS officer who reinvented himself as one of the world's most important arms dealers and the main international ally of Paul Schäfer, leader of Colonia Dignidad in Chile, a redoubt from which arms were trafficked, political prisoners were held, and minors were abused for more than 40 years.

A third partner accompanied Contreras and Mertins: a Brazilian military officer whose identity remains unknown to this day. The photos in this report could help unravel the mystery. Because the mission that took Contreras to Iran was revealed along with the delivery of the photos and is directly related to Operation Condor, the coordination of the secret services of the Southern Cone dictatorships, which was beginning its third phase in those days of April 1976, aimed at carrying out surveillance and assassinations outside the borders of Latin America.

The trail of Carlos

Among the key reports exchanged by the member countries of Operation Condor, there is one that will play a relevant role in the story that motivates this report. The name of the Venezuelan Ilich "Carlos" Ramírez Sánchez appears among the documents seized in May 1975 from two leaders of the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) arrested in Paraguay by the secret police of Alfredo Stroessner: the Chilean MIR militant Jorge "Trosko" Fuentes and the Argentine Amilcar Santucho, brother of the top leader of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP).

The information was confirmed to journalist John Dinges by Robert Scherrer, the face of the FBI bureau in Latin America in those years. In his book Operation Condor: A Decade of International Terrorism in the Southern Cone (Ediciones B, 2004), Scherrer maintains "that the enormous amount of information extracted from Fuentes and Santucho had provided an important clue that helped track down one of the most famous international terrorists of the era: Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, better known as Carlos, a Venezuelan agent residing in Europe."

Dinges says in his book: "According to Scherrer, the Paraguayan police found a reference to a 'Carlos' in Santucho's address book, along with an address or phone number in Paris. They thought it was a clue that would lead to the whereabouts of Santucho's brother, Roberto, whose code name in the ERP was 'Carlos,' and they passed the information to the French security service (DST).

On June 27, 1975, 40 days after the arrests in Paraguay, three DST agents and an informant knocked on the door of an apartment in Paris where Ilich Ramírez, Carlos, was living, posing as a student living with his girlfriend. Carlos let them in, pulled out his weapon, and shot the agents, managing to escape after murdering the DST agents."

The version was corroborated by documents found in the Paraguay Archive after the fall of Stroessner, in a document from the head of that country's secret police (DIPC), Pastor Coronel.

Secret mission

The horror that shook the world on December 21, 1975, was received by Manuel Contreras as a true gift for his plans to extend the borders of Operation Condor. Ilich "Carlos" Ramírez Sánchez, leading a six-person commando—militants of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Baader-Meinhof Group—assaulted the headquarters of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna in a daring and successful action, taking 63 hostages, including ministers and delegates from the countries gathered there, after shooting and killing three security personnel.

The operation, financed by Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and conceived and executed by the PFLP under the direction of "Carlos," was a strong message against Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, OPEC members who not only appeared pro-Western but had also increased their crude oil production, threatening to collapse high prices.

It seemed like madness, but it made sense: the PFLP was precisely financed thanks to the support of several OPEC members.

The commando led by the Venezuelan gradually released its hostages, but not before issuing proclamations and obtaining a plane to flee.

Almost four months later, Manuel Contreras landed in complete secrecy in Tehran. His mission: to propose to the Shah of Iran the elimination of Ilich "Carlos" Ramírez Sánchez in exchange for a large sum of money.

It had been in his plans for months. From the very moment the Venezuelan's name emerged as a link between Latin American, European, and Palestinian leftist groups. Carlos was the trophy Contreras needed to consolidate Operation Condor beyond the borders of Latin America.

Killing Carlos was also a target for United States intelligence services, which had already identified him as the primary enemy among extremist groups. In his investigation into Operation Condor, journalist John Dinges found a secret US Senate report ("Activities of Certain Foreign Intelligence Agencies in the United States") that confirms the priority of that operation.

After describing Phase Three of Operation Condor, the aforementioned report notes: "Subsequently, Condor planned an operation aimed at assassinating three well-known European leftists, one of whom was the famous terrorist 'Carlos'."

En route to Tehran, Contreras made a stopover in what was then the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), where he arrived with a fake passport. It was there that he met with the German Gerhard Mertins, the former Nazi SS officer and arms dealer.

Mertins had a close link with the leader of Colonia Dignidad, Paul Schäfer, which allowed his meeting with Contreras to have one of the few public records. German journalist Gaby Weber, in a report published in the Uruguayan weekly Brecha in January 1988 ("Nazis in Chile: Colonia Dignidad and its Sadistic Boss"), recounts that the close relationship they maintained for years was consolidated when, after arriving in Germany, Contreras continued his trip "a few days later with his friend Mertins to Iran, where the Shah (Reza Pahlavi) still ruled." Weber does not give the date or the reason for their trip to Iran.

