“Barraza and associates. Law firm and private consultants,” is how the sign will read that the former commissioner of the Investigative Police, Jorge Arnoldo Barraza Riveros, alias “El Zambra,” will place in the office he claims he will open in Santiago once he finishes his work as a private investigator on the Matute case.

But that is not the only work he has carried out in recent times, because despite his persistent denial, various sources agree in pointing to him as the ‘shadow advisor’ to the UDI in the efforts deployed by that party to demonstrate that there is “a political setup” behind the accusations against two of its leading figures in the Spiniak case.

Barraza asserts that he does not know Cristián Espejo –“I haven’t even had a coffee with him”– the municipal official from Providencia who has been the public face of the gremialista team that has conducted the parallel investigation.

The name of Commissioner Barraza Riveros came to public light in March 1991 when General (R) Horacio Toro, then Director General of the Investigative Police, ordered him to investigate the homicide of the prefect of Concepción, Héctor Sarmiento, by a commando of the Movimiento Juvenil Lautaro.

Barraza was a sub-commissioner and served as head of the Investigative Brigade for Sexual Crimes in that city, but he managed in a few months to arrest the perpetrators of the crime and clarify another 14 homicides and 52 assaults that occurred in various parts of the country.

For some human rights lawyers, Barraza led a true “dirty war” against the MJL. Due to the success of his management, in November of that same year, Toro sent him to Santiago and put him in charge of the investigation of two police events of great public commotion: the assassination of Senator Jaime Guzmán and the kidnapping of Cristián Edwards del Río.

But the investigative line that Barraza took led him down a different path than the one that had been followed until then by the Homicide Brigade and the special group Lex, headed by the operational sub-director Juan Fieldhouse, which pointed to the habitual criminal Sergio Olea Gaona as the author of the crime.

Following the trail of a student from the Campus Oriente of the Universidad Católica, the place in front of which Guzmán was assassinated, who withdrew from the establishment the day after the crime, Barraza found the place where Edwards was being held captive.

On January 3, 1992, the Investigative Brigade of Criminal Organizations (BIOC) was created and Barraza was designated as its supreme chief in what was considered a recognition of his work. For Barraza’s detractors, at those moments Toro gave his ‘star policeman’ unlimited power that contributed to the BIOC becoming an autonomous body within the Investigative Police.

After the release of Edwards (on January 31, 1992), the kidnapping commando fell into custody shortly after. Among them was Ricardo Palma Salamanca, who turned out to be the author of the assassination of Senator Guzmán and several other crimes.

Political Earthquake In the summer of 1992, after Toro’s departure from the institution, following the leak of political espionage plans, Nelson Mery assumed command, who shortly after began to strip power from the BIOC until finally dissolving it.

In October 1994, Barraza was called to retirement. Two years later, the former commissioner delivered all the background information gathered to the press and produced a true political earthquake, the epicenter of which was the prosecution in the first instance of high-ranking government officials.

The then-deputy Andrés Aylwin released information indicating that after the 1973 military coup, Barraza was assigned to the intelligence services of the FACH and had a leading role in the repression against opponents of Pinochet.

Last year, from France, the former agent Andrés Valenzuela declared within the framework of the investigation being followed by Judge Juan Guzmán for the Calle Conferencia case, that Barraza participated in the torture sessions that were practiced at the Air War Academy (AGA).

As stated by Aylwin, the former commissioner was also declared a defendant by Judge Carlos Cerda, as an accomplice to illicit association, in the process followed against the Comando Conjunto. In addition, the former parliamentarian stated that Barraza received a commendation from the CNI for his participation in the confrontation that occurred in November 1980.

According to the Rettig Report, it was a “false confrontation” where two members of the MIR lost their lives. Barraza points out that he never belonged to the Comando Conjunto and that the declaration of defendant ordered by Cerda never materialized. He claims that he never participated in repressive tasks.

Source: La Nación, February 29, 2004

The former policeman Barraza was head of the Investigative Brigade for Sexual Crimes of Concepción, of the Investigative Brigade of Criminal Organizations, in addition to being accused of participating in the repression during the military dictatorship.

The former commissioner of the Investigative Police, Jorge Arnoldo Barraza Riveros, known as “El Zambra,” began to become known in March 1991 when the Director General of the Investigative Police at that time, Horacio Toro, gave him the mission to investigate the homicide of the prefect of Concepción, Héctor Sarmiento, by a commando of the Movimiento Juvenil Lautaro.

In this effort, Barraza managed to find the perpetrators and practically dismantle the Lautarista structure in the Eighth Region, which constitutes the first success of the Concertación Government in the anti-subversive struggle.

The objective proposed in this investigation was fully met, since not only were there no deaths, but also overwhelming evidence was obtained and 14 homicides and 52 assaults were clarified. That year, Barraza held the position of sub-commissioner and was designated as head of the Investigative Brigade for Sexual Crimes in the capital of the Biobío.

Given the scarce results of the police in clarifying the assassination of the senator and founder of the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) Jaime Guzmán and the kidnapping of the manager of El Mercurio, Cristián Edwards del Río, and taking into account Barraza’s achievements, Director Horacio Toro decided in 1991 to transfer him to Santiago.

Toro put Barraza in charge of a special group, which had resources from the Government’s reserved funds and which came to have nearly 80 officials. This group would transform, in 1992, into the Investigative Brigade of Criminal Organizations (BIOC) and Jorge Barraza would be designated as chief for his merits.

Thus, the former commissioner divided the work into two groups, one in charge of the kidnapping of Cristián Edwards and the other in charge of the assassination of Senator Guzmán. After Toro’s departure in 1992, Nelson Mery assumed the role of director of the institution, who dissolved the BIOC and in 1994 called Barraza to retirement.

His dark side Deputy Andrés Aylwin provided information referring to the fact that after the 1973 military coup, Barraza was assigned to the intelligence services of the Chilean Air Force and had a leading role in the repression against opponents of the military regime.

According to the same legislator, the former commissioner was also declared an accomplice to illicit association in the process followed against the Comando Conjunto. In addition, he stated that Barraza received commendations from the National Intelligence Center (CNI) for his participation in the confrontation that occurred in November 1980.

According to the Rettig Report, it was a “false confrontation” where two members of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR) lost their lives. Despite this, former commissioner Barraza has pointed out that he never belonged to the Comando Conjunto nor participated in repressive tasks, and that the declaration of defendant never materialized.

Now the former police official is carrying out private investigations, as is the case with the Matute case, and he is linked to the investigations requested by the UDI to face the Spiniak case. Soon, in Santiago, Barraza hopes to open an office for private consultants and a law firm.

Source: Cooperativa.cl, March 1, 2004

What the Valech Report does not say: The torturers: who they are and where they are

"I was raped, they applied electric shocks to me, they burned me with cigarettes, they gave me ‘hickeys’, they put rats on me. I think I was at Venda Sexy (a secret DINA facility); they tied me to a stretcher where trained dogs raped me.

I was always covered with scotch tape, then a blindfold, and then a hood. They would laugh, offer us food, and give us orange peels. They would wake us up at night to make us lose our sense of time." (Testimony of a 16-year-old girl, kidnapped in the Metropolitan Region, who was later expelled from the country without her family.)

The horror became a reality for all Chileans. Some will continue to say it is a lie, that the survivors "were paid to speak against the Armed Forces," or ultimately that "they deserved it." But the country has now learned the truth, and even a model-host wants to "know the names of the torturers." That is the idea of this special: to deliver a part of the truth that does not have to wait 50 years to be known.

That is one of the many criticisms made of the Report on Political Imprisonment and Torture presented by Ricardo Lagos on the night of Sunday, November 28, through a pre-recorded speech for the national broadcast aired before the news programs on television channels.

Alone, with no victims or family members to look in the eye, the President of the Republic fulfilled the ritual of informing his fellow citizens. There was no symbolic delivery of the text, no possibility of asking questions, no recognition of the motives that led so many men and women to torture their compatriots, no accurate criticism, no names of victims or perpetrators, and no background information was handed over to the Justice system, as had been done after the Rettig Report and even the Dialogue Table.

Reactions from hatred

Designated senators and former uniformed officers reacted by dismissing any participation in the crimes. Former Admiral Jorge Martínez Bush demanded a "final point" to end the "lies" against his institution.

The other former admiral, Jorge Arancibia, flatly denied the possibility of "decommissioning" the La Esmeralda, "which can only be decommissioned in combat," and threatened: "I cannot commit myself, nor can anyone else, to ensuring that something never happens again if I do not know what originates it." Many insisted on Hermógenes Pérez de Arce’s thesis regarding the baseless slanders against the uniformed officers and the "military government," repeated by retired generals and admirals.

Designated senator and former commander-in-chief of the FACH, Ramón Vega, supported his institution's official statement and added: "We are lamenting the consequences today and we are investigating them, but a plan for torture, at least I never heard of it, it was never analyzed, nor in the War Academy, nor in the Aviation School, nor in any training school was the word torture ever heard."

Senators Rodolfo Stange and Fernando Cordero, former general directors of the Carabineros, did not accept institutional responsibility for the torture and asserted that "there are no reasons for the uniformed police to ask for forgiveness."

Stange criticized the report on torture "because it borders on the unconstitutional, calling into question the institutions and not the individuals. I participated in the government junta, but I do not make a mea culpa because I do not feel responsible for any extreme situation as is being indicated in Bishop Valech's commission," he noted.

Cordero, for his part, said that one would have to "complete the third leg of the table, because at this moment the table is wobbly; a mea culpa must be made for what occurred before September 11, 1973, which was the cause of all the situations that occurred subsequently."

The current General Director, Alberto Cienfuegos, also appeared distant from the possibility of asking for forgiveness or assuming institutional responsibility, although he should answer about what his role was, starting March 25, 1974, when as a lieutenant he was appointed on a service commission to serve as Head of the Information Office of the National Executive Secretariat for Detainees, remembered by many people by its acronym: SENDET.

The UDI, National Renewal, and Lavín opted to downplay it, to appear in deep shock, even asserting that their participation in the dictatorship was, precisely, to prevent further abuses from being committed and to pave the way for democracy.

No one believed them. Sergio Fernández continued trying to dismiss his participation in human rights violations, but his cabinet colleague Mónica Madariaga asserted that in the clandestine torture centers, agents knew him as "the car’e jote." Soon he will have to begin continuous visits to the courts, along with Sergio Onofre Jarpa, Sergio Diez, Ambrosio Rodríguez, among so many others, to answer the many questions that arise regarding their responsibilities as civil authorities.

A new avalanche of lawsuits for torture, like those already filed by hundreds of former political prisoners, is announced following the delivery of the report. Fernández Fernández must answer, for example, for why he denied the existence of Villa Grimaldi to the Justice system, as demonstrated by the confidential official letter in which he responds on May 18, 1978, to the inquiry from the Third Major Criminal Court of Santiago.

Demands from organizations

The coalition of organizations of former political prisoners reacted in unison (see page 2), and the associations of victims' relatives joined the denunciation. The Communist Party announced new lawsuits and added that "the main reparation the country expected is the one related to it being proportional to the damage caused.

This implies truth and full justice for all victims. We demand that for the sake of those principles, the Report be made public in its entirety; that the names of the torturers be handed over to the courts of justice and all necessary judicial proceedings be initiated; that their files be declassified immediately and not in 50 years; that all those responsible for torture and abuse be immediately removed from the armed and police forces; that the military doctrine whose matrix is established by North American imperialism, and in which Chilean military and police cadres are and have been systematically instructed to repress their own people, be ended."

The issue of monetary reparation was not the center of the controversy, except for Ricardo Lagos's attempt to blackmail the tortured with the threat of having to take money from social programs to pay their compensation.

From CODEPU, another demand was made: "Just as new deadlines are going to be opened to reconsider the status of victims for people who did not qualify, we propose that because it is a crime against humanity, there cannot be an exclusionary deadline for qualification.

In this sense, the State must open a new deadline for new submissions from people who, for various reasons, did not attend the initial call, especially when the Report itself points out that the testimonies collected 'only represent a partial sample of the total universe of people affected by such human rights violations during the military regime'."

Thus, neither the mea culpa that some media outlets, such as Canal 13, attempted to make, nor the "astonishment" of some dictatorship officials like Jorge Hevia, have managed to remove the main issue from the center: torture took place in Chile.

Torture was systematic and organized, supported by the entire infrastructure of the State, which had become a terrorist entity; hundreds of men and women were trained to subject other men and women to the most terrible abuses.

The use of rats and dogs to sexually assault prisoners, electricity on the most delicate corners of their bodies, mock executions, food deprivation for long periods, and many other aberrations were committed against those they considered "enemies," "humanoids" in the words of one of the members of the Military Junta.

The other thing that has been clear is that the survivors have had the courage and dignity to recount what they suffered, to transform it into hope and the desire to continue insisting on the need to transform this country, to continue fighting to make the dreams of those who could not come to give their testimony a reality: the executed and the forcibly disappeared.

DINA: Pinochet's hand

"I always complied (...) in accordance with the orders that the President of the Republic gave me. Only he, as the Superior Authority of the DINA, could dispose of and order the missions to be executed, and always, in my capacity as Delegate of the President and Executive Director of the DINA, I strictly complied with what was ordered." (Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, director of the DINA).

In the proceedings against the DINA, looking at the list of the accused and convicted, it would seem that the only ones who made it up were a few commanders headed by its director Juan Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, alias "Mamo" and "Mojón." Pedro Octavio Espinoza Bravo, alias "Don Rodrigo"; Raúl Eduardo Iturriaga Neumann, alias "Don Elías" and "Luis Gutiérrez"; Miguel Krassnoff Martchenko, alias "caballo loco"; and the operatives Gerardo Godoy García, Basclay Zapata Reyes, and Osvaldo Romo Mena always appear.

But the torturers were many more.

Caupolicán Brigade

Major Marcelo Luis Manuel Moren Brito,

Head of the Caupolicán Brigade. Alias "coronta," "ronco," and "oso." Lieutenant Colonel Vianel Valdivieso Cervantes, alias "Víctor." Head of the Psychological Operations Department. He maintained contact with journalists who performed services for the DINA, such as Roberto Araya, Julio López Blanco, Claudio Sánchez, Pablo Honorato, Ricardo Coya, and Beatriz Undurraga, and the publicist Manfredo Mayol.

He retired in 1987 and settled in Temuco with a private company. Corvette Captain Sergio José Peñaloza Marusic, operative agent. Corvette Captain Alejandro Paulino Campos Rehbein, alias "Antolín." ID 3.704.573-K.

Operative agent. Later joined the Sub-directorate of Foreign Intelligence. Captain Francisco Maximiliano Ferrer Lima. Alias "Max Lenoux." Head of the clandestine torture center known as José Domingo Cañas, replacing Ciro Torré.

Partner of "Pedro Diet Lobos" and instructor at the National Intelligence School, teaching courses on "secret service and observation." He continued his work in the CNI and remained in active service, at least until the early 90s with the rank of colonel.

Lieutenant Fernando Eduardo Laureani Maturana, alias "Lieutenant Pablo." Agent of the Caupolicán Brigade and head of the Aguila group, known as "the guatones." Until the early 90s, he remained in active service, with the rank of colonel, as Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army Division in Concepción.

Carabineros Lieutenant Jaime Gustavo López Abarca, agent of Londres 38 and Cuatro Alamos. ID 1.822.793-2. Involved in the disappearance of María Cecilia Labrín Sazo. Carabineros Corporal Emilio Hernán Troncoso Vivallos.

ID 4.236.940-3. Involved in the disappearances of Juan Bautista and Washington Maturana Pérez, Mario Juica Vega, Gabriel Castillo, and Daniel Palma Robledo. Carabineros Corporal Heriberto del Carmen Acevedo Acevedo.

Army Lieutenant Jorge Claudio Andrade Gómez, ID 5.293.833-3. In the first days of the coup, he participated in the massacre at the Panguipulli logging complex. He acted under the direct command of Krassnoff at the Terranova barracks (Villa Grimaldi).

In August 1979, already in the CNI, he participated in the application of the torture that caused the death of teacher Federico Alvarez Santibáñez. In 1991, he was a major in the Metropolitan General Garrison and a member of the DINE.

Carabineros Corporal José Aravena Ruiz, alias "muñeca del diablo" and "cucharita"; the latter nickname was given to him by prisoners because he used to hit their knuckles with a spoon after torture. He was funado (publicly exposed) in December 1999 at his home at Alfonso Leng 5569-0, in the Villa Santa Elena de Macul, a site he abandoned shortly after.

Army Conscript Samuel Enrique Fuenzalida Devia, alias "gato." Emilio Iribarren Ledermann, alias "Joel." Went from being a MIR militant to a DINA agent. Leonardo Alberto Schneider Jordán, alias "Barba." Went from being a MIR militant to an agent, first of the Joint Command and then of the DINA.

These days he is being prosecuted in several cases of torture and disappearances. Carabineros Captain Egladio Salgado Torres, agent assigned to the Belgrano General Headquarters, but also with operative functions in kidnappings and torture at Villa Grimaldi.

In 1980, he returned to his institution, joining the DICAR. He retired with the rank of colonel. Sergio Bernardino Ortega Parada, alias "gil culiao." Corvette Captain Sergio José Peñaloza Marusic. ID 4.782.486-9.

DINA operative agent until its dissolution. Carabineros Corporal José Avelino Yévenes Vergara, alias "Quico" or "Daniel Cáceres." Member of the Halcón II group, with duties as a torturer at Londres 38, José Domingo Cañas, and Villa Grimaldi. At the end of the DINA, he moved to the CNI and then to the DINE. He was funado at his home on Calle B 5266, Villa San Luis de Macul, Peñalolén commune.