The companions

In Tehran, Pinochet had as ambassador the Carabineros General Arturo Yovane, who, despite having been part of the group of uniformed officers committed to the coup from the very beginning—in fact, he added the man who would be the head of Carabineros in the Military Junta, General César Mendoza—very soon aligned himself with the wing dissident to the Pinochet regime.

Appointed by the Military Junta as the dictatorship's first Minister of Mining, Yovane was abruptly stripped of his rank in 1974 and sent to the embassy in Iran. In November 1974, he inaugurated the new diplomatic headquarters in the Persian capital.

What Yovane found in Iran was a terror similar to that which prevailed in Chile. The regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi was living its final years before being overthrown by the Islamic Revolution of February 11, 1979, which would bring Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power.

At the time Contreras and Mertins arrived, the sovereign still ruled with an iron fist in a country where discontent and protests were increasing, both due to his distancing from Islamic codes and the regime's ostentatious celebrations, despite the prevailing poverty.

The uprisings would soon be brutally silenced by SAVAK, the Shah's political police, which turned his government into an icon of repression.

Contreras did not arrive in Tehran alone with Mertins. In addition to his German friend, he was accompanied by three men of his utmost confidence: Lieutenant Colonels Sergio Arredondo González, Vianel Valdivieso, and Major Alejandro Burgos de Beer.

The most important is Sergio Arredondo, one of the first instigators of the military coup within the ranks of the Army from the War Academy and with privileged contacts with United States intelligence services.

The Cavalry officer always knew how to maintain quotas of power without occupying the leading role: his pleasure was to manipulate the pieces from the back of the stage. The beginning of the dictatorship bears his mark.

On September 11, 1973, he was appointed Chief of Staff to General Sergio Arellano Stark, in charge of operations in Santiago, and was later his right-hand man in the fateful Caravan of Death.

When his compadre and friend Manuel Contreras later became the second most powerful man in Chile, Arredondo followed him in the shadows. He knew him well. Their friendship had been forged in the days when both were cadets at the Military School and Contreras had to fight against his shyness and awkwardness with women.

That complicity proved decisive for Contreras, as it was Arredondo himself who took him to Pinochet days after the coup so he could present his DINA plan, an idea welcomed by the last man to join the conspiracy.

Pinochet required help to impose his authority among coup plotters with solid and clandestine ties. Contreras would provide him with the main tool he lacked to establish himself as the new owner of power.

The second Chilean companion of Contreras was then-Major Vianel Valdivieso. He earned Contreras's absolute trust by forming a squad of women who, under different functions, including that of secretary and also "lady companion," informed him of all the details and comments circulating through official offices and the secret barracks of the DINA.

It was one of the sources that allowed Contreras to help Pinochet defiantly exclaim, "In Chile, not a single leaf moves without me knowing about it."

Major Alejandro Burgos de Beer completed the list of officers who accompanied Contreras to Tehran. He was his direct aide in the DINA high command. Thirty years later, he would have to testify before a judge about how he was a witness to the daily meetings his boss had with Pinochet every morning.

It was in those meetings that the life or death of many was decided, as well as who remained among the regime's chosen ones.

Traces in Tehran

Apart from the Chileans and the German, the list accompanying Contreras was completed, according to witnesses, by a Brazilian Army general who has not been identified to this day. Although there are clues that would allow for his identification, because almost everyone who arrived at the then-new Chilean embassy in Tehran left two types of traces: the photos that accompany this article, and the greetings and signatures they stamped in the diplomatic mission's guestbook.

A copy of this last record is preserved to this day. Contreras, for example, signed on April 15, 1976: "With deep gratitude for all the kindnesses received in your home. We wish you every kind of success and that you continue on the same current path. Manuel Contreras S., Colonel, Director of National Intelligence."

Below, and with the same date—but not with the same legibility—is a dedication written in German that alludes to Chilean-German ties, which would correspond to Mertins. Then, a very grateful Lieutenant Colonel Rolando Gálvez signs.

There were no officers by that name in the DINA high command, although there was a lawyer. Who is Gálvez? The key was provided by Manuel Contreras himself in the statement he gave on May 14, 1992, before Minister Adolfo Bañados.

That day, when Contreras had to admit that he had indeed formed DINA companies in Panama, he also said: "Rolando Galvez Baeza is the fictitious name of Vianel Valdivieso." He delivered it without hesitation, providing the clue to identify the man who stamped his greeting in Iran.

As for Burgos de Beer, he signed his stay—in which he wishes "prosperity" to the Yovane family—without any secret: "Major. DINA."