Purén Brigade

Army Captain Alfonso Faúndez Norambuena,

Head of the Purén Brigade. ID 5.454.077-1. On September 11, he was serving at the San Bernardo Infantry School, participating in the executions and disappearances in Paine and Cerro Chena. He continued his work in the CNI.

After the end of the dictatorship, he settled in Talca, where he has a company that provides forage and grain to the Army. Army Colonel Manuel Andrés Carevic Cubillos, alias "Raúl" and "Claudio." Second in command of the Purén Brigade.

He continued his work in the CNI and, in 1989, was appointed Head of the Plaza in the district of La Pintana, Puente Alto, Pirque, and San José de Maipú. Until the early 90s, he was part of the DINE with the rank of colonel.

Carabineros Major Eduardo Víctor Espinoza Paiella. ID 3.662.969-K. Agent of the Economy Department. He retired along with Manuel Contreras. Carabineros Captain Germán Jorge Barriga Muñoz, alias "Don Jaime." ID 5.060.938-3.

Member of the Purén Brigade and later of the CNI. With the rank of colonel, Barriga performed duties in 1991 at the National Mobilization Directorate. He was funado at his home at Irarrázaval 2061, apartment 105, a place he abandoned hurriedly.

Today he is the head of security for the Lider supermarkets. Lieutenant Manuel Abraham Vásquez Chahuán, alias "Lieutenant Manuel." ID 5.090.309-K. Responsible for the disappearances and executions in Paine and Cerro Chena.

He continued in the CNI and in 1989 was appointed commander of the Logistics Battalion of Concepción. Army Corporal Basclay Humberto Zapata Reyes, alias "el troglo." Known for being very cruel in torture and raping detained women.

Prosecuted for multiple cases of disappearance, executions, and torture. Until the early 90s, he remained as an instructor at the "Daniel Rebolledo" Non-Commissioned Officers School and with operative duties in the DINE.

Carabineros Officer Gerardo Urrich González, alias "mano negra." Instructor at Tejas Verdes. Responsible for a series of executions in the sector known as Barrancas, today mostly the Pudahuel commune. He was funado at his office of "Servicios de Seguridad Alcázar," located at Ahumada 236, office 408.

Army Lieutenant Manuel Jorge Provis Carrasco. As a member of the San Bernardo Infantry School, he participated in the crimes of Paine and Cerro Chena. He continued in repressive tasks and was commander of the CNI barracks on Calle Borgoño, participating in Operation Albania.

At the end of 1989, he returned from a professional trip he made to Israel. Until 1991, he was a lieutenant colonel in the Army Intelligence Brigade. Army Lieutenant Marco Antonio Sáez Saavedra. ID 5.795.624-0.

Specialist in the repression of the Communist Party and Socialist Party. In 1991, he was a lieutenant colonel and performed his duties in the Army Operations Directorate. Brother-in-law of CNI major Joaquín Molina, murdered by Manuel Contreras Valdebenito.

Army Lieutenant Manuel Rolando Mosqueira Jarpa. Detective Manuel Gregorio Chirinos Ramírez. Detective Jorge Lander Cabezas. Detective Francisco Aladino Caamaño Díaz. Detective Arturo Patricio Vargas Cid. Investigations Inspector Juan Saldías Valdés, alias "Harry el sucio." Investigations Inspector Risiere del Prado Altes España, alias "Pedro."

Other commanders and agents

Army Lieutenant Colonel Jerónimo Luzberto Pantoja Hernández, Sub-director of the DINA and the CNI. ID 2.095.044-7. Responsible for the Chihuío massacre as vice-commander of the Maturana Regiment of Valdivia.

In 1990, he was arrested for his participation in the illegal financial firm known as "La Cutufa." Army Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Elissalde Muller, Head of the Economy Department. ID 3.118.465-7. As head of the Personnel Sub-directorate, he paid the agents' salaries through the front companies "Villar y Reyes" and "Elissalde y Poblete." At least until the late 90s, he lived on one of his extensive properties in the southern part of the country.

Major Carlos Rafael Parera Silva, Alias "Luis Gutiérrez," ID 3.090.193-2. Head of the Foreign Department (successor to Iturriaga Neumann). In 1973, he was Second Commander of the Black Berets in Peldehue.

When the DINA was dissolved, he rejoined the Army and was assigned as Commander of the Dolores Regiment, Director of the Paratrooper and Special Forces School, and in 1985, military attaché in France. During the government of Patricio Aylwin, he was Military Attaché at the Chilean embassy in South Africa.

Andrés Terrise Castro. Agent of the Psychological Operations Department, where he performed functions of covering up crimes and preparing propaganda campaigns. He continued in the CNI and the DINE as a civil agent.

Today he appears as a businessman for a publicity firm based in the Ciudad Empresarial of Huechuraba. Major Rolf Gonzalo Wenderoth Pozo, head of Villa Grimaldi. ID 3.870.222-K. He was the boss and lover of Luz Arce.

In 1985, he was a military attaché in the Federal Republic of Germany, retiring in 1987 to go south, where many high-ranking DINA officials have extensive areas of land. Major Julio Cerda Carrasco, Head of Security of the Central Barracks (Belgrano).

Responsible for disappearances and executions in Cerro Chena. He retired in December 2002 as Commander-in-Chief of the IV Army Division. Army Captain Eugenio Armando Videla Valdebenito, operative agent.

ID 4.209.466-8. Participated in the Tejas Verdes courses before belonging to the DINA. He was director of the Tejas Verdes Engineer School and governor of San Antonio. In active service until the early 90s, he came to be part of the Army General Staff.

Army Lieutenant Juan Viterbo Chiminelli Fullerton, ID 3.704.546-2. Foreign Department agent. In 1973, he served in the aviation command and was one of the pilots who accompanied General Arellano Stark to the south and north of the country in the "Caravan of Death." In 1974, he became part of the DINA.

Funado at his home on Avenida El Bosque Norte and his work at the mining company Kvaerner-Chile, of Dutch origin. Lieutenant Ricardo Víctor Lawrence Mires, 5.392.869-2, Head of the Halcón 1 Brigade. Alias "cachete grande." Prosecuted for numerous cases of kidnapping, executions, and torture, including the disappearance of María Cecilia Labrín Sazo, who was in an advanced state of pregnancy.

He was funado at Tabancura 1382, his workplace at the shrimp distributor "Kamaron Bay," where he uses the alias "Ricardo Flores" in his contact with owners of numerous restaurants in Santiago. Carabineros Lieutenant Emilio Patricio Sajuria Alvear, partner of the front company Pedro Diet Lobos.

ID 5.122.525-2. Funado at Telefónica, where he worked in its Legal Department. Today he practices as a lawyer for tourism companies. Carabineros Second Lieutenant Gerardo Ernesto Godoy García, Head of the Tucán Support Group and Head of Venda Sexy.

Alias "cachete chico." Until March 1991, with the rank of major, he was head of the Ancud police station. After that date, he was transferred to Santiago. Today he is convicted for the kidnapping of Miguel Angel Sandoval, having to be transferred to Punta Peuco II, although he is still seen around his house in La Reina.

Carabineros Officer Gerardo Alejandro Aravena Longa, operative agent. ID 4.567.685-4. Involved in the execution of five political prisoners in Cuesta Barriga and in the disappearance of José Guillermo Barrera.

When the DINA ended, he moved to the CNI and in 1985 returned to the Carabineros, retiring as a commander. Today he is the General Manager of Radio Santiago. Army Officer Mario Alejandro Jara Seguel. ID 3.319.824-8.

Head of the DINA barracks in the IV Region, based in Coquimbo. At another time, he was in command of the brigade that operated in Rocas de Santo Domingo. Personal friend of Manuel Contreras. He acquired a plot of land between Coquimbo and La Serena where he would live with his ex-secretary, named Nancy.

Joint Command Terrorism from the FACH

The so-called Joint Command (CC) was an intelligence group that operated approximately between the end of 1975 and 1976, and whose main objective was the repression of the so-called Central Force of the MIR, and the central committees of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth.

During this period, according to the Rettig Report, it was responsible for the disappearance of about 30 people. Other sources speak of more than 70.

The CC was formed mainly by agents belonging to the Air Force Intelligence Directorate (DIFA) and later with significant participation from personnel of the Carabineros Intelligence Directorate (DICAR).

It also had, to a lesser extent, the participation of agents from the Naval Intelligence Service (SIN) and some personnel from the Army Intelligence Directorate (DINE). In addition, members of the Chilean Investigative Police and civilians from the extreme right-wing group Patria y Libertad collaborated in that Command.

The beginnings at the AGA

Witnesses who survived the torture at the Air War Academy remember as their torturers, among others, Generals Orlando Gutiérrez Bravo and Juan Soler Manfredini; commanders Sergio Lizasoaín Mitrano, Edgar Cevallos Jones, Jaime Lavín Fariña, Carlos Godoy Avendaño, Juan Bautista González, Ramón Cáceres Jorquera, and Humberto Velásquez Estay; the FACH colonel and doctor Humberto Berg Fontecilla; colonels Sergio Sanhueza López and Javier Lopetegui Torres; captains León Duffey Treskoff (who reached the rank of general within the FACH), Alberto Waschtendorf, Juan Carlos Sandoval, Alvaro Gutiérrez (currently residing in Melipilla), Jaime Lemus, Víctor Mattig Guzmán, Florencio Dublé, Contreras, and Hernán Fucshlogher (permanent guard chief); the lawyer Julio Tapia Falk (mastermind of the war council and main advisor to General Leigh. Appointed rector at the U. de Chile, lawyer for Manuel Contreras when he tried to take refuge in the Talcahuano Naval Hospital and, lately, a plaintiff against the play "Arturo Prat." He works in his private law firm in the Providencia commune, on Calle Santa Magdalena), legal advisors Cristián Rodríguez, Jaime Cruzat Corvera (who has his office right on Paseo Huérfanos), and Víctor Barahona; lieutenants Juan Carlos Sandoval, Luis Campos, José García Huidobro, Franklin Bello, and Gonzalo Pérez Canto; Sergeant Hugo "chuncho" Lizana, Non-Commissioned Officer Juan Normabuena, Corporal Eduardo Cartagena, and 2nd Corporal Gabriel Cortés (who changed his name).

The most sinister

Sergio Manuel Barra Von Kretschmann

(ID 1.614.559-9), head of the Naval Intelligence Service in the Intelligence Community (José Antonio Ríos 6). Frigate captain at the time of the coup d'état, part of the DINA leadership in 1974 and sub-director in 1975.

In 1976, he became part of the CNI. He was prosecuted as an accomplice to the criminal illicit association and the kidnapping of Edrás Pinto and Reinalda Pereira by Judge Cerda. Freddy Enrique Ruiz Bunger, FACH general (ret.).

Head of the DIFA at J.A.R. 6. Prosecuted as the perpetrator of the criminal illicit association and accomplice to the kidnapping of Edrás Pinto and Reinalda Pereira, for the kidnapping of Víctor Vega and the disappearance and death of Juan Luis Rivera Matus.

Also for the crime of qualified kidnapping of Víctor Vega, David Urrutia, Juan Carlos Orellana, Ricardo Weibel, Alonso Gahona Chávez, and Miguel Rodríguez Gallardo, and the illegal detention of survivors Isabel Stange, Jaime Estay, and Amanda Velasco.

Mario H. Vivero Avila, FACH general (ret.), Aviation judge and commander of the Santiago garrison in 1976. Prosecuted as a cover-up for the illicit association and the disappearance of Víctor Vega. Edgar Benjamín Cevallos Jones, FACH colonel (ret.).

Director of the DIFA and later of the SIFA, torturer at the Air War Academy and boss of Roberto Fuentes Morrison in the CC. Alias "Inspector Cabezas." ID 2.895.236-8. Prosecuted as the perpetrator of the criminal illicit association and accomplice to the kidnapping of Edrás Pinto and Reinalda Pereira, and for the disappearance of Luis Baeza Cruces and the murder of Alfonso Carreño Diaz in 1974.

Carlos Arturo Madrid Hayden, FACH commander (ret.). Vice-commander of the Colina Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment where the "Remo Cero" torture center operated. Prosecuted as the perpetrator of criminal illicit association, the kidnapping of Víctor Vega and Juan Luis Rivera Matus.

Daniel Luis Enrique Guimpert Corvalán, Navy lieutenant (ret.) (ID 4.638.149-1). Prosecuted as the perpetrator of the criminal illicit association and accomplice to the kidnapping of Edrás Pinto, Reinalda Pereira, and Víctor Vega.

Eduardo Enrique Cartagena Maldonado, alias "Lalo." ID 5.083.760. FACH non-commissioned officer (ret.). CC agent since 1975, participating in kidnappings, torture, and disappearances of numerous communist leaders between that year and 1976.

After the dissolution of this organization, he joined the Air Force Intelligence Service (SIFA). His last known address is Del Rey 394, Maipú, where he was denounced by the FUNA Commission. It is most likely that he is living in the central coastal area.

Miguel Arturo Estay Reyno, alias "El Fanta." ID 6.446.545-7. Former communist militant, went from being an informant to an agent after being detained in 1975 by members of the Joint Command. Prosecuted by Judge Cerda and amnestied by Silva Ibáñez, today he is serving a life sentence in Colina for the murder of the three communist professionals and is being prosecuted for the disappearance of Víctor Vega.

César Luis Palma Ramírez, alias "El Fifo." ID 6.387.372-1. As a militant of Patria y Libertad, he participated in numerous terrorist attacks against the UP government; he was detained in August 1973 for his participation in the homicide of presidential aide Arturo Araya, amnestied after the coup d'état by Admiral Adolfo Waulbaum.

A friend of Fuentes Morrison, who brought him to the CC, he became his right-hand man in the execution of repressive tasks. His last known address is El Quilo 5535, Quinta Normal, where the cooling equipment factory FRIGOMET LTDA. operates, where they claim not to know him; however, his phone-fax 7738010 continues to be in the name of Palma Ramírez.

Leonardo Alberto Schneider Jordán, alias "El Barba." ID 5.521.250-3. Former MIR militant, agent. Accused by numerous survivors of having participated in their detention and torture at the Air War Academy.

Later he would join the brigade dedicated to repressing the MIR in the DINA. Prosecuted for torture and permanent kidnapping in at least two Santiago courts. His last known address is Las Hualtatas 4966, phone 2633546, Vitacura.

Roberto Alfonso Flores Cisterna, alias "El Huaso." ID 7.767.975-8. FACH soldier (ret.). On September 11, 1973, as a FACH soldier at the El Bosque Air Base, he participated in interrogations and torture of detainees.

In 1975, he became part of the CC, being responsible for the kidnapping, torture, and disappearance of dozens of communist militants. Until the mid-90s, he remained in active service in the SIFA; today he appears to be working in the trade sector.

His last known address is Villa Tantauco, Block 10282, apt. 31, San Bernardo. Otto Silvio Trujillo Miranda, civil agent, alias "Colmillo Blanco" in a La Nación report. ID 5.684.434-1. DC militant in his youth, later joined Patria y Libertad where he met "Wally," who would take him to the CC.

He participated in the kidnapping, torture, and disappearance of dozens of leftist militants until his expulsion due to the incident with the DINA. After a long stay in the Penitentiary Hospital, he has been seen circulating in the La Florida commune.

Guillermo Antonio Urra Carrasco, alias "Willy." ID 6.687.227-0. FACH second corporal (ret.). Operative agent of the CC since its formalization in 1975. He was prosecuted by Judge Carlos Cerda for his participation in the kidnapping, torture, and disappearance of dozens of leftist militants.

According to direct witnesses, he is responsible for the execution of prisoners in the Cajón del Maipo (among them José Weibel and agents Carol Flores and Guillermo Bratti), in Cuesta Barriga (among others Horacio Cepeda, Fernando Ortiz, and Reinalda Pereira), and in the throwing of others into the sea off the coast of Quinteros.

His last known address is Santa Blanca 1990, Las Condes. Fernando Patricio Zúñiga Canales, Alias "Chirola." ID 5.974.807-6. FACH non-commissioned officer (ret.). As a soldier at the El Bosque Air Base, on September 11, 1973, he participated in the torture of his comrades-in-arms.

He was then transferred to the Air War Academy to perform the same functions and from there became part of the DIFA. In 1975, he joined the CC, in which he participated in the kidnapping, torture, and disappearance of dozens of leftist militants.

He belonged to the FACH Intelligence Service (SIFA) at least until the early 90s. His last known address is Pasaje Simón Bolívar 1298, San Bernardo. Jorge Rodrigo Cobos Manríquez, FACH reserve lieutenant, from Patria y Libertad.

Alias "Kiko" or "Elefantito" (ID 5.890.505-4). Prosecuted as the perpetrator of criminal illicit association and accomplice to the kidnapping of Edrás Pinto, Reinalda Pereira, and Víctor Vega. Jorge Arnoldo Barraza Riveros, Investigative Police commissioner (ret.).

Alias "El Zambra." Prosecuted as an accomplice to the criminal illicit association. Pedro Ernesto Caamaño Medina, FACH non-commissioned officer (ret.). Alias "Peter" (ID 7.024.319-9). Operative agent at the "La Firma" torture center.

Prosecuted by Judge Carlos Hazbún for the kidnapping of Víctor Vega. He participated in the kidnapping of José Weibel and dozens of militants of the Communist Youth. His last known address is José Miguel Carrera 424, apartment 702, Santiago Centro, a place where he was denounced to his neighbors by the FUNA Commission.