Always with the same date, there is another dedication: "Even though I am not Chilean by birth (sic), I have a heart that marches to the same rhythm as the Chile of today, that is, a lover of democracy, free and independent." The signature, barely legible, suggests a Carioca surname that could be "Safreire" or "Safiera." Immediately below it, two words are read, one of which is clearly "Merex."

Coincidence or not, "Merex" is the name of the company that the German Gerhard Mertins used as a base for arms trafficking, a business in which he became widely known and forged such powerful contacts that the few times his country's justice system cornered him, he was saved thanks to an ace he had up his sleeve: the acts for which he was accused had allegedly been committed on behalf of the German Federal Intelligence Service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND).

The fact was no coincidence. The BND counted in its origins on the participation of another former Nazi: the former Wehrmacht General Reinhard Gehlen, an old friend of Mertins. Gehlen had bought his freedom from the United States at the end of World War II in exchange for his files and knowledge of espionage against the Soviets, which led him to be the first head of the BND in the middle of the Cold War.

Contreras would reveal to the justice system, many years later, that his link with Mertins resulted in the German providing arms to the dictatorship and even helicopters to the Carabineros.

How much is "The Jackal" worth?

The photos capture a social gathering at the Chilean embassy headquarters in the days when the head of the DINA offered Shah Reza Pahlavi the ambitious deal of "producing" the elimination of one of the sovereign's main enemies: the terrorist most wanted at that time by intelligence services around the world, the Venezuelan Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, better known as "Carlos the Jackal."

The operation required a high figure in dollars in exchange and was recounted by Contreras himself to General Yovane. Perhaps, foreseeing that the ambassador, very well connected with the Shah's circles, would know about it anyway.

There is no testimony of what happened with Contreras's mission. What is known is that a little more than three years later, the Shah would be forced to leave power, go into exile, and finally died far from Iran in 1980. Carlos is still alive, but imprisoned for life in the French prison of Clairvaux.

Contreras did not obtain from the Shah the funds he required to continue with the international operations of Condor and the DINA. But he had other sources. In addition to direct allocations from the military regime, the DINA built a true holding company of businesses, the history of which will be detailed in the second part of this series.

THE FRENCH CONNECTION OF CONDOR

French journalist Marie Monique Robin, in an incredible and revealing investigation into Operation Condor (the documentary Death Squads: The French School, which she broadcast in September 2003 on France's Canal Plus and TV channels in a dozen countries), provides another piece of information on why France's security services were aware of Condor's steps.

In an interview with French General Paul Aussaresses, whose book Services Speciaux Algérie 1955/57 shook France in 2001 by describing in detail—and for the first time—the brutal torture and clandestine executions committed by French military personnel to stifle the battle for Algerian independence, he confessed that after the defeat in Algiers, he passed through the School of the Americas in the United States and then, and in an absolutely secret manner, arrived in Brazil to a position as an attaché at the French embassy in that country.

There, he installed an intelligence and training school in torture methods and prisoner management, which was attended by members of the services of the dictatorships coordinated in the Condor network.

Manuel Contreras and DINA agents were also there, as he himself affirmed to Marie Monique Robin.

Aussaresses never cut his tie with the French security service (DST). Even more so when the information that reached Condor was that Carlos had established a close link in Paris with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

A month after the report on the link between the terrorist Carlos and the PFLP and the Latin JCR, Manuel Contreras was received in Washington by CIA chief Vernon Walters. In his investigation, journalist John Dinges recounts the details of that meeting, which was held at the request of Pinochet himself on August 25, 1975.

Consulted by Dinges about the reason for that meeting with Walters, Contreras told him that he was bringing "information" to Washington to support his message that "we were in a subversive war against terrorism..." And he added: "I met with Vernon Walters. He met with Kissinger about the information I was carrying and about the type of support we needed to avoid this problem."

The truth is that Contreras did not travel directly to Santiago. From Washington, he went to Caracas, a city he arrived in on August 27. In the Venezuelan capital, he met with Rafael Rivas, head of the Venezuelan intelligence apparatus (DISIP), and Orlando García, another high-ranking official of the same agency. "The next day we had a meeting that we dedicated entirely to discussing the possibility of an exchange of services," Rivas later testified.

The head of the DISIP also stated that Contreras boasted of having great power and great resources at his disposal and that "he was building this magnificent plan to have an enormous and powerful service that would provide him with information from all over the world."

García, in an interview with Dinges, stated that Contreras presented them with a plan for an organization that would allow participating countries to track their leftist enemies in each of the other countries. "He came to ask for collaboration, that we unite our services in collaboration with the DINA." García noted that Contreras gave them a set of codes and keys for telex communications and "spoke of computers, which caught our attention because we used card indexes and cards." And he recalled that Contreras, along with inviting them with all expenses paid to a meeting in Santiago to plan the new system, said: "We have to eliminate the enemies."

Source: Ciper, August 6, 2009