Alejandro Fígari Verdugo, alias Luty, from Patria y Libertad, second in command of the detention team, after "Fifo" Palma (according to Otto Trujillo). ID 6.693.227-3. Alex Damián Carrasco Olivos, FACH official, escort for Leigh, Fernando Matthei, and Ramón Vega.

Alias "Loco Alex" (ID 6.243.426-7). Operative agent of the Joint Command. Juan Arturo Chávez Sandoval, FACH corporal (ret.). Alias "Peque," "Rucio," or "Pol." ID 6.476.141-2. Torturer at the AGA and CC operative.

Prosecuted for the kidnapping of Víctor Vega. Raúl Horacio González Fernández, FACH official (ret.). Alias "Rodrigo" or "Wally Chico." ID 6.519.815-0. Witnesses state that he participated in the detention of José Weibel. Funado in Puerto Montt, in October 2002, in front of the Volcanes radio taxi company located on Calle Doctor Marín 459, phones 313131 and 313989, from which he offered service.

to the newspapers El Mercurio and El Llanquihue, and to the local Coca-Cola subsidiary. Prosecuted as an accomplice to the illegal detention of Amanda Velasco Pedersen in the 25th Criminal Court. Antonio Benedicto Quiros Reyes, ID 3.189.349-6.

Colonel (ret.) of the FACH and head of the Counterintelligence Department during the years of the CC. Prosecuted by Carlos Cerda as the author of criminal illicit association. Andrés Pablo Potin Lailhacar, civilian agent of the CC.

Alias "Yerko". ID 5.390.709-1. Militant of Patria y Libertad detained in August 1973 for his participation in the homicide of presidential aide Arturo Araya. Prosecuted by Judge Hazbún as a participant in the kidnapping of Víctor Vega.

Listed as a businessman in the computer sector with an office at Américo Vespucio Norte 2506. Robinson Alfonso Suazo Jaque, soldier (ret.) of the FACH. Alias "Jonathan". ID 7.641.894-2. Torturer at the AGA.

Prosecuted in the 25th Criminal Court for the kidnapping and disappearance of Víctor Vega. Pedro Juan Zambrano Uribe, FACH official. Alias "Chino". ID 6.969.320-2. Prosecuted by Minister Hazbún as the author of the kidnapping of Víctor Vega.

Franklin Bello Calderón, lieutenant (ret.) of the FACH, prosecuted in the Ninth Criminal Court of Santiago for the disappearance of Luis Baeza Cruces and the murder of Alfonso Carreño Diaz in 1974. Other torturers of the Comando Conjunto Miguel Angel Perucca López, FACH reservist.

Víctor Misael Robles Mella, officer (ret.) of the FACH. Luis Eduardo Rojas Campillay, FACH official. Patricio Eugenio Saavedra Rojas, commander (ret.) of the FACH. Ramón Eduardo Valenzuela Cuevas, 5.934.129-4.

Alberto Roque Badilla Grillo, ID 5.164.080-2. Tito Alejandro Figarí Verdugo, ID 6.693.227-3. Angel Gabriel Valdivia Pérez, ID 3.277.893-3. Lénin Figueroa Sánchez, ID 4.633.329-2. Enrique Augusto Werner Haase, 4.086.322-2.

Santiago Segundo San Martín Riquelme, ID 4.530.448-5. Angel Segundo Valdivia Pérez, ID 3.996.083-4. José Florentino Fuentes Castro, ID 5.340.552-5. Francisco Hidalgo García, 2.633.797-6. Francisco Segundo Illanes Miranda, ID 4.294.918-3. Ernesto Arturo Lobos Gálvez, ID 5.082.345-8. Jorge Aníbal Osses Novoa, ID 4.818.025-6.

Source: elsiglo, December 10, 2004

Arrest warrant against Jorge Barraza

The minister of the Temuco Court of Appeals, Fernando Carreño, ordered the arrest of Jorge Barraza, the former detective known for his participation as an investigator in the kidnapping case of Cristián Edwards and the homicide of UDI senator Jaime Guzmán, among others, as well as for his complaints against the former director of the institution, Nelson Mery, in 1996.

The magistrate's decision is part of a case -docket 113.051- that he is investigating for the crime of torture committed in the mid-80s against José Ponce Martínez and other people at the barracks of the defunct National Intelligence Center (CNI) at Miraflores 724 in the same city.

These facilities, where the CUT currently operates, were inspected a little over a year ago by Carreño, who confirmed the victims' accounts. Carreño verified that Barraza belonged to the CNI at the time the crime occurred, as well as that he participated in torture sessions.

For this reason, the minister took his statement last year, when the summary had not yet provided details that incriminated him. However, two weeks ago, when he summoned him to confront him with other agents, he resorted to the addresses that Barraza himself had left to be located.

The minister's surprise was great when the detectives informed him that they were all false. Carreño then ordered him to be arrested to appear before the court, since he would be prosecuted in the coming weeks and that final step was missing.

Barraza has never been charged in any criminal case. It is known that he belonged to the Comando Conjunto and the CNI, but this is the first time that his arrest has been ordered by a court in cases linked to human rights violations.

Nicknamed "El Zambra," Barraza jumped into the public eye in March 1991. The then-director of Investigations, General (ret.) Horacio Toro, ordered him to investigate the homicide of the Concepción prefect Héctor Sarmiento by a commando of the Movimiento Juvenil Lautaro.

During those years, Barraza served as a sub-commissioner in the Investigative Brigade of Sexual Crimes. In a few months, he cleared the case and 14 other homicides and assaults by the MJL. That same year, when the news of the moment was the homicide of UDI senator Jaime Guzmán and the kidnapping of Cristián Edwards, Toro called him again and put him in charge of these cases.

In 1994, he was called to retirement when he was head of the BIOC, a unit created especially to investigate the aforementioned cases. Later, in 1996, while already out of the civil police, Barraza sent information to the justice system that, in his opinion, involved the government's public security office of the time in a possible cover-up of the authors of the Guzmán homicide.

However, his accusations could never be proven.

Source: La Nación, May 2, 2006

Jorge Barraza is transferred to Temuco

Today, the former commissioner Jorge Barraza, arrested on Saturday in Santiago by order of a judge investigating human rights violations committed in that area, will be placed at the disposal of the courts of the IX Region.

Agents of the Investigative Brigade of Special Affairs and Human Rights arrested the former policeman on Saturday by virtue of an order from the minister of the Temuco Court of Appeals, Fernando Carreño, who had unsuccessfully summoned him on three occasions to testify as an accused.

Barraza must testify as an accused, after which the judge could keep him in preventive detention until deciding whether to prosecute him. The magistrate is investigating a case (docket 113.051) for the crime of torture committed in the mid-1980s against José Ponce Martínez and other people at the barracks that the defunct National Intelligence Center (CNI) maintained at Miraflores Street No. 724, in the regional capital.

These facilities, where the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT) currently operates, were inspected a little over a year ago by Minister Carreño, confirming the victims' versions. In the case, Carreño verified that Barraza was part of the ranks of the CNI during the time the illegitimate coercion occurred.

Likewise, he confirmed that he participated personally in torture sessions. For this reason, the judge took his statement as a witness last year, when the summary had not yet provided details that incriminated him.

Commissioner Jorge Barraza became publicly known in March 1991, when the director of Investigations at that time, General (ret.) Horacio Toro, ordered him to investigate the homicide of the Concepción prefect Héctor Sarmiento, who was shot down by a commando of the Movimiento Juvenil Lautaro (MJL).

During those years, Barraza served as a sub-commissioner in the Investigative Brigade of Sexual Crimes. In a few months, he cleared the case and 14 other homicides and assaults by the MJL. That same year, when the news of the moment was the homicide of UDI senator Jaime Guzmán and the kidnapping of Cristián Edwards, Toro called him again and put him in charge of the Investigative Brigade of Criminal Organizations.

In 1994, he was called to retirement by Nelson Mery, who had taken command of the police institution. While already out of the civil police, in 1996, Barraza sent information to the justice system that, in his opinion, involved the government's Public Security Office of the time with a possible cover-up of the authors of the Guzmán homicide. However, his accusations could never be proven.

Source: La Nación, May 29, 2006

The secret history of the kidnapping of Cristián Edwards (III): The capture

The police and political guerrilla that broke out to find the whereabouts of Cristián Edwards and then to capture his kidnappers had several unprecedented episodes. Testimonies from Frentistas and police officers who participated in the operation, in addition to unknown intelligence reports, allow for the reconstruction of the three threads that led to the identification of the authors and the main role of "La Oficina" and its star informant, never mentioned in this case until today.

A story that shows the Carabineros, behind the back of La Moneda, advising the owner of El Mercurio, detectives driving Agustín Edwards crazy by accusing him of having his son hidden in his house in Lo Curro, and the BIOC agents of Investigations arriving at the doors of the house where they were holding the former executive of The New York Times captive.

The announcement that the owner and director of El Mercurio received at the beginning of November 1991 at his house in Lo Curro was imperative. Two agents of the Investigative Police demanded to communicate in person a message from their director, General (ret.) Horacio Toro, about "the appearance of his son." Two months had passed since the kidnapping of Cristián, and Agustín Edwards Eastman prepared for the worst.

He thought they had found his son's body. This was confirmed in his judicial statements, which are unprecedented until now: -I went to receive them outside the house, at the entrance door, because I did not want my wife to hear any tragedy (...).

I asked them what there was about Cristián's appearance, in what way he had appeared, and where they knew this news from. They told me they knew it from the director of Investigations. When I asked them again about the appearance, one of them said to me, pointing with his finger toward my house: "He appeared here." I told him I did not understand.

He insisted again that Cristián was in my house. Upon hearing this, I lost my composure and asked them if they perhaps believed that I had Cristián hidden in my house, to which they replied yes. There I lost my composure and treated them very harshly.

In Agustín Edwards' version, the Minister of the Interior, Enrique Krauss, had promised him that he would put "the best of his men" on the case. And if the best of Investigations had confused Cristián with one of his brothers, forging the reckless thesis of "self-kidnapping," the family decided from then on to trust only the Carabineros.

What happened that day at the Edwards del Río house is one of the most embarrassing episodes in the history of the Investigative Police and marked a milestone in the true police guerrilla -and with the La Moneda Public Security Council team ("La Oficina") in the middle- that took place quietly around the search for Cristián Edwards and the capture of those responsible for his kidnapping.

From the testimonies of police and former Frentistas, contrasted with the statements and documents contained in the judicial file, details emerge that are unknown until today about that guerrilla and the investigations.

Young undercover police officers, data provided by an informant located in the heart of the FPMR, the desertion of one of Edwards' guards whose identity had never been mentioned, unpublished intelligence reports, telephone interceptions, and even the analysis of the trash from the holding house.

And in the background, the police and political rivalries that prevented a coordinated investigation and allowed a large part of the commando to "fly" after the payment of the one-million-dollar ransom.

There are three threads that allowed the kidnapping to be cleared up. The first was the tracking that Investigations did on a university student that led to the holding house. Another was the information provided by the informant Lenin Guardia that the young Ricardo Palma Salamanca was involved.

And the third, the information provided by the Frentista Agdalín Valenzuela, an informant for "La Oficina," whose "tips" allowed for the identification of one of those involved and the keeping of a chronological record of the internal troubles that the kidnappers starred in.

The secret of the Carabineros On September 11, 1991, two days after the kidnapping of Cristián Edwards, his father read the message that the captors had left him at the offices of the regional newspapers of El Mercurio.

They asked him to "negotiate his life" and not alert the authorities. A few hours later, Agustín Edwards spoke with Minister Krauss. The Carabineros were also informed. Agustín Edwards expressed a preference from the beginning for the work of the Carabineros, which would later be reaffirmed by the shameful error of Investigations.

The uniformed police were aware of the kidnapping from the very first minute, even before La Moneda. And in the following weeks, the officers of that institution in charge of the investigations would hide their game from the occupants of the Palace.

On that same day, the 11th, Lieutenant Oscar Olmedo, of the Vitacura precinct, was summoned to the El Mercurio building by the company's head of security, Jorge Zamora, who informed him of the disappearance of the owner's son.

In an unusual deference, the officer accompanied Zamora to tour the morgue and hospitals in search of news. At the end of the fruitless tour, Olmedo met with several authorities in the newspaper's offices and had to report directly to Agustín Edwards in his office.

Starting that same week, a "crisis committee" was established that met on Friday afternoons at the Edwards residence. The owner of the house and his advisors, the former Minister of the Interior under Pinochet, the Air Force General (ret.) Enrique Montero, and Juan Pablo Illanes, responsible director of the morning newspaper, would attend permanently; the secretary of "La Oficina" and current deputy (PS), Marcelo Schilling; the head of intelligence of the Carabineros, General Sergio Lutjens, and the prefect of Investigations, Juan Fieldhouse.

The coordination table was only part of the mechanism set in motion to find the whereabouts of Cristián Edwards. Because the Carabineros worked directly with Agustín Edwards without notifying La Moneda.

Although General (ret.) Lutjens told CIPER that the uniformed police only performed minor tasks because the Ministry of the Interior paralyzed the investigations that could expose the hostage's life, the truth is that he received privileged information from the family.

Precisely that was what happened when the exchange of messages between the Edwards and the FPMR began: the Carabineros were alerted, but did not pass the information on to the government. Marcelo Schilling confirmed the bilateral relationship between Edwards and the Carabineros in his judicial statement on February 13, 1992.

On that occasion, he pointed out that it was only at the beginning of December 1991 that the government learned that the family had been negotiating with the kidnappers for two months, that the Carabineros knew it, and that Agustín Edwards himself intervened before La Moneda so that the officers who handled that information would not be punished.

The Carabinera Domitila del Carmen Sepúlveda was 26 years old at the time and worked in Intelligence. Before the court, she confirmed that, hiding her status as a police officer, she made contact with a subject who communicated with the family.

That happened on November 6, a month before the government found out that the Carabineros were handling information. -Colonel (Sergio) Ávila entrusted me with the mission, which consisted of appearing dressed in white at the El Mercurio company, where he would be waiting for me (...).

He told me that I should take an envelope to an individual (...) He told me that that man would give me an envelope (...). I had to indicate to him that I was coming on behalf of Max. The meeting would take place at the Pila del Ganso station.

The envelope I received, I gave to Colonel Ávila –declared the female police officer. The deployment of the Carabineros was useless. Finally, the successful proceedings would be reserved for Investigations and "La Oficina." "La Pequeña Lulú" Marcela Mardones stopped attending the UC Oriente Campus only a couple of weeks before the assassination of UDI senator Jaime Guzmán, perpetrated at that university campus on April 1, 1991.

Although the members of the Lex Group of Investigations worked for months reconstructing the puzzle of that attack, they did not give importance to the fact. Both the Lex Group and "La Oficina" had been obsessed with following the trail of a common criminal -Sergio Olea Gaona- that in the end would lead nowhere.

On November 15, 1991, after the monumental confusion that tarnished Investigations, its director brought sub-commissioner Jorge Barraza from Concepción and entrusted him with two tasks: to clear up the kidnapping of Edwards and the assassination of Guzmán.

Barraza arrived preceded by the prestige of having solved the crime of an Investigations officer at the hands of the Mapu Lautaro. Horacio Toro was nervous. The Lex Group showed few and uncertain advances and was running out of credit in La Moneda after the error that fueled Agustín Edwards' anger.

He played his cards on Barraza and put him in charge of the Investigative Brigade of Criminal Organizations (BIOC), an ad hoc team for the task. Barraza had experience in harassing subversive groups. He had worked in the CNI.

He says that there he only investigated subversive assaults, but he has been prosecuted for illegitimate coercion, although the higher courts have not convicted him. The BIOC checked the attendance of the students of the Oriente Campus.

That is how the name of Marcela Mardones appeared. The agents identified her as "La Pequeña Lulú," a former leader of the Communist Youth of the Pedagógico, married and mother of a child, who within the organization used the alias "Ximena." Barraza told CIPER that "Ximena's" husband told them that they were separated, that he had not seen her precisely since before the attack on Guzmán, and that she had left the child with him with the promise of returning for him in a few weeks.

But almost eight months had passed and she did not appear. Barraza's agents confirmed that "Ximena" was now living with Raúl Escobar Poblete, a militant of the FPMR known as "Emilio." Both rented a small apartment inside a house on Huara Street, in La Florida.

A young police officer settled in the main dwelling, pretending to be the niece of the owners. From there, she began the "wiretaps" and guided the exterior surveillance, which included a point with binoculars from the roof of an Ekono supermarket a couple of blocks away. "Emilio" was followed.

Sometimes he met with a tall and burly subject whom the police identified as "Rodolfo." The latter was also followed, leading the agents to a small house in a narrow, dead-end alley in Macul. Although they were after Guzmán's assassins, so much activity by the cell they had in their sights led the BIOC to suspect that the group was also participating in the kidnapping.

But the house to which "Rodolfo" led them in Macul, located at Poeta Vicente Huidobro 3718-1, was narrow, semi-detached, and had no driveway. It seemed impossible to the police that Cristián Edwards could be there.

How could they bring in and take out a captive without arousing suspicion among the neighbors? Besides, a married couple with an adolescent son lived there. It was difficult for the FPMR to include in the secret a kid who went to school every day.

The tracking of "Emilio" and "Ximena" led the police to another house, this time in La Dehesa. Since this residence was large and was in an affluent neighborhood, Barraza became convinced that they had him there captive to Edwards and was dismissing the reports from his subordinate René Cocq, who insisted that the analysis of the trash from the Macul house indicated that it was inhabited by more people than just two adults and an adolescent.

Detective Cocq was right. Because the small semi-detached property on Pasaje Poeta Vicente Huidobro was the holding house provided by the married couple Rafael Escorza and María Cristina San Juan. And the employee who went out to do the shopping and whom they called “Gabriela” was Maritza Jara, an FPMR militant in charge of checking the surroundings.

Conflict with “La Oficina”

Barraza assured CIPER that the BIOC initially did not give much credence to a piece of information that the Undersecretary of the Interior, Belisario Velasco, had received weeks earlier. The informant Lenin Guardia had told Velasco that a young man named Ricardo Palma Salamanca might be involved in the kidnapping of Cristián Edwards.

Palma’s sister had allegedly confessed to her psychologist her suspicion that the boy was involved in something strange related to the FPMR. The psychologist turned out to be Lenin Guardia’s wife. Undersecretary Velasco had passed the information to “La Oficina,” which, it seems, did not make use of it either.

By then, the investigations were already contaminated by the conflict taking place in La Moneda. Velasco considered that the fight against subversion was a task he should lead, since his undersecretariat was responsible for public security.

But, after the death of Jaime Guzmán, President Aylwin had created “La Oficina,” entrusting its leadership to Jorge Burgos and Marcelo Schilling. The bridges between Velasco and “La Oficina” were burned. Each had its own network of informants, and essential data did not flow in either direction. Toro, and therefore the BIOC, aligned themselves with Velasco.

In the first three weeks of Cristián Edwards’ kidnapping, the police were advancing blindly. There were no clues as to who was holding him. It was “La Oficina” that scored the first success: it confirmed that it was an FPMR operation and identified one of those involved.

An informant for “La Oficina,” designated “F 1,” had provided the data: an FPMR group under the orders of commander “Ramiro” —who would later be identified as Mauricio Hernández Norambuena— was holding Edwards. This is what Schilling declared to the court:

-We knew it was a kidnapping because of the information we received in the first days of October 1991 (from “F1”), regarding the existence of an alleged defector from the kidnapping. He called himself “Julio”; he was a member of the Front who had escaped from the Public Jail in 1989 and his real name is Florencio Velásquez Negrete, as stated in the photocopy of a personal file that I am making available to the court at this moment.

Until now, Velásquez’s name had not been associated with the kidnapping. The file contained not only the record of Florencio Velásquez (“Floro” or “Julio”), but also that of the then-unknown “Salvador,” the supreme leader of the Front, although the identity attributed to him was inaccurate: Juan de Dios Apablaza Apablaza. In reality, it is Galvarino Apablaza Guerra.

The “F1” reports

“F 1” was the FPMR militant Agdalín Valenzuela. A high-level informant. He had been one of the two drivers of the truck that transported the kidnapped Colonel Carlos Carreño to Brazil in 1987. He was also the personal driver for “Ramiro” and had his full trust, to the point that at times the informant would hide him in his house in Curanilahue.

Until now, it was unknown that Valenzuela had provided key data to identify the perpetrators of the Edwards kidnapping. A report from “La Oficina” attached to the judicial file corroborates this:

Investigation of Florencio Velásquez Negrete.

Data from F1

He escaped from prison. He describes him as approximately 30 years old, dark-skinned, more or less “mapuche-looking,” mapuche build, he is short, coarse face, stocky chest. He has a peculiarity: one of his shoulders droops.

In a camp where they were together in '86 when they were throwing grenades, his right shoulder would droop and he would put it back in place himself (...). He indicates that this man was part of the protection group at the house where CE (Cristián Edwards) is being held. JULIO was dismissed in a meeting held in the same house where CE is.

The defection of “Floro”

Valenzuela’s reports indicate that, during the kidnapping, commander “Ramiro” maintained contact with another Front leader: “Chele,” later identified as Juan Gutiérrez Fischman. This is evident from the document “Consolidated Informative Chronology of Information Supply on the CE Case,” included in the judicial summary. These are some paragraphs from that report:

9/26/91 F1 reports that the Front has CE in its power. He indicates that he received this information from Cmdr. Ramiro. He indicates that this commander is acting directly in the operation. He reports that a defection has occurred in the operational team on the part of Julio.

12/19/91 F1 reports that he met with commanders Ramiro and Chele. He reports that CE is alive and the Front definitely has him.

12/23/91 F1 reports that CE’s family is negotiating with the Front. He indicates that they have asked for a reduction in a figure requested by the Front and that the Front will accept the reduction in future negotiations. He indicates that the negotiation will culminate in mid-January with the release of CE.

Rafael Escorza, the militant who provided his home for Edwards’ confinement, confirmed to CIPER that “Floro” left his post as a guard and caused a crisis in the holding house. Florencio Velásquez was taken from the place with his eyes covered, wearing dark glasses and looking at the ground, so that he would not identify the site if he were arrested.

Like the kidnapped man and another of the guards, he had arrived at the house without being able to identify its coordinates.

After abandoning the mission, “Floro” was supposed to hole up in a safe house, but his companions lost track of him. A report from “La Oficina” recorded the event and the concern it caused in the FPMR: “On 12/19/91, it is reported that Julio is away and that commander Ramiro reported that he has not been able to find him.”

Former members of the FPMR still consider “Floro” a defector and believe he may have played a role in the subsequent fall of the command that carried out the kidnapping, having become an informant or having shared data, without knowing it, with a source from “La Oficina.”

The return of “El Negro”

The information provided by the star informant of “La Oficina” was not passed on to the BIOC. That lack of coordination produced the absurdity that, during the surveillance deployed during the kidnapping, the BIOC photographed “Ramiro” without suspecting the caliber of the man whose steps they were following. “La Oficina,” at the same time, did not know that Barraza had identified the house where Edwards was being held captive.

Despite the lack of coordination, the BIOC entered the final stretch with an advantage over “La Oficina.” Barraza asserts that every time “Ximena” or “Emilio” went to the public telephones at the Ekono near their house on Calle Huara, the conversations were recorded.

Through that channel, “Ximena” contacted a man with a youthful voice whom she scolded harshly and with whom she arranged a meeting. The agents checked the phone. It was the mother of Ricardo Palma Salamanca. Thus, Lenin Guardia’s information was confirmed.

Ricardo Palma, “El Negro,” was 22 years old. Partnering with “Emilio,” he had shot and killed Guzmán and the retired Carabineros Colonel Luis Fontaine. Palma participated in the “capture” of Edwards, but in the operation, he accidentally shot himself in the leg. He required medical attention and could not occupy the guard post he was assigned to.

Once recovered, “El Negro” entered the holding house but did not finish the mission. He was a hyperactive boy and the confinement caused him problems that led him to abandon his post. That is why “Ximena” scolded him. But since he was also an experienced guy, they called him back. They needed him for the final stitch: to collect and release Edwards.

Party on Calle Huara

On January 31, 1992, Agustín Edwards paid the ransom. This time the members of “La Oficina” were informed. According to Schilling’s statement, Agustín Edwards sought his opinion one day before the delivery of the million dollars in hundred-dollar bills was carried out.

Influenced by his advisor and kidnapping expert, the British-Cuban Hugh Bicheno, the owner of El Mercurio harbored doubts about making the delivery on the day proposed by the kidnappers. A week earlier, the Edwards’ mediator, the Jesuit Renato Poblete, had made a long journey through the city without having managed to deliver the money.

Finally, Schilling’s opinion prevailed: to follow “the kidnappers’ instructions rigorously.”

Arguing security reasons to protect the life of Cristián Edwards, “La Oficina” did not alert the BIOC to the delivery of the money. Barraza’s men saw how, on that January 31, Rodriguistas left all the houses under surveillance and contacts multiplied.

The sub-commissioner told CIPER that the movement was such that those in charge of the surveillance began to run into and get in each other’s way. Fearing that the FPMR would detect them, he ordered them to withdraw and concentrated on watching the houses.

For this reason, the BIOC did not know that the ransom was paid on that last day of January. But its members sensed that something big had happened, because that same night the young undercover policewoman installed in the house on Calle Huara reported a party, with dancing and drinks. Barraza asserts that “Ramiro” and “Chele” were at the celebration.

Retreat in Colliguay

The day after the payment, “Emilio” and “Ximena” headed to the coast. They were followed by sub-commissioner Roberto Ruiz in his private car. But abruptly, the engine of Ruiz’s car seized, and the sub-commissioner lost their trail. “Emilio” and “Ximena,” like “Ramiro,” would not return to the points monitored by the police.

According to Barraza, the BIOC only had one card left: the house on Pasaje Poeta Vicente Huidobro in Macul. And they decided not to raid it so as not to put Cristián Edwards’ life at risk. On the night of February 1, the van that Escorza used to trade eggs parked in front of the entrance.

It was obvious they were going to load something. The agent responsible for the surveillance had Barraza on top of him, who demanded that he not miss a detail of what was happening and of the movements of the only suspects they still had under surveillance.

The pressure was such that the policeman decided to send his wife, who was pregnant, to look closer. The woman entered the passage and asked for a midwife who supposedly lived in the neighborhood. Upon returning, she reported: false alarm, they were only taking out a rolled-up rug.

Hours later, Toro called Barraza. He told him that Cristián Edwards was already at his parents’ house. He had been released. Barraza still believes they took him out rolled in the rug and that, probably, he entered in the same way in September.

But Cristián Edwards himself claimed to have been taken out of the house in a sleeping bag. The truth is that after the release, the command had fled and the sub-commissioner only had the married couple who owned the house at hand. A meager haul for so much time and resources invested.

A month later, the BIOC detected the Front members at a campsite in Colliguay, in the Fifth Region. There were “Ramiro,” “El Negro,” “Rodolfo,” “Emilio,” “Ximena,” “Gabriela,” and the guard José Miguel Martínez Alvarado (“Palito”).

They filmed them. Barraza would later say that he was sure that the supreme leader, “Salvador,” would arrive and that is why he delayed the arrests. He will also say that commander “Chele” was in Colliguay.

He will accuse “La Oficina” of protecting “Chele” because he was the son-in-law of the Cuban leader Raúl Castro and that, suspiciously, another police team prowled the campsite in a strange anti-narcotics operation, which alerted the FPMR group and made their escape possible. His denunciations are the axis of the book he wrote in 1999 with his former subordinates Ruiz and Cocq: Razón de Estado.

In the stampede, the BIOC could only arrest “Gabriela” and “Palito” when they were trying to cross into Argentina. Rafael Escorza and María Cristina San Juan were arrested in their house, where there were still traces of the cell-box.

The hunt was completed by “El Negro,” who made the incredible mistake of returning to his home before trying to leave the country. “Ramiro” was arrested the following year, in 1993, when he visited “F1” in Curanilahue.

The informant, although he was captured along with the most wanted FPMR commander, was released almost immediately. That would have sealed his fate: Agdalín Valenzuela was shot to death in 1995.

Of all those arrested, only Escorza served his sentence: in 2003 he obtained the benefit of Sunday release. María Cristina San Juan was released in 2000 for humanitarian reasons due to a serious illness. “Gabriela” escaped in December 1992. “Palito” was killed while attempting an escape in October of that same year. “Ramiro” and “El Negro” fled by helicopter from the High Security Prison in 1996, but the former was captured again in Brazil in 2002 for another kidnapping and is being held in a São Paulo prison. “Ximena,” “Emilio,” “Floro,” “Rodolfo,” and “El Negro” remain fugitives.

Source: CIPER October 20, 2009

Chile: Former PDI commissioner and CNI agent Jorge Barraza Riveros dies.

Barraza Riveros was prosecuted for homicide committed during the dictatorship.

The former policeman was close to the UDI and recognized for his work in the dismantling of the Movimiento Juvenil Lautaro and in the clarification of the homicide of former senator Jaime Guzmán. On the night of Monday [October 8, 2018], at the Carabineros Hospital, Jorge Barraza Riveros passed away, a former CNI agent prosecuted last August by Minister Mariela Cifuentes for his participation as an author in the homicide of the couple formed by Sergio Flores and María Verónica Cienfuegos.

As noted by La Tercera, Cristián Espejo, lawyer for El Zambra – as Barraza was known – indicated that he suffered from cancer and had a long-standing heart problem, and that his death is associated with a pacemaker failure.

It should be remembered that in the case of the murder of Flores and Cienfuegos, the preventive detention of Barraza was originally ordered, and he was subsequently released on bail. Barraza was also declared a defendant by Judge Carlos Cerda, as an accomplice to illicit association in the process followed against the feared Comando Conjunto.

Along with this, Barraza is known for leading —in his capacity as commissioner of the Investigative Police— what human rights organizations have described as the “dirty war” against the Movimiento Juvenil Lautaro in the first years of the Concertación governments.

The former policeman was close to the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) because he was key in the investigation of the death of the former Gremialista senator Jaime Guzmán. In addition, he was pointed out as the “shadow advisor” of that group in the framework of the so-called Spiniak Case, specifically in the tasks to demonstrate that the accusations against recognized faces of that party were part of an alleged political setup.

October 10, 2018.

Source: elciudadano.cl, October 12, 2018

Santiago Court sentences 23 former CNI agents for murders in a fake confrontation in 1983

The Santiago Court of Appeals confirmed the first-instance sentence issued by Minister Miguel Vásquez Plaza on July 19, 2019, which sentenced 23 former agents of the Central Nacional de Informaciones (CNI) for their responsibility in the crimes of qualified homicide of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) militants Hugo Ratier Noguera and Alejandro Salgado Troquián.

The crimes were perpetrated on September 7, 1983, in a fake confrontation on Calle Janequeo in the Quinta Normal commune.

In the ruling (case file 4741-2019), the Third Chamber of the appellate court —composed of ministers Verónica Sabaj Escudero, Alejandro Aguilar Brevis, and Rodrigo Carvajal Schnettler— resolved to reject the appeals and cassation motions filed by some of the convicted and to confirm the first-instance sentence with the declaration of reducing from 20 to 17 years in prison the sentences applied to the former Army officers and former CNI leaders Roberto Urbano Schmied Zanzi, Álvaro Julio Federico Corbalán Castilla, and Aquiles Mauricio González Cortés, as co-authors of the crime.

The first of the convicted, Schmied Zanzi, served as head of the CNI Metropolitan Division; Corbalán Castilla was head of the Anti-Subversive Division, and Aquiles González acted as head of the Blue Brigade, specialized in the repression of the MIR.

Meanwhile, the former Army officers Sergio María Canals Baldwin, Luis Arturo Sanhueza Ros, Fernando Rafael Mauricio Rojas Tapia, Norman Antonio Jeldes Aguilar, and the former agents José Abel Aravena Ruiz, José Guillermo Salas Fuentes, Egon Antonio Barra Barra, Jorge Octavio Vargas Bories, Manuel Ángel Morales Acevedo, and José Isaías Vidal Veloso must serve 15 years and one day in prison, as authors of the crimes.

For their part, the former agents Rodolfo Enrique Olguín González, Ema Verónica Ceballos Núñez, Luis Hernán Gálvez Navarro, Rosa Humilde Ramos Hernández, Francisco Javier Orellana Seguel, Miguel Fernando Gajardo Quijada, Juan Carlos Vergara Gutiérrez, Raúl Boris Méndez Santos, Raúl Hernán Escobar Díaz, and Rafael Ricardo Ortega Gutiérrez were sentenced to 10 years and one day in prison, as accomplices to the crimes.

In the case, the acquittal of agents Zinaida Lena Vicencio González, Jorge Raimundo Ahumada Molina, and Eduardo Martín Chávez Baeza was decreed, as their participation in this event was not proven. Another person prosecuted in this case, the former PDI officer Jorge Arnaldo Barraza Riveros, died during the course of the process; meanwhile, the prosecuted former Carabineros officer Miguel Ángel Patricio Soto Duarte remains a fugitive.

This fake confrontation was carried out by the CNI on the same day and immediately following the execution of three other MIR militants on Calle Fuenteovejuna, in a criminal act also orchestrated as a fake confrontation. Judicially, both events are processed as separate episodes, in circumstances where it was a single repressive operation.

In the investigation of the repressive act, it was demonstrated that the dictatorship’s repressive agency developed a tracking and surveillance operation during the months prior on a group of MIR members who were acting in clandestinity in the resistance struggle against the tyrannical regime.

With the data obtained from that prior observation, the CNI orchestrated the extermination operation that meant the detention of a dozen people, the attack and murder of the three residents of the house on Calle Fuenteovejuna, in the Las Condes commune, and then the attack and murder of two other militants in the house on Calle Janequeo in the Quinta Normal commune.

On September 7, 1983, dozens of CNI, SIFA, Investigative Police, and other repressive agency agents went to the address located at Calle Janequeo No. 5707, Quinta Normal commune, which had been under surveillance for a few weeks, proceeding to surround and cordon off the place, and then, through the use of a base of fire and other weaponry, to shoot without any provocation and with great firepower against the property, as a result of which Hugo Ratier Noguera, 39 years old, died from various gunshot wounds in the backyard of the house.

In addition, upon arriving at the same address where he resided, Alejandro Salgado Troquián, 30 years old, was gunned down by multiple gunshot wounds and executed on the public thoroughfare, that is, on Calle Janequeo in front of number 5946.

A minor, the adopted son of Salgado and a resident of the house along with Salgado and Ratier, was a victim and witness to the events but in the middle of the shooting managed to flee to neighboring houses, thus saving his life and later denouncing the criminal attack.

Source: resumen.cl, November 18, 2